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ABSTRACT 
JIHAD IN A CONTEXT OF SHIFTING ALLIANCES AND ENMITIES: A 
STUDY ON THE RELATIONS OF THE EARLY ARTUKIDS AND CRUSADERS 
AS REFLECTED IN CONTEMPORARY MUSLIM AND CHRISTIAN 
HISTORIOGRAPHY, 1098-1124 
 
Tezcan, Selim 
Ph.D., Department of History 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Paul Latimer 
December 2013 
 
This thesis is a study of the relations of the early Artukids with the Crusaders, 
with the aim of seeing how they fit into the general context of the reaction of the 
Muslim world to the Frankish presence in the Middle East. On the one hand, it re-
veals that emirs like Ilghazi played a kind of diplomatic chess game and allied with 
whoever was necessary to preserve their possessions and interests, without regard for 
their religion. On the other hand, it argues that the Artukids may stil have seen their 
warfare as jihad whenever they happened to clash with the Franks for these strictly 
practical and strategic aims. It aims to historicise the jihad concept within the early 
twelfth century, inquiring what jihad might have meant for the early Artukids and 
other contemporary emirs, and compare this with the approach of later leaders like 
Nur al-Din and Saladin. Finally, the study examines what advantages and disad-
vantages were brought to the Artukids by their contiguity with the Franks, by their 
conflicts with them on their own behalf as well as by their collaborations. The meth-
od followed throughout is to compare the close-readings of related pieces of source 
text, rather than solely individual pieces of evidence, and in doing so always to con-
sider the standpoint of the source or even the group of sources from which the exam-
ined text issues. An approximate reconstruction of the course of events is then al-
lowed to emerge from such a procedure of close-reading and comparison. 
 
Keywords: Artukids, Crusaders, Crusader States, jihad, medieval historiography, 
Mardin, Aleppo 
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ÖZET 
 DEĞİŞKEN İTTİFAKLAR VE DÜŞMANLIKLAR ORTAMINDA CİHAD: 
DÖNEMİN MÜSLÜMAN VE HRISTİYAN TARİHYAZIMINA AKSETTİĞİ 
ŞEKLİYLE İLK ARTUKLULAR VE HAÇLILAR ARASINDAKİ İLİŞKİLER, 
1098-1124  
 
 
Tezcan, Selim 
Doktora, Tarih Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Paul Latimer 
Aralık 2013 
 
  Bu tez, ilk Artuklular’ın Haçlılar ile ilişkilerinin bir incelemesi niteliğini taşı-
makta ve bu ilişkilerin Ortadoğu’daki Haçlı varlığına karşı İslam dünyasının göster-
diği tepki çerçevesine nasıl yerleştirilebileceği konusuna ışık tutmayı hedeflemekte-
dir. Bir yandan, İlgazi gibi emirlerin bir nevi diplomatik satranç oyunu oynadıklarını 
ve varlıkları ve menfaatlerini korumak için dinine bakmaksızın kim lazımsa onunla 
ittifak kurduklarını ortaya koymaktadır. Diğer yandan ise Artuklular’ın bu tamamen 
pratik ve stratejik amaçlar doğrultusunda Haçlılar’la çatıştıkları zaman bunu yine de 
cihad olarak görmüş olabileceklerini savunmaktadır. On ikinci yüzyılın başlarındaki 
cihad kavramını tarihselleştirme hedefini gütmekte, cihadın ilk Artuklular ve çağdaş-
ları diğer emirler için ne anlama gelmiş olabileceğini araştırmakta ve de bunu Nu-
reddin Mahmud ve Salahaddin Eyyubi gibi sonraki liderlerin yaklaşımıyla karşılaş-
tırmaktadır. Nihayet, Artuklular’ın Haçlılar ile komşuluklarının, onlarla kendi adları-
na girdikleri çatışma ve ittifakların kendilerine ne gibi avantaj ve dezavantajları ge-
tirdiği konusuna eğilmektedir. Tüm çalışma boyunca izlenen metot, salt muhtelif 
kaynaklardan toplanan tekil bulguların karşılaştırılmasından ziyade birbiriyle alakalı 
kaynak metinlerin yakından okumalarının karşılaştırması ve incelenen metnin çıktığı 
kaynağın, hatta kaynaklar grubunun bakış ve duruş noktasının bu esnada her daim 
hesaba katılmasıdır. Olayların gidişatının yaklaşık bir yeniden kurgusu da bu yakın-
dan okuma ve karşılaştırma sürecini takiben ortaya çıkmaktadır. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Artuklular, Haçlılar, Haçlı Devletleri, cihad, Ortaçağ tarihyazımı, 
Mardin, Halep 
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 1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and arguments 
This thesis is a study of the relations of the Artukids with the Crusader states, 
with the aim of seeing how they fit into the general context of the reaction of the 
Muslim world to the Frankish presence in the Middle East. It should be emphasized 
right from the outset that when discussing this one should beware of reading the po-
litical history of the region backwards from 1187, as the story of a gradually unfold-
ing conflict between a Muslim block of states, on the way towards unification and 
bent on the expulsion of the “infidels,” and a Christian block opposing it, first on the 
offensive, then on the defensive. Challenging this teleological, confrontational para-
digm, Michael Köhler has demonstrated convincingly that in the Middle East at the 
time of the Crusades there were no such monolithic Muslim and Christian blocks fac-
ing each other: there was rather a system of shifting alliances between rival polities 
of both religions, a system in which the decision whom to ally with was not dictated 
by the religion of the other side but by strategic considerations about one’s survival, 
economic well-being and chances of expansion at any specific political conjuncture.
1
  
                                                 
1
 Michael Köhler, Allianzen und Verträge zwischen fränkischen und islamischen Herrschern im Vor-
deren Orient. Eine Studie über das zwischenstaatliche Zusammenleben vom 12. bis ins 13. Jahrhun-
 2 
As far as the Muslim side is concerned, notwithstanding the jihad ideology 
which admittedly influenced homines religiosi and part of the population, and which 
could exert some pressure in exceptional, limited periods like the late 1180s, Muslim 
rulers usually acted on the lines of realpolitik. They viewed their own situations not 
according to the outlook of the homines religiosi and those influenced by them, but 
more similarly to rulers of today, hard pressed by many considerations other than 
eradicating the “infidel.” The preservation of the integrity of their domains, their in-
dependence and power, as well as ensuring the succession of their heirs, were only 
the foremost of these motives that obliged them to play a political kind of chess, 
whether they wanted to or not, and whether the allies they had to make against those 
who emerged as a threat in these considerations turned out to be Muslim or Christian. 
Under such conditions it was very difficult for jihad to remain a determining factor in 
the policies they were compelled to follow.  
In this context the present study argues that the Artukids were no exception to 
this situation, as far as their relations with the Frankish states are concerned, and that 
their policy towards these states is in fact a particularly good illustration of it. They 
were expelled from their iqta‘ Jerusalem by the Fatimids because of the turmoil cre-
ated in the north by the siege and fall of Antioch. Then the Artukid Sokman and his 
nephew Belek as well as other relatives carved out a new existence for themselves in 
Diyar Bakr, but here they became direct neighbors of the Franks who had recently 
taken hold of Edessa, Tell Bashir and other places. The Artukids were expelled by 
the Franks from Samosata and Saruj, but nevertheless, delivered a severe blow to the 
initial Frankish expansion when, together with the lord of Mosul, they defeated the 
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Franks of Antioch and Edessa who had set out to take Harran and isolate Syria from 
the Muslim East.  
After this though, a fifteen-year period began in which the Artukids rarely 
confronted their new neighbors directly, and more often than not remained neutral or 
even allied with them against other Muslim powers. What they saw as the greatest 
threat toward their domains in this period was not the Franks but the Great Seljukids. 
In the period of interregnum following the deaths of Malikshah and Nizam al-Mulk, 
the local lords in their western territories had taken advantage of the situation to 
build up a de facto independence, even though they were still nominally subject to 
the sultan. When the new sultan Muhammad Tapar had consolidated his position he 
dispatched six consecutive armies to bring them back under control as well as to sub-
jugate the Franks. Ilghazi, who had acquired Mardin after being expelled by Mu-
hammad from the post of the shihna of Baghdad, was the quickest to realize this aim 
of these expeditions, and refrained from taking part in person after the first one. In 
the final two campaigns he went further, defeating an army of the sultan and then al-
lying with the Franks against another. In this he was not alone, and almost all the lo-
cal emirs in the former western territories of the Seljukid state assumed the same pol-
icy. Preserving their independence and possessions was more important for them 
than the religion of whom they allied with.      
But this did not mean that the Artukids’ alliance with the Franks was perma-
nent either. If a Seljukid hegemony was unacceptable, so was a Frankish one, and 
after the crushing defeat of the last army from Mosul had put an end to the series of 
Seljukid expeditions, the local emirs found themselves faced alone with the Franks. 
Ilghazi in Mardin was not the first to feel the effects of this development, and even 
continued his amiable relations with Roger of Antioch. But the Franks were not slow 
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in filling the power gap left by the Seljukid absence, and began to work towards en-
circling Aleppo from all sides. Ilghazi was among those summoned to Aleppo to stop 
this process, and taking over the city, he inflicted the greatest check on the Franks 
since the First Crusade through his victory at Ager Sanguinis.  
Aleppo is especially important in this context, and another argument of the 
present study is that the efforts of Ilghazi and his successor Belek were chiefly di-
rected at the aim of breaking the Frankish encirclement of Aleppo, especially by 
pushing back the borderline with the Principality of Antioch that extended from Azaz 
in the north through al-Atharib and Zardana to Jabal Summaq, so that the hilly natu-
ral barrier of Jabal Talat would stand between the city and the Principality. For they 
were aware that the fall of Aleppo to the Franks would lead to a major reshuffling of 
the cards in the Middle East and tilt the power balance of the region in the Franks’ 
favor, so much so that after they had averted the danger of a Seljukid hegemony, they 
would find themselves face to face with a Frankish hegemony. While the two 
Artukid emirs treated Aleppo as a remote dependency, therefore, they did their best 
to break the encirclement around the city and ensure that the Franks would not take 
it. This is important insofar as it demonstrates that they were not bent on waging ji-
had per se against the Franks, using this city as a base to expel them from Antioch or 
elsewhere; they had precisely defined strategic aims. It can be said then that this 
study also attempts to evaluate the Artukids’ performance by what they themselves 
were trying to do, rather than by what they should have been doing according to the 
teleological paradigm mentioned at the beginning, and to respond to those scholars 
who have criticized them from that perspective.   
There were of course differences between the tactics followed by individual 
Artukid emirs, and another aim of the present study is to shed light on the various 
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methods they adopted to push back the borderline. Ilghazi concentrated most of his 
attacks on al-Atharib and Zardana, immediately to the west of Aleppo, variously try-
ing to take, defend or recover them, but Belek focused on the northern and southern 
ends of this frontier, Azaz and Jabal Summaq, largely because of a new fortification 
that the Franks had built nearby. Timurtash wanted to recover the entire borderline, 
but instead of war resorted to negotiation with the king of Jerusalem previously cap-
tured by Belek. While he tried to dispossess the Franks, however, he also attempted 
to return to the former Artukid policy of allying with them against other Muslim rul-
ers, in this case against those led by Dubais ibn Sadaqa. Not surprisingly, Timurtash 
failed in this far too optimistic policy and when the Franks and Muslims attacked 
Aleppo in collaboration, found himself unable to rescue it with his own means, aban-
doning it to its fate. The city was taken over by Aksungur al-Bursuki, the lord of Mo-
sul, and eventually by his successor, Zangi.  
After this point the direct relations of the Artukids with the Franks continued 
in the Jazira (Northern Mesopotamia), where they were neighbors with the Franks of 
Edessa. As in the 1110s, however, they did not confront them militarily, being faced 
with a greater threat from the Muslim side, posed this time by Imad al-Din Zangi. 
They would eventually rely on Frankish support to resist Zangi’s policy of annexing 
their territories, which lay on the line of communications between his two cities, 
Aleppo and Mosul. This collaboration led to the fall of Edessa, however, and they 
were saved from being completely dispossessed only when Zangi was assassinated 
shortly thereafter. They took a share of the spoils of the County of Edessa, and 
Zangi’s son Nur al-Din adopted a less aggressive policy towards them, but in the ab-
sence of the counterweight supplied by the Franks they gradually slid into vassaldom 
under the Zangids and Ayyubids.      
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So the Artukids played a kind of diplomatic chess game and allied with who-
ever was necessary to preserve their possessions and interests, without regard for 
their religion. Fighting the “infidel” for its own sake never came into it. When they 
fought the Franks most, as in the beginning of their contiguity in the Jazira, at the 
time of the Battle of Harran and during their rule in Aleppo, they did not do this out 
of their subscription to a jihad movement, but to preserve their possessions and to 
prevent the balance of power in the region from being tilted in the favor of a particu-
lar group, just as they had done against the Seljukids. In this respect they are a good 
illustration of the argument that there were no monolithic religious blocks aligned 
against each other in the region, but rather a pattern of continuously shifting policies.   
However, a further argument of this study is that all this does not necessarily 
mean that the Artukids did not see what they did as jihad when they happened to 
clash with the Franks for these strictly practical and strategic aims. It would be both 
anachronistic and ahistorical to deny they ever made jihad by moving from textbook 
definitions derived from legal texts or from preconceptions of modern historians.
2
 
The latter, like all moderns, tend to think in much more categorical and exclusive 
terms than people of the twelfth century and perhaps too often fall into the tempta-
tion of teaching them what is to be counted as jihad and what not, such as when they 
exclude any motive for material or political gain from  a “true” jihad, reject the pres-
ence of jihad whenever such gain seems to have been an objective, and conclude that 
declarations of allegiance to jihad in such cases must only be cynical and insincere. 
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In spite of the practical bent of their policy, there is some evidence that Ilghazi and 
Belek did see themselves as mujahids waging war on behalf of Muslims against the 
“infidels,” acknowledging their renown as such.  
Accordingly this study aims to historicise the jihad concept within the early 
twelfth century, inquiring what jihad might have meant for the early Artukids and 
other contemporary emirs, and compare this with the approach of later leaders like 
Nur al-Din and Saladin. Such an approach would help us better grasp the develop-
ment of jihad in the twelfth century. Basically, I argue that jihad, especially in this 
early period, may not have been a driving force on its own, but rather the form that 
warfare assumed in contemporaries’ eyes whenever the rival in the struggle for pre-
serving and augmenting one’s possessions and strategic interests happened to be 
Christians, in this case the Franks. I shall also argue that Belek resembled the later 
leaders in that he regarded it also as jihad when he attacked a Muslim town and this 
happened to be necessary to defend his possessions and interests better against the 
Franks. Nevertheless, in the case of later leaders like Nur al-Din and Saladin, the 
elaboration of jihad on the ideological level led to a magnification of its goal, making 
it the expulsion of the Franks from the Middle East rather than the protection of 
one’s own possessions and interests; this paradoxically led to the result that warfare 
against other Muslims became much more extensive, being legitimized on the 
grounds of gathering the resources necessary for that ambitious goal.  
Finally, this study examines what advantages and disadvantages were brought 
to the Artukids by their contiguity with the Franks, by their conflicts with them on 
their own behalf as well as by their collaborations. I argue that these direct relations 
were generally advantageous for the Artukids, insofar as the Franks constituted a 
counterweight against great Muslim powers like the Great Seljukids and Zangi, and 
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also because fighting them on their own behalf brought prestige that enabled them to 
attract Turkoman forces, take over other Muslim towns and get invited to campaigns 
promising further booty and prestige. Thus I point out that it is hardly a coincidence 
that the Artukids were at the peak of their power when they had maximum direct 
contacts with the Franks at Aleppo, and decreased in power as they ceased to be their 
neighbors, first as a result of Timurtash’s abandonment of Aleppo, and then, because 
of the dissolution of the County of Edessa. 
1.2 Literature review 
A limited number of studies have been made previously on the Artukids, which deal 
with their relations with the Franks in varying degrees of detail. In general, it can be 
said that the current literature has the problem that it still remains loyal to the tradi-
tional paradigm of two religious blocks aligned against each other in Crusade and 
Counter-Crusade. As a result of this, it fails to problematize the contradictory poli-
cies followed by Ilghazi and the other Artukids against the Franks and try to work 
out what their true strategy was. Either it tends to present the Artukids as the first 
champions of jihad and explains away their collaboration with the Franks as an initial 
aberration, or going to the other extreme, it stresses their alliances with the Franks as 
well as pragmatic purposes in fighting them and, judging these by the teleological, 
idealistic yardstick, rejects the idea that they could have any serious relationship with 
jihad, comparing them unfavorably in this respect with later leaders like Nur al-Din 
or Saladin. Doing so, it also fails to historicize the jihad concept in the early twelfth 
century or grasp what the contemporary emirs might have made of it.   
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The first scholar to dedicate a study to the Artukids was Claude Cahen, 
whose article on Diyar Bakr at the time of the first Artukids
3
 traced the history of the 
Artukid principalities up to the time of their full subjection to Saladin in the mid-
1180s, establishing a chronological framework of the events and a genealogy of the 
family as well as commenting briefly on the political and social structures of their 
principalities. The wide, generally oriented scope of the study, however, allowed Ca-
hen no more than a passing glance into their relations with the Franks, although he 
did make some insightful comments in the process.  
Amongst Turkish authors, Osman Turan has dedicated a chapter to the 
Artukids in his book about the Eastern Anatolian Turkish States.
4
 Here he touches 
upon their relations with the Franks but, besides making some important factual er-
rors,
5
 Turan also seems to have subscribed to the traditional paradigm of a Muslim 
block waging inexorable jihad against the “infidel,” which is bolstered moreover by a 
strong nationalistic bent. This is to such an extent that from time to time he does not 
flinch from dispensing with the facts that do not accord with this view, such as when 
he passes over in silence Ilghazi’s collaboration with the Franks against the Seljukid 
expedition of 1115.
6
  
Ali Sevim wrote a PhD dissertation on the early Artukid emirates and pub-
lished the results of his research in articles about the political actions of Artuk, Sok-
man, Ilghazi and Timurtash.
7
 Of these only the last three interest us here. The studies 
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on Sokman and Ilghazi suffer similarly from a nationalistic subscription to the idea 
that the Turks must have waged unrelenting jihad against the Franks, with exceptions 
failing to raise any questions. Such is the case when Sevim attributes the expansion 
of the Artukid domains to their victories against the Franks,
8
 even though it emerges 
from his own account that the cases in which they remained neutral or allied with the 
Franks were just as many. His study on Timurtash’s reign in Aleppo is more bal-
anced in comparison, perhaps inevitably so considering this prince’s notorious reluc-
tance to fight the Franks. The accounts of Turan and Sevim also both suffer from the 
fact that, although they use the Eastern and especially Islamic sources in full, they 
fail to make similar use of the Latin sources about the events they discuss.  
Işın Demirkent, in her history of the County of Edessa,9 offers a very detailed 
and meticulous discussion of the relations of the Franks there with the neighboring 
Muslim polities, including the Artukids. Her focus remains firmly fixed on the 
Frankish county however, with the result that she does not evaluate the course and 
import of the relations of the Artukids themselves with the Franks in general, includ-
ing the Principality of Antioch, and leaves out the aspects of these relations that do 
not directly concern the County of Edessa. The result is that her work, otherwise very 
informative about the history of the County, allows for only a limited perspective of 
Artukid-Frankish relations per se. Moreover her account, like the previous ones, re-
mains basically a straightforward political narrative based on the unquestioned as-
sumption that the Artukids were dedicated fighters in an ongoing jihad against the 
Franks, and while the exceptions to this “rule” are not ignored, as they are in Turan’s 
study, they are also not allowed to problematize this issue and “sully” the picture, 
like in Sevim’s work. Although, unlike Turan and Sevim, Demirkent does draw upon 
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a relatively wide array of Western sources as well as the Eastern ones, she seems to 
have missed a few important Latin sources, such as Ralph of Caen or Walter the 
Chancellor.   
Remzi Ataoğlu wrote a PhD dissertation on the history of the Artukid emirate 
of Hisn-Kaifa.
10
 In the second part of this work, dedicated to the political history of 
the emirate, he touches upon its contacts and clashes with the Frankish principalities. 
However, he does not offer any overall evaluation of the policies followed by the 
Artukid emirs of this branch against the Franks. His study of the Artukid-Frankish 
relations is hampered further by the fact that he uses the Latin sources only through 
secondary literature, and partly as a consequence of this, adds little new to what is 
already found in the general histories of the Latin East.    
Aydın Usta wrote a detailed article11 that examines the relations between the 
Artukids and the Franks, covering the early period of 1098-1124 during which their 
contacts were most frequent. A notable virtue of his work is that he draws upon the 
widest range of Latin sources among the Turkish and Arab students of the topic.
12
 
Nevertheless, he still bases himself on the teleological paradigm of a Muslim block 
emerging gradually against a Christian one, and accords to the Artukids an important 
role in the “development of Muslim unity” during what he calls the initial period of 
recovery and rearmament. Indeed Usta does not ignore Ilghazi’s collaboration with 
the Franks, but he fails to problematize this further and takes the emir to task for not 
having acted in accordance with the paradigm in question, trying to expel the Franks 
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from Antioch. Although he seems aware of Ilghazi’s struggle to relieve Aleppo, he 
fails to realize its essential nature for the emir’s overall strategy.  
These problems are also found in the related section of the scholar’s encyclo-
pedia article on the Artukids,
13
 where he fails to discern Belek’s similar strategy and 
assumes him to have united the Muslim world in order to deliver the “death-blow” to 
the Franks. In the same article he contents himself with rebuking Timurtash for his 
abandonment of Aleppo, and omits a discussion of the causes and full significance of 
this crucial move. In yet another study Usta has taken the much needed step of exam-
ining how the medieval sources regarded the Artukid leaders and their confrontations 
with the Franks, which makes it a seminal study in this respect.
14
   
In the most recent article to date on the topic
15
 Hüseyin Kayhan provides a 
short summary of the contacts between the Artukids and the Franks throughout the 
twelfth century. In doing so he also bases himself on the unquestioned assumption 
that the Artukids were waging jihad against the Franks as part of a united Muslim 
block, playing an important role in stopping the Crusader advance and then expelling 
them from the Near East. This perspective is also evident in the title of his article, 
“the Artukids against the Crusaders.” He overlooks anything that could challenge the 
view in question, largely ignoring the Artukids’ collaborations with the Franks and 
failing to question why leaders like Sokman or Ilghazi did not attempt to expel the 
Franks from Edessa and Antioch after their victories in the battles of Harran and Ag-
                                                 
13
 Aydın Usta, “Artuklular,” Türkler Ansiklopedisi (Ankara, 2002). 
14
 Aydın Usta, “Latin (Haçlı) Kronikleri ve Yerli Hristiyan Kaynaklarında Artuklular,” I. Uluslararası 
Artuklu Sempozyumu Bildirileri, 25-26-27 Ekim 2007, Mardin, edited by İbrahim Özcoşar (Mardin, 
2008), I, 57-71.  
15
 Hüseyin Kayhan, “Haçlılar Karşısında Artuklular,” I. Uluslararası Mardin Tarihi Sempozyumu Bil-
dirileri, edited by İbrahim Özcoşar and Hüseyin H. Güneş (Mardin, 2006), 53-62. 
 13 
er Sanguinis. He also fails to draw upon the full scale of Western sources, omitting to 
use Ralph of Caen or Walter the Chancellor.
16
  
There are also two full-fledged works on the history of all the Artukid emir-
ates from their foundation to their demise, originally written as PhD dissertations by 
Imad al-Din Khalil
17
 and Gerhard Väth.18 These dwell on the Artukid-Frankish rela-
tions to different extents. Khalil’s study contains a full chapter concentrating on the 
subject, and touches upon it also in the chapters about the Artukids’ relations with 
the Zangids and Ayyubids.  
The main criticism that can be leveled against Khalil’s study is that like the 
previous works it sticks unquestioningly to the traditional view of the Muslim-
Frankish relations as a struggle between two solid religious blocks locked in holy 
warfare. Considering the Artukid-Frankish relations from this point of view, Khalil 
periodizes them into different phases in which, he argues, the Artukids contributed in 
widely varying degrees to the ongoing jihad: they acted initially as members and then 
leaders in Muslim coalitions against the Franks, ceased thereafter to participate in 
Holy War, withdrawing into isolation or even allying with the Franks under pressure 
from the Greater Seljukids and Zangi, and finally resumed their role in jihad by as-
sisting Nur al-Din and Saladin, the latter themselves assumed to be engaged in a re-
lentless Holy War against the Franks. Doing so, however, the author fails to question 
how far the relations of the Artukids with the Franks were a function of their sub-
scription to the ideology of jihad against the “infidel,” and how far a function, initial-
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ly, of their need to protect their territories and especially Aleppo against the Franks, 
and, later, of their subjection to the Zangids and Ayyubids, whom they supported no-
lens volens when the latter needed to protect their own territories against the Franks.  
There are other criticisms to be brought against Khalil’s work as well. Alt-
hough he admittedly dedicated a full chapter (some hundred pages in length) to the 
subject, this still turns out to be insufficient for a full treatment insofar as many im-
portant topics receive far shorter shrift than they deserve. The consequence is that 
although the author draws upon primary source material, his accounts about various 
events frequently turn out to be little more than yet another reproduction of the ac-
counts found in general works like those of Runciman and Grousset. Another weak-
ness of the work in this context is that although it deploys the Eastern and especially 
Arabic sources in full, this is by no means the case as far as the Western sources are 
concerned, and the author frequently relies on the secondary literature for the testi-
mony of Latin authors.  
As for Väth’s study, the author does not treat the Artukid-Frankish relations 
as a topic on its own or venture to problematize them in any degree. Consequently 
his contribution to the present subject, found distributed in piecemeal fashion 
throughout his work, remains a summary and straightforward political account that 
brings little new insight to what can already be found in standard works about the 
history of the Latin East. Besides, it is not free of a number of important factual er-
rors, which also prevent it from serving as a reliable guide for the course of events.
19
 
In yet another PhD thesis on the Artukids which, along with a critical edition 
and translation of the chronicle of Ibn al-Azraq on Mayyafariqin, also incorporates 
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chapters dealing with the careers of Ilghazi and his sons,
20
 Carole Hillenbrand has 
discussed the relations of these Artukid princes with the Franks. Like Väth, she co-
vers the relations in question as only one aspect amongst many in their careers, deal-
ing with it only in piecemeal fashion, and does not focus on the subject as an inde-
pendent topic. Nonetheless, this does not prevent her from offering among other 
things a detailed and valuable discussion of Ilghazi’s attitude towards jihad, going 
further than any other scholar mentioned above in problematizing the question of the 
Artukid’s relations with the Franks. In doing so, however, Hillenbrand leans some-
what too heavily on the classical thesis of the French scholar Emmanuel Sivan about 
the gradual development of a jihad movement in the Muslim world against the 
Frankish threat, as well as on his interesting discussion of Ilghazi’s status as one of 
the first Muslim emirs to employ jihad propaganda.
21
 Like Sivan and the other stu-
dents of Artukid history, she still takes for granted the paradigm of a Muslim block 
developing slowly in face of the threat posed by the other camp. Based on this view, 
she charges Ilghazi with having failed to realize this threat, or “political realities” as 
she calls it, in alleged contrast to Zangi, Nur al-Din and Saladin, and consequently 
having wasted his chances to become the first great Muslim leader of jihad before 
them. 
The common perspective of all these studies is the teleological, confronta-
tional one of Crusade vs. Counter-Crusade, looking backwards from 1187, as a result 
of which Artukid emirs like Ilghazi and Belek are accused of not having moved in 
accordance with a way of thought and action utterly foreign to their own concerns. 
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Once this perspective is left aside, all of their actions against the Franks from Ager 
Sanguinis onwards become perfectly intelligible, as suggested by Thomas Asbridge’s 
analysis of the early history of the Principality of Antioch,
22
 as a series of efforts to 
protect Aleppo by pushing back its borders with the Principality. This study builds 
on the implications of that analysis from the perspective of the Artukids themselves.   
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
The main body of the thesis is divided into two parts, comprising four chap-
ters each. The first, “The New Neighbors,” covers the period during which the 
Artukids adjusted to the presence of the Franks, first clashing with them for posses-
sions in Diyar Bakr and then barring their ambitious venture at Harran, but then, after 
Sokman’s death, adopting a cautious policy of balance between the Franks and the 
Seljukids. The second chapter describes the initial contacts of the Artukids with the 
Franks, from their confrontation before Antioch to their loss of Samosata and Saruj. 
Among other things it dwells upon the uneasy and fragile collaboration between the 
Artukid and Frankish rulers in this early period, discusses the consequences of the 
Frankish presence for the Artukid expansion in Diyar Bakr, and draws attention to 
the negative role played by Sokman in the fall of Antioch to the Crusaders.  
The third chapter focuses on the Battle of Harran and Sokman’s death on his 
march to the aid of Tyre, evaluating his role in halting the Frankish expansion but 
neglecting to take advantage of the opportunity to capture Edessa. It reveals him as a 
precursor of Ilghazi and Belek in his approach to jihad, in that he fought the Franks 
chiefly for particular towns, or for strategic aims such as preventing them becoming 
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too powerful by acquiring Harran, Tripoli or Damascus. Otherwise, he did not seem 
interested in expelling the “infidels” from Edessa, but, despite this he did consider 
himself as a mujahid responsible for the safety of Muslims in general.  
The fourth chapter covers Ilghazi’s arrival in Diyar Bakr, his first contacts 
with the Franks, and his policies during the Seljukid expeditions led by Mawdud. It 
concludes with an analysis of the reasons for the emir’s discreet and aloof attitude 
during these campaigns. The fifth chapter deals with his open alliance with the 
Franks against the last two Seljukid expeditions, and discusses the possible reasons 
for this harshening in his attitude toward the Seljukids. Both chapters argue that what 
lay behind the emir’s policies was less his resentment against the sultan for being 
dismissed from Baghdad and bypassed for the post of governor of Mosul and more 
the realization that the Sultan’s chief purpose was to subjugate the local emirs like 
Ilghazi himself. It is also discussed whether Ilghazi had indeed undergone any 
change of heart and regretted his alliance with Christians against other Muslims, as 
has been claimed by some scholars loyal to the teleological paradigm.  
The second part, “The Fight for Aleppo,” covers the period that saw the 
Artukids’ contacts and clashes with the Franks at a maximum, when the Artukids 
possessed Aleppo and were thereby neighbors with the Franks also in Syria. The 
sixth chapter focuses on Ilghazi’s takeover of Aleppo and subsequent campaign that 
ended with his victory at Ager Sanguinis, followed by an inconclusive battle at Tell 
Danith. Among other things, it discusses Ilghazi’s strategic aims for the campaign 
and the criticisms directed at the emir for having failed to attack Antioch after his 
annihilation of the major part of the Frankish army. The seventh chapter covers the 
remainder of Ilghazi’s reign in Aleppo, up to his death in 1122. It shows how his at-
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tempts were still directed at the aim of recovering and retaining the borderline of 
Azaz, al-Atharib and Zardana. It also suggests that the emir might have clashed with 
a young Bohemond II on a hitherto unknown initial visit to the East. Another topic 
examined is Ilghazi’s venture to Georgia and the setbacks he suffered in Syria be-
cause of his preparations for that campaign and subsequent defeat on it. This chapter 
brings the portion on Ilghazi’s reign to an end and concludes with a general assess-
ment of the emir’s policies towards the Franks as well as of his attitude to jihad.  
The eighth chapter examines the activities of Belek, how he captured the 
Frankish leaders, took over Aleppo along with other Muslim towns, dealt with the 
revolt of the captives in Kharput and died while besieging the Muslim town of 
Manbij. It includes an analysis of Belek’s policies against the Franks, discussing 
among other things whether the emir can be criticized for having failed to take ad-
vantage of his capture of the Frankish leaders in order to deliver the “death-blow” to 
their principalities. It also examines Belek’s particular approach to jihad and com-
pares him in this respect with Ilghazi as with later leaders.  
The ninth chapter opens with an account of how Timurtash arrived at an 
agreement with the captive king Baldwin and released him in return for extensive 
concessions meant to restore a satisfactory border, as well as for a promise of alli-
ance against the Arab emir Dubais. As it turned out though, Baldwin and Dubais 
joined forces instead and besieged his city Aleppo. It proceeds with an analysis of 
Timurtash’s possible plans and motives in making such an agreement and then aban-
doning Aleppo to its fate, deducing the implications of this for the contemporary un-
derstanding of jihad, and discussing the aptness and structural causes of Timurtash’s 
decision to withdraw for good to Diyar Bakr.  
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After this point the relations of the Artukids with the Franks decreased con-
siderably, and there is a corresponding sharp decrease in the related source material, 
so the final section of this chapter is an epilogue in effect, going over the relatively 
more important instances of their subsequent contacts with the Franks, charting how 
they allied with them against Zangi, shared in the partition of the County of Edessa 
and then took part as vassals in the campaigns of Nur al-Din and Saladin against the 
Franks. In the light of these developments, it shows how the dimunition of the 
Artukids’ direct relations with the Franks contributed to their decline in power and 
independence.  
1.4 Methodology 
In all these chapters a considerable place is dedicated to the close-reading and 
analysis of each related primary source account in the light of the other accounts and 
modern scholarship before an attempt is made at reconstructing the course of events. 
Here I would like to justify this practice. In early classical Islamic historiography the 
chroniclers simply cited one account of the same event after another, without at-
tempting to subject them to a process of criticism and analysis as to the truth of their 
content, and the reader was simply left to pick up for himself which he deemed best. 
It is clear enough that this practice runs directly counter to what is expected of a his-
torian today, and already by the time of Ibn al-Athir, perhaps the greatest of medieval 
Arab chroniclers, it had been superseded by one in which the historian himself car-
ried out the task of selecting the version he deemed the most sound and plausible, or 
combined various versions to arrive at an account of his own. Indeed the latter prac-
tice is still continued by modern historians writing about the political history of the 
Crusades and the Latin East as well as of the contemporary Muslim world. 
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Nevertheless, the earlier approach had also some important virtues that have 
been lost. The later historians come up with an account of their own by using the 
primary source accounts as heaps of bits of evidence, rejecting some of these bits and 
accepting others, with the result that despite the elaborate footnote apparatus it re-
mains difficult in practice for the reader to see why the historian has rejected a par-
ticular bit or accepted another unless the historian specifically notes the reason ––
which is by no means always the case. Nor is it clear how the historian combines and 
reconciles the pieces of evidence that have been accepted. This considerably reduces 
the accountability and transparency of the historian’s work, which are perhaps the 
only possible sort of “objectivity” in such a context. Although of course the reader 
cannot simply be left alone to ponder mutually contradictory primary source ac-
counts, he can at least be given a chance to see for himself what each source testified 
to, why the source did it in that way, where the source agrees or not with others, and 
why the source is accepted or rejected on a particular point. The reader is then free to 
question and correct the historian’s choices if he prefers to do so. 
It is also problematic for a historian to treat these primary source accounts, 
each with its own perspective, intentions and outlook simply as repositories of factu-
al evidence. The historian may not write, combining at will, as if he had been a direct 
witness of the events, as if all the sources together allow a transparent first-hand view 
into the past events, producing a text along the lines that event A happened (Chroni-
cle X, p. 1) and then event B happened (Chronicle Y, p.2) etc. Such an approach fails 
to evaluate the individual medieval accounts as texts in which the socio-political con-
text of the authors’ own milieu as well as their ideas, aspirations  and intentions are 
inscribed. Consequently it fails to pay attention to how the contemporary authors tell 
or “emplot” what they tell and why in that particular way; what significant even 
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though slight modifications they make when quoting earlier authors and for which 
reasons; and of course what stance they assume towards the subject at hand, although 
these are as important and as interesting as the factual data in the sources about bat-
tles, alliances and so on.  
Elements that are normally dismissed as “legendary,” “irrelevant” or “ficti-
tious” and discarded as such from narrative histories can also be evaluated in this 
way and made to yield interesting insights. A case in point is the fierce debate be-
tween King Baldwin II and the Latin clergy about whether to take the Holy Cross 
north to a battle against Ilghazi, which Fulcher of Chartres reports to have taken 
place in Jerusalem. The king and his troops were anxious not to be deprived of the 
miraculous protection of the Cross, while the clergy feared that it could get lost in 
case of defeat –– a prospect that they did not seem to consider all that unlikely. It is 
not necessary to believe in the relic’s efficacy to take the story as evidence of how 
wary even the Franks in distant Jerusalem had become against this Turkoman chief 
after his crushing defeat of the Antiochenes.
23
      
But failing to consider each primary source account as a whole in itself does 
not only deprive the historian of such significant sorts of information. More im-
portantly, it also raises the risk of going amiss when trying to sift individual bits of 
factual evidence from the sources, for in doing so one may stake too much on the de-
ceptively straightforward narration of an event by an author with quite a different axe 
to grind. A case in point is the Battle of Harran, handled below in the third chapter.  
Modern students of this battle regularly assert that the Artukid Sokman of 
Hisn Kaifa and the Seljukid governor of Mosul, Chakarmish, gave up an existing 
feud between them and joined forces for jihad on hearing of the Frankish attack on 
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Harran.
24
 This view of the events is based on Ibn al-Athir’s account of the battle.25 
But they fail to take note of the fact that this particular account of the reconciliation 
is only one of two given by Ibn al-Athir, and that the other account is significantly 
different.
26
 In this second version of the conciliation there is no word of the attack or 
reference to the motive of uniting against the “infidel.” We are simply told that 
Chakarmish compensated Sokman for the death of his nephew Yakut. There is some 
ground therefore to think that Ibn al-Athir either fabricated the first version or at least 
suppressed the fact that there was a payment before their alliance, in an effort to en-
courage the emirs of his own age to give up their petty interests and unite against the 
threat posed by the Franks as well the Mongols. This possibility is corroborated fur-
ther by other elements in the account, like Sokman discovering Count Baldwin to 
have been kidnapped from his tent by Chakarmish’s men, but declaring that he did 
not want to spoil the Muslim victory by attacking his ally and allowing the gloating 
of “infidels.” Ibn al-Athir also ignores the fact that Sokman’s departure for home af-
ter this incident prevented the Muslims from exploiting their victory fully and per-
haps from capturing Edessa itself.  
On the other hand, the same problem of division in the face of the “infidel” 
threat seems to have preoccupied the Latin chroniclers as well, for a serious dispute 
had broken out before the battle between Baldwin du Bourg and the Normans Bohe-
mond and Tancred. While Fulcher of Chartres did his best to cover up this rift in the 
Christian ranks and to emphasize the importance of preserving unity against the “in-
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fidel,” Ralph of Caen and Albert of Aachen produced a version of the events that ex-
onerated the Normans from the charge of deserting their allies at the most critical 
point, showing them on the contrary as fighting in the forefront and trying to rescue 
the Edessenes. Thus the Battle of Harran served as a set-piece for Muslim and Latin 
chronicles alike to emphasize the importance of unity and the dangers of dissension 
in face of the “infidel” enemy.  
Under these conditions, it might seem that the accounts of the Syriac sources, 
Michael the Syrian and the Anonymous Syriac, as well as that of Matthew of Edessa, 
should give a clearer idea of the dissension between the Franks and the course of the 
battle, since the authors in question did not have such an agenda and were moreover 
geographically close to the scene of the events. Nevertheless, such an approach 
would also be misleading, because the indigenous Christian authors also had their 
axes to grind. Already by the time of the Battle of Harran the Franks had come to 
look considerably less like saviors and more like new persecutors to the indigenous 
Armenian and Jacobite populations. Accordingly they are represented in the Syriac 
and Armenian accounts of the battle as proud, egoistic, greedy, and in Matthew’s ac-
count, capable of committing outrageous sins like putting feces in the host. This ren-
ders it advisable to approach the testimony of the indigenous Christian sources with 
caution too.  
Claude Cahen asserts that the widely disparate and contradictory sources 
about the battle are in fact “irreconcilable,”27 and as we have seen, the reason for this 
is none other than the differences and conflicts among their respective standpoints, 
allegiances, and agenda. Without paying due regard to these factors, resorting to me-
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chanically applied criteria such as contemporaneity is not sufficient in itself to judge 
the reliability of the sources and to use them appropriately to reconstruct past events.  
For all these reasons, it seems advisable to treat individually each of the rele-
vant accounts that the sources offer on a certain event, with each account’s specific 
point of view and way of reflecting things, and not simply as a bucket of useful 
“source material” from which one can choose or reject discrete pieces of evidence at 
will. Jonathan Riley-Smith observes that the classical method of historical research is 
“built on the comparison of related pieces of evidence, rather than on a line-by-line 
interpretation of a single text.”28 But the method followed here is to make a compari-
son of the “line-by-line intepretations” or close-readings of the related pieces of text, 
rather than solely the “related pieces of evidence,” and in doing so always to consider 
the standpoint of the source or even the group of sources from which the examined 
text issues. An approximate reconstruction of the course of events is then allowed to 
emerge from such a procedure of close-reading and comparison. 
A corollary of this procedure is that equal attention must be dedicated to all 
the primary source accounts, whatever their provenance, and they must be studied in 
the original versions where possible. In the field of Crusading history most Western 
scholars use the Latin sources in the original, but for the Arabic sources rely on 
translations only, including the highly inadequate and misleading translations in the 
RHC series. In keeping with this approach, they tend to use the sources in Arabic as 
a sort of fill-in material to supplement those in Latin. On the other hand, Muslim his-
torians use the Arabic sources in full and in their original versions, but draw upon a 
more limited array of Latin sources in translation, sometimes even through secondary 
works, and similarly treat them as fill-in material. But in accordance with the de-
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mands of its methodology this study seeks to give the testimonies of Latin, Arabic, 
Syriac and Armenian sources alike their full due. The Latin and Arabic sources are 
examined both in the original and in translations, with the incorrect and misleading 
parts in the latter pointed out where necessary;
29
 the Syriac and Armenian sources are 
used through both English and French translations, comparing the two. 
1.5 Chief primary sources 
Before proceeding in the second chapter to analyze the primary source ac-
counts in accordance with the methodology outlined above, it might be useful to pre-
sent a brief introduction to the most relevant sources to have a better understanding 
of their respective eras, backgrounds, and standpoints. 
1.5.1 Muslim sources 
Ibn al-Qalanisi was a dignitary in Damascus who worked in and headed the 
Diwan al-Rasa’il (Correspondance Bureau) and twice held the post of ra’is, the 
highest civil office in the city. His work Dhail Tarikh Dimashq was conceived as a 
continuation (dhail) of Hilal al-Sabi‘’s history of Damascus and covers the period 
from 970 to 1160. This work is particularly valuable insofar as the author was able to 
set down eyewitness accounts about most of the events he related, and told these 
from the perspective of a member of the ruling circles in Damascus. For the period 
under consideration in this study, Ibn al-Qalanisi was close to Tughtekin and reflect-
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ed the events from the atabek’s point of view, placing the latter in the center of the 
stage. At this time, when Zangi of Mosul had not yet risen as the greatest enemy of 
Damascus, the author wrote in a marked spirit of religious confrontation, making it 
clear that he saw it as a duty of Muslim leaders to unite against Franks, and covered 
up cases of collaboration between Franks and Muslims as best as he could. 
Tughtekin is portrayed in this context as an advocate of jihad and Muslim unity 
against the Frankish threat, as an eager mujahid defending all Muslims in Syria. The 
Artukids and especially Ilghazi are often upstaged a result, but the work is valuable 
for this particular perspective from Damascus as well as for the wealth of original 
information it provides throughout the period under scrutiny.  
Al-Azimi came from a distinguished family of Aleppo, where he lived be-
tween 1090 and 1163. Like Ibn al-Qalanisi, he was an exact contemporary of the pe-
riod under scrutiny here, and composed a long and a short chronicle concerning the 
history of Aleppo. The longer version has been lost, except for some passages cited 
by later sources like Ibn al-Adim, while the shorter version, coming up to the year 
1143, is still extant but provides rather sparse information. Nevertheless it is valuable 
for the present study for the occasional bits of original information supplied by the 
author. More importantly, Al-Azimi was also a poet and the verses he wrote at the 
time of Ilghazi’s rule of Aleppo, transmitted by himself as well as by Ibn al-Athir, 
yield invaluable insights about how the contemporary Aleppans viewed Ilghazi and 
his battles with the Franks.          
Ibn-al Azraq, a scion of an important family from Mayyafariqin (today Sil-
van), accompanied Artukid rulers, and notably Ilghazi’s son Timurtash, until his 
death in 1181. His work Tarikh Mayyafariqin wa Amid, as it exists today, covers the 
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period from the caliphate of Umar to the year 1176, and includes events of local im-
port in Mayyafariqin and Amid as well as material collected during his wide-ranging 
travels. For the period under consideration, however, he provides disappointingly 
little information about the Artukids’ relations with the Franks, except for his ac-
count of the lands acquired by Timurtash after the fall of Edessa. This may have been 
due to the exclusively local focus of the author, who dedicated extensive place only 
to those events that happened in Diyar Bakr in his own days, when the Artukids were 
no longer direct neighbors with the Franks. Significantly, it may also have been due 
to the general attitude of his patron Timurtash and his successors who had deliberate-
ly withdrawn from Aleppo and avoided direct confrontations with the Franks. In this 
respect, Ibn al-Azraq’s attitude is valuable for providing interesting insights into the 
mindset of that emir and his descendants concerning jihad against the Franks. 
Usama ibn Munqidh was a poet, historian, diplomat and warrior who came 
from the Arabic Munqidhite dynasty that ruled Shaizar till 1157. He lived through 
most of the twelfth century, until his death in 1188 at the age of 93. His work Kitab 
al I‘tibar is basically a book of memoirs that offers edifying examples of conduct 
and feats of valor that he had witnessed in his youth and adulthood, and in the pro-
cess touches upon the social and political events of the time. For the period under 
consideration here Usama also mentions some of the events concerning the Artukids, 
notably Bursuk’s expedition in 1115 and the Battle of Ager Sanguinis in 1119, and 
contributes some interesting hints and details. Because the memoirs were written in 
the author’s old age, however, the information he provides has to be handled with 
particular care. His testimony is also valuable insofar as it reflects the outlook of a 
member of the local Arab aristocracy toward a Turkoman chief like Ilghazi.      
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Ibn al-Athir was a native of Jazirat ibn Umar (today Cizre), but passed most 
of his life as a professional historian in Zangid Mosul, where he died in 1233. His 
most important work al-Kamil fi’l-Tarikh extends from the Creation to 1231, and the 
last volumes covering the period from late eleventh century to early thirteenth centu-
ry provide much original information. Beside this work Ibn al-Athir also composed a 
work on the history of the Zengid atabeks of Mosul, al-Tarikh al-Bahir fi’l-Dawlat 
al-Atabakiyya, which provides some additional information. Ibn al-Athir is generally 
notable for the cohesiveness of his account, which transcends the bounds of the 
chronicle form in this respect, as well as for his analyses of the causes and conse-
quences of the events he described. It was a special concern of his to urge the rulers 
of his own time to unite against the threat posed by the Mongols and Franks, and he 
recounted the events of early twelfth century from this perspective as well, upholding 
what he saw as examples of Muslim unity and deploring those to the contrary. Partly 
in connection with this, and partly because he wrote under the patronage of the 
Zangids of Mosul, Ibn al-Athir emphasized the role of Zangi and his descendants at 
the expense of other rulers, chiefly Saladin but also the Artukids Timurtash and 
Fakhr al-Din Kara Arslan, whom he portrayed extremely unwilling to wage jihad. 
For the present study Ibn al-Athir is an indispensable source throughout, both for this 
outlook and for the length and detail with which he relates the Artukid’s relations 
with the Franks in the early decades of the twelfth century. It is also interesting to 
observe Ibn al-Athir reworking earlier extant sources like Ibn al-Qalanisi, filling in, 
providing plausible explanations and bolstering the message of Muslim unity through 
the subtle shifts and changes he effected.        
Ibn al-Adim was a distinguished citizen of Aleppo who lived between 1193-
1262 and composed works on Islamic law and hadith tradition as well as on history. 
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Like Al-Azimi in the previous century, he was a local historian who focused on the 
past of his native city. One of the two works he wrote in the field was Bughyat al-
Talab fi Tarikh Halab, a biographical dictionary of all the important personalities 
who lived in or passed through Aleppo. The other was Zubdat al-Halab fi Tarikh 
Halab, a work of local political history, for which Ibn al-Adim drew upon infor-
mation found in the first work, albeit removing the references to his sources, and 
added significant material derived from other sources, some of which are no longer 
extant. Both works, and especially the latter, have proved indispensable for the pre-
sent study, in particular for the period of Artukid rule in Aleppo. Although Ibn al-
Adim himself lived in the following century, his relation is extremely rich and vivid 
in detail. It is also interesting to observe the historian at work, constructing the ac-
counts of the critical events during this period as set-pieces that reflected the general 
anxiety and popular religious fervor in an Aleppo under immediate threat from the 
Franks. The spirit of religious confrontation that we have seen was evident in other 
Muslim sources reaches a peak in such passages where Ibn al-Adim emphasizes the 
desecrations and other sacrilegious acts perpetrated by some of the Frankish princes 
and soldiers when they attacked Aleppo, and in his condemnation of the Arab emir 
Dubais ibn Sadaqa for having collaborated with the Franks in their siege of the city 
in 1124.             
1.5.2 Indigenous Christian sources 
Matthew of Edessa, an Armenian monk of Gregorian faith, was the abbot of 
the Monastery of Red Convent near Kaisun, where he lived until 1144. His chronicle, 
which covers the period from 952 to 1136, was presumably written during the first 
four decades of the twelfth century. The religious vocation of the author shows its 
influence in the spirit of confrontation he displays toward the Turks and other Mus-
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lims, whom he saw as a scourge for the Christians’ sins after the end of Christ’s 
thousand-year reign around 1030. It is also evident in the way Matthew initially wel-
comed the Franks as saviors, even though this view tended to change for the worse in 
parallel with the gradual dispossession of Armenian lords in the region by the 
Franks. Eventually Matthew came to see these latter as possessed by greed and pride. 
Despite this, he never denounces the Franks completely in the chronicle, emphasizes 
Christian unity, and conceals the alliances between Muslims and Franks as much as 
possible. As far as the present study is concerned, his chronicle has been invaluable 
and used throughout for the wealth of information it provides about the relevant 
events, most of which may have been set down from eye-witness testimonies. An-
other valuable aspect of the work is Matthew’s evaluation of the Artukid rulers Sok-
man, Ilghazi and Belek, who were his exact contemporaries. He condemns and deni-
grates the first two as evil and bloodthirsty men who went so far as roasting babies 
over fire, while he unexpectedly calls the last a brave and vigorous warrior and prais-
es him for the treatment of the Christians under his rule.       
Michael the Syrian was the Jacobite Patriarch of Antioch from 1166 to 1199. 
He composed a chronicle extending from the Creation until his own lifetime, making 
use of earlier sources in Syriac and Arabic for the period before his death. It emerges 
from the work that the author’s personal relations with both the Franks and Muslim 
rulers like Kilij Arslan of Rum were quite good. He has a generally positive attitude 
toward the Franks, while in assessing Muslim rulers he seems to have attached prior 
importance to their treatment of the Christians under their rule. Evaluating the 
Artukids, he admits that they generally treated their Christian subjects well, although 
he does note that Timurtash of Mardin had handled them harshly at the beginning of 
his reign and Fakhr al-Din Kara Arslan of Hisn Kaifa prohibited the construction of 
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churches for a time. For the period under focus in the present study Michael’s work 
is valuable for the original information it provides about the period from Battle of 
Harran to the death of Belek, to whose reign he dedicates the greatest amount of de-
tail.       
The author of the Anonymous Syriac Chronicle, a monk living in Edessa, be-
longed to the households of Michael the Syrian’s brother and then of his nephew. His 
chronicle was probably finished by 1234. Although it is independent of the chronicle 
of Michael the Syrian, the two authors do seem to have shared some sources from the 
twelfth century, notably the history of the Edessene Basil Bar Shumana (d. 1171). A 
difference between the outlooks of the Anonymous and Michael, especially evident 
when they use such common sources, is that the Anonymous’s stance against the 
Franks is much more critical, representing them like Mathew as given to pride and 
greed. The information he supplies about the Artukids in the period under considera-
tion is also more circumstantial than Michael’s, beginning right from their first 
clashes with the Franks in Diyar Bakr, around the time of the First Crusade, to the 
death of Belek –– whose reign is covered with the greatest amount of detail as in Mi-
chael’s work. Another valuable aspect of the source is the circumstantial information 
it yields about Ilghazi’s cautious policies toward the County of Edessa at a time he 
held Aleppo and fought the Franks of Antioch. The Anonymous also provides useful 
information about the Artukids’ later collaboration with the Franks against Zangi and 
their partition of the County of Edessa after that emir’s death.      
Bar Hebraeus was a monk who lived between 1226 and 1286 near Melitene. 
Although his chronicle stands as a valuable source for his own times, it heavily relies 
on Michael and Ibn al-Athir for the preceding century. As a result it contains little 
original information useful for the present study, apart from an interesting report 
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about a possible visit by Bohemond II to the Levant in 1122 and his clash with Ilgha-
zi. As we shall see, this looks at first sight to be one of those legendary accounts en-
countered in the part of Bar Hebraeus’s chronicle that covers the period before his 
lifetime, but it is in fact corroborated by reports of Ibn al-Qalanisi and al-Azimi.  
1.5.3 Latin sources 
Fulcher of Chartres, the chaplain of Baldwin de Bouillon from 1097, com-
posed his work Gesta Francorum Iheruaslem Peregrinantium in three portions in 
1101, 1106 and 1124-27. As he resided for most of this period in Jerusalem, he 
viewed the events in North Syria from the perspective of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 
and constructed his narratives in such a way as to place the king in the forefront of 
the events, like Ibn al-Qalanisi did with Tughtekin. In the chronicle Fulcher writes 
from a sharp perspective of religious confrontation, doing his best to emphasize the 
importance of Christian unity and to cover up cases of dissension among the Franks, 
mentioning such cases only to deplore them heavily. He also passes as quickly as 
possible over Frankish defeats by Muslims and dwells at great length on their victo-
ries, which he invariably attributes to the efforts of the king himself. Being a priest, 
he also places special emphasis on the efficacy of the Holy Cross and other religious 
symbols in fighting Muslims. Although Fulcher had to depend on others when 
transmitting information from Northern Syria, and this sometimes caused distortions 
or gaps in the information he supplied, as in his account of Belek’s death, he is still 
an important source for the period under consideration. He is also valuable insofar as 
he shows how the Artukids in Aleppo caused concern and fear even in distant Jerusa-
lem –– Belek even more so than Ilghazi, likened by the author to a raging dragon 
trampling upon Christianity. 
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Ralph of Caen was a member of Tancred’s retinue who had joined him after 
coming to Syria in 1108. His work Gesta Tancredi Siciliae Regis in Expeditione Hi-
erosolymitana was composed with a frankly eulogistic approach after his patron’s 
death in 1113. For the present study it was relevant with its detailed account of the 
Battle of Harran. 
Little is known about Albert of Aachen, whose work Liber Christianae Expe-
ditionis pro Ereptione, Emundatione et Restitutione Sanctae Hierosolymitanae Ec-
clesiae was written around 1130 and covers the period from the First Crusade to 
1119. Albert himself never left Germany, but composed his account based on the ac-
counts of Crusaders on their way to or from the Middle East. Although Albert’s dis-
tance from the scene of the events he was writing about led frequently to geograph-
ical confusions and occasionally to fictive accounts, he has proved to be a more reli-
able source than was assumed in the nineteenth century, and his work is particularly 
valuable for its richness in circumstantial details. Albert is relatively less reliable 
however when telling events after the First Crusade, since the number of travelers 
who served as sources for him was reduced after the debacle of the Crusade of 1101. 
Like Fulcher Albert dwells at length on the need of Christian unity, constructing his 
narratives in such a way as to show how dissension brought about baleful conse-
quences for the Franks, and how restoration of unity immediately bore its fruits in the 
form of success against Muslims. He also warns the Franks against adopting the 
“heathen” customs of the Muslims who had formerly occupied the territory of their 
principalities. For the present study, Albert’s work has proved useful for the period 
from the First Crusade until Bursuk ibn Bursuk’s expedition in 1115. Although the 
chronicle actually extends to 1119, it fails to cover the Battle of Ager Sanguinis.  
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Walter the Chancellor acted as chancellor for Prince Roger of Antioch. He 
wrote his brief work De Bello Antiochene in two installments probably, after the Bat-
tle of Tell Danith in 1115 and after the Battles of Ager Sanguinis and Tell Danith in 
1119. Then he brought it up to Ighazi’s death in 1122. His account is valuable for the 
present study insofar as he belonged to Prince Roger’s inner circle and was a direct 
eyewitness of the first two of the three battles. He fell captive in the second battle, 
and provides interesting information about his experiences as a prisoner of Ilghazi 
and his son Shams al-Dawla Sulamian; in this respect he is also valuable as a source 
of how the Latins of Antioch viewed their Artukid neighbors in Aleppo. In his treat-
ment of the latter in particular and all Muslims in general Walter displays a very 
strong spirit of religious confrontation, going so far as to attribute the Franks’ initial 
lack of success against the Seljukid army in 1115 to their alliance with the Muslims 
of Syria and Jazira, and their later success to their separation from the latter.    
Orderic Vitalis was a monk from Normandy who composed his work Histo-
ria Ecclesiastica in the 1120s and 1130s. Although he never came to the Middle 
East, like Albert, he occasionally provides valuable information about Northern Syr-
ia, probably basing himself on reports from his acquaintances among the Normans of 
Antioch. For the present work however, apart from some exceptions, his accounts are 
full of legendary elements and in this respect they are more valuable as a source for 
how the Normans in Antioch viewed the Artukids and other Muslims. In this latter 
respect Orderic is particularly notable for the stringent spirit of religious confronta-
tion evident in his work, even more than in authors who lived in the Levant. It is also 
curious to see how he projects the newly developing courtly culture of the Europe of 
his own time on Muslims, as evident in his account of the captivity of Baldwin and 
other Franks in Belek’s castle at Kharput.   
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William of Tyre was the archbishop of that city. He composed his work His-
toria Rerum in Partibus Transmarinis Gestarum between 1169 and 1184, and cov-
ered the period from 1095 to 1184. Although William provides original information 
for the period after 1127, when Fulcher’s work comes to an end, he relies on the lat-
ter chronicler as well as on Albert of Aachen and Walter the Chancellor for the pre-
ceding period that concerns us. Nevertheless, he also diverges from them occasional-
ly and is sometimes the sole Latin source to parallel the accounts of Syriac or Mus-
lim sources about the Artukids’ contacts with the Franks. As in the case of Ibn al-
Athir, it is also fruitful to compare William’s accounts with those of his sources, Ful-
cher, Walter and Albert, and observe the differences in between. This yields interest-
ing insights into William’s use of his sources, his mindset, and his approach toward 
the Muslims in particular. He is often seen at work trying to explicate the more ob-
scure passages in his sources, providing explanations, discarding the more implausi-
ble elements, and in the process often coming up with analyses that may still stand 
their ground today. In his reinterpretation of the accounts of his sources, the more 
secular outlook of the historiography of the later twelfth century is observable, with 
far less reference than Fulcher of Chartres to supernatural intervention. Also evident 
in William’s reshaping of his sources’ narratives is the development of the courtly 
culture and notions of chivalry in the latter half of the twelfth century. It is notable as 
well that although William resided in the Kingdom of Jerusalem like Fulcher, he 
moderated Fulcher’s sharp focus on the role played by the king in the events in North 
Syria. Most importantly, it turns out from these comparisons that William had a less 
religiously confrontational stance toward the Muslim adversaries of the Franks, not 
least, perhaps, because he was more knowledgeable about Islam than most Latin au-
thors of the early twelfth century. In reference to the Artukids, William generally re-
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moves the particularly pejorative anecdotes and epithets that his sources heaped upon 
Ilghazi and other Artukid leaders, probably because of this general outlook as well as 
of his distance in time to the clashes with the Artukids in early twelfth century.  
1.6 System of transliteration 
Finally, a few words about the principles followed in transliteration: rather 
than full consistency, my priority in this issue was to secure easy legibility and un-
derstandability for the reader, using as familiar forms as possible and having recourse 
to the diacritics only where they were indispensable. Thus for the Western person 
and place names, I have used the forms found in standard works about the Crusades, 
among them Steven Runciman’s A History of the Crusades,30 which covers most of 
the names in question. For the names in Turkish, I preferred to use a transliteration 
close to the orthography and pronunciation of these names in (modern) Turkish. For 
the familiar person and place names in Arabic that are regularly encountered in 
standard works, I used Anglicised forms such as Aleppo and Saladin (instead of Hal-
ab and Salah al-Din respectively). In transliterating the other person and place 
names, book titles and more familiar words like qadi, I made use of a streamlined 
form of the American Library of Congress system, without the diacritical marks or 
the initial ‘ain. For the transliteration of other words, phrases and sentences in Ara-
bic, on the other hand, I used the same system with the full set of diacritics as well as 
the initial ‘ain.  
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PART I  
THE NEW NEIGHBORS 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE ARTUKIDS’ FIRST CONTACTS WITH THE FRANKS 
This preliminary chapter will concern the Artukids’ first contacts with the 
Franks, examining their role in the First Crusade and the Crusade of 1101 as well as 
their relations and conflicts with the Franks of Edessa, particularly the loss of Samo-
sata and Saruj by the Artukids. Before discussing these events, however, it seems 
appropriate to begin with a general discussion of the impact of the arrival of the Cru-
saders and of the establishment of the Frankish principalities on the fortunes of the 
Artukids.  
2.1 The consequences for the Artukids of the First Crusade and the estab-
lishment of the Frankish principalities  
As the army of the First Crusade arrived in Syria, Sokman, Ilghazi and other 
members of the Artukid family held Jerusalem, which had originally been granted as 
an iqtā’ to their late father Artuk. The Fatimids, eager to recover this city, which they 
had lost a quarter of a century before to the Seljukids, took advantage of the weaken-
ing of the Turkish emirs, including Sokman, after their crushing defeat and loss of 
many troops in the Battle of Antioch.
1
 Eager to seize this opportunity, Al-Afdal, the 
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Fatimid vizier, marched at the head of his army against Jerusalem. At first he resort-
ed to peaceful methods to take the city and, writing to Sokman and Ilghazi, requested 
them to hand it over without a fight and bloodshed. As the latter rejected this request 
he launched a violent assault with a great number of mangonels that made breaches 
in the walls. After a siege of about forty days the Artukids were finally compelled to 
yield. Once in Jerusalem Al-Afdal treated Sokman and Ilghazi well, giving them 
many gifts before he sent them to Damascus. From there Ilghazi proceeded to Iraq, 
whereas Sokman preferred to settle with his cousins in Diyar Bakr.
2 
 
Jerusalem itself was lost a short while afterwards to the Franks, but the ten-
year reign of the Artukids in the city was not forgotten entirely. Ibn al-Azraq claims 
that even half a century later the Artukids were still feared and respected by the 
Greeks and the Franks because of their reign in Jerusalem.
3
 Ibn Khallikan, writing 
some centuries later, goes so far as to suggest that Jerusalem might not have been 
taken so easily if it had been defended by the Artukids.
4
 This view does not seem jus-
tified. Although admittedly they had put up a staunch resistance to the Fatimids they 
had finally surrendered the city, and there is no reason to assume that the result 
would have been different if it had been the Crusader army that besieged them. 
Sokman settled in Saruj upon arriving in Diyar Bakr. A few years earlier Tu-
tush ibn Alparslan had granted this city to him in iqta‘, when Sokman had killed the 
emirs Buzan and Akungur and confiscated all their possessions. Saruj was one of 
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these, and it was meant to pay for the Artukids’ unfaltering support for Tutush 
against the Seljukid sultan in Baghdad.
5
 Taking this town as his center, Sokman now 
set about the task of establishing new bases in Diyar Bakr so as to carve out a new 
domain for himself and his family in this region. Thus, the arrival of the Crusaders 
and the consequent expulsion of the Artukids from Jerusalem eventually led to the 
establishment of the Artukid principalities in the Jazira. And in this process Sokman 
found himself once again confronted with the Franks, now as neighbors rivaling him 
for the control of that region.  
What were the implications of this rivalry for the Artukids? For one, the Latin 
occupation in Syria ended all Artukid hopes of expansion in North Syria.
6
 But they 
were also affected in the Jazira: Grousset suggests that the Artukids had intended to 
make Edessa the center of their possessions in the Jazira after they had lost Palestine 
to the Fatimids. Consequently, the establishment of the Franks in this city meant a 
veritable catastrophe for them.
7
 Although it is not clear that the Artukids really had 
such intentions for Edessa, it remains true that the establishment of a speedily ex-
panding Frankish principality in their home domain could only have been an obstacle 
to their plans for further expansion. As Amoureux-Mourad notes, the strongholds 
occupied by the Franks in the region were deployed not only for defensive purposes 
but also with an offensive function: the defense of Azaz and aggression against 
Manbij; the defense of Edessa and aggression against Harran; the defense of Sha-
bakhtan (the region between Edessa and Mardin) and aggression against Mardin and 
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Nisibis; the defense of Gargar and Babula and aggression against Amid and 
Kharput.
8
 
Nevertheless, the negative effects that the Frankish presence in Edessa exert-
ed on the Artukids should not be exaggerated. As Stevenson points out, the borders 
of Frankish suzerainty coincided with those of the Armenian population, and Edessa 
itself lay near the eastern border of that. The Franks of the County were unable to 
make substantial conquests at the expense of their Muslim neighbors, even to take 
Harran. Because of the insufficient number of Franks migrating to this region, they 
remained too weak to pursue a sustained and aggressive policy towards their Muslim 
neigbors. It was only where the local population was friendly that they could garrison 
the towns and castles in the region. Edessa was only important insofar as it could 
shield Antioch against the Muslims of the Jazira and also support Antioch against 
Aleppo.
9
  
In fact, as Gerhard Väth points out, the establishment of the County of Edessa 
also increased the strategical and economic importance of Mardin, the most im-
portant possession of the Artukids. It lay at an already strategically advantageous po-
sition on the main caravan road from Mosul to Aleppo via Nisibis, Edessa and al-
Bira. When Edessa fell into the hands of Christians, the caravan traffic shifted to a 
route that led from Mardin to Aleppo in a south-westerly direction over Ra’s al-Ain, 
Harran and, according to the political situation, either Saruj, al-Bira or Qal‘at Najm. 
Thus while Edessa ceased to be a destination or point of transit for merchandise, the 
importance of Mardin increased correspondingly, and this development was reflected 
in the extraordinarily strong fortifications of the city.
10
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Some Turkish historians have also argued that the establishment of the Franks 
in the region provided the Artukids with an opportunity to expand their domains, by 
waging jihad against them. Osman Turan, for example, tries to establish a connection 
between the presence of the Franks and the success of the Artukids in carving out 
principalities in Diyar Bakr in the early twelfh century. He suggests that it was chief-
ly by subscribing to jihad that the Artukids managed to establish their principalities, 
for the upheaveals caused by the Frankish invasion provided those waging jihad with 
ample opportunities to do this.
11
 
Turan’s thesis seems questionable for a number of reasons. To begin with, as 
Emmanuel Sivan shows,
12
 the movement of jihad against the Franks was something 
that developed only slowly, during the course of the twelfth century; in the first dec-
ade after the First Crusade it was hardly in its infancy. Admittedly, there did occur 
several battles between the Franks and Muslim emirs including the Artukids, but 
there were just as many clashes between the Muslim emirs themselves. These had 
begun already before the Crusades, during the period of interregnum and civil wars 
that followed Malikshah’s death in the Seljukid Empire. In the highly fragmented 
political structure that this situation produced, there were bound to be many conflicts 
among the local emirs who competed to appropriate the distant western lands of the 
disintegrating Seljukid Empire regardless of the presence of the Franks. When the 
latter arrived, moreover, it did not take them long to be fully integrated into the polit-
ical system as Latin “emirs” competing with others, whatever their adversaries’ reli-
gion might be. 
In a way reminiscent of Turan’s thesis, Ali Sevim argues that the small 
Artukid states of Hisn Kaifa and Mardin managed to expand their territories through 
                                                 
11
 Turan, Doğu Anadolu Türk Devletleri, 218. 
 43 
the “victories they had won against the Crusaders,” in addition to the turmoil in the 
Seljukid Empire. This view does not seem more tenable either. It is sufficient to con-
sider how many battles the Artukids undertook against the Franks in the first twenty 
years of their rule in Diyar Bakr, up to the Battle of Ager Sanguinis in 1119, and how 
many of these they won. Indeed the only victory they scored before 1119 was in the 
Battle of Harran in 1104. Between these years their only undertaking against the 
Franks was the participation of Ilghazi, the lord of Mardin, in a campaign launched 
by the Seljukids in 1110. And in the subsequent campaigns this emir only sent a con-
tingent under his son or even allied openly with the Franks against the sultan’s army. 
So once again we see that it was not primarily fighting against the Franks that ena-
bled the Artukids to establish their rule in Diyar Bakr. Rather, it was their rivalry 
with other local emirs for the spoils of the western part of the Seljukid Empire, which 
was disintegrating fast in the course of the internecine conflicts during the interreg-
num period.
13
 As Claude Cahen points out, by playing a “perpetual double game” in 
these internecine conflicts, the Artukids constantly strove to acquire autonomous ter-
ritories, which led to the result that the earlier fragmentation of the region gradually 
gave way to a territorial concentration in their benefit.
 14
 
These points having been made, now let us turn to examine the family’s first 
contacts with the newly arrived Franks. 
2.2 The participation of the Artukid emirs in the battles before Antioch  
The Artukids confronted the Franks for the first time in North Syria. Here 
Sokman fought against them during the Latin siege of Antioch, when he fought for 
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Ridwan of Aleppo in the Battle of the Lake. Then, along with the other Artukids, he 
joined Kerbogha’s army in the Battle of Antioch. Already before these battles, how-
ever, Sokman had made a fateful impact on the course of the war against the Franks: 
Ibn al-Adim relates that Ridwan, Sokman, Yaghi Siyan of Antioch and other emirs 
had assembled at Shaziar to attack Hims, where the atabek Janah al-Dawla had taken 
refuge after falling out of Ridwan’s favor. At this point they received a series of mes-
sages warning that a Frankish army was threatening Antioch. Yaghi Siyan, “the wis-
est amongst them” according to Ibn al-Adim, proposed to return to his city and come 
to grips with the Franks. But Sokman objected, declaring that it would be advisable 
to march to Diyar Bakr first to take the region from the Franks.
15
 “Once we gather 
strength in this country,” he reportedly said, “I shall leave my family there, and we 
shall return to Hims.” This disagreement led to the result that Ridwan returned to 
Aleppo in haste, angry with both Sokman and Yaghi Siyan.
16
  
Basing himself on this account of Ibn al-Adim, Ali Sevim writes that in ob-
jection to Yaghi Siyan’s advice to go directly to the aid of Antioch, Sokman pro-
posed to go first to Diyar Bakr to collect soldiers and return with them to confront 
the Franks. He regrets that the other emirs did not accept what he describes as the 
idea of establishing a strong line of defense against the Crusaders with the Turko-
mans of Diyar Bakr. He argues further that the following events justified Sokman, 
pointing out that the troops Sokman collected from Diyar Bakr were to score great 
victories against the Crusaders. He concludes that because of this dissension no final 
agreement was reached and a strong line of defense could not be established against 
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the Crusaders.
17
 As we just saw, however, Ibn al-Adim himself does not quite report 
that Sokman spoke of establishing a strong line of defence against the Crusaders. In 
Ibn al-Adim’s version, he only seems to have proposed to recover the region con-
quered by the Franks, and then to return with the troops collected there to attack Ja-
nah al-Dawla in Hims.  
Thus, contrary to Sevim’s argument, Sokman’s real intention was not to de-
fend Antioch better, but rather to persuade the other emirs to use the army at hand to 
recover and expand his territories in Diyar Bakr against the Franks. Indeed Imad al-
Din Khalil remarks that Sokman’s proposal only served to reveal to others his urgent 
desire to occupy Diyar Bakr and to make it both a military base for himself and a 
safe country to settle for the Artukids. He attributes this desire to Sokman’s realiza-
tion of the futility of continuing to rely on Jerusalem as a fixed center, considering its 
proximity to the Fatimids who coveted it after the arrival of the Crusaders. He adds 
that Sokman’s focus on Diyar Bakr was to remain the cornerstone of Artukid policy 
in the decades to follow.
18
 Under these conditions, Sokman’s allies seem to have 
been justified in rejecting his proposal: hurrying to Antioch before the Franks would 
be able to besiege it was obviously a much more urgent task, given the strategically 
central importance of the city that would potentially enable its conquerors to threaten 
the entire region. In this light Sokman’s offer emerges as a principal cause of the dis-
sension and dispersal of the emirs and the resulting failure of the Muslims to hurry to 
the defence of Antioch. 
It should be noted that Sevim is more faithful to Ibn al-Adim in his article on 
Sokman in İslâm Ansiklopedisi.19 There he simply states that a dissension broke out 
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among the emirs on account of Sokman’s proposal to go to seize Diyar Bakr rather 
than to set out immediately for Antioch. He neither attempts to represent this idea as 
a better strategy for defending Antioch, nor accuses the other emirs for declining it. 
Thus Sokman’s responsibility in the Muslims’ failure to defend Antioch effectively 
becomes clear.  
Taking advantage of this failure, the Crusaders laid siege to the city, and it 
was during that siege that Sokman confronted the Franks for the first time. Ibn al-
Adim makes it clear that he was among the emirs sent by Ridwan to Antioch against 
the Crusaders. As the latter camped before the city and raided the territory of Aleppo, 
he relates, Yaghi Siyan’s son came to Aleppo to ask for aid. Upon this Ridwan de-
cided to overcome his old resentment against Yaghi Siyan, and sent the troops of 
Aleppo along with Sokman to Antioch. But these forces “confronted the Franks in an 
unprepared condition,” Ibn al-Adim states, and withdrew to Harim. They soon aban-
doned this position as well, and its control passed to the Armenians. On his return 
from this expedition Sokman left Ridwan’s side to join the latter’s brother and rival, 
Dukak of Damascus.
20
 Sokman’s role in the failure to prevent the siege, and now his 
lack of success in raising it, could have been a cause of this rupture between him and 
Ridwan, at least as far as the latter was concerned. The reason for Sokman’s defeat in 
the Battle of the Lake was that the Franks had been warned beforehand by the Chris-
tian peasants in the region. Thanks to this, they were able to keep an eye on the Turks 
in the citadel of Antioch and at the same time to rout Sokman and the Aleppans near 
Jisr al-Hadid. The debacle was not quite compensated by the defeat of a group of 
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Armenians from the territory of Tell Bashir who had come to plunder the west of the 
Butnan valley, lying to the northeast of Aleppo.
21
 
Sokman also participated in the great Battle of Antioch and fought under 
Kerbogha’s command, along with the other Artukids. While Ibn al-Adim mentions 
only Sokman in his account,
22
 Ibn al-Athir counts among the participants, beside 
Sokman, a certain Sulaiman ibn Artuk,
23
 who is probably the same as Fulcher’s 
“Amisoliman.” 24 As no son of Artuk with this name is recorded, there is reason to 
believe that this Sulaiman was rather a son of Ilghazi, with the title Shams al-Dawla. 
He later became the governor of Aleppo for a short period, but then revolted and was 
dismissed by his father.
25
 In his study on Sokman’s career26 Sevim states that 
Sulaiman was the emir of Sinjar at this time, but in his encyclopaedia article he men-
tions him as the emir of Samosata instead.
27
 This issue is of some importance, for 
according to Albert of Aachen it was a certain Balduk who ruled Samosata at the 
time,
28
 and there is some possibility that the two persons might be the same. This 
point will be discussed more closely in the following section. Beside Sulaiman Al-
bert also mentions Belek ibn Behram ibn Artuk, the emir of Saruj, as an Artukid par-
ticipant on the Muslim side. Among these members of the Artukid family we only 
know of the role played by Sokman during the battle itself from Ibn al-Athir’s ac-
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count. According to this chronicler, Kerbogha prevented the Muslim emirs from at-
tacking the Franks as they were going out of the city, and the Muslims were com-
pletely routed as a result.  He asserts that Sokman had been lying in an ambush with 
Kerbogha and Janah al-Dawla of Hims, and together with them he was one of the last 
to withdraw; the other emirs had abandoned the battlefield due to their irritation with 
Kerbogha’s imperious attitude toward them.29 
2.3 The relations between Balduk of Samosata and Baldwin of Edessa 
We hear more about emir Balduk of Samosata in connection with the strug-
gles of Baldwin of Boulogne with the Turks around Edessa. The first of these con-
frontations took place before Baldwin had reached Edessa. Fulcher of Chartres, a di-
rect witness of the events, relates how Baldwin accepted a request of help from 
Thoros, the ruler of Edessa, against the Turks and, setting out with a small contingent 
of eighty knights, crossed the Euphrates. It is worthwhile to quote Fulcher’s first-
hand testimony at some length: 
After we had crossed this river we went on very hastily all night and, very 
much afraid, passed between the Saracen towns which were scattered about. 
When the Turks who were in the fortified town of Samosata heard this, they 
set ambushes for us on the way through which they thought we would go. But 
on the following night a certain Armenian carefully sheltered us in his castle. 
He warned us to guard against these snares of the enemy, and for this reason 
we hid there for two days. But on the third day the Turks, irked by such de-
lay, rushed down upon us from their place of hiding and with flags flying gal-
loped in front of the castle in which we were located and before our eyes 
drove off as plunder the livestock which they found in the pastures. We went 
out against them, but because we were few we were unable to contend with 
them… Then the enemy left, but we remained there. On the following day we 
resumed our journey. When we were passing by the towns of the Armenians, 
you would have been amazed to see them coming humbly to meet us, carry-
ing crosses and banners, and kissing our feet and garments for the love of 
God because they had heard that we were going to protect them against the 
Turks under whose yoke they had been long oppressed.30  
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We learn the precise context of the Franks’ task from Albert’s account.31 
Shortly after Baldwin’s arrival in Edessa, he relates, Thoros asked him to gather all 
his forces and, taking along a number of Edessenes, to advance against the castle of 
Samosata which had formerly belonged to Edessa. Here they were to fight Emir Bal-
duk, who had attacked and captured this castle some time before. According to Al-
bert, the reason for this request was the fact that Balduk had inflicted “intolerable 
evils” on the people of Edessa. By threats he had taken as hostage the sons of many 
noble families in the city, so that he would secure the payment of the annual taxes 
and tributes that he demanded from the Christians to let them cultivate the vines and 
grain fields in the region. Baldwin was unwilling to turn down this first request of the 
duke and elders of the city, Albert states, so that he mustered his two hundred com-
panions as well as the entire army of Edessa, and advanced upon Samosata.  
William of Tyre, who mainly draws upon Albert, offers a slightly different 
version of the events.
32
 According to him Balduk, “a valiant warrior but a tricky and 
wicked man,” doubled the tribute and taxes on the fields of the Edessenes and bur-
dened them with services, ensuring their cooperation by holding their children as 
hostages. Adding a detail that seems calculated to render the story more poignant, he 
states that these children were “forced under conditions of extreme inhumanity to 
serve him like slaves with bricks and clay.” Another slight change apparently meant 
to increase the emotional impact of Albert’s story is that in William’s version it is not 
Thoros and the elders who request help from Baldwin, but the entire population of 
the city. He relates how they tearfully embraced Baldwin’s knees and implored him 
to save them from the tyranny of Balduk and to rescue their children from their pre-
dicament.  
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Albert and William proceed to relate that Baldwin arrived before Samosata 
and began to attack the walls, only to be thrown back by Balduk and his men who 
sent forth a shower of arrows. Albert attributes this defeat to the “weak and thought-
less” fighting of the numerous Armenian troops, who he says were totally routed as a 
result, whereas only six of Baldwin’s knights fell struck by arrows. When Baldwin 
saw that Samosata was impregnable and “garrisoned by the most warlike and stead-
fast Turks,” in Albert’s words, he left behind most of his knights in the nearby castle 
of Saint John, telling them to resist the Turks tirelessly and to harass them by contin-
uous fight. After this he returned with only twelve men to Edessa.
 
 
Matthew of Edessa, however, offers a quite different version of the events.
33
 
He relates that upon Baldwin’s arrival in Edessa Thoros gave him presents and made 
an alliance with him. Shortly after Constantine of Gargar arrived too, and a few days 
later Thoros sent them to attack Balduk and Samosata, taking along the troops of the 
city as well as the infantry forces of the whole region. Arriving before Samosata the 
Christians began to plunder the houses outside its walls, while the Turks did not dare 
to go outside for battle. But when the latter saw that all the Christian troops had 
joined the plunder, Matthew relates, three hundred of their horsemen made a sortie 
and defeated all the Christians. Both the Franks together and the Armenian infantry 
accompanying were put to flight. Matthew notes that from Samosata up to Tell 
Hamdun as many as one thousand men were slaughtered. After this Baldwin and 
Constantine returned to Edessa.  
Işın Demirkent questions the veracity of Matthew’s version, arguing that if 
Baldwin and the Franks had met with so great a failure in this case, the following de-
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velopments would not have been in their favor as they were in the event. Therefore 
she considers Albert’s version to be the more plausible one, although he was writing 
in distant Germany whereas Matthew was a local observer.
34
 But the rout and slaugh-
ter described by Matthew may in fact have involved the local Christian troops only, 
rather than the Franks, and indeed this seems to be corroborated by the remark of Al-
bert that it was the Armenian troops who were routed, while only six Franks were 
killed. 
Albert proceeds to relate that after a plot in Edessa that had resulted in 
Thoros’ death and Baldwin’s accession, Balduk grew apprehensive that the Franks 
might deprive him of Samosata by a protracted siege. Accordingly he sent envoys to 
Baldwin and offered to sell the castle for ten thousand Bezants. Additionally he 
promised to do military service if an agreement was made to this effect.
35
 Baldwin 
did not pay heed to Balduk’s offer at first, stating that the emir had seized the castle 
unjustly from the Christians. When Balduk perceived Baldwin’s pride and inexora-
bility, Albert relates, he changed tactics and threatened to burn down the castle, be-
head the numerous Edessene hostages he held, and to set traps for Baldwin day and 
night if his offer was not accepted. Listening to the counsel of his men, Baldwin fi-
nally agreed and sent Balduk a talent of gold and silver, expensive purpure clothing 
and horses and mules. Having purchased Samosata in this way, he installed a strong 
garrison in the castle and restored the hostages he found there to the elders and citi-
zens of Edessa.  
We have seen William’s emphasis on the predicament of the hostage children 
as the cause of the  expedition. Building on it, he writes that the children’s rescue 
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added greatly to the prestige of Baldwin, who won with this feat “such high favor 
from the citizens of Edessa that, thenceforward, they regarded him not only as lord 
but as father and were ready to fight to the death for his welfare and glory.”  
As for Balduk, Albert reports that he became a vassal of Baldwin, was re-
ceived in a friendly manner at his house, and even joined his immediate retinue. 
René Grousset, who was always eager to demonstrate the excellent skills of adapta-
tion supposedly displayed by the Crusaders, the earliest proponents of benign French 
colonialism in his eyes, comments on this passage:  
A Turkish emir living in the entourage of a Latin baron, in the manner of his 
knights: could there be a more striking example of the speedy adaptation of 
the crusaders to the oriental milieu, of the facility, too, with which the Mus-
lim world itself accepted the fact of the Frankish conquest?
36
  
But the outcome of the experiment showed that this process of mutual adaptation and 
acceptance was in fact neither so easy nor so speedy, for Albert continues his account 
in a quite different vein: “Since the heathens and the Christians could not unite and 
both parties mutually mistrusted each other,” he states, Baldwin demanded Balduk to 
give his wife and children as hostages to ensure his loyalty. Although Balduk seemed 
to accept this demand,  he came up everyday with a new pretext for postponing its 
fulfillment.
37
 As we shall see, this procrastination eventually led to his execution, 
when Baldwin’s confidence in his Turkish friends was undermined further by Bel-
ek’s attempt to trap him. 
The identity of Balduk has not been fully clarified. While Ibn al-Adim states 
that Samosata was in the hands of Sulaiman ibn Ilghazi,
38
 Matthew and the Latin 
chroniclers assert that it belonged to a certain Balduk, son of “Emir Ghazi.” After 
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noting this discrepancy, Osman Turan suggests that both Ibn al-Adim’s account and 
the course of the events imply that Balduk was from the Artukid family as well, and 
that like other Artukids he had carved out a lordship for himself in this region.
 
Up to 
this point his suggestion seems plausible, and is also supported by Cahen, who notes 
that around the same time as Sokman took Saruj and installed his nephew Belek 
there in 1096. Ilghazi may have occupied Samosata and given it to Balduk, if the lat-
ter was indeed an Artukid.
39
 The other possibility, that Balduk was a son of Ghazi 
Danishmend, seems remote, as Samosata remained too far to the south of the Dan-
ishmendids’ sphere of activity. But then Turan proceeds to argue that Balduk had in 
fact two names according to the custom of the age, the Islamic Sulaiman and the 
Turkish Balduk. When Balduk’s father “Emir Ghazi” is identified as Ilghazi, he 
claims, Balduk turns out to be none other than Shams al-Dawla Sulaiman, the only 
son of Ilghazi to carry this Islamic name.
40
 Nevertheless, this cannot be true, for 
Ilghazi could not have had two sons with the same name Sulaiman, and although 
Balduk was executed by Baldwin in 1099, Shams al-Dawla Sulaiman died only in 
1124. So even if Balduk was an Artukid and a son of Ilghazi, he could not have been 
the same person as Ilghazi’s son known by the name of Shams al-Dawla Sulaiman. 
Evidently Turan did not see or consider the mention of Balduk in the Anon-
ymous Syriac chronicle, where he is interestingly called “Ghazi, a Turk of the 
Baladukia.” As noted by Gibb in the relevant footnote, this passage suggests that 
Balduk was the name of a family or territory rather than an individual.
41
 Indeed such 
a group does find mention in Ibn al-Athir’s al-Kamil among the events of the year 
513/1119-20, where the historian writes about certain “Baladukiyya Turks” and two 
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emirs of theirs, Sungur Alp and Ali ibn Sokman. The latter had seized Basra in this 
year. Apparently Ali’s father Sokman was not the same as Sokman ibn Artuk, who 
has no son with this name in Ibn al-Azraq’s genealogy.42  
Basing herself on these two sources, Işın Demirkent has put forward an alter-
native theory about Balduk’s identity.43 She contends that there were in fact two dif-
ferent individuals, confused and called with the common name of “Balduk” by the 
historians. The first of these was indeed Sulaiman ibn Ilghazi, the emir who success-
fully resisted Baldwin in the first expedition to Samosata. The second was the chief 
of a group of “Baladukiyya” Turkomans in Samosata, who had been entrusted with 
the castle by Sulaiman when the latter went to the Battle of Antioch. After the defeat 
of the Muslims and before Sulaiman’s return to Samosata, this “Baladukiyya” leader 
felt compelled to surrender it to Baldwin; the latter’s power having been bolstered in 
the meanwhile by the Frankish victory. Indeed Demirkent challenges the general 
consensus, based on Albert of Aachen, that the surrender occurred shortly after 
Baldwin’s accession and quite long before the Battle of Antioch. She points out that 
Baldwin’s initial rejection of Balduk’s offer would show that the event took place 
after the debacle of the Muslim army, since only by that time would Baldwin have 
been sufficiently confident of his powers to do so.
 
 
Although Demirkent’s theory seems like an attractive explanation at first 
sight, it fails to explain why Sulaiman ibn Ilghazi did not immediately return to Sa-
mosata after the battle, which he would have been expected to do in order to secure it 
against any possible attacks after the disaster. Moreover, it seems implausible that a 
deputy of Sulaiman would have acted on his own to enter into negotiations with the 
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Franks to sell the city. Under these considerations, it seems more sensible to assume 
that Sulaiman had preferred to withdraw to a safer place after the disaster, now that 
Samsota was in much too exposed a position. He may have granted it to a deputy, 
Balduk, particularly if the latter was also an Artukid, and the latter may have pro-
ceeded to sell it to the Franks on seeing the impossibility of holding it. Alternatively, 
Sulaiman may have instructed him to start negotiations in his own name.  
As for the question of Balduk’s identity, this must remain in doubt. At least it 
can be said that he probably belonged to the Artukid family, may have been a son of 
Ilghazi who did not find mention in Ibn al-Azraq’s genealogy because of his early 
death, enjoyed the leadership of a group of “Baladukiyya” Turkomans around Samo-
sata, and served Ilghazi’s son Sulaiman.   
2.4 The loss of Saruj to Baldwin of Edessa  
After Samosata, the Artukids suffered a second important loss in the region, 
Saruj. By capturing Saruj, the Franks gained control of the route which connected 
Edessa to Tell Bashir, Ravendan and Antioch, and thereby consolided their control 
over the territory of the County. According to Runciman, the fall of the city also 
served as a warning to the Muslims that the County of Edessa was a power to be tak-
en seriously. So much so that Kerbogha, on his way to Antioch, lost valuable time 
besieging Edessa in a futile attempt to remove this Frankish base. Hence Runciman 
argues that the fall of Saruj led indirectly to the capture of Antioch by the Crusad-
ers.
44
  
Nevertheless, this interesting connection is not acceptable on closer inspec-
tion. Işın Demirkent demonstrates that not only Samosata but also Saruj was occu-
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pied by the Franks only after the Battle of Antioch, and not following the establish-
ment of the County of Edessa as Runciman and Cahen accepted.
45
 She points out that 
the proliferation of the Franks in the region as reported by Albert took place only af-
ter the capture of Antioch when an epidemic that began to rage there persuaded many 
distinguished Franks to travel to Edessa and enter Baldwin’s service. Apparently 
conclusive evidence on this issue is supplied by Albert’s mention of a certain Fulcher 
of Chartres (different from the historian with the same name) among the newcomers. 
According to Raimund of Aguilers, this man had been the first Frankish knight to 
climb the walls of Antioch on the night of its capture,
46
 and Albert dates his arrival in 
Edessa to August 1098. As he also reports that Baldwin entrusted this Fulcher with 
the command of Saruj after its occupation, it becomes clear that the town could not 
have been taken before August 1098.  
In the same connection, Demirkent also points out that it must have been 
these hundreds of newcomers from Antioch who enabled Baldwin to occupy Samo-
sata and Saruj at all, for he had few men on his first arrival in Edessa. Indeed Albert 
states explicitly that Baldwin was able to take control of the entire region thanks to 
these reinforcements.
47
 Monique Amouroux-Mourad similarly argues that it was only 
thanks to the reinforcements fleeing the plague in Antioch and arriving in groups of 
fifty to a hundred that Baldwin managed to bring the entire region including Saruj 
under his authority as well as to strike deals with the Turkish emirs in the region.
48
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How the strategically important city of Saruj passed into the hands of the 
Franks is not entirely clear. According to Albert’s account,49 all began when Belek 
summoned Baldwin to aid him against his rebellious Muslim subjects in the town. 
Because of the growth of Baldwin’s power and the spread of his fame as a result of 
his succesful campaigns, Belek dispatched envoys to the count. He requested him to 
gather all his forces and march upon the town. Baldwin was to overcome the re-
sistance of the rebellious inhabitants, and having gained control of the town, restore 
the citadel to Belek. Albert notes that the inhabitants in question were Muslims who 
resisted the emir and scorned to pay tribute to him. He relates that Baldwin trusted 
Belek’s words and the two princes mutually swore oaths. Baldwin then prepared to 
besiege the city with all his troops and to keep attacking it until the populace would 
yield and agree to pay the tribute as before. But the latter, hearing of this, bought the 
aid of Balduk and other Turks to help them defend the walls of the town. Albert af-
firms that Balduk was “corrupted for long by greed,”  and so immediately marched 
with his troops to Saruj, hoping to take advantage of this opportunity to become the 
new master of the city. 
However Baldwin had got wind of this and set out without further delay to 
besiege Saruj, taking along a great amount of siege equipment including mangonels. 
Albert states that the Muslim populace grew fearful upon hearing of the count’s mili-
tary power and formidabe equipment, and so sent him envoys. These bid him to 
come and take over the city without any resistance, and also promised to pay the an-
nual tribute to him rather than to Belek. Baldwin allowed himself to be persuaded by 
their request, and a peaceful agreement was reached. Before long, Albert asserts, the 
town was in Baldwin’s hands and its inhabitants became his tribute-paying subjects. 
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Upon this Belek placed the citadel under Baldwin’s control, while Baldwin in turn 
entrusted it, along with the town, to Fulcher of Chartres, “a warlike man and very 
skillful in battle” in Albert’s words. 
In the face of this situation, Albert continues, Balduk felt the need to adopt a 
new policy, and going from Saruj to Edessa, approached Baldwin with “feigned loy-
alty.” “Do not believe that I marched to Saruj in order to help the citizens there 
against you,” he reportedly said. “I went there rather in order to hold them back from 
the rebellion they had launched, using all arts of persuasion, and to render them will-
ing subjects and tribute-payers to you.” Albert states that Baldwin did not believe the 
emir in the least, but still listened to his words patiently and allowed him to remain in 
his retinue after the apology.
 
 
Albert’s tale about a Muslim emir summoning Baldwin to aid against the 
Muslim inhabitants of his own city seems have appeared rather puzzling and uncon-
vincing to Wiliam of Tyre, who therefore simplified it in his account.
50
 According to 
him, the reason for Baldwin’s campaign against Saruj was that its ruler Belek was 
continually harassing Edessa and inflicting “grievous wrongs” upon it. Consequently, 
the townsfolk had entreated Baldwin to gather an army and move against it. This ex-
planation clearly bears a remarkable resemblance to the reason William had put for-
ward for Baldwin’s previous campaign against Balduk of Samosata, so it seems like-
ly that William found Albert’s explanation of the campaign implausible and pre-
ferred to model his own on the previous campaign against Samosata. Probably the 
same grounds also led William to assert that the townsfolk surrendered upon Bald-
win’s attack, while according to Albert the mere news of Baldwin’s approach with a 
great army and much equipment had sufficed to persuade them. William omits to 
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mention Fulcher of Chartres’ name when reporting the appointment of a governor 
over the town, but reveals that he was one of those who had carried out the peace ne-
gotiations. Before concluding his account William, with his usual insight, offers a 
still valid analysis of the consequences of the campaign. He observes that the occu-
pation of Saruj opened up the communications between Antioch and Edessa, for its 
midway position on the route between Edessa and the Euphrates had up to that time 
formed a hindrance to those going back and forth. 
An independent account that is also free of the more puzzling aspects of Al-
bert’s story is provided by the Anonymous Syriac Chronicle.51 The Anonymous 
notes that Saruj was a prosperous town at this time, inhabited by a great number of 
Muslims and Christians and frequented by many merchants of note. It was also situ-
ated in a valley that was rich and populous itself, full of hamlets. However, despite 
these advantages, the Anonymous reports that it was harried on two sides, both by 
the Franks of Edessa and the Armenians living under Frankish suzerainty near the 
river Euphrates. “As Belek realized that Saruj could not continue in the midst of 
Christian lands,” the chronicler states, “he sent an embassy to Baldwin of Edessa, 
offering to surrender Saruj if terms were agreed to and established by oath.” Baldwin 
agreed to the offer, and Saruj was delivered to him together with its citadel. The 
Anonymous corroborates the appointment of Fulcher (“Putshir”) as governor, and 
adds that this man grew rich and strong through the extortions he inflicted on the 
Muslim population.  
The most important point on which the Anonymous diverges from the previ-
ous accounts is his failure to mention any rebellious attitude on the part of the towns-
folk in Saruj. But some sort of unrest does seem to have existed among the inhabit-
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ants of the town: the geographer Ibn Shaddad relates in his description of Saruj
52
 that 
Belek treated the Christians of the city cruelly, confiscating their properties. The lat-
ter were not able to tolerate these oppressions any longer, and therefore called the 
count of Edessa to surrender the town to him. This could perhaps be connected to the 
Anonymous’s report about Fulcher’s extortions from the Muslim populace; these 
may have been undertaken as some sort of retaliation, at the instigation of the local 
Christians who had suffered under Belek’s regime.  
It is time now to ask what result emerges from these contradictory accounts. 
Most modern historians of the Crusades have accepted Albert’s account without 
much ado, and have made inferences from it about Muslim-Frankish relations around 
this time. Thus Grousset and Runciman consider Belek’s request of aid from Bald-
win as evidence showing that the Muslims regarded the count as a mere adventurer 
like Roussel Bailleul, whose services they supposed were hireable at will.
53
 Howev-
er, William of Tyre seems justified in having felt uneasy about Albert’s account and 
sought another explanation for Baldwin’s summons to Saruj. Questionable above all 
is Albert’s assertion that it was the Muslim rather than the Christian population who 
rebelled against Belek. If there was really an insurrection, it is much more likely to 
have come from the Christian element which is indeed confirmed by the report of Ibn 
Shaddad. Moreover, as Demirkent points out, it would have been strange for Belek 
not to accompany Baldwin in a campaign against the town that he wanted to bring 
back under his control by chastising its rebellious populace. Accordingly Demirkent 
argues that Belek could not have played any role in the launching of Baldwin’s cam-
paign and even that he might have been away from the region, for the Muslim popu-
lace had turned to Balduk rather than the warlike Belek for support against Bald-
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win.
54
 Of course this choice of theirs would have been perfectly comprehensible if it 
was indeed Belek who called Baldwin against them, but as we have already seen that 
this is highly unlikely.  
Nevertheless, there is yet another alternative explanation, as revealed by the 
Anonymous, which can be supplemented by the reports of Albert and Ibn Shaddad 
about the insurrection by a part of the townsfolk. It yields such a reconstruction of 
the events: the Franks as well as the Armenians under their protection began to har-
rass Saruj continuously, with the ultimate purpose of removing this obstacle on the 
Frankish line of communications between Edessa, Tell Bashir and Antioch. Under 
these conditions, the Christian populace of the town grew confident enough to refuse 
paying the heavy taxes imposed upon them by Belek, and sought aid from outside to 
get rid of their Muslim lord and evade his confiscations. This meant that Belek would 
be deprived of the financial means required to organize the defense of the town just 
at a time when it was being pressed hard from outside. He must also have perceived 
that the danger of its betrayal from inside was increasing. In view of this situation, he 
regarded it best to follow the precedent of Balduk and hand over the town to the 
Franks for some profit before it was seized by force or treachery. Accordingly, he 
offered to sell it to Baldwin, who agreed. 
As the latter went to take over the town, however, the Muslim majority, fear-
ful perhaps of a massacre, refused to submit to the terms agreed by their lord and the 
count. Instead they turned for help to the only suitable Muslim alternative they could 
find in the region, Balduk, and offered to make him their new ruler. However, Bald-
win’s military superiority became clear through an actual attack he made, or perhaps 
by the news of the great forces and equipment he had assembled. When the count 
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gave new guarantees of safe conduct upon this the Muslim population finally yield-
ed, perhaps also persuaded by the fear of a betrayal by the Christians in the town. As 
a result no alternative was left for Balduk but to knock on Baldwin’s door with apol-
ogies. The count did not immediately take measures against the emir, but preferred to 
wait for a more opportune moment to act against him.  
Michael Köhler points out that the treaty between Belek and Baldwin, what-
ever its exact contents might have been, was a significant event, just as the previous 
agreement between Balduk and the count had been. For it represented one of the ear-
liest cases of peaceful contact between the Muslims and Franks, involving the con-
clusion of a sworn peace treaty that incorporated promises of a mainly financial na-
ture.
55
 Nevertheless, there is some possibility that Baldwin failed to fulfill at least 
part of the terms, for Albert asserts that in return for the town Belek failed to receive 
anything from him.
 56
  
The Artukids did not give up their claims on Saruj for good. Beside setting a 
trap for Baldwin (see the next section), they undertook a direct assault on the town to 
take it back (1101).  They might also have been called by the Muslim populace to 
rescue them from subjection to the Franks.
57
 The Artukids were probably encouraged 
in this undertaking by the capture of Bohemond and the change of counts in Edessa 
in the previous year.
58
 Imad al-Din Khalil draws attention to the important fact that 
they thus became the first Muslim power to venture an armed clash with the Franks 
established in Northern Syria and the Jazira.
59
 The most detailed account of this 
campaign is found in the Anonymous Syriac Chronicle, which we shall supplement 
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with reports from the other sources, notably Matthew of Edessa, wherever appropri-
ate.
60
 Although the expedition took place only in January 1101, that is more than two 
years after Saruj had fallen to the Franks, the Anonymous starts his account right af-
ter the report of that former event: “When Sokman ibn Artuk, uncle of Belek, heard 
that the Franks had taken Saruj,” the chronicler relates, “he gathered a great army 
and besieged it, relying on the number of Muslims in the town.” It is by no means 
astonishing that there was still a great number of Muslims in the town by this time. 
The Franks had been levying poll-tax on the Muslim population of the town, but they 
did not exercise any forcible conversion or impose other religious restrictions. As 
Runciman points out, this was at any rate inevitable for a town where the Muslims 
constituted an overwhelming majority.
61
 
The Anonymous goes on to relate that Baldwin marched to fight Sokman 
when he heard of the siege, but then fell into an ambush from which he could scarce-
ly escape to Edessa. Fulcher himself, the Latin lord of Saruj, was taken captive in the 
same incident. Matthew of Edessa, another indigenous source on the event, attributes 
this initial defeat of the Franks to their “carelessness and negligence.” Differently 
from the Anonymous, he states that the lord of Saruj was killed rather than captured.  
The Anonymous proceeds to relate that Baldwin crossed the Euphrates and 
went “in fear” to Antioch in order to raise an army of relief. Matthew reports that in 
the meanwhile Sokman besieged Saruj once again and came to an agreement with its 
inhabitants. These must have been the Muslims of the town, for the Anonymous 
notes that all the Christians had gone up to the citadel with Papias, the Frankish bish-
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op of Edessa, who happened to be at Saruj at the time. Stores had also been collected 
in the citadel. Al-Azimi and Ibn al-Qalanisi, exact contemporaries of the event like 
Matthew, both state explicitly that Sokman captured Saruj, so it can be assumed that 
the Muslims received the Turks into the city while the Christians sought refuge in the 
citadel. This is supported by the Anonymous’s report that the Christians were be-
sieged there by the Turks who attacked them fiercely.  
While this fighting went on day and night, the Anonymous continues, a mes-
sage from Baldwin reached those in the citadel, telling them to get ready to go on in 
the offensive. Matthew notes that twenty five days had passed by the time Baldwin 
returned to Saruj in order to “harass the wicked Persian army.” At dawn a two-
pronged attack was made, one from the citadel and the other from the Franks who 
had arrived before the city. The Turks were severely defeated, with many dead, and 
their camp was plundered. According to Ibn al-Qalanisi, their defeat was caused by 
the flight of a group of Turkomans just when they were on the point of victory. Sok-
man lost heart as a result and retired.  
The Anonymous goes on to relate that the Franks besieged Saruj after the de-
feat. Fearful of a massacre again, the Muslims denied them entry despite the promis-
es of safe conduct given them. Evidently, they hoped to be able to keep the town till 
the arrival of a Turkish relief force. But before that they were massacred by the 
Franks, who first warned the Christians inside to wear a badge of the cross and then 
stormed the town, slaying all the Muslims they could find. The Anonymous is cor-
roborated on this point by Ibn al-Qalanisi and Ibn al-Athir, who affirm that nobody 
was spared slaughter or captivity except those who managed to escape. The rich and 
populous town was thus destroyed, and the local Christians were reduced to leading 
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an impoverished life amidst its ruins, around the citadel. This event is also reflected 
in contemporary Arabic literature: the likeable rake Abu Zaid, the protagonist Al-
Hariri’s famous Maqamat, is originally a native of Saruj. He is reported to have left 
that town to lead the life of a wanderer and swindler after he was driven out by “the 
enemy.”62  
2.5 Belek’s unsuccesful plot against Baldwin of Edessa 
Before Sokman made his full-scale enterprise to recapture Saruj, however, 
Belek had already attempted to achieve the same result through a trap he set for 
Baldwin of Boulogne, around the end of 1098. The story of this incident is related by 
Albert
 
 of Aachen and also by William of Tyre who follows him.
63
 Like the preced-
ing story of Baldwin and Balduk, it shows the existence of close contacts between 
Muslims and Franks at this early period, while it also reveals that these contacts were 
far from adding up to a peaceful co-existence based on mutual confidence; in fact 
they rather tended to produce conflict.  
The mistrust of each other by the Franks and Muslims is also reflected in Al-
bert’s view of Belek: he asserts that the emir’s heart was “full of deceit” towards the 
Franks who arrived in the region after the capture of Antioch, for in the face of their 
proliferation he despaired of being able to receive something in return for Saruj, or to 
take it back from Baldwin. Therefore, Albert relates, he pondered in silence a way of 
destroying Baldwin through cunning and finally hit upon a “mean way of deception” 
by which he hoped to do away with the count. Pretending that his heart was full of 
purity and loyalty, he went to Baldwin and offered to surrender his person and family 
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as well as his remaining castle, Amacha.
64
 He praised the Count as “a man of great 
power and intelligence” who knew well how to reward those willing to pay tribute 
and do military service to him. Evidently, Belek proposed here to do exactly what 
Balduk had done before him, following the latter’s precedent of a Turkish emir serv-
ing a Frankish prince. This precedent must have assured Belek that his offer would 
not arouse suspicions in the count’s mind. Rather than Belek’s success in feigning 
sincere loyalty, it must also have been what primarily led the count to swallow the 
bait and accept the offer gladly.  
Albert goes on to relate that Belek and Baldwin agreed on a day for the deliv-
ery of Amacha. He deplores that Belek “had not given up his deceitful plan” and so 
hid a hundred men in the castle as the agreed day approached; his purpose was to 
seize the count as soon as he had set foot in the castle. Baldwin finally arrived with 
two hundred men, and Belek, “full of deceit and honey-sweet, flattering words” as 
Albert puts it, began to work on him. He begged the count to enter the fortress with a 
few men to take control of it; if he desired so, he could then garrison it with the most 
loyal of his followers. Baldwin gave full credence to the flattering words of the emir 
and prepared to choose the men who would accompany him into the castle. But he 
was taken aside at this point by those of his companions who were less at ease about 
placing so much confidence in the words of an “infidel;” they vehemently advised 
against entering the castle so trustfully, accompanied by only a few troops and with-
out receiving hostages. Evidently, the same tensions and mistrust were at play here as 
in the case of Balduk, which had finally led Baldwin to demand hostages from the 
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emir in his retinue. Therefore, pace Grousset and Köhler,65 it seems too early at this 
period to speak of the establishment of a well-functioning modus vivendi between the 
Franks and the Muslims. The agreements concluded between the two sides still stood 
on flimsy foundations because of a justified lack of trust that the other party would 
loyally observe its terms.  
Indeed the suspicious Franks who after long disputations managed to dis-
suade the count from entering the castle proved right according to Albert. They 
agreed that Baldwin would wait below in the valley with his companions, while 
twelve of his most trusted men would enter the castle to take it over. Once inside the 
castle, these walked straightaway into the ambush prepared beforehand by Belek, and 
only two were able to escape from the surprise attack of a hundred Turks previously 
hidden there. Albert relates that the two Franks managed to reach a window and noti-
fy Baldwin waiting below of the trap. But the count could not do anything to rescue 
them, since the castle was perched on a rocky height and no man’s power or ingenui-
ty would suffice to capture it. “Full of lament about the fate of such excellent men,” 
Albert reports, “Baldwin showered Belek with reproaches about his perfidious deceit 
and repeatedly implored him to return the captured men and accept a pound of Byz-
antine gold coins as their ransom.” Nevertheless, Belek would not consent to any-
thing less than the delivery of Saruj. Since this was impossible for Baldwin, on ac-
count of the strategic importance of that stronghold for securing the communications 
of Edessa with Tell Bashir and Antioch, he returned home with empty hands, 
“gloomily and complaining bitterly” as Albert notes. 
Because of this event the course of the relations between the Turks and 
Franks in the Jazira took a decisive turn for the worse according to Albert: “From 
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this day onwards,” he says, “Baldwin began to consider the Turks, their  counsel and 
help as well as their frequent visits, with much hate and suspicion.” The first victim 
of this new state of affairs was Balduk, who still delayed in handing over his wife 
and children as hostages. When the hapless emir dropped in Baldwin’s palace a few 
days later, “full of creeping flattery” as Albert has it, he was caught and beheaded on 
the count’s orders. The next measure Baldwin took was to give a hundred knights to 
Fulcher of Saruj, instructing him to harass Amacha with continuous attacks and so to 
exact revenge for the captive Franks. During the course of the offensive Fulcher 
managed to capture six of Belek’s men in an ambush: these were exchanged for six 
of the prisoners in the emir’s hands. Albert notes that after Baldwin became the king 
of Jerusalem, four of the other six escaped by taking advantage of the negligence of 
the guards, but the remaining two were beheaded on Belek’s orders.  
 
William of Tyre’s account closely follows that of Albert, but with many dif-
ferences in details that shed light on this historian’s view of the relations between 
Muslims and Franks. We have seen that Albert depicted Belek as being full of deceit 
towards the Franks and related the event as the story of the perfidious trick he played 
to recover Saruj. William gives a remarkably different bent to the story, presenting it 
as one of betrayed friendship. He begins his account by pointing out that Belek had 
been allied by treaty with Baldwin, and asserts that the two had been on very friendly 
terms before the arrival in Edessa of great numbers of Franks. Reportedly, their inti-
macy had reached such a degree that Belek pretended to fear other Muslims greatly 
because of his mixing with Christians. But then, William continues, Belek noted a 
marked reduction in Baldwin’s affection towards himself and resented this  change. 
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William attributes Belek’s plot against Baldwin to this feeling of resentment against 
the cooling in the count’s attitude.   
As William relates how Belek tried to persuade the count to enter the castle 
with only a small retinue, he puts into the emir’s mouth a pretext that would render it 
more plausible that he almost succeeded: the risk of harm to Baldwin’s new property 
if all the troops were allowed to enter it and then felt tempted to plunder. We have 
seen that William almost excused Belek for plotting against Baldwin, attributing it to 
his feelings rather than to his deceitfulness as Albert had put it. But he uses a notably 
harsher language than the latter when relating the efforts of Baldwin’s men to warn 
him against Belek’s intentions: “they rightly distrusted the evil designs of the rascal 
and judged it safer that the trial be first made by others.” As soon as these others had 
entered the castle, he states with some vehemence that they “fell victims to the per-
fidious treachery of the wicked Belek.” 
In the passage where William relates how Baldwin reproached Belek and im-
plored him to return his captured men, he interestingly implies that the two princes 
had entered into a formal lord-and-subordinate relationship. There is no hint to this 
effect in his source Albert, who simply reports that Baldwin showered reproaches on 
the emir because of his “perfidious deceit.” In William’s account, on the other hand, 
we are told that the count “earnestly admonished Belek to remember the oath of fi-
delity which he had taken. On the strength of this fealty, he urged him to return the 
prisoners so treacherously seized and to receive instead a large sum of money as ran-
som.” This difference probably has to do with the age in which William lived, for the 
mores of ‘curtesie,’ of chivalry, the world of the knightly romances were already 
flourishing by his time. Albert’s world, on the other hand, was less governed by for-
mality, more rough and ready. 
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Another example of this “courtly” coloring of William’s narrative is notable 
in the passage about Fulcher’s ambush of Belek’s men. In Albert’s original version 
this feat was a fulfillment of the orders given by Baldwin, who had also provided the 
hundred knights necessary for it. But William represents it instead as an initiative of 
Fulcher, who, moved by “wholehearted pity” for his lord, had set out with his men to 
avenge the “outrageous trick” played on him.  
There is a final point of interest where William diverges from Albert: in Wil-
liam’s version, Baldwin’s change of heart against the Turks does not take place im-
mediately after Belek’s attempt to ambush him, but after the execution of the two 
remaining Frankish captives “by the order of that wicked and impious man.” William 
himself must have known quite well from his source Albert that the executions in 
question took place only after Baldwin’s departure for Jerusalem, so this change 
seems rather like a subtle play on chronology calculated to let Belek’s “wicked and 
impious” acts build up to a climax, so that Baldwin’s change of heart would be still 
more justified in the readers’ eyes. “From that day onwards,” the author states, 
“Baldwin declined any alliance of friendship with the Turks and utterly distrusted 
their good faith.” He cites Balduk’s execution soon afterwards as a striking proof of 
the count’s new attitude towards the Turks, and remarks in conclusion that by this 
summary act Baldwin prevented the possibility of similar treachery in the future.    
2.6 Belek’s participation in the battles against the armies of the Crusade of  
1101 
Albert mentions Belek among the Muslim emirs who fought against armies of 
Crusaders that arrived in Anatolia in 1101. It might be advisable to approach this 
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with caution, for he also counts Ridwan of Aleppo among them,
66
 which is highly 
unlikely given the usually exclusive concern of that prince with securing his posses-
sion of Aleppo. It is possible that Albert only wanted to make a place for Belek, this 
notable enemy of the Franks, in a particularly bloody scene of his narrative. With a 
similar motive to embellish his narrative, he had shown Kilij Arslan I going as Yaghi 
Siyan’s envoy to Baghdad in order to beg for the sultan’s aid –– although the two 
Seljukids were in fact deadly rivals.
67
 Like Cahen, one might alternatively content 
himself with accepting that Belek and Ridwan provided some sort of support to the 
Seljukids and Danishmendids, without personally going to join them.
68
 Whatever the 
case may have been, it is worth having a look at what Albert has to say about Belek’s 
role in the Crusade of 1101.  
Belek appears in Albert’s account among those pursuing a remnant of the 
first army of the Crusade. This was a force of around four hundred, formed by the 
spontaneous gathering of the troops scattered after the rout of the main army near 
Merzifon. Albert relates that Belek, together with Kilij Arslan and Danishmend, pur-
sued them for three days along the route to Sinope, the same route taken before by 
their fugitive princes. The three emirs had not “had enough of slaughter,” Albert re-
marks, and so they were eager to kill and capture these as well. But they had to aban-
don the pursuit after three days, in view of the scattering of the Franks and the threat 
posed by the powerful emperor in Constantinople. Albert notes that on the way back 
they slew a thousand of the scattered Christians who were hapless enough to cross 
their path: “A great number of powerful knights, the speed of whose horses could not 
help them, met these butchers and were killed by their arrows.” 69  
                                                 
66
 Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana, 602-03 and Geschichte, II, 84 (VIII.13). 
67
 Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana, 248-53 and Geschichte, I, 167-70 (IV.2-4). 
68
 Cahen, Syrie du Nord, 231. 
69
 Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana, 614-17 and Geschichte, II, 94-95 (VIII.23). 
 72 
This report of Albert’s, if true, shows that Belek was not unwilling to fight 
those Franks outside his immediate sphere of influence as well. Indeed we shall see 
later that by the time of his death he was in preparations to go to the aid of Tyre 
against the Frankish besiegers.
70
    
 
The Artukids had not emerged with any gain from their initial period of con-
tacts with the Franks, comprising the years between the First Crusade and the Cru-
sade of 1101. On the contrary they had lost two important towns, Samosata and 
Saruj, in their new homeland in the Jazira. This lack of Artukid success would 
change not long afterwards, when Sokman scored a major victory against the Franks 
in their efforts to capture Harran. That will be the subject of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
SOKMAN: SAVIOR OF HARRAN –– AND EDESSA 
 
The failure of the Crusade of 1101 did not prevent the Franks from continu-
ing to expand their territories at the expense of their Muslim neighbors. On the con-
trary, the years following the Crusade represented one of the most critical periods of 
the Frankish offensive. One of their most important ventures in the north was to try 
and capture Harran, which would help them separate Muslim Syria from the Jazira as 
an important first step to the former’s planned annexation. But they were prevented 
from realizing this plan by Sokman who, joining forces with Chakarmish, the lord of 
Mosul, inflicted a major defeat on them. But Sokman did not show himself interested 
in following up this victory with an attack on Edessa, and instead departed with his 
troops when the captive count of Edessa was kidnapped from his tent by the men of 
his ally. Although Chakarmish besieged the city on his own, he was not successful 
and the fall of the Frankish base was postponed for another forty years. The Franks 
were also besieging Tripoli at this time, which was to be the center of the fourth 
principality they would establish in the Levant. Upon calls for help from that city 
Sokman set out to raise the siege; he had also been invited to Damascus by an ailing 
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Tughtekin who feared the Frankish designs on his own city. Before being able to 
proceed further, however, Sokman succumbed to illness and died.  
Although Sokman fought the Franks to recover Saruj, he seems to have aimed 
mainly at preventing them from capturing important cities in Syria and the Jazira and 
thereby establishing a hegemony in the region, rather than attempting to expel them 
from Edessa or elsewhere. He thus confronted them only to protect his possessions 
and strategic interests. Nevertheless, on these occasions he does seem to have con-
sidered himself as a mujahid waging Holy War; we shall see that he was a precursor 
of Ilghazi and Belek in this sense. 
3.1 Sokman’s role in the Battle of Harran 
Although the Crusade of 1101 had ended in disaster, the Latin principalities, 
through the activity of their new leaders, continued to expand to the detriment of 
their Muslim neighbors in the north and south. In Jerusalem Baldwin count of Bou-
logne had replaced his brother Geoffrey in 1100. Tancred ruled Antioch for three 
years, during the captivity of Bohemond in the hands of Danishmend, and resumed 
its rule after his uncle’s departure for the West. In Edessa Baldwin of Boulogne had 
chosen Baldwin du Bourg as his successor before going to Jerusalem. Finally Josce-
lin, arriving among the remnants of the Crusader armies of 1101, had become lord of 
Tell Bashir, an appanage of the County of Edessa to the west of the Euphrates. What 
all these princes strove for during this time was to establish control over the route 
between Syria and the Jazira. This would enable them to prevent any military aid 
from reaching Aleppo and other Muslim cities in Syria, if they besieged them, and 
also would deprive the Muslims of the profits from the trade activity along this route. 
Since Harran was situated on the junction between this route and another running 
south from eastern Asia Minor, and as it lay at a distance of only about 40 km from 
 75 
Edessa, capturing it was a good way to realize this aim as well as to secure the safety 
of Edessene territory. In this section we shall examine their venture in this direction 
and the resulting battle they had with Sokman and Chakarmish. Before that, howev-
er, it is necessary to look at a series of preparatory attacks they launched in 1103.   
To begin with, the rulers of Tell-Bashir and Edessa undertook a two-pronged 
offensive on the routes leading from the territory of Aleppo to the Jazira.
1
 On the one 
hand Joscelin strove to block the communications between Aleppo and the Euphra-
tes, and made considerable headway in this direction with his capture of Basarfut (29 
March 1104). As Stevenson points out, this step constituted an important preliminary 
for the attempt against Harran insofar as it enabled the Franks to secure the route be-
tween Antioch and Edessa.
2
 On the other hand, Baldwin carried out incursions fur-
ther east for the purpose of weakening the Muslim neighbors to the south and east of 
Harran before attacking the city itself. Thus in the south he ravaged the territories of 
Qal‘at Ja‘bar and Raqqa, both of which were held by Emir Salim ibn Malik.3 In the 
east Baldwin raided the territories of the Artukids around Mardin and attacked the 
Turkomans who made up their military power.
4
 Matthew of Edessa reports that 
Baldwin not only slaughtered a good many of the Turkomans he came across in this 
region, but also captured their emir Ulagh-Salar as well as their wives and children. 
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He also got hold of innumerable flocks of sheep as well as thousands of horses, cattle 
and camels.
5
  
As Imad al-Din Khalil observes, Baldwin must have aimed through this at-
tack to terrorize the Artukids, restrict their action, and compel them to assume a de-
fensive stance. At the same time, he would be able to bolster his communications 
with the other Frankish territories in northern Syria.
6
 The attack may indeed have 
reduced the fighting capacity of the Turkomans to some extent, but the limited nature 
of the harm they suffered is revealed by the victory that Sokman scored with them 
soon after, in the Battle of Harran. 
3.1.1  The perspectives of the sources 
3.1.1.1 Ibn al-Athir 
Ibn al-Athir is the Muslim source who dwells most on the Battle of Harran.
7
 
This is hardly surprising, for the historan seems to have used the account of the battle 
to illustrate the importance of Muslim unity for warding off the attacks of the “infi-
dels,” a favorite theme of his. For this purpose, he represented the attitude of Sokman 
ibn Artuk and Chakarmish of Mosul as an example to be imitated by the rulers of his 
own time who neglected waging jihad against the Mongols and Franks because of 
their petty bickerings. However, we shall see that Ibn al-Athir did not shrink from 
making convenient modifications in the actual course of events and in the arrange-
ment of his material for this purpose of edification. The very beginning of his ac-
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count, with his lamentation of the lack of Muslim unity at that time, followed imme-
diately by the report of internecine strife in Harran, makes this edificatory bent clear: 
At a time when the Franks (may God forsake them) were boasting of the Is-
lamic territories they had seized and it turned out in their favor that the armies 
and princes of Islam were busy fighting each other, the opinions of the Mus-
lims were divided, their desires at variance, and their properties in a state of 
dissipation.  
Ibn al-Athir proceeds to tell how Harran fell prey to a palace coup just on the 
eve of the Frankish attack. The deputy left in the city by its ruler Karaja, a mamluk of 
Malikshah, had rebelled against his master and got rid of all his men save a certain 
Turk. Although he befriended this man and appointed him as the commander of his 
troops, the latter’s thanks were to murder him in collaboration with one of his 
friends. It was at this point that the Franks marched on Harran and laid siege to it. Ibn 
al-Athir makes it clear that his protagonists Sokman and Chakarmish were shining 
exceptions in this general picture of Muslim weakness and disunity: 
Between Mu‘in al-Dawla Sokman and Shams al-Dawla Chakarmish there 
were hostilities, since Sokman was seeking revenge for the killing of his 
nephew and both were preparing to confront the other. When they heard this 
news, each of them sent to the other calling for unity to rescue the situation at 
Harran and announcing that he had offered himself to God’s service in return 
for His reward to come. Each accepted what the other wanted and so they set 
out and met at the River Khabur, where they swore mutual oaths and marched 
on to meet the Franks.         
Nevertheless, the fact of the matter may have been a little bit different and 
somewhat less exemplary than Ibn al-Athir makes it appear here, as revealed by an-
other passage later in his chronicle. For when reporting the earlier murder of Sok-
man’s brother Yakuti and the start of Sokman’s feud with Chakarmish,8 the historian 
offers a rather different version of how the feud ended: “Chakarmish sent a large sum 
of money in secret to Sokman, who took it and was satisfied. He said, ‘Yakuti was 
killed in battle and his killer is unknown.’” This seems to stand in contradiction to 
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the earlier story that the two emirs gave up their feud to join in jihad against the 
Franks, but the two versions may be complementary: perhaps Chakarmish was anx-
ious to settle the dispute in order to have Sokman’s support and therefore offered the 
money, and Sokman accepted the proferred settlement as sufficient in the given con-
ditions. Ibn al-Athir may have deemed it useful to ignore the payment issue to 
strengthen his message. We have already seen his introductory plea for Muslim uni-
ty, and further below we shall see how he depicts Sokman as renouncing his right on 
the captive count stolen from his tent for the sake of “Muslim unity.” Considered to-
gether, these two give sufficient ground to surmise that with the same edificatory in-
tention the historian may have concealed part of the original story to urge the rulers 
of his own time to join in jihad against the Franks and Mongols alike. His separation 
of the two reports, those of the feud and the Battle of Harran, and the significant re-
versal of their order in the narrative, may also have been directed to the same end.       
Continuing with his account, Ibn al-Athir indicates that the Muslims were 
about ten thousand strong in all, seven thousand of these being made up of Sokman’s 
Turkomans and the rest of the mixed troops of Chakarmish constituting Turks, Kurds 
and Arabs. In the battle by the river Balikh, he relates, the Muslims applied the tech-
nique of feigned flight for about two leagues before they turned against their pursuers 
and routed them, collecting a good deal of booty in the process. The chronicler notes 
that before the battle Bohemond and Tancred had lain in ambush behind a hill to take 
the Muslims from the rear once the fight was in full course. Observing the rout of 
their allies from the top of that hill, they hid until the night and fled. But they were 
pursued and attacked on the way by Sokman, and got away with only six horsemen.   
Baldwin and a number of Frankish counts, on the other hand, fleeing the bat-
tlefield, had got stuck in the mud while trying to cross the river Balikh. Caught by 
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one of the Turkomans, they were taken to Sokman’s tent, which was shortly to be the 
scene of an especially edifying example of Muslim unity offered us by the historian. 
He relates how Chakarmish’s troops, returning with empty hands from the battle-
field, observed in envy that Sokman’s Turkomans had gathered all the booty availa-
ble. So while Sokman was away in pursuit of the Normans they incited Chakarmish 
to seize Baldwin, pointing out the public shame that would accrue for them if they let 
the Turkomans seize the entire booty. As Grousset remarks, it is possible here to ob-
serve the contempt that the regular, heavy mailed Seljukid troops of mixed ethnic 
origin felt for the free-roaming Turkoman groups that served the Artukids.
9
 On their 
urging, Ibn al-Athir relates, Chakarmish consented to send some of his men to bring 
Baldwin from Sokman’s tent. When Sokman returned from the pursuit to discover 
the theft of a prisoner invaluable for the prestige as well as the high amount of ran-
som he would have brought, he was greatly offended and his men began to prepare 
for a battle with the forces of Chakarmish. But Ibn al-Athir states that he contained 
himself and held his troops back, exclaiming: “Let the Muslims’ rejoicing at this 
ghaza not turn to sorrow because of our discord. I don’t deem it wise to quench my 
anger with the gloating of the enemies over the Muslims.”10  
This scene is obviously in harmony with Ibn al-Athir’s general treatment of 
the battle, aiming to press home for his own contemporaries the need to supersede 
divisions among the Muslims in order to ensure the survival of Islam in face of the 
Franks and Mongols. Sokman’s reported declaration in this case seems ideally fit for 
this edificatory purpose of the historian, for it represents the emir’s abandonment of 
his claim on the valuable captive and his avoidance of retaliation as a heroic sacrifice 
made for the cause of Muslim unity. It is also in keeping with Ibn al-Athir’s earlier 
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suppression of the payment of money when he told how the two emirs in feud had 
renounced their right to exact further vengeance so that they could join forces against 
the “infidels.” Sokman’s declaration should also be approached with the same cau-
tion.   
Again in keeping with his edificatory bent, Ibn al-Athir suppresses the fact 
that the two allies parted ways after this event and failed to collaborate further to fin-
ish the work they had begun. This provided the Franks of Edessa with the opportuni-
ty to recover with very little permanent territorial loss from the veritable disaster they 
had suffered. Instead the historian contents himself with noting that Sokman seized 
some castles in Shabakhtan, through deception, by having his men disguised as 
Franks. After his departure Chakarmish headed to Harran, installing his own gover-
nor there, and then proceeded to Edessa. He besieged this city for fifteen days, with-
out result, and so returned to Mosul with Baldwin as his captive.  
Ibn al-Athir had good reason for treating this stage of the events in summary 
fashion, as it would hardly show his heroes, especially Sokman in a positive light, 
and would certainly detract from the ideal example of Muslim unity he wanted to put 
before his readers. But the fact remains that Sokman’s hasty departure with his 
troops, who made up the major part of the Muslim forces, caused a golden opportuni-
ty to be lost for taking Edessa. Indeed Işın Demirkent contends that Sokman’s act 
saved Edessa from almost certain capture, and posponed its fall for another forty 
years.
11
 Grousset goes even further in arguing that without this rupture, which possi-
bly saved the great Frankish cities, the Battle of Harran could have signified the de-
bacle of Frankish Syria much like the Battle of Hattin eighty years later. But the gen-
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eral Muslim disunity brought about the result that the Muslim reconquest came to a 
halt on the line of the Orontes.
12
  
Touching upon the same issue, Cahen and Runciman assert that what actually 
saved Edessa was Chakarmish’s preoccupation with seizing the Frankish castles in 
Shabakhtan as a precautionary measure against Sokman. According to them, this 
caused a delay that granted Tancred precious time to organize the defences of the 
city.
13
 However, as Ibn al-Athir’s account makes clear, it was not Chakarmish but 
Sokman himself who occupied the region of Shabakhtan after the Battle of Harran. 
As Demirkent suggests, the reason for the failure of the siege of Edessa should rather 
be sought in the depletion of the Muslim troops on Sokman’s departure with the ma-
jor part of the army.  
Ibn al-Athir commits an error in the conclusion, where he states that 
Chakarmish released Baldwin in return for 35,000 dinars and 160 Muslim captives. 
As Matthew of Edessa reports and Ibn al-Athir himself reveals at a later point,
14
 the 
count was in fact released a few years later by Chawli, the successor of Chakarmish 
in Mosul. He also notes that the total Frankish casualties amounted to twelve thou-
sand, but this seems a very exaggerated number. 
3.1.1.2 Ibn al-Qalanisi and al-Azimi 
One of the earlier sources that Ibn al-Athir seems to have drawn upon in his 
account of the battle is the Damascene dignitary Ibn al-Qalanisi, a contemporary of 
the events.
15
 The theme of jihad  and the confrontational language associated with it 
is as much a component of Ibn al-Qalanisi’s work as that of Ibn al-Athir’s, although 
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its distribution throughout the chronicle is uneven, changing in accordance with the 
political allegiances of Damascus at the time. Thus while it was strikingly limited 
during the reign of Zangi, whose aggressive policy compelled the Damascene nota-
bles including Ibn al-Qalanisi to steer close to the Frankish camp, it flourished in the 
periods before and after. Accordingly, his account of the Battle of Harran, like that of 
Ibn al-Athir, openly glorifies the Muslim alliance against the “enemies of God”: 
News arrived that the emirs Sokman ibn Artuk and Chakarmish, lord of Mo-
sul, had joined forces and made a solemn agreement with one another to 
prosecute the Holy War against the Franks, the enemies of God, and to devote 
their entire strength and means to active warfare with them. 
The agreement in question is of course the one mentioned by Ibn al-Athir, but 
Ibn al-Qalanisi does not state that the two sides had abandoned their feud to conclude 
it.  
Another important point where Ibn al-Qalanisi diverges from Ibn al-Athir is 
that he makes no mention of a prior Frankish attack on Harran. On the contrary, he 
reports that the Muslim allies went first to Ra’s al-Ain and then advanced upon Edes-
sa. In his version, it was only when the Muslims had reached Ra’s al-Ain that Bohe-
mond and Tancred set out from Antioch to avoid Baldwin in Edessa. As they ap-
proached the Muslim forces attacking Edessa, both sides got prepared and joined bat-
tle on 7 May. Nevertheless, there is a serious problem with Ibn al-Qalanisi’s version 
of the events. Firstly, he fails to make any mention of Baldwin and Joscelin, making 
it seem as though the battle had taken place only between the Normans from Antioch 
and the Muslims –– whereas the case was entirely different, as we shall see. Second-
ly, we know from the other accounts of the battle that it did not take place anywhere 
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near Edessa but much farther to the south, near the town of Raqqa, which lay at a dis-
tance of around a hundred kilometers from Edessa.  
Of course it is possible that Ibn al-Qalanisi may have allowed himself some 
degree of geographical imprecision here, for it was not uncommon for medieval 
chroniclers to indicate, for the sake of convenience, simply the nearest big city for 
the location of a battle, despite knowing that it had in fact occurred quite far away. 
Nevertheless, this does does not seem to be the case with Ibn al-Qalanisi’s testimony, 
for he clearly states that the battle broke out when the Frankish army closed with the 
Muslim army that was busy attacking Edessa. It follows that the geographical dis-
crepancy between Ibn al-Qalanisi’s account and what can be ascertained from all the 
other sources is a real one, and it seriously compromises the credibility of his asser-
tion that the Muslims attacked Edessa first. This is all the more so as the chronicler 
fails to mention any pursuit that might have led the two armies away from Edessa. 
Accordingly Nicholson cannot be deemed justified in preferring Ibn al-Qalanisi’s 
testimony to that of Ibn al-Athir on the basis of contemporaneity alone, and to use it 
to prove that it was the Muslims rather than the Franks who attacked first.
16
  
Indeed another example of how a contemporary author could go astray in re-
lating the battle is the case of Al-Azimi,
17
 a local chronicler of Aleppo who lived 
around the same time as Ibn al-Qalanisi. His city, into the bargain, was also closer to 
the scene of the Battle of Harran than Damascus. In his work Al-Azimi mentions the 
battle as “the event of Qattar,” and erroneously dates it to the Muslim year 496 rather 
than 497. He relates that Sokman ibn Artuk and Chakarmish lured the Franks by a 
ruse into the desert of “Qattar,” blocking the water sources on their way. Here they 
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attacked the Franks, killing many of them, while the survivors died later of thirst. 
The location in question remains unidentified, though it might be an Arabicized form 
of Carrhae, the ancient name of Harran. At any rate, however, Al-Azimi’s testimony 
does not seem reconcilable with any of the other accounts of the battle. At most it 
might be possible to see in the luring of the Franks into “the desert” a distant echo of 
the initial stage of the battle, when the Muslims withdrew to Raqqa as we shall see. 
The thirst of the survivors, in turn, might reflect the difficulties suffered by the 
Franks as they were dispersed in flight toward Edessa and other places.       
Ibn al-Qalanisi’s apparent ignorance about the geographical and other details 
of the battle does not seem to have prevented him from grasping the full significance 
of the victory, as his rhapsodic language in the conclusion reveals: “God gave victory 
to the Muslims over their enemy, and they put them to flight, and did great execution 
amongst them. Their numbers exceeded ten thousand horse and foot, exclusive of 
baggage-train and camp followers. Bohemond and Tancred fled with a small follow-
ing.”18 Ibn al-Qalanisi rightly considered the victory as a turning point, a break-
through, not least psychologically, for the Muslims: 
This was a great and unprecedented victory for the Muslims; it discouraged 
the Franks, diminished their numbers, and broke their power of offence, 
while the hearts of the Muslims were strengthened, and their zeal for the vic-
tory of the Faith and the war against the heretics was whetted and sharpened. 
The people joyfully noised abroad the good news of the victory over them, 
and became assured of their destruction and the turning of fortune against 
them. 
Indeed, leaving aside the defeat of the Crusader armies of 1101 in the far-
away western and northern regions of Asia Minor, this was the first time that the 
Franks saw themselves defeated by a force of equivalent size in the central Muslim 
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lands of Syria and the Jazira. This damaged their military prestige and revealed that 
they were not invincible after all.
19
 The psychological effect of this revelation on the 
Muslims and indigenous Christians in the region was to show up clearly in the sequel 
of the battle, when the normally pusillanimous Ridwan attacked the territory of Anti-
och and the subjected Muslims and indigenous Christians rebelled against Frankish 
rule.  
3.1.1.3 Ibn al-Adim 
The Muslim source who relates this sequel in greatest detail is Kamal al-Din 
Ibn al-Adim,
20
 a younger contemporary of Ibn al-Athir and the local chronicler of 
Aleppo. He dwells especially on the relief that the victory brought for a time to 
Aleppo. He reveals that Ridwan of Aleppo had not taken part in the battle itself but 
waited by the banks of the Euphrates to see its outcome. Learning about the victory, 
he ordered the subjected Muslim population in the former lands of Aleppo to rebel 
and arrest all the Franks living there. Ibn al-Adim reports that upon this the people of 
Fou’ah, Sarmin, Ma‘arrat-Misrin and other towns ran to arms and carried out Rid-
wan’s orders. There remained in the Franks’ hands only Jabal Summaq and Hab as 
well as the strongholds of Ma‘arrat Nu’man, Kafartab and Sawwaran, the last of 
which was captured later by Shams al-Khawass, lord of Hama and Salamiya. As a 
result, the Frankish garrisons of Ma‘arrat Nu’man, Kafartab, Lathmin and al-Bara 
found themselves isolated and surrounded on all sides by Muslim territory, and 
sought refuge in Antioch. Then the inhabitants of all these places, except for Hab, 
handed them over to Ridwan and his officers. All these conquests must have bol-
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stered Ridwan’s position against other Muslim rulers as well, for Ibn al-Adim notes 
that the men of Janah al-Dawla of Hims garrisoned in Balis and al-Faia and those of 
Shams al-Khawass garrisoned in Hama and Salamiya also handed over their towns to 
Ridwan.  
In conclusion Ibn al-Adim remarks that security came to prevail in the lands 
of Aleppo once again and those who had fled began to return. Ridwan, with his self-
confidence restored, instructed his troops to carry out continuous incursions against 
the lands of Antioch. The chronicler observes that Bohemond found himself unable 
to defend his territory against these attacks, since he had been able to escape from 
Sokman’s pursuit with only a small remnant of his men. Apprehensive of the re-
stored power of the Muslims, according to Ibn al-Adim, he embarked from Syria to 
bring back new recruits from his homeland, and entrusted Antioch and Edessa to his 
nephew Tancred.
 
 
It might be asked at this point why Sokman and Chakarmish failed to partici-
pate in Ridwan’s offensive against the Principality of Antioch. For they had reported-
ly sworn oaths to wage jihad against the Franks, and Sokman would later march to 
assist against them the emirs of two other Syrian cities, Damascus and Tripoli. The 
reason for Sokman’s failure to help Ridwan in this case was probably that they had 
been at loggerheads since the time of the First Crusade, when Sokman had prevented 
the timely defense of Antioch with his insistence on going to Diyar Bakr, and then 
failed in the Battle of the Lake to raise the Frankish siege.
21
 As for Chakarmish, we 
shall see Albert of Aachen relate that he was severely defeated in the siege he under-
took against Edessa following Sokman’s departure, and lost many troops as a result. 
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So he was probably not in a position to proceed west and engage the Franks around 
Antioch even if he had wished so.  
Nevertheless, more important than these factors must be the fact that Ridwan 
himself would hardly be willing to receive aid from these powerful lords of the Jazi-
ra, fearing that he might be deprived of his city in the process. How strong this fear 
was would become clear in the campaign of the allied Seljukid forces in 1111:  alt-
hough they had come to ward off the Frankish threat against Muslim Syria, Ridwan 
even refused to open the gates for them.
22
 Already by 1104, Sokman and Chakarmish 
may have been aware of Ridwan’s attitude to the Muslim powers of the Jazira and 
this was probably the chief reason why they did not consider joining him in a com-
mon offensive against the Principality of Antioch. 
Ibn al-Adim’s account of the aftermath of the Battle of Harran is valuable in-
sofar as he points out the resulting revival of the powers of Ridwan and the relief of 
Aleppo, which had been placed under intense pressure by the Franks since Bohe-
mond had returned from his captivity in the hands of Danishmend. The historian also 
takes notice of the corresponding weakening of the Principality of Antioch as a result 
of the heavy loss of troops and territories, which rendered it the real victim of the 
disaster rather than the County of Edessa.
23
 Another point discerned by Ibn al-Adim 
is that Bohemond’s decision to depart for Europe was among the indirect conse-
quences of the Muslim victory at Harran. All these observations are indeed con-
firmed by the Latin chronicler Ralph of Caen, as we shall see. 
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3.1.1.4 The Anonymous Syriac and Michael the Syrian 
While the Arabic sources thus hold up an idealized example of Muslim unity, 
the Syriac sources offer a contrasting picture of Christian disunity, caused according 
to them by the egoism, greed and ambition of the Frankish leaders. Rendering them 
blind to the consequences of reckless competition among themselves, these faults 
had arguably led to their crushing defeat at the hands of the Muslims. Matthew of 
Edessa, as we shall see, adds to these charges their sinfulness, which had supposedly 
provoked divine punishment.  
The account of the Anonymous Syriac is the most detailed amongst these in-
digenous Christian sources.
24
 He notes at the beginning that the Franks had grown 
very powerful by 1104, so much so that their leaders resolved to march east and con-
quer all the lands there. But when they gathered at Edessa with their armies, the 
Anonymous relates, they fell into disagreement about how they would share the 
Muslim cities, which they counted as already captured: 
One wanted Mayyafariqin, one Amid, one Nisibis, one Mosul, till they cast 
lots which deserved mockery. As was their bad habit they did not agree 
through pride. They stayed long in Edessa discussing the division of the 
towns that belonged to the Turks. 
It is observable in this passage that the author adopts an explicitly critical, 
even mocking attitude towards the Franks’ self-confidence, as he knew by hindsight 
the disastrous outcome of their venture. Also notable in the passage is that he points 
out the Franks’ pride and their resulting discord as a characteristic bad habit of theirs.  
The Anonymous goes on to relate that the Franks finally agreed on marching 
against Nisibis, which might in fact be the final destination in their planned series of 
conquests. But during their delay in Edessa, the Anonymous notes, the Turks had 
heard of their gathering and assembled a great force themselves. Then they began to 
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wait for the Franks to march off, planning to attack them on the way. The Anony-
mous reveals that when the Franks finally left Edessa, they were accompanied by a 
numerous group of townsmen who were also too sure of the victory, and therefore 
eager to make an easy fortune by collecting booty and taking Muslim prisoners 
wherever they would occupy. After reaching the plain of Harran and passing it on the 
East, the Franks reportedly stopped at Ra’s al-Ain. Here, according to the Anony-
mous, the inhabitants of Harran brought the keys of the town to the Franks, because 
of their fear, and doing them obeisance, offered their submission.  
But the keys were rejected by Baldwin, and the Anonymous offers a critical 
analysis of his motive in doing so. He states that Baldwin considered Harran to be 
already his property, as it would be annexed to his domains once taken over. If the 
other princes entered and camped in the city, he feared they would get hold of it as 
well, and in any case the sack and plunder of the town by their numerous troops 
would cause him to take it over in a much weakened state. Considering this to be dis-
advantageous for himself, the count returned the keys to the populace of Harran, tell-
ing them that they were henceforth his subjects and were accordingly to keep the 
town until he would return and the troops of other princes would disperse. The 
Anonymous states that the latter, and especially Tancred
25
 were very angry at Bald-
win for this decision, and notes the objections they brought against it: 
They told him that he had not done well, they should have occupied that 
strong city, left their superfluous baggage in it, and gone in light order to 
meet the enemies who were near. If God gave them victory none would have 
taken it from Baldwin; and if the Turks had heard of the taking of the city, it 
would have broken their spirit. If they should be defeated, which God forbid, 
it would be a near refuge. 
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All these points were made in vain, however, as they were unable to over-
come the recalcitrance of Baldwin.   
Then the Anonymous depicts the Frankish army on the march, hinting there-
by at the rift that had opened in their ranks as well as at the psychology of the Nor-
mans: “The Franks marched from Dahbanah [Ra’s al-Ain] and spread out towards 
the river Balikh, the angry Tancred marching always behind and in the rear.” Upon 
reaching the river, he relates, they found themselves face to face with “thousands and 
tens of thousands” of Turks. With the shower of arrows they poured “like clouds of 
rain” these threw the Franks into fear and consternation at the start of the battle. 
Then, drawing their swords, the Turks began a slaughter in the vanguard of the 
Frankish army. This description of the battle seems plausible, as we know that the 
classical military techniqe of the Turkoman troops at the time consisted of surround-
ing the enemy in great numbers, breaking their ranks by a shower of arrows from 
afar, and then fighting at close quarters with swords.
26
 All these details fit in with the 
Anonymous’s description.   
Significantly, the Anonymous reveals that Tancred and his troops, who had 
remained in the rear because of their resentment against Baldwin, had turned and fled 
on seeing the vanguard massacred, and thus abandoned their comrades in the front. 
In view of what had gone before, this report of the Anonymous seems quite plausi-
ble. They had been denied a share from the spoils of Harran, and not even allowed to 
deposit their baggage there, as Baldwin had rejected to pay heed to their common-
sense advice to turn Harran into a safe military base before meeting the enemy. Ap-
parently, this had much reduced their eagerness to collaborate with the count on the 
joint venture against the Muslims, a state of mind revealed by the fact that they had 
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doggedly kept to the rear of the Edessene army during the march. Under these condi-
tions, it was not surprising that they deserted Baldwin and the Edessenes as soon as 
they saw them in trouble. 
As a result, the Anonymous relates, “the Turks increased in strength, slew 
without mercy, and took many into captivity.” Amongst those captured were Bald-
win and Joscelin, whose camp, equipment, horses and goods were throughly plun-
dered. Unaware that Baldwin and Joscelin were separated, the latter being taken to 
Hisn Kaifa,
27
 the Anonymous states that “the Turks took them in bonds to Mosul and 
there they reigned, topsy-turvily as they hoped.” Thus he ends his account with a re-
turn to his starting criticism of the Franks’ pride and presumption. Sardonically, he 
draws attention to the contrast between their grandiose plans of conquest and the piti-
ful outcome of those plans. The Anonymous’s final report about the Normans is 
hardly more benevolent. He relates how Tancred went to Edessa and rested there for 
a few days, eating, drinking, and acting as he wished. Before returning to Antioch, he 
notes, the Norman prince confiscated much wealth and many horses from the city 
and appointed his man Richard (of the Principate) as governor. 
 
The chronicles of Michael the Syrian and the Anonymous are accepted to be 
generally independent of each other, as their testimonies on the same events usually 
display considerable divergence.
28
 Nevertheless, their accounts of the Battle of Har-
ran turn out to be remarkably parallel on basic points, with Michael the Syrian’s ver-
sion resembling a summary version of that of the Anonymous. As we shall see, this 
might have been because the two chroniclers drew upon a common source for this 
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event. In comparison Michael’s account29 is more straightforward and matter-of-fact, 
attributing the Franks’ defeat directly to their division about the partition of Muslim 
lands and the takeover of Harran. In the same connection, it must be noted that his 
attitude toward the Franks and their failed attempt, although not entirely without crit-
icism,  is nowhere as depreciatory and sarcastic as that of the Anonymous.  
Michael starts by relating how the Franks went in great numbers and “with 
ostentation” to Edessa, where they passed the days discussing the partition of the 
lands and cities of the Muslims once taken. Like the Anonymous, he states that the 
Turks assembled to confront the Franks as they continued their delay in Edessa with 
such discussions. When the Franks finally advanced to battle, he notes, they were 
still “dissatisfied with each other because of the partition of the country.” Whereas 
the Anonymous reported that the people of Harran came to offer the keys to the 
Franks before Ra’s al-Ain, Michael states that they came out to meet the Franks as 
the latter arrived before Harran itself. Rather than take advantage of the troubled sit-
uation of Harran, he relates, Baldwin refused to receive its keys for fear that the other 
Franks would plunder and devastate it upon entering. When they departed from be-
fore the city, he remarks, “they were still more divided for not having entered Harran 
to deposit their baggage.” It is possible to find here a distant echo of the arguments 
put forward by the others to dissuade him according to the Anonymous. But it is not 
reported as a dialogue, and leaves out the arguments about breaking the spirit of the 
Turks by taking the city and about turning it into a safe refuge to serve in case of de-
feat.  
Michael also fails to mention the fact that Tancred and the other Normans 
kept, angrily or otherwise, to the rear of the Edessene troops and abandoned them 
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when the fight at close quarters began. It should be noted that unlike the Anonymous 
Michael avoids naming Tancred as the leader of those who opposed Baldwin in the 
dispute. Relating the battle, he contents himself with stating that the Franks were de-
feated because of their divisions, firstly about the partition of the yet-to-be-
conquered Muslim lands, and then about the issue of entering Harran to deposit their 
baggages. Like the Anonymous, he erroneously reports that both Baldwin and Josce-
lin were taken to Mosul and, without making any mention of Bohemond, notes that 
Tancred fled to Edessa where he appointed Richard of the Principate as governor. 
Nevertheless, he omits any mention of Tancred’s confiscations in the city. Indeed, 
the kind of critical, sardonic side remarks that we have seen the Anonymous make 
about Tancred, Baldwin and Joscelin are singularly lacking in Michael’s version. 
This is in keeping with his mild attitude toward the Franks that we have observed in 
the rest of the account and shall discuss presently.  
It is evident that the testimonies of the Anonymous and Michael the Syrian 
display too many parallels to be considered independent of each other. Common to 
both accounts are the course of events, the isues at stake in the divisions of the 
Franks, the analysis of Baldwin’s motivation for refusing to receive Harran’s keys, 
some of the arguments put forward by the other princes to dissuade him, and the sin-
gling out of these divisions as the main cause of the ultimate disaster. There are also 
common errors, like reporting that Joscelin had been sent to Mosul with Baldwin, 
and failing to mention Bohemond. And yet there are also some rather subtle but still 
important differences between the two accounts. Indeed, leaving aside the single jibe 
at the “ostentation” of the Franks in the beginning, Michael avoids any explicit re-
marks about what the Anonymous castigates as the pride and egoism of the Franks, 
although both relate the same bickerings. Again in contrast to the Anonymous, he 
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maintains a discreet silence about the opposition of Tancred and other Normans to 
Baldwin, as well as their subsequent desertion at the most critical stage of the con-
flict.  
The reason for this might be that the two authors made use of a common 
source that originally had a more objective tone, while the remarks against the 
Franks were added later by the Anonymous. But Michael the Syrian does not men-
tion concrete events like the desertion of the Normans either, which would show the 
Franks in a bad light. So it seems more probable that the original source did contain 
these criticisms and events in some form, which were then taken over by the Anon-
ymous, while Michael the Syrian preferred to bowdlerize them as much as possible. 
This is supported by the further consideration that the author of this source had prob-
ably lived through at least part of the first half of the twelfth century, before the col-
lapse of the County of Edessa. Indeed he may have been a certain Basil Bar Shumana 
(d. 1171), whose now lost History of Edessa was used by the Anonymous and Mi-
chael the Syrian alike.
30
 If this was so, he had witnessed the Frankish presence dur-
ing its most powerful period in the Jazira, and as in the case of Matthew of Edessa, 
this experience may have alienated him from the Franks and led him to assume a 
generally hostile attitude against them.  
This raises the question why Michael should have chosen to excise the reflec-
tions of this hostility, while the Anonymous did not. The reason might be sought in 
the fact that Michael, as the Jacobite patriarch of Antioch in the latter half of the 
twelfth century, was in a position where he had to maintain good relations with the 
Franks. Indeed he even resided for a year in Antioch,
31
 and does not seem to have 
had any particular grievances against them. He had every interest in ensuring that 
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this remained so, for the sake of the Jacobite Church as well as the Jacobite popula-
tion under Frankish rule. In contrast, a modest cleric like the Anonymous (who wrote 
in the early thirteenth century) had no such connections and responsibilities, and 
therefore lacked any particular motive to purge the remarks and events in his source 
that would show the Franks in a bad light.  
The course of events reported by the Syriac sources has not remained uncon-
tested in the modern literature. Robert Nicholson, calling into question the reliability 
of the Anonymous’s version,32 rejects the idea that the Frankish force could have re-
mained in Edessa to discuss the partition of Muslim lands. Accepting the disputable 
testimonies of Ibn al-Qalanisi, Ralph of Caen and Albert of Aachen,
33
 he argues that 
this was a “relief force” trying to save Edessa, rather than an army bent on territorial 
aggrandizement at the expense of the Muslims. He also finds it implausible that Tan-
cred, following his dispute with Baldwin, angrily kept to the rear of the Edessenes 
and fled after their rout, asserting that “these statements are in disagreement with all 
the contemporary accounts of the campaign of Harran.” But we have seen that the 
source used by the Anonymous for this event was probably contemporary as well, 
and living in the Jazira itself, this source was in a good position to know what hap-
pened. More importantly, we shall see that Matthew of Edessa, who was an exact 
contemporary of the battle and similarly lived in the region, corroborates the testi-
mony of the Anonymous in its main lines. In any case, as is evident from the ac-
counts of Ibn al-Qalanisi and Al-Azimi, contemporaneity is not by any means the 
sole criterion with which to measure the reliability of sources. Ralph of Caen and Al-
bert of Aachen were authors contemporary with the events, but we shall see that they 
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only reproduced Norman propaganda aimed to exonerate Bohemond and Tancred 
from the charge of having forsaken their comrades in the battle. 
Nicholson objects to the testimony of Michael the Syrian on the same lines.
34
 
He rejects his statements that the Franks disputed the partition of Muslim territory in 
Edessa, and that the people of Harran brought them the keys of their city. In the last 
connection, he points out the role of these people in the pursuit and massacre of the 
Franks in flight: “The citizenry of Harran played no such craven role as Michael the 
Syrian alleges, but rather one of active cooperation with their fellow Muslims against 
the Franks.” Although indeed the Anonymous (rather than Michael) indicated that 
the townsfolk had brought the keys to the Franks out of fear, this was probably not a 
matter of cravenness on their part. As we shall see in the accounts of Matthew of 
Edessa and William of Tyre, they were rather compelled to surrender by famine con-
ditions and were accordingly able to go on in the offensive once they had been provi-
sioned by the Muslim army. Işın Demirkent, like Nicholson, asserts that “it cannot be 
deduced in any way from the course of events that the people of Harran offered to 
surrender to the Crusaders,”35 but fails to go into further detail and explain why. On 
the other hand, she does accept that some sort of dispute took place between the 
Frankish leaders before Harran, pointing out the contrast between the firm collabora-
tion of the Normans and Edessenes up to this time and the extremely hostile attitude 
Tancred adopted toward the latter from then until 1112. 
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3.1.1.5 Matthew of Edessa 
Matthew of Edessa’s account36 agrees with the course of events related by the 
Syriac sources in its main lines, including the start of the conflict with the Franks’ 
siege of Harran and their eventual separation into two contingents because of a dis-
pute. The author also criticizes the pride and overconfidence of the Franks, like the 
Anonymous, and adds to this charge a condemnation of their sinfulness. He starts by 
relating how Baldwin and Joscelin launched an expedition against Harran and sum-
moned Bohemond and Tancred from Antioch to join them; mustering all the Arme-
nian troops in Edessa as well, they constituted a great army. As the Franks and Ar-
menians marched against Harran and besieged it tightly, he states, the town was con-
fronted with the danger of famine.  
Thus Matthew corroborates the testimony of Ibn al-Athir and the Syriac 
sources in attributing the cause of the battle to the Franks’ siege of Harran rather than 
the Muslims’ siege of Edessa. On the other hand, he does not report that the people 
of Harran offered the keys of the town to the Franks. Nevertheless, the conditions 
that may have forced them to make such an offer can be discerned in Matthew’s 
mention of the danger of famine they faced. This is corroborated by William of 
Tyre’s testimony, as we shall see. It must be noted besides that unlike the Syriac 
sources Matthew does not fail to name Bohemond among the Frankish princes in the 
campaign. Finally, the Armenian troops that he says were mustered from Edessa may 
have been the same as the inhabitants of Edessa who according to the Anonymous 
accompanied the Franks to share in the booty to be made.      
At this point in his narrative Matthew inserts an interesting episode which 
cannot simply be dismissed as legendary material of no value, for it is illustrative of 
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the author’s attitude to the Franks and in this respect displays some remarkable affin-
ities with the critical stance of the Anonymous. He relates that during the siege of 
Harran one of the Franks committed an act “not pleasing to God,” which he says be-
came a direct cause of their eventual defeat by the Muslims. Reportedly, this man 
broke open a loaf of bread, and after he had defacated in it, placed it before the gates 
of the town. A townsman starving in the conditions of famine finally dared to go and 
pick up the bread, but was nauseated when he looked inside and took it to the towns-
people. The story goes that upon seeing the bread they exclaimed: “This is a sinful 
deed which God will not allow to go unpunished.” They went on to assert: “He will 
not give the Franks the victory, for they have contaminated this bread, a profanation 
without compare on the earth.”  
Here Matthew seems to hold the Franks guilty of nothing less than profaning 
the host. The population of Harran was in fact Muslim, but this detail was apparently 
of little concern to the author as he wrote the anecdote to press home his point about 
the sinfulness of the Franks. Although of very doubtful authenticity, therefore, the 
story should still be taken seriously for its value in showing how much the Armenian 
author’s view of the Franks had already changed by the time of the Battle of Harran, 
only seven years after he had celebrated their arrival as the coming of saviors. 
Matthew goes on to relate how a formidable Turkish army under the com-
mand of Chakarmish and Sokman marched after this against the Franks, and how the 
latters’ princes advanced to confront them “greatly rejoicing.” By the last detail, 
Matthew points out, like the Anonymous, that the Franks were much too sure of vic-
tory in their pride and unwarranted self-confidence. Indeed he states that at a place of 
two days’ march from Harran “the count of Edessa and Joscelin became puffed up 
with pride and placed Bohemond and Tancred at a distance from their troops, saying: 
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‘We shall engage in combat first and thus take the laurels of victory.’” Despite cer-
tain differences of significance, to which we shall come in a moment, Matthew’s ver-
sion thus shares with the Syriac accounts a common story line and interpretation. 
They all relate how the Frankish princes’ pride, egoism and selfish greed for securing 
all there was to gain, the spoils of Harran or the laurels of victory, gave rise to a divi-
sion of fatal consequences in their ranks.  
Along with the Syriac accounts, Nicholson also challenges Matthew’s version 
of how the Franks became divided.
37
 He points out the open hostility between Tan-
cred and Baldwin du Bourg, as well as Bohemond’s aggressive policies, and argues 
that under these conditions the Norman princes would not have consented to being 
pushed around by the Edessenes. He adds that Matthew’s general anti-Lorrainer atti-
tude and enthusiastic partisanship for the Normans would render his accusation 
against Baldwin and Joscelin highly doubtful on this occasion. Unlike in the case of 
the Syriac sources, Nicholson seems right in these criticisms. Both because of these 
points and the circumstantial details they contain, the accounts of the Anonymous 
and Michael seem preferable to that of Matthew. As we shall see, they are also rec-
oncilable with the testimony of William of Tyre. In comparison Matthew’s version 
appears more crude and rather tailored to illustrate what he saw as the sinful pride 
and egoism of the Franks, as well as to shift the burden of the eventual disaster from 
the Normans to the Edessenes.   
In the same place Nicholson also questions Matthew’s report that the Nor-
mans failed as a result of the division to play an active role in the battle. Against it he 
points to the testimonies of Albert of Aachen and Ibn al-Athir, who he says show the 
Normans taking an active part in the conflict. Nevertheless, it is surprising that Ni-
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cholson can cite Ibn al-Athir beside Albert of Aachen to support his claim that the 
Normans took an active part. We have already seen Ibn al-Athir relate that the Nor-
mans merely watched the rout of the Edessenes from the top of a hill and, waiting for 
the night, fled without having joined in the battle. So it seems that Nicholson, while 
conflating the two sources to construct his narrative of the battle, confused their tes-
timonies about the role of the Normans. This leaves only Albert of Aachen to support 
Nicholson, but we shall see that like Ralph of Caen he cannot be trusted on this issue.  
Nicholson also puts forward some arguments to support his thesis that the 
Normans played an active role in the battle. In this connection he firstly draws atten-
tion to “Bohemond’s and Tancred’s warlike propensities –– their readiness to fight at 
all times.” This is obviously a highly questionable deduction made from an unwar-
ranted generalization, and can hardly be used to reject the testimonies of Ibn al-Athir 
and Matthew. Then he argues that although Bohemond was “no friend of the 
Edessenes,” he would have seen that he himself would be weakened as well through 
the defeat and slaughter of the Edessene troops. To support this argument, Nicholson 
reminds us how Bohemond, before his departure for Europe in 1105, confessed that 
he was compelled to undertake the journey by the recent losses of his men, and takes 
this as evidence that “he sorely needed the assistance of the Edessenes slain at Har-
ran.” But the troops whose loss Bohemond bewailed could well have been the troops 
of Antioch massacred in flight, rather than those of Edessa, and this is indeed pre-
cisely what Nicholson himself suggests elsewhere, as we shall see. Moreover, even if 
it was the Edessene troops that Bohemond spoke of before his embarkation, this can-
not be taken as evidence that he had thought and acted in the same direction on the 
battlefield and rushed to help the Edessenes rather than deserting them. As is clear 
from the case of Joscelin I and Richard of Antioch against Ilghazi in 1119, or of Jos-
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celin II and  Raymond of Poitiers against Nur al-Din in 1149, such considerations as 
Nicholson points out did not prove sufficient to make some Frankish princes assist 
others in trouble.  
Matthew proceeds to relate that Baldwin and Joscelin went on to clash with 
the Turks and “a frightful and violent battle took place here in this strange and alien 
Muslim land.” It is hard to figure the meaning of this reference to the “strange and 
alien Muslim land.” It might be a reference to the fact that the Muslims had with-
drawn deep into Muslim territory, followed by the Franks, as we shall see further on. 
Reporting the outcome of the battle, Matthew interestingly remarks that the Turks, 
by vanquishing the Franks, “[brought] the divine-rebuking wrath of God upon the 
Christians.” Indeed the whole point of his account seems to be that the Franks’ sin-
fulness, symbolized by their profanation of the host, had combined with their pride, 
egoism and overconfidence in their own power to bring upon themselves divine pun-
ishment through the Muslims’ hands.  
Accounting for the losses, Matthew asserts that “the whole land was covered 
with blood and corpses of more than thirty thousand Christian faithful, and so the 
region became depopulated.” Compared with the already inflated numbers of twelve 
thousand given by Ibn al-Athir and the ten thousand given by Ibn al-Qalanisi, this 
seems a grossly exaggerated number of Christian casualties, even when it is assumed 
to include the Armenians of Edessa who accompanied the army in order to collect 
booty. 
Matthew also asserts that Baldwin and Joscelin were taken prisoner and led 
into captivity, while Bohemond and Tancred, as well as their forces, suffered no 
harm. This conflicts with the Muslim chroniclers’ report that Bohemond and Tancred 
were able to escape with only a handful of their men. But Matthew seems to contra-
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dict himself too when he states immediately afterwards that Bohemond and Tancred, 
taking along their most valiant men, sought refuge as fugitives in Edessa. If they 
were accompanied there only by their “most valiant men” what had happened to the 
rest? Thus Matthew’s latter statement, in contrast to the first, appears to corroborate 
the testimony of the Muslim sources.  
The key to solving this problem might be found in Matthew’s next report. He 
relates how the Franks of Edessa suffered further massacre, when the inhabitants of 
Harran cut off their retreat by encircling the mountain and the plain and slaughtered 
ten thousand of the fugitives. He goes so far as to assert that the Muslims of Harran 
“brought more destruction upon the Christian faithful than the Turks had ever done.” 
If it is possible to conjecture that these “Franks of Edessa” in Matthew’s account 
were in fact the Norman troops of Bohemond and Tancred who, escaping without 
scatch from the battle, got caught by the people of Harran on their way to Edessa, the 
riddle can be solved. Indeed Işın Demirkent finds Matthew’s attribution of the great 
losses of the Norman troops to the assault of the people of Harran more plausible 
than Ibn al-Athir’s attribution of it to the pursuit of Sokman.38 Nicholson, on the oth-
er hand, does not reject either version, and reasonably suggests that the garrison of 
Harran –– Matthew himself speaks of the people rather than the garrison –– joined 
Sokman’s forces in a common attack against the Normans in flight.39  
Concluding his account, Matthew asserts that “all the Christan lands were in 
despair on that day.” Unlike the Syriac sources, he seems aware that Joscelin was 
taken to Hisn Kaifa by Sokman while Baldwin was taken to Mosul by Chakarmish.  
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3.1.1.6 William of Tyre 
Among the Latin accounts of the battle of Harran, William of Tyre’s testimo-
ny stands remarkably close to those of Ibn al-Athir and the indigenous Christian 
sources.
40
 He joins them in attributing the cause of the battle to the Franks’ siege of 
Harran, and in that connection gives additional information of interest about how 
they ravaged its lands beforehand in preparation. He is also the only Latin author to 
tell explicitly of the dispute that broke out between the Normans and Edessenes. On 
the basis of these parallels, Nicholson suggests that William may have drawn upon 
“an anonymous Syriac or Saracen chronicle” when composing his account.41 But this 
remains on the level of speculation, unless it can be shown that William used the 
same chronicle as Ibn al-Athir and the Christian sources, and the parallels in question 
must be taken seriously as a corroboration of their testimonies. 
William begins his account by reporting that the four Frankish princes of 
Edessa, Antioch, Tripoli and Jerusalem agreed in 1104 to cross the Euphrates and 
besiege Harran. He relates how they zealously assembled troops from their own 
lands as well as from their allies and went to Edessa for this “ill-fated expedition,” 
accompanied by Patriarch Bernard of Antioch, Archbishop Benedict of Edessa, and 
Daimbert, the former patriarch of Jerusalem. Advancing from there against Harran, 
they blockaded the town and began to wait for those inside to surrender out of hun-
ger.  
William explains at this point that during the immediately preceding years 
Baldwin of Edessa had been busy wasting the lands between Edessa and Harran that 
were used in common for cultivation. As these were Harran’s only source of food, he 
aimed thereby to reduce it to destitution. This plan proved succesful, William states, 
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and so the besiegers found the town suffering greatly from a dearth of provisions. As 
the pressure of famine kept increasing every day, and no response came from the 
emirs summoned to their aid, the people of Harran resolved to surrender rather than 
starve to death, and accordingly went out to make an unconditional surrender to the 
Franks.   
Thus William’s testimony not only seems reconcilable with that of the Syriac 
sources, but also fills an important gap through its explanation of why the people of 
Harran offered to surrender. His report about Baldwin’s devastation of the agricul-
tural lands of Harran in preparation for the siege also fits in well with what we have 
seen in the last section about the Franks’ efforts to isolate Harran from Aleppo and 
intimidate its Muslim neighbors. Accordingly, it does not seem justified to discredit 
William’s testimony on the sole ground that he was not an exact contemporary of the 
event like the other Latin chroniclers, who relate the battle quite differently as we 
shall see.  
William’s account of what followed the offer of the keys is again similar to 
the Syriac versions. He relates how the jealousy between Bohemond and Baldwin 
gave rise at this point to “an unfortunate contention” as both insisted that he should 
be the one to receive the town and take in his standard first. Consequently the sur-
render of the town was postponed to the next day to consider the “trifling matter” in 
William’s words. Nevertheless, it turned out to be too late on the next day, as “a vast 
host of enemies” had arrived before the dawn, “an army of Turks so numerous and 
formidable that the Christians began to doubt whether it would be possible to save 
even their lives.” William states that the Turks had brought abundant supplies of 
provisions, and now devised a clever strategem for getting these across to the towns-
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people: they divided their forces into two contingents, one of which was to challenge 
the Christians, whatever the result, while the other was to use this opportunity to 
supply the city with food. Accordingly, shortly after dawn, one contingent of Turks 
was drawn up in battle array, while the other was stationed apart to the west in order 
to provision the town.  
Robert Nicholson challenges William’s testimony thus far on a number of 
points. He first rejects the implication of William’s version that the siege of Harran 
lasted long enough to cause its residents to suffer severely from famine, on the 
grounds that this is contradicted by the testimonies of Ralph of Caen, Albert of Aa-
chen and Ibn al-Qalanisi. But Nicholson’s objection is undermined by the fact that he 
again overlooks the testimonies of the Syriac and Armenian sources on the question-
able ground of contemporaneity, basing himself exclusively on the pro-Norman ac-
counts of Albert and Ralph and the disputable testimony of Ibn al-Qalanisi. 
In keeping with his insistence on the shortness of the siege, Nicholson pro-
ceeds to question William’s report of the famine in the town and his attribution of 
this to Baldwin’s previous depredations. He states in this connection: “It is incredible 
that the city could have been so short of food that the citizens were faced with starva-
tion after a very short siege.” This seems to be something of a circular argument, for 
Nicholson takes for granted the testimony of Albert, Ralph and Ibn al-Qalanisi that 
the siege was of brief duration, and basing himself upon this as a reference point, 
takes William to task for speaking of famine conditions. However, the latter author 
offers a self-consistent account that does not share Nicholon’s premise about the 
brevity of the siege.  
Nicholson also questions whether Baldwin’s depredations could have been 
severe enough to put an end to all the food supplies of the area. Nevertheless, we 
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have seen that William explains this quite convincingly, relating how Baldwin spe-
cifically targeted the plain of Harran, which constituted the town’s only source of 
provisions. In this connection Nicholson points out that Harran was situated on the 
Muslim trade routes of northern Syria, and asks how it could have been so close to 
starvation by spring 1104. But if Baldwin of Edessa’s troops had regularly been raid-
ing the area, this might have discouraged grain traders, who were hardly likely to be 
ignored by marauding Edessenes. Besides, the exorbitant costs of overland transport 
made it difficult at this age to carry over long distances large amounts of bulk mate-
rials like grain. The inner disturbances and palace coups reported by Ibn al-Athir 
may also have prevented the populace of Harran from taking the limited measures 
they could to avert famine. 
Finally, Nicholson argues that if famine conditions had really prevailed in the 
town, Sokman and Chakarmish would have provisioned it before proceeding to the 
investment of Edessa.
42
 Of course this issue is easily solved once it is accepted, as 
William of Tyre does, that the campaign began with the Franks’ siege of Harran and 
not with the Muslims’ siege of Edessa. The problem here is that Nicholson fails to 
study William’s account as a self-consistent whole, and then goes on to discredit his 
individual reports for not being consistent with the testimony of other sources that he 
unwarrantedly takes for granted. As we have seen, he also adopts a similar approach 
in discussing the duration of the siege and the resulting famine. In fact this is a part 
of the more general problem in the traditional methodology that tends to jump arbi-
trarily from one source to another, treating their accounts like heaps of unconnected 
evidence to be picked up, compared and used at will.
43
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Although William’s account is indeed quite self-consistent generally, he 
seems to contradict himself when he states next that the Turks “had little hope of 
success or even of keeping up a show of resistance very long, their only purpose be-
ing to engage the Christians in battle so that supplies might be carried into the belea-
guered city.” Of course this conflicts with his previous remark that the Turks were so 
numerous as to inspire the Franks with fear of their lives. This statement of Turkish 
weakness is not in agreement with what follows either, for according to his account 
of the battle proper it seems to have been the Franks rather than the Muslims who 
suffered from a lack of courage and steadfastness. He relates how the two patriarchs 
went among the ranks before the battle, exhorting the soldiers in order to inspire 
them with courage. But this did not work, William says, and at the first encounter 
they “turned their backs on the foe in disgraceful flight, abandoned their camp with 
all it contained, and thought only of seeking safety, which, alas, was nowhere to be 
found.” At this point, William continues, the Turks cast aside their bows and engag-
ing with their swords in close fight, almost wiped out the Christians. This again re-
sembles the report of the Anonymous, who related how the Turks caused consterna-
tion in the Frankish vanguard
44
 by a shower of arrows and then engaged them with 
sword at close quarters.   
However, William diverges from the Anonymous and Ibn al-Athir on one 
important point. He states that Baldwin and Joscelin were taken captive and carried 
off in chains to a distant corner of the enemy country, while Bohemond and Tancred, 
along with the two patriarchs, managed to escape from the tumult of the battle and 
reached Edessa through sequestred bypaths. Significantly, he does not mention in 
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any way that the Normans kept aloof from the battle, whether because they were ly-
ing in ambush or because of their dispute with Baldwin about Harran. Nevertheless, 
this is not surprising in consideration of William’s marked bias in favor of the Nor-
mans and especially Tancred, perhaps due to the fact that William was of Italian 
origin himself.
45
 William also notes how Benedict, the captured archbishop of Edes-
sa, was allowed by his Christian guardian to escape. Nicholson rightly objects to this 
on the grounds that Turks would hardly have entrusted him to the custody of a Chris-
tian.
46
 William reports in addition that Bohemond took over Joscelin’s territory and 
for the time being entrusted Edessa to Tancred. In conclusion, he offers a final evalu-
ation of the battle: “Never during the rule of the Latins in the East, whether before or 
after this event, do we read of a battle so disastrous as this one, which resulted in so 
terrible a massacre of brave men and so disgraceful a flight of the people of our 
race.” 
Although William was not an exact contemporary of the Battle of Harran, his 
account is still a valuable source for that event, not least because it offers some sig-
nificant and probably independent parallels with the testimonies of Ibn al-Athir and 
the Syriac sources: the initial siege of Harran by the Franks, the offer by its people to 
surrender and the Franks’ failure to take advantage of it because of the dispute be-
tween the princes of Edessa and Antioch, and finally the collapse of the Frankish 
vanguard under the Turks’ arrows, followed by a close combat that cost them many 
lives. William also complements the other sources with additional details of value, 
such as Baldwin’s strategem of ravaging the agricultural lands of Harran, which ex-
plains the surrender of the townsfolk, and the tactic applied by the Turks to provision 
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it again. On the other hand, the separation of the forces of Antioch from those of 
Edessa finds no mention in William’s account, probably because of his bias in favor 
of the Normans.   
3.1.1.7 Fulcher of Chartres 
At first sight, Fulcher of Chartes’ testimony seems to diverge considerably 
from that of William and the other sources in agreement with the latter historian.
47
 
Most importantly, he attributes the beginning of the hostilities to the aggression of 
the Muslims rather than to the Franks’ siege of Harran. Nevertheless, on closer scru-
tiny, his version turns out to be much less irreconcilable with the testimonies of Wil-
liam and the others. To begin with, his report about the Muslim offensive that sup-
posedly led to the battle seems rather vague and fails to make clear what, exactly, 
they undertook. This forms a contrast with the testimonies of sources like Albert of 
Aachen and Ralph of Caen who as we shall see state clearly that they besieged Edes-
sa. Fulcher, in turn, seems to speak of a general increase in raiding activity rather 
than a regular campaign against a specific Frankish target: “In that year (1104) the 
Parthians, Medes, Chaldeans, and all the inhabitants of Mesopotamia, our neighbors, 
were stirred to attack us Christians and to molest us in every way.”  
Fulcher then proceeds to relate how the Frankish princes responded to this 
situation and prepared to engage the Muslims with a throng of knights and common 
people. His reference to the “common people” here could perhaps be interpreted in 
line with the Anonymous’s report about the Edessenes who set out with the army to 
share in the booty. Fulcher states that with these forces the Franks crossed the Eu-
phrates and advanced up to Harran, where they encountered the Muslim forces. His 
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next statement comes as a surprise: “At once they joined battle near Raqqa.” This is 
problematic, as we have seen that Raqqa lies no less than a hundred kilometers to the 
south of Harran. It is of course possible that Fulcher did not take great care about the 
precision of geographical details here, and used Harran and Raqqa interchangeably. 
Nevertheless, a comparison with the other accounts suggests that he may have tele-
scoped the course of events at this point of the narrative and skipped over an episode 
of pursuit from Harran to Raqqa. 
This laconic character of Fulcher’s account extends to the description of the 
battle itself, where he contents himself with stating that “the Christians were given 
over to dispersion and confusion because of the gravity of [their] sins.” He adds that 
the engagement was “far more disastrous than all previous battles, as the result 
showed.” Baldwin, Joscelin and the archbishop of Edessa had been captured, while 
Bohemond and Tancred had fled in a “bewildered and confused” state along unfre-
quented bypaths. Many Franks had also died in the battle, some drowned and lost in 
the river Khabur, and some transfixed by arrows and daggers. Horses, mules and a 
great amount of wealth had been lost as well.  
Thus so far Fulcher had passed over much in silence and offered a quite la-
conic account of the event. But at this point he seems to have been no longer able to 
contain himself fully, and so breaks into a diatribe against the persons and factors he 
held responsible for the debacle. In doing so, he also touches upon some of the facts 
that he apparently knew well but had preferred to suppress in his actual narrative. 
Although these revelations are still quite vague, they do suggest some affinities with 
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the testimony of William of Tyre, Ibn al-Athir and the Syriac sources. Before dis-
cussing them more closely, let us read Fulcher’s diatribe first:48 
They who could have taken Harran without great difficulty, if they had occu-
pied49 it at first, afterwards could not have taken it during either the outward 
or return journey. And because security sometimes works harm by deception, 
so fear and caution seem to be an advantage to the wary and the timid. For as 
it is written, often “delay is dangerous for those who are ready to act.” For 
certainly two enemies, discord and envy, were hurtful to our people in this 
undertaking rather than misfortune. These enemies are accustomed to bring 
down men from the riches they have acquired to extreme poverty. We have 
often seen this. We have learned it by experience. I am not deceived, nor am I 
beguiled by deceptive circumlocution to meditate in terms of trivialities. In 
this campaign so dangerous and fearful the Franks antagonized each other 
even before the disaster, so that they almost wished to part company and 
break the alliance thay had made. Indeed he is foolish who does evil and ex-
pects good. For nothing is acceptable to God which is done in strife and with-
out love. It is therefore cowardly and disgraceful to desert the society of him50 
whom I ought to serve unto death.  
These seemingly confused fulminations of Fulcher do allow some deductions 
to be made. Apparently the Franks were late in occupying Harran before the enemy 
forces arrived, due to a dispute between their leaders and the excessive wariness of 
some among them, and were consequently defeated in the ensuing battle. Fulcher 
shows himself remarkably discreet and reticent about the cause and sides of the dis-
pute, preferring to content himself with general warnings about the dangers of envy, 
discord and excessive caution. But what he reveals can still be reconciled with the 
testimonies of William, Ibn al-Athir and the Syriac sources. For one, his reference to 
excessive caution may be related to the hesitation and reluctance of Baldwin to ac-
cept the keys of Harran. As for the dispute he mentions, this could only be the one 
that resulted from Baldwin’s attitude according to the Anonymous, or from his and 
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Bohemond’s rivalry to get hold of the town according to William. Indeed the actual 
cause of the dispute may have been a combination of both factors: perhaps Baldwin 
had acted so warily and refused to receive the keys in the others’ presence because of 
his fear that Bohemond would raise claims on the city.  
On the other hand, Fulcher’s rebuke of those who almost broke the alliance 
and deserted their companions might be taken to indicate that already at Harran the 
Normans came to the brink of abandoning the expedition. Indeed we shall see that 
this is precisely what they did according to Sibt ibn al-Jawzi, who reports that one 
part of the Frankish army stayed before Harran while the other proceeded to Raqqa. 
But perhaps there is also a criticism here directed at the Normans for having actually 
abandoned the troops of Edessa during the course of the battle, as reported by Ibn al-
Athir and the Anonymous Syriac. 
At the end of his account Fulcher relates how the captured archbishop of 
Edessa was saved through the heroic endeavour of a “very valiant knight” who held 
mortal life less precious than the salvation of his soul. We have seen that William’s 
story about the archbishop being entrusted to a Christian is not very plausible. On the 
other hand, we shall see Ralph and Albert attribute the feat to Tancred. When all 
these versions are compared, Fulcher’s version seems to be the most credible, since 
three chroniclers against one declare that it was a rescue operation, rather than a case 
of the archbishop being released by his co-religionist, and it would have been normal 
for Ralph and Albert to attribute the feat to a famous figure like Tancred, rather than 
let some obscure knight get away with the credit. Fulcher adds that this knight was 
only one of the many Crusaders who “burned with zeal for God and chose to sacri-
fice this life, endeavoring to die a blessed death and thus enjoy rest with Christ.” 
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Thereby he gives unreserved support to the theory that those who died fighting for 
God could be counted as martrys, although this was then still a controversial issue 
because of their unpeaceful state of soul at the time of death.
51
 
3.1.1.8 Ralph of Caen and Albert of Aachen 
Although we have seen that the Latin accounts of William of Tyre and Ful-
cher of Chartres are reconcilable with the testimony of Ibn al-Athir and the Syriac 
sources, the situation is quite otherwise with the accounts of Ralph of Caen and Al-
bert of Aachen.
52
 Like Ibn al-Qalanisi, these two Latin sources explicitly attribute the 
cause of the battle to a siege of Edessa undertaken by the Muslims. According to 
Ralph’s version, the Franks assembled upon this to raise the siege, but the Muslims, 
retreating, drew them towards Harran and beyond it. When both sides had crossed 
the river Balikh, they suddenly attacked the pursuing Franks and defeated them. Ac-
cording to Albert’s version, the Franks, Count Baldwin and his troops among them, 
assembled before Harran on seeing the Muslims advance upon Edessa. Their aim 
was probably to cause a diversion, as the Muslims could not have run the risk of be-
ing sandwiched between the garrison of Edessa and the Frankish army positioned to 
their rear at Harran. Accordingly they were compelled to strike south and attack the 
Franks near Raqqa. 
 Moreover, neither source mentions any dispute that took place between 
Baldwin and the Normans or reveals in any way that the latter kept to the rear and 
abandoned their allies in the battle. On the contrary, they show the Normans fighting 
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at the forefront and causing many losses to the enemy. According to Ralph’s and Al-
bert’s version, the Normans would even have gained victory if the Edessenes had not 
been routed and had not failed to support them. They also relate that the Normans 
were determined to resume the fight on the next morning but were prevented from 
doing so by the flight of their panicked troops during the night. Compelled to follow 
these to Edessa, they elected Tancred as the new ruler of that city. In conclusion both 
sources give information about what happened after the battle. Albert relates how the 
Muslims besieged Edessa without success. Ralph firstly supplies information on the 
rebellion of the indigenous populations against Frankish rule and the attacks of Rid-
wan as well as of Byzantine forces against the Principality of Antioch. He then re-
lates how Bohemond resolved under this pressure to go to procure help from Europe. 
What limits the reliability of the testimonies of Albert and Ralph is that they 
apparently drew upon Norman sources from the circle of Bohemond and Tancred. 
Naturally, these had apologetic and propagandistic interests in disseminating a self-
serving account of the battle. When considered in this light, the differences in their 
testimony from that of Ibn al-Athir and the Syriac sources appear only too meaning-
ful: supposedly, the Norman princes had gone to the aid of their brethren in Edessa 
when that city was besieged by the infidels, rather than joining forces with them on a 
grand venture that would be doomed to end in miserable failure.
53
 They had acted in 
perfect collaboration with the Edessenes, rather than quarreling with them over the 
spoils and perhaps the possession of Harran. In the battle they had fought valiantly 
and only missed victory because of the rout of the Edessenes, rather than keeping to 
their rear and deserting them on the battlefield. If they had admittedly returned to 
Edessa without resuming the fight on the next day and rescuing their comrades, this 
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was not because they had willingly abandoned them, but only because their troops 
had panicked and fled at night.  
As far as Ralph is concerned, it is hardly surprising that he came up with such 
a version of the events. One of his undisguised purposes as an author was to offer a 
panegyric of his late patron Tancred,
54
 and besides he was not a first-hand witness of 
the events. He first joined the retinue of Bohemond in 1106, during the latter’s visit 
to Europe, and accompanied him to the Balkans on his expedition against Byzanti-
um. It was only after Bohemond’s death in 1111 that he came back from Italy to An-
tioch, where he entered Tancred’s service.55 When composing his work, therefore, he 
had to depend on what Bohemond, Tancred and their retinue told him about the bat-
tle. Under these conditions it was only natural that his testimony would be heavily 
influenced by the political concerns of these two Norman princes. Bohemond was 
touring Europe to seek support for his Crusade against Byzantium, and he must have 
been quite aware that the debacle of the ambitious campaign against Harran would 
hardly encourage those in Europe to back another grand venture such as he now 
planned to launch. This was all the more so as that defeat might have been caused in 
part by his own desertion and then led to his departure for the West. So a quite dif-
ferent, self-vindicating story had to be told about the battle to those in the West, in-
cluding of course to his new chaplain Ralph of Caen.  
But this Norman story of the battle must also have made its way to Albert of 
Aachen, whose testimony displays significant parallels with that of Ralph. This is 
despite the fact that Albert was normally far from being pro-Norman and could well 
criticize their conduct when he had access to independent source material showing 
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them in a negative light.
56
 However, in the period following the First Crusade, Albert 
was not in a position to draw upon a wide assortment of eye-witnesses who had come 
back from the East to relate their first-hand experiences. As also shown by the wide 
circulation and influence of the anonymous Gesta Francorum, another pro-Norman 
work, Bohemond and his retinue served the chroniclers in Europe as a chief source of 
news about the events in the Outremer. Indeed they enjoyed almost monopoly status 
as reporters of the developments after 1101, since the stream of those returning from 
the East had trickled away by this time. The result was that they were able to imprint 
their stamp even on historical narratives written as far away as Aachen.     
In Antioch, where Ralph arrived in 1111, Tancred and his men had other in-
terests in promoting such an alternative account of the battle. The rift that had opened 
between Baldwin and the Norman princes during the Battle of Harran had turned into 
an open breach when Bohemond and Tancred had not lifted a finger to ransom 
Baldwin and Joscelin, and after their release, resisted their return to Edessa.
57
 Tan-
cred had even made common cause with Ridwan of Aleppo against the two and de-
feated them in battle.
58
 By the time Ralph came to the East Baldwin and Joscelin had 
received back their lands and the two sides had been apparently reconciled, largely 
through Baldwin I’s efforts but also because of the Seljukid expeditions beginning 
from 1110. Nevertheless, Tancred had not entirely given up his claims on Edessa, as 
is evident from Albert’s report that he still demanded tribute from the County of 
Edessa,
59
 and from Ralph’s failure to mention the provisions made for Baldwin’s re-
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turn when he related Tancred’s election as the new ruler of the city. Consequently, 
by the time of Ralph’s arrival in Antioch, a version of the battle that supported and 
justified these claims could still have been in circulation amongst the Normans there. 
Of course, a story that showed them deserting the Edessenes would not have been in 
the Normans’ best interest. Far more favorable would be a version according to 
which they had done their best and fought heroically to the end, but had failed in the 
end because of the defeat of the Edessenes. 
As a result the same self-vindicating story of the battle seems to have been 
told by the Norman princes and their retinues in Europe and the Levant, with the dif-
ference that those in the Levant did not flinch from extolling Tancred’s performance 
at the expense of his uncle Bohemond. The accounts of Albert and Ralph should 
therefore be taken as reflecting this political context, rather than the actual course of 
the battle.  
Obviously, this is not sufficient to solve the problem of conflict between the 
sources, as we have seen that Fulcher of Chartres and Ibn al-Qalanisi, who had noth-
ing to do with the Normans, also attribute the cause of the battle to an initial Muslim 
attack. Nevertheless, their testimony can be accounted for in different ways. Fulcher 
resided in distant Jerusalem, and the information he was able to gather about the 
events in North Syria and the Jazira seems to have been limited, even distorted in 
some cases. An example was the death of Belek ibn Artuk, who had actually been 
killed by an arrow thrown from the castle he besieged. But Fulcher, relying on the 
false report of a messenger sent by Joscelin, wrote that the emir had been killed in 
the preceding battle he had made with Joscelin’s forces.60 Similarly unreliable mes-
sengers sent from the North may have been Fulcher’s sources for his report about an 
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initial Muslim offensive. They may have calculated in this way to conceal from those 
in Jerusalem that they had miserably failed in an ambitious undertaking. After all, 
having been defeated by a surprise Muslim attack would sound far better than having 
messed up a great venture prepared for a long time.
61
 Moreover, Fulcher is quite 
vague about the exact nature of the Muslim offensive, as we have seen, and testifies 
nowhere that they attacked Edessa. The same point about distance and inadequate 
information could also be made about the testimony of Ibn al-Qalanisi. We have al-
ready noted the confused character of his account, which shifted the site of the battle 
from Raqqa to Edessa among other errors. 
It follows from these considerations that Ibn al-Athir, the indigenous Chris-
tian sources and William of Tyre provide us with a more accurrate testimony about 
the course of events, and we have seen that Fulcher corroborates them in part despite 
himself. While these sources from very disparate backgrounds seem to be in agree-
ment or at least reconcilable with each other, Albert and Ralph, who base themselves 
on a common Norman version of the story, are supported only by Ibn al-Qalanisi’s 
otherwise misleading testimony.  
Robert Nicholson looks at the issue from a different point of view, however. 
Basing himself on a strict division between the contemporary and non-contemporary 
sources, he prefers to lend credence to the testimonies of Albert, Ralph and Ibn al-
Qalanisi instead. As for the divergence of the other, later sources from these, he at-
tributes it solely to the oblivion of the salient details by the date of their composition. 
Thus he assumes the contemporary sources to be ipso facto reliable and the later ones 
unreliable. But doing so he overlooks the possibility that the late sources may have 
drawn upon contemporary sources that are no longer extant. More importantly, he 
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fails to consider the political concerns and agenda of these sources, contemporary 
and non-contemporary, which are likely to have shaped their way of reflecting the 
events at least as much as their distance in time to these events. As a result he does 
not approach the pro-Norman testimonies of Ralph and Albert with due caution, and 
cannot avoid being misled by their bias, even though he is aware of Ralph’s euolo-
gistic purpose and rejects some individual details in his account for that reason. It 
cannot be said either that Nicholson uses the criterion of contemporaneity with due 
meticulousness. He calls Ralph’s account “practically first-hand,” although the au-
thor arrived in the outremer only seven years after the battle. He also classifies Mat-
thew of Edessa wrongly as a non-contemporaneous source.  
Because of this approach, Nicholson accepts that it was the Muslims’ siege of 
Edessa that began the war, and not the Franks’ siege of Harran. He does not entirely 
deny that a siege of Harran might have been planned beforehand for spring 1104, but 
argues that in the event it turned out to be little more than a hasty, ad-hoc rescue op-
eration, undertaken upon Baldwin’s urgent call for aid to divert the Muslim siege 
force. According to him, the Muslims resorted to a feigned flight in response, and 
drawing the Franks away from Edessa, defeated them by a surprise attack.
62
       
Steven Runciman explains the development of the conflict in a way not un-
like Nicholson’s. But he accepts that Harran had long been an ultimate target of the 
Franks who began raiding its territory for this purpose. According to him, this caused 
Sokman and Chakarmish to unite in an expedition against Edessa, in order “to attack 
before they were attacked.” The historian relates that Baldwin, faced with the immi-
nent siege of his city, summoned the Normans to aid. He proposed to reciprocate the 
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Muslim attack with an assault on Harran, but when they began quarreling over that 
town, the Turks found the time to strike south and attack them.
63
  
Thus both scholars seem to have attempted in an all-too-ingenious but just as 
unwarranted fashion to combine the testimonies of Albert of Aachen and Ralph of 
Caen with the others, notably that of Ibn al-Athir. They accept both that the Muslims 
attacked Edessa first, as Albert and Ralph relate, and that the Franks besieged Har-
ran, as other sources testify. However, it is questionable methodologically whether 
such contradictory accounts can be so easily combined by treating them as if they 
represent a cumulative body of evidence of equal value. Adopting such an approach 
toward the sources would exclude from consideration their various standpoints and 
agenda, although the existence of these implies that each of the individual accounts is 
a coherent whole that cannot be disassembled in so easy and arbitrary a fashion. 
Even more importantly for the case at hand, it also implies that some of these ac-
counts might be misleading as a whole, necessitating great caution when borrowing a 
seemingly useful report they may contain. 
Nicholson falls into such a trap despite being aware that Ralph’s work is ba-
sically a panegyric of Tancred. Because he still treats Ralph’s account as a quarry of 
useful material, he takes at face value this author’s claim that Tancred single-
handedly attacked and defeated the Turkish forces. He also accepts without question-
ing the tale of Ralph and Albert about how Tancred rescued Archbishop Bernard of 
Edessa, although Fulcher gives the credit for this more plausibly to an obscure 
knight.
64
 More generally, Runciman and Nicholson fail to take notice of the fact that 
the Norman point of view pervades the accounts of Ralph and Albert of Aachen 
throughout. So without considering the provenance and agenda of these sources and 
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examining whether they can be relied upon in general for the battle, the scholars in 
question try to make a synthesis that incorporates the initial Muslim siege of Edessa 
reported by the two sources. 
In any case it is possible to find abundant evidence supporting the opposing 
version of an initial siege of Harran by the Franks. Işın Demikent points out some of 
these: Ibn al-Athir reports about the difficulties and troubles in the Muslim world as 
well as the threefold change of the ruler in Harran, and the Anonymous remarks on 
the proud Franks’ dreams of conquering Mosul, Mayyafariqin and Amid. She also 
has another point to make, namely the testimony of Matthew and the Anonymous 
that many residents of Edessa had set out with the army on the lookout for booty.
65
 
The last, it must be pointed out, is a particularly important observation: if this had 
really been an urgent operation undertaken to rescue Edessa, would the inhabitants 
have been so eager to leave the city in hope of booty? Grousset also points out the 
grandiose ambitions of the Franks mentioned by the Anonymous, remarking that “all 
hopes seemed to be permitted to them” in this period when the hold of the Artukids 
on Diyar Bakr was not yet fully consolidated. Especially, the Franks of Edessa had 
occupied the three important castles of Tell Goran, Tell Munzar and al-Karadi, the 
last one situated almost at the gates of Mardin.
66
 Moreover, Sokman and Chakarmish 
were at loggerheads, and there did not seem to be any Muslim emirs to oppose them. 
This was a golden opportunity therefore to capture Harran and sever the lines of 
communication between Muslim Syria and the Jazira, as well as to secure full control 
of the region of Diyar Mudar around Edessa.
67
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Now it is time to examine the accounts of Ralph and Albert in detail to illus-
trate and explicate the general observations and points made so far. Ralph begins his 
account by indicating that the Muslims went on to the offensive first, surrounding 
Edessa and its neighborhood with an infinite multitude. He states significantly that 
“Bohemond did not delay when asked for aid,” but taking all his troops crossed the 
Euphrates with Tancred, Joscelin and the Patriarch of Antioch. He relates that the 
Turks, on learning of Bohemond’s advance, drew the Franks towards unfamiliar 
lands, where they would face danger, hunger and losses. For three days the two sides 
advanced in this way towards Harran and beyond it, until they reached the river Kha-
bur. Once they had crossed the river, the Turks turned around to attack the Franks. 
This episode of Muslim withdrawal reported by Ralph does seem to have a basis of 
truth, considering that other sources state the battle to have taken place near Raqqa, 
about a hundred kilometers to the south of Harran and Edessa. However, if this Mus-
lim retreat took place, it should be seen as having begun from before Harran, as ar-
gued above, rather than from Edessa. 
Ralph notes that the Christians were marching along in three columns as the 
Turks went into attack. The one on the right was led by Bohemond and the one on 
the left by Baldwin, while Tancred led the middle one. Ralph asserts in a laudatory 
tone that amongst these only Tancred and his column were “prepared, ready and 
armed,” whereas the others, supposedly unaware of the enemy’s plans unlike the 
wily Tancred, marched without preparation, even without their armor. Indeed the his-
torian attributes the Turks’ attack to this defenceless condition of the latter. On learn-
ing about this from their scouts, they reportedly slid past Tancred’s column and at-
tacked those of Bohemond and Baldwin as all had stopped to pitch camp. These were 
caught by surprise, and compelled to defend themselves with bare heads and chests. 
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It is evident that Ralph’s version of the story is an undisguised eulogy of 
Tancred, intended to extol him, his prudence and wisdom at the expense of Baldwin 
and even Bohemond.
68
 Despite his implicit criticism of Bohemond, Ralph gives us to 
understand that the Normans in general fared much better in the battle than the 
Edessenes. He asserts that the forces of Antioch tried to resist as best as they could, 
and although in the process they had to abandon their baggage, this allowed them to 
save themselves as the Turks fell busy plundering it. “But then,” he continues, ”the 
men of Edessa suddenly failed. They were not able to protect their baggage or them-
selves. Baldwin was captured and led away in bonds.” The implication is clear here: 
if the Franks were ultimately defeated, this was mainly the fault of the Edessenes 
who had “suddenly failed” and not only lost their baggage, but even their count.       
Ralph gives us to understand that the Edessenes would also have lost their 
archbishop if Tancred had not rescued him. He relates that the archbishop came be-
fore Tancred’s troops as he was being led away by the Turks. Seeing Tancred, he 
cried for help, and the prince charged at once to rescue and bring him back to safety. 
There he consoled the trembling man and stayed beside him until his fear had passed. 
This episode is obviously meant to illustrate the admirable blend of heroism, tender-
ness and piety supposedly found in Tancred’s character. Nevertheless, its effect is 
diluted by the fact that Fulcher attributes this feat to an obscure knight, while accord-
ing to William’s testimony the prelate was not even rescued at all, but released by his 
Christian guard. Even if we discredit William’s account on the grounds that the 
Turks would not have entrusted the archbishop to a Christian guard, it is hard to im-
agine that Fulcher would have failed to mention Tancred by name if it had really 
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been he who had rescued the archbishop. Probably the escape of the prelate was so 
tempting an opportunity for Ralph and his sources to eulogize Tancred that they felt 
little scruple about withholding due acknowledgement from the Christian guard or 
from Fulcher’s obscure knight.  
According to Ralph Tancred was still desirous of returning to the battle, but 
he was prevented from doing so by the approaching night as well as by the objection 
of his troops. Bohemond was also persuaded to stop fighting until the next day. But 
while they were fast asleep amidst the “comforts of the court,” Ralph notes, the 
common soldiers were busy seeking a way of flight, apprehensive of their fate in the 
fight next day. Ralph gives us to understand that their prudent leaders had foreseen 
this and set up guards by the one and only ford in the river, but these had to yield be-
fore the pressure of the crowd fleeing in panic to save their lives. When Bohemond 
and Tancred were woken up by the guards and realized that they had been abandoned 
by their troops, Ralph concludes, they had little else to do other than follow them in 
retreat.  
When this all-too-neat story is considered in the light of the other sources, it 
seems to be a rather obvious attempt on the Normans’ part to exonerate themselves 
from the charge of having deserted their allies. As is evident from the testimonies of 
Ibn al-Athir, the Syriac sources and even Fulcher, this was a charge that could well 
have been brought against them at the time. According to Ralph’s version, in con-
trast, the Norman princes had not abandoned the troops of Edessa on their first clash 
with the Muslims, but on the contrary fought in the front ranks and after the initial 
defeat were still desirious of continuing the battle. Nevertheless, they were prevented 
from doing so by the objection of the common troops, and then forced to retreat be-
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cause of the latter’s panic and flight during the night. They were not responsible for 
this either, as the guards they had installed in anticipation were simply pushed aside 
by the crowd. So if Tancred and Bohemond had indeed abandoned the battlefield this 
was entirely the fault of the common troops who had suddenly fled, just as their ear-
lier defeat was entirely the fault of the Edessenes who had “suddenly failed.”  
This attempt of the Normans to rehabilitate their egregious conduct in the 
Battle of Harran was necessary for Bohemond, if he wanted to secure the support of 
those in Europe for his planned crusade against Byzantium, and for Tancred, if he 
desired to vindicate his still enduring claims on the County of Edessa. It must be not-
ed however that Ralph does not entirely spare Bohemond, but criticizes him along 
with Baldwin for lack of caution. This can be attributed to his purpose of writing a 
panegyric of Tancred; criticising Bohemond would serve to show Tancred in a still 
more favorable light. Let it be pointed out once more that these distortions need not 
all be attributed to Ralph himself. Being only a newcomer in the Orient, he must 
have heard this self-justifying version of the story from Tancred, Bohemond and 
their followers.  
Ralph shows Tancred in a heroic role also in his account of how the Norman 
army withdrew to Edessa. Reportedly, the prince remained in the rear while “some 
went on ahead” and “others prepared to flee,” so that he could “take up the role of a 
wall against the spears of the enemies following behind.” Despite this reference to 
the enemies following behind, Ralph surprisingly claims that the Turks remained un-
aware of the retreat. He proceeds to depict how the Christians escaped with difficul-
ty, under rain and through muddy, slippery paths,burdened by their loads, throwing 
away most of their baggage and even weapons. All in all, this reads more like a rout 
before the pursuing enemy than an organized retreat. Moreover, Ralph’s claim that 
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the Normans could flee in safety while the Turks were asleep also stands in contra-
diction with the testimonies of Ibn al-Athir, Ibn al-Qalanisi and Matthew of Edessa, 
who assert that the Norman princes reached Edessa with only a handful of their sol-
diers while the rest were slaughtered in flight by the troops of Sokman and/or the 
people of Harran. In this connection Nicholson aptly observes that Ralph had good 
reasons to suppress the Muslim’s pursuit and slaughter of the Normans, which would 
have been damaging to their reputation, but then gave the game away when reporting 
the speech that Bohemond made before embarking for Europe. The prince seems to 
have confessed in this speech that the number of Franks in North Syria had been 
greatly reduced, making it necessary to obtain help from the West.
69
 All this evi-
dence shows that Ralph’s testimony about the retreat of the Normans cannot be lent 
credence either.  
Ralph proceeds to relate that all those who had been able to escape gathered 
in Edessa. Here, as he puts it, Tancred was found worthy to be elected successor to 
Baldwin and to carry the heavy burden of ruling the city. Significantly, Ralph does 
not say at all that Tancred was entrusted with the rule of Edessa only for the time be-
ing, with the provision that he would immediately restore it to Baldwin on the latter’s 
release. However, this is precisely what William of Tyre and Albert of Aachen attest. 
Once again, Ralph’s testimony should be considered the less plausible one, insofar as 
it reflects the Normans’ still persisting claims to Edessa. 
Ralph concludes his account with the disastrous consequences of the Frankish 
defeat for the Principality of Antioch: 
When the Frankish defeat became known through the cities, Cilicia, Syria and 
Phoenicia rejoiced, both those who had been subjected, and those who might 
face subjection. The latter shed fear from their hearts while the former shed 
the yoke from their necks.  
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He relates how the Cilician cities of Tarsus, Adana and Mamistra called in 
the Byzantines and expelled the Franks, while the Turks attacked Artah and took 
their ravages as far as the Orontes river. Following this, he reports, a very large Byz-
antine fleet, which was equipped with building material and personnel as well as 
arms, entered the port of Latakia and fortified it before Bohemond could bring relief. 
Ralph states like Ibn al-Adim that Bohemond saw little hope of recovering by his 
own resources from the extremely difficult situation in which he found himself. Ac-
cordingly, he decided to embark for Europe and seek support and reinforcements 
from there. If Ralph is to be believed, this was despite the protests of Tancred that 
Bohemond should stay and that he should be sent instead.  
By this time there was still a sizeable Muslim population in strategically im-
portant Ruj valley and Jabal Summaq, who rebelled upon the news of the Frankish 
defeat and at the instigation of Ridwan. As a result all the Latin possessions there 
were lost, apart from the castle of Hab. But it was not only the Muslims who rebelled 
against Frankish rule. Thomas Asbridge speaks in general of “the instability caused 
by the presence of a large non-Latin population within the principality,” which in-
cluded the disenchanted Armenian population of Cilicia and elsewhere as well.
70
 We 
have already seen the signs of this disenchantment in the account of Matthew of 
Edessa. Perhaps it was also due in part to the tactless policy of the Latin ecclesiasti-
cal organization against the Gregorian faith. The resentment against this policy went 
so far that the Armenian population of Albistan, a town to the north of Mar‘ash, col-
laborated with the Turks to massacre the Frankish garrison stationed there.
71
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The rebellion in Albistan was repressed brutally and the town did not fall to 
the Turks, but the result turned out to be quite otherwise in another, strategically 
much more important town, Artah. This was situated to the south of the river Afrin, 
near the mouth of this river that poured into the lake of Amiq opposite Antioch. 
Since it was the last fortified town to the east of Antioch, that city could come under 
serious threat if a Muslim army managed to entrench itself in it.
72
 Indeed this was 
almost realized in spring 1105, when the Armenians of Artah, “disquieted by the 
neighborhood of the Franks, surrendered the place to Ridwan,” as Sibt ibn al-Jawzi 
puts it.
73
 The ruler of Aleppo had been relieved of his preoccupations in the south, 
owing to the struggles in Damascus after his brother Dukak’s death, and so had been 
able to increase his pressure on Antioch. This in turn had provided the disillusioned 
Armenians of Artah with the opportunity to make common cause with him.
74
 Tan-
cred, duly alarmed, gathered his forces, defeated Ridwan, and retrieved this strategi-
cally vital place, thereby restoring his eastern frontier once again (20 April 1105).
75
    
It emerges from Ralph’s account that the Armenian and perhaps also the 
Greek townsfolk in Cilicia were eager as well to exchange Frankish rule with anoth-
er, in this case that of Constantinople. Anna Comnena complements Ralph’s account 
by noting that it was the Byzantine admiral Cantacuzenus who captured Latakia. She 
adds that the Admiral seized al-Ullaiqa, al-Marqab and Jabala as well. On the other 
hand, she reports that Tarsus and the adjacent, no longer extant, port of Longinada, 
as well as Adana and Mamistra, were occupied by the Greek general Monastras, who 
was heartily welcomed by the Armenian population.
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  Bohemond had not even been able to save Latakia in the course of these at-
tacks, but some scholars have argued that he actually profited from the disaster by 
becoming the “dominant” and “most powerful” Latin prince in the north. They at-
tribute this to the fact that Baldwin and Joscelin had been captured and Tancred 
elected as the regent of Edessa.
77
 But this rise in Bohemond’s standing meant little in 
fact, as is demonstrated by his having to embark for Europe not long afterwards. 
Harold Fink aptly describes his difficult situation in the wake of the battle: 
Bohemond’s position was therefore rendered desparate by pressure on all 
sides from the Byzantines and Aleppo. With many of his troops lost at Har-
ran, his home garrisons demoralized, Edessa weak, and now himself in debt 
for his ransom of 1103 and unable to secure more men, Bohemond was at the 
end of his resources.78  
Accordingly, Bohemond had no option left other than seeking help overseas, 
a sorry lot indeed for the “most powerful” Latin prince in the north. In an effort to 
finance his journey, moreover, he aggravated the sorry state of his principality by 
stripping it of its resources.
79
  
 
Albert of Aachen begins his version of the story by reporting that Chakarmish 
and Sokman collected an army of sixty thousand (obviously an exaggerated number) 
and set out “in arrogance and great force” to besiege Edessa. In mentioning Sokman 
the author feels it necessary to remind his readers that this man had “wickedly invad-
ed” Jerusalem but then, on the first approach of the Christian army, lost the city to 
the Fatimids and fled to Damascus in order to seek support from the Turks there. He 
goes on to relate how Baldwin of Edessa was frightened upon hearing the arrival of 
such hordes, and calling up all those in his service, posted them to defend the ram-
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parts. Leaving the city after this, he sent for aid to Bohemond and Tancred and re-
quested them to bring reinforcements. Emphasizing Christian unity, Albert writes 
that he “begged and implored them not to suffer the arrogance of the Turks to prevail 
over their Christian brothers.” When the Normans received his summons for aid, 
they called together around three thousand knights and seven thousand footsoldiers 
from all the places and castles of Antioch, and proceeded to the appointed place, the 
fields of Harran. Here Baldwin was impatiently awaiting their arrival with all the 
troops he had brought together.  
There is a notable contradiction in Albert’s account so far: he first makes it 
appear as if Baldwin had posted all the troops in the city to defend the ramparts and 
departed alone, or almost so, from the city. But then he reveals that the count had all 
the troops he had mustered in his company as he waited for the Normans before Har-
ran. How to explain this apparent contradiction? Perhaps the only solution is to as-
sume that Baldwin had left a sufficient force in the city to guard the walls and de-
parted with the rest of his troops to meet with his allies. However, this still leaves 
unanswered the basic question of what happened to the large Muslim force suppos-
edly posited before Edessa in between Baldwin’s departure from the city and the bat-
tle. It seems to have vanished altogether, not only in Albert only but all other sources 
upholding the idea of an initial Muslim attack on Edessa. If there was indeed a threat 
to Edessa, which seems unlikely, this must have been of a much more distant and 
vague nature, perhaps against the territory, rather than an army actually marching to 
besiege the city.  
In the light of these considerations, it seems more plausible to assume that 
Baldwin’s departure with most of his troops was not a defensive measure against an 
approaching Muslim attack, but rather the beginning of a Frankish offensive against 
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Harran. The question why Albert’s account makes it seem otherwise has already 
been discussed at length. Let it suffice to repeat briefly that the historian probably 
drew for this account upon a Norman version of the story disseminated during Bo-
hemond’s sojourn in Europe. On a campaign to raise aid for the Latin East, the Nor-
man prince would not have deemed it profitable to reveal that the Franks there had 
just squandered vast resources and men on an ambitious expedition that failed miser-
ably. It would be far more preferable to represent the disastrous venture as a des-
parate defense against the onslaught of vast hordes of “infidels.”  
Yet another significant point in Albert’s account so far is the passage where 
Baldwin is shown imploring the Normans “not to suffer the arrogance of the Turks to 
prevail over their Christian brothers.” As we shall see, the necessity of preserving 
Christian unity against the “infidel” is a theme that emerges time and again in Al-
bert’s account of the battle. Indeed it is quite possible to argue that the historian re-
garded the account as an opportunity to underline the importance of Christian unity, 
as a plea to his contemporaries to preserve this unity intact. This is not at all unlike 
the way Ibn al-Athir treated his account of the same battle.  
Albert goes on to relate that an Arab came to the Franks assembled before 
Harran, informing them that the Turks were speedily approaching to besiege Edessa. 
Hearing the news, they moved their camp to the river Balikh and thence to the open 
field before Raqqa, near the confluence of that river with the Euphrates. Albert does 
not neglect to note that here they made confession to the prelates present, and thereby 
“turned all their dissensions into love.” After this, he says, they arranged the troops 
in twenty rows and positioned them in two wings so that they could “support each 
other mutually and thus bear the burden of the battle more lightly when resisting the 
enemy.” It was reportedly at this point that Sokman arrived with his thirty thousand 
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(sic.) powerful warriors and archers from the right side and joined battle with the 
Franks.   
All this reveals that Albert’s geographical knowledge about the region was 
quite blurred. He states perplexingly that the Turks advanced upon Edessa, while the 
Franks, hearing of their approach, moved in the opposite direction, towards Harran in 
the south, to take up position. And then we are told as in Fulcher’s account that the 
Turks finally arrived not at Edessa or even Harran, but at Raqqa, some hundred kil-
ometers to the south. As if this was not enough, Albert asserts that the Franks were 
busy preparing for an imminent battle, as though they were awaiting the Muslim ar-
my on its route, and singularly fails to explain why they had proceeded from Harran 
to Raqqa. The other sources corroborate that the battle indeed took place near Raqqa, 
but Albert himself does not seem to have been aware of the distance between this 
town on the one hand and Harran and Edessa on the other. He probably assumed 
them to be so close that an army going from Mosul or Hisn Kaifa to Edessa would 
have to pass through Raqqa. Accordingly, he does not attempt to explain when and 
why the Turks had struck south from their route towards Edessa.  
In the light of this discussion, it can be said that Albert’s testimony is less 
plausible than Ralph’s report that the Turks drew the Franks south by a tactical re-
treat. Demirkent rightly points out that Albert contradicts himself in relating that 
Baldwin, terrified by the Muslim attack on Edessa, collected his forces to protect the 
walls, but then proceeded to the Turkish-controlled city of Harran, thence to Raqqa.
80
  
To solve this problem it could be assumed that by going to Raqqa the Franks 
tried to divert the Muslims away from Edessa and that the latter, learning of their 
presence to the south, turned in that direction to defeat them before besieging the 
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city. But this is only a conjecture that is implied nowhere by Albert himself, who ap-
parently supposed that at Raqqa the Franks were still near Edessa and positioned on 
the route of the Turks marching towards that city. The assumption in question also 
fails to explain why the Franks had first assembled before Harran and then decided to 
move their camp further south to Raqqa –– again a point about which Albert does not 
supply any information. In consideration of these points, it seems more judicious to 
give preference to the testimonies of the other sources. A combination of these would 
suggest that the Franks gathered to besiege Harran, but then, because of a dispute 
among their leaders, fell in pursuit of the withdrawing Turks before being able to oc-
cupy it. Taking advantage of this opportunity, another Turkish contingent then re-
plenished the depleted provisions of the town.  
It is also noteworthy in Albert’s account that like Ralph he does not mention 
the vehement dispute between the princes of Edessa and Antioch that almost broke 
the alliance even before the battle. On the contrary, he presents his readers with an 
edifying example of Christian solidarity, relating how the Normans hurried to aid 
their Christian brothers and together they “turned all their dissensions into love.” All 
this emphasis on Christian unity when it was severely disrupted in reality might be a 
part of the Norman propaganda intended to cover up the displeasing facts that could 
inconvenience Bohemond’s cause in Europe. Nevertheless, Albert’s mention of the 
Franks’ dissensions also suggests that he may have been aware of these, and may 
have stressed Christian unity in reaction, either as a covert criticism, or perhaps in 
order to present his readers with a good rather than a bad example. 
The elements of Norman propaganda are as evident in Albert’s description of 
the clash as in Ralph’s. He shows them fighting in the forefront and being prevented 
from reaching victory only by the Edessenes’ failure to join them. Between the lines, 
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he compares the latters’ performance unfavorably with that of the Normans: “Bohe-
mond, Tancred and all the army of Antioch were not sluggish in meeting [the enemy] 
head-on with weapons, hauberk, helmet and a shield roof to resist them, blaring loud-
ly with tumpets and bugles;” they were accompanied on the left by Baldwin and Jos-
celin. Albert relates that the Normans gained the upper hand in the beginning, pene-
trating the Muslims’ ranks and scattering them, but were eventually compelled by the 
exhaustion of their power to flee the battlefield. Reportedly, they had managed to kill 
five hundred enemy troops by this time, while losing less than half of that number on 
their own side. If they were routed in the end despite this, Albert explains, it was due 
to the fact that the forces of Edessa, running rashly into an ambush, failed to join 
them at the moment when they had gained the upper hand. According to his story 
Baldwin and Joscelin, hearing that the Normans had joined battle about a mile away 
and were prevailing in the fight, attempted to break through the dense enemy ranks 
“with burning zeal” to join and reinforce them. But at this point ten thousand Turks 
suddenly emerged from an ambush and showered the Edessenes with arrows, putting 
them to flight and killing or capturing many, including clergymen, monks and the 
archbishop of Edessa.  
The report that the Turks routed the army of Edessa with a shower of arrows 
is obviously in accordance with the testimonies of the Anonymous and William of 
Tyre. However Albert, like Ralph, shows the Normans in a totally different role. Ac-
cording to him, they had not abandoned the Edessenes at that point, but on the con-
trary joined battle before them and prevailed against the enemy until the Edessenes’ 
rout had altered the course of the battle. Albert allows himself even more explicit 
criticism of the Edessenes than Ralph when relating the capture of Count Baldwin: 
“Because he was too greedy for slaughter and hurried heedlessly, and did not wait as 
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he should have done for Bohemond’s victory standards, [he] was overcome, cap-
tured, and taken off.” So once more, as in Ralph’s account, the whole responsibility 
for the debacle is laid at the feet of Baldwin and the other Edessenes who had alleg-
edly failed to play their part in the battle unlike the Normans.  
Not content with this, Albert even depicts the Normans as making a heroic ef-
fort to save their Edessene comrades. He relates how Tancred was shattered on re-
turning from his successful charge to learn the Lorraniers’ lot and set out at once to 
pursue the Turks and rescue Baldwin and other captives. But the enemy escaped, Al-
bert states, and so he was able to save only the archbishop of Edessa and three 
knights. It is worthy of attention here that the rescue of the archbishop, related by 
Ralph as yet another heroic feat, comes across in Albert’s version as a mere consola-
tion prize. This difference probably stemmed from the ends pursued by the two au-
thors in composing their accounts. Ralph’s purpose was to eulogize Tancred and ac-
cordingly he was eager to underline the contrast between Baldwin, who had failed to 
save even his own person, and Tancred, who had supposedly saved even the latter’s 
archbishop. On the other hand, Albert sought to promote Christian unity and was 
therefore more interested in drawing attention to the alleged concern of the Normans 
for their Christian brothers who had been captured.  
In addition to this, the episode also serves Albert to support his claim that the 
Normans would have won the battle if the Edessenes had not been routed. For it im-
plies that the Normans were compelled to break off their own successful fight with 
the enemy in order to rescue them. Nevertheless, it must be observed that the story of 
this rescue attempt stands in contradiction with Albert’s earlier report that the Nor-
mans themselves were put to flight as well when their power was exhausted. Appar-
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ently, the historian chose to include it on account of its value as an edifying example 
of Christian solidarity.  
The story also contradicts what follows next, Albert’s account of the Nor-
mans’ flight to Edessa. Like Ralph, he states that the Norman princes retired to their 
camp at nightfall to have a rest before resuming the fight on the following day, but 
were prevented from doing so by the flight in question.
 
We have seen Ralph attribute 
this to the common soldiers’ fear of what awaited them on the next day. Albert at-
tributes it in contrast to the panic that reportedly seized them upon discovering 
Baldwin’s absence by early morning. However, they must have already known that 
Baldwin was missing if Tancred had indeed pursued the Turks to rescue him and the 
other captives, but returned with almost empty hands. Because of such contradic-
tions, this explanation of Albert about the Normans’ flight seems even less satisfacto-
ry than that of Ralph. Albert himself seems to have felt this too, for he offers a sec-
ond, relatively more plausible as well as more flattering explanation for the hasty re-
treat of the Normans to Edessa. Reportedly, their motive was to reach the city before 
the Turks riding ahead in triumph, so that they could prevent it from falling into the 
enemy’s hands. He asserts in accordance with this that Bohemond and Tancred, once 
inside Edessa, reassured its populace who still bewailed Baldwin and other losses, 
and encouraged them to defend the city.  
Albert proceeds to note that the Armenians of Edessa assembled the next day 
to raise Tancred to Baldwin’s position, until they could see whether the latter’s re-
lease could be secured through ransom or otherwise. Albert concludes that Bohe-
mond returned to Antioch after Tancred had thus been appointed to hold the city and 
its principate in Baldwin’s name. As we have seen, Albert’s emphasis that Tancred 
held Edessa only as Baldwin’s regent until the latter’s return is singularly lacking in 
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Ralph’s account, where Tancred is shown tout court as the elected new ruler of the 
city.  
Albert ends his story of the battle with a lengthy account of the subsequent 
siege of Edessa. He assumes this to have been undertaken in common by Sokman 
and Chakarmish, although we have seen in Ibn al-Athir’s account that the lord of 
Mosul had to besiege the city on his own after his dispute with Sokman and the lat-
ter’s departure. As pointed out before, this was precisely what led to his failure, and 
Albert relates in detail how he was sorely defeated by Tancred in a sortie. In the con-
text of this episode, Albert cites a letter that he says was written by Tancred to Bo-
hemond to ask for his aid against Chakarmish. Nevertheless, it looks more like a 
treatise on the importance of Frankish and Christian unity and the need to preserve 
these, rather than an urgent call of help. For a last time, then, Albert used his account 
of the battle to make a case for Christian solidarity against the Muslims. In this re-
spect he comes remarkably close to Ibn al-Athir, who as we saw showed Sokman as 
declaring his commitment to Muslim unity towards the end of the account.   
3.1.1.9 Sibt ibn al-Jawzi: an alternative account of the battle? 
About the Battle of Harran Sibt ibn al-Jawzi offers a brief report derived from 
the account of Ibn al-Qalanisi.
81
 But for the same year, 497/1103-4,
82
 he also reports 
another confrontation between the Franks and Muslims. According to this the Franks 
set out from Edessa and divided into two detachments, one of which went to Harran 
while the other went to Raqqa.
83
 Upon this Sokman arrived from Mardin to confront 
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them. In the bitter fight that ensued the Franks captured the Uqailid chief Salim ibn 
Malik, who had camped with his tribe near Ain al-Arus, but were ultimately defeated 
and compelled to retire with considerable losses.  
The report of such a battle in 497 is not corroborated by any other source. But 
considering that Harran and Raqqa were precisely the scene of the events associated 
with the Battle of Harran, it seems quite reasonable to assume that this could be an-
other report of that battle, mistaken by Sibt ibn al-Jawzi for a later, different confron-
tation. Given the vast divergence between the two accounts, the chronicler may well 
have failed to notice that they referred to the same battle and reported them as sepa-
rate events. There is a further consideration that reinforces the possibility that this 
might be an alternative account of the Battle of Harran: after the disaster that they 
had suffered in that battle, the Franks would hardly have possessed sufficient confi-
dence and military strength to venture another major expedition. If they had only car-
ried out a local incursion, in turn, it is unlikely that Sokman would have bothered to 
set out once more from Mardin to proceed as far as Raqqa.  
What renders this report especially valuable, if it indeed pertains to the Battle 
of Harran, is its testimony that it was indeed the Franks who went on to the offensive 
by assembling in Edessa and marching against Harran and Raqqa. As such, it pro-
vides further corroboration to the testimonies of Ibn al-Athir, the indigenous Chris-
tian authors and William of Tyre against those of Ralph, Albert and Ibn al-Qalanisi. 
Another point of interest in Sibt ibn al-Jawzi’s account is the report that the Franks 
separated into two detachments, one of which went to Harran and the other to Raqqa. 
This might explain the surprising jump in the accounts of Fulcher and Albert from 
the Franks’ siege of Harran to the battle at Raqqa without any explanation as to why 
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they had proceeded there. As it has already been pointed out, the most reasonable 
explanation for this seems to be their pursuit of the Turks who had resorted to a tacti-
cal retreat. Nevertheless, Sibt ibn al-Jawzi’s testimony suggests the possibility that a 
part of the Frankish forces had left the others outside Harran to march towards 
Raqqa.  
If this was indeed the case, it is not clear why the Franks would have taken 
such a step. Perhaps their aim was to lure the main Turkish army away from Harran 
and join battle with them near Raqqa while the Frankish detachment before Harran 
would try to prevent the remaining Turks from provisioning the already starving 
town. An attempt might also be made to reconcile Sibt’s account with the episode of 
retreat. It was perhaps only the Edessenes who proceeded to Raqqa in pursuit of the 
Turks, whereas the Normans had indeed broken the alliance after their dispute and 
remained before Harran just as implied by Fulcher’s invective. This would also ex-
plain why the people of that town took an important part in the pursuit and massacre 
after the defeat of the Edessene army. On the other hand, if Baldwin was really wor-
ried about the Normans demanding a share of Harran, or the right to pillage it, he 
would hardly go off to Raqqa and leave the Normans there.  In any case, the absence 
of further details in Sibt ibn al-Jawzi’s account renders it quite difficult to say any-
thing for certain.    
3.1.2 Did Belek play any role in the conflict? 
At this point it must be clarified whether Sokman’s nephew Belek ibn Beh-
ram took part in the battle as well, or at least had a role in the hostilities that eventu-
ally led to it. Indeed Mükrimin Halil Yinanç, in his encyclopaedia article on Belek, 
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asserts unequivocally that the emir accompanied Sokman in the Battle of Harran.
84
 
Nevertheless, no statement or even hint to this effect has been found in the primary 
sources indicated in that article’s bibliography and examined for this study.  
Gerhard Väth suggests in turn that Belek’s activities may have been among 
the causes of the battle, and argues in this context that the County of Edessa was 
threatened by this emir as well beside Sokman.
85
 According to his assertion Belek 
turned to the north after being expelled from Saruj by the Franks, captured Kharput, 
and began to attack the territory of Edessa from this base. Väth goes on to argue that 
Belek’s threat against the Frankish lordship grew still more after his conquest of the 
towns of Ana and al-Haditha in October 1103, which supposedly compelled Baldwin 
du Bourg to undertake action. Neither of these arguments is supportable, however, 
for Belek did not capture Kharput before 1115,
86
 and the two towns in question, lo-
cated more than four hundred kilometers from Edessa, were simply too distant for 
Baldwin to feel any threat from Belek. 
3.1.3 The course of events 
The comparative close reading of the primary source accounts on the Battle 
of Harran allows for the following reconstruction of the events. In order to entrench 
their presence in North Syria, and perhaps also to capture some Muslim cities like 
Aleppo, the Franks wished to sever the communication lines between Muslim Syria 
and the Muslim powers in the Jazira. Accordingly Harran, with its key strategic posi-
tion, came to constitute an attractive target for them, situated as it was at the junction 
of the routes between Syria, Anatolia and the Jazira. It also promised considerable 
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profits from the trade carried out along these routes. Still more importantly, the 
Franks could not hope to secure full control of the territory around Edessa as long as 
Harran remained in the Muslims’ hands, owing to the close proximity of the two 
towns. 
In preparation for a planned siege of the town, therefore, Baldwin of Edessa 
had been carrying out systematic ravages to deplete its food resources. By the year 
1104 Harran was rent by strife, with its rule changing hands frequently, and the 
Franks were not late in seizing upon the long-expected opportunity that offered itself. 
Raising a huge army, the princes of Antioch and Edessa marched upon the town and 
laid siege to it. Baldwin’s previous depradations turned out to have worked and the 
starving townsfolk came to offer their submission. Nevertheless, the eagerness of 
Baldwin to keep the town unscathed for himself, as well as his rivalry with Bohe-
mond for its possession, led to a serious dispute between the Normans and 
Edessenes. Because of this dispute, the Franks were unable to enter and take over 
Harran before the arrival of the Muslim relief army commanded by Sokman ibn 
Artuk and Chakarmish of Mosul. The Turks adopted the strategy of dividing their 
forces into two contingents. While one of these withdrew south, with the Franks in 
pursuit, the other tried to supply the starving townsfolk with provisions.  
The contingent in retreat descended as far south as Raqqa, where the river 
Balikh joins the Euphrates –– an ideal place for a well-staged ambush, as the escape 
routes of the enemy would be blocked on two sides by these rivers. Here the Turks 
surprised the Edessenes in the vanguard, throwing their ranks into disorder with a 
shower of arrows. At this point the Normans, who had kept to the rear of the 
Edessenes because of the dispute, refrained from joining them and withdrew behind a 
hill nearby. From here they fled at night towards Edessa. In the meanwhile the Turks 
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had thoroughly defeated the Edessenes in close combat and taken Baldwin and Jos-
celin captive. Then Sokman joined the people of Harran in the pursuit of the fleeing 
Normans, and the forces of Antioch were decimated in the ensuing slaughter. But 
during Sokman’s absence Count Baldwin was taken away from his tent by Chakarm-
ish’s men, who were unwilling to leave that valuable captive to the Turkomans and 
let them gain all the credit for the victory. Discovering this on his return, Sokman 
angrily departed without collaborating further with Chakarmish to reap the fruits of 
their success, and contented himself with seizing the Frankish castles in Shabakhtan. 
As for Chakarmish, he proceeded alone to besiege Edessa, where Tancred had been 
elected regent, but was defeated by the latter in a sortie. Thus whereas the division in 
the Franks’ ranks had caused them to lose the battle, the division between the victo-
rious Muslims caused them to lose the chance of taking the significant prize of Edes-
sa.  
3.1.4 The consequences of the battle 
Although the Franks managed to hold on to Edessa despite their defeat, this 
was only a small compensation for their failure to take advantage of the golden op-
portunity to capture Harran. They had also lost thereby the chance of isolating Mus-
lim Syria from the Jazira, in preparation for its conquest, as well as of acquiring a 
useful base from which they could expand their rule towards the East. In this respect 
Grousset and Harold Fink liken the Battle of Harran to the defeat that the Roman 
forces under Crassus suffered before the same city, as they assume that this battle 
had put a definite end to the Roman expansion eastwards and endangered their hold 
on Syria.
87
 Runciman, on the other hand, compares the consequences of the battle 
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with those of the Crusade of 1101: the failure of the latter had meant that North Syria 
would be deprived of the reinforcements from the West that were necessary for the 
firm establishment of Frankish domination, while the disaster of Harran meant that 
the County of Edessa was destined to fall in the long run and that Aleppo was never 
going to be captured. For the Franks had failed to drive a wedge securely between 
the three Muslim centres of Anatolia, Iraq and Syria.
88
  
Although both Baldwin and Joscelin had been captured, it was interestingly 
the Principality of Antioch that fared worse in the immediate aftermath of the disas-
ter.
89
 Ridwan of Aleppo and the Byzantine fleet simultaneously attacked its territo-
ries, while the local Christians and subject Muslims rebelled against what they saw 
as the oppressive Frankish government. As a result, within a short time the Principal-
ity had shrunk to little more than the environs of Antioch, and Bohemond was com-
pelled to embark for Europe to seek help. As Grousset puts it memorably, “the Nor-
man knights, before the disaster, had been galloping wih impunity in the suburbs of 
Aleppo. After the fatal day, it was the Turks of Aleppo who came back to menace the 
suburbs of Antioch.”90 Likewise Cahen observes that “the conquests of the last five 
years were lost at one blow,” which meant that only the districts of interior Syria re-
mained to the Franks.
91
 However, under the able administration of his successor 
Tancred, the state was to speedily recover its former boundaries and even expand be-
yond them.  
Consequently, the victory that the Muslims scored in the Battle of Harran did 
not enable them to realize long-term territorial gains at the expense of the Frankish 
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principalities. But it postponed the encirclement of Aleppo by the Franks for nearly 
fifteen years and prevented them from seizing a post of such strategic importance as 
Harran. Were it not for this battle, they would not only have been able to isolate the 
Muslim cities of Syria from Mesopotamia, but also to expand further east, perhaps 
even to seize Mosul, owing to the relative weakness of the Seljukids at this time.     
3.1.5 Sokman’s equivocal role in the victory 
Sokman and his Turkomans, who made up the major part of the Muslim ar-
my, must be granted the chief credit for this result, although we have seen that his 
abrupt departure after the kidnapping of Baldwin from his tent probably saved Edes-
sa from almost certain capture. In this connection Ali Sevim points out that Sokman 
was the first emir to stop the Muslims’ ongoing loss of ground to the Franks, who he 
says were “inexorably making progress in the lands of Islam and expanding the area 
under their rule through daily successes.”92 Going further than this, Aydın Usta ar-
gues that Sokman’s victory constituted a beginning for the Artukids’ rise to a posi-
tion of leadership among Muslims, and points out that the latter had been unable be-
fore this time to overcome their divisions against the Frankish expansion. He adds 
that the leadership of the Artukids in jihad would develop with Ilghazi and reach its 
peak at the time of Belek.
93
 Developing the same line of argument, Imad al-Din Kha-
lil states that this “first critical victory against the Crusaders” opened “the way before 
the emergence of the Muslim leaderships and alliances that inflicted successive 
blows upon the Crusader forces, which began with Mawdud and ended with Saladin, 
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having respectively continued through the Artukids Ilghazi and Belek, Aksungur al-
Bursuki, and the Zangids Imad al-Din and Nur al-Din.”94  
It must be observed however that such an interpretation is rather teleological, 
for Ilghazi was not to play any role of leadership against the Franks before 1118, 
fourteen years later, and until then either did not participate in the campaigns led by 
the sultan’s officers, or even actually allied against them with the Franks. When he 
did emerge as the chief adversary of the Franks in North Syria, he was not so much 
the leader of a fully-fledged jihad campaign against the Franks as the savior and de-
fender of Aleppo. The same is true of Belek as well.
95
 Although Zangi is asserted to 
have followed them in the leadership of jihad, he was in fact far more interested in 
subjugating the petty Turkish and Kurdish principalities in Diyar Bakr than waging a 
consistent jihad campaign against the Franks. Nur al-Din and Saladin were similarly 
bent on expanding their territories at the expense of their Muslim neighbors while 
keeping the Franks at bay.  
All this implies that Sokman’s achievement should be considered within the 
context of his own time rather than looking backwards from 1187 to count him as the 
first link in a chain of increasingly illustrious leaders of jihad. The period in question 
witnessed the imminent threat of the Frankish encirclement of Aleppo and their 
penetration of the eastern Jazira, developments that compelled Sokman to take urgent 
action as the only local emir in a position to do so. He certainly rose to this chal-
lenge, and by saving Harran with Chakarmish, dealt a critical blow to Frankish ex-
pansion in North Syria and the Jazira during its initial, most critical period. Argua-
bly, he also prepared thereby the ultimate doom of the County of Edessa. Despite 
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this, there remains the fact that his desertion of Chakarmish in the aftermath of the 
victory also postponed the capture of Edessa and other important cities of the County 
for another forty years. Of course Sokman had very good personal reasons for doing 
so, as the attachment of Edessa to Mosul would have left him in a difficult position 
indeed, much like his descendants and nephews would later face against Zangi. 
Therefore Sokman’s interest in an alliance with the lord of Mosul must have ended 
the moment the Frankish threat to Harran ceased.  
3.2 An anticlimactic sequel: Sokman’s death on his march to aid Damascus 
and Tripoli  
It seems that Sokman’s victory in the Battle of Harran had gained him con-
siderable reputation as the chief adversary of the Franks in the region, for he was 
summoned to aid against them by two Muslim rulers at once: Tughtekin, the atabek 
of Damascus, who was fatally ill and concerned about the future of his city, and 
Fakhr al-Mulk Ibn Ammar, the emir of Tripoli, whose city was besieged by the 
Franks.  
It should be asked at this point how a local emir of the Jazira could have be-
come the hope of cities so distant from his base around Mardin and Hisn Kaifa, even 
though he might have defeated the Franks in a battle fought much nearer that base. 
There seem several reasons to account for this. To begin with, it was the first serious 
victory scored against a substantial Frankish army of comparable size to the Muslim 
forces. This was bound to cause widespread excitement on the one side and de-
spondency on the other, as revealed by the remarks of Ibn al-Qalanisi in Damascus 
and Fulcher of Chartres in Jerusalem, both cities located far from the scene of the 
events. Secondly, it was the Principality of Antioch that had been most severely af-
fected by the Muslim victory, and since this was the Frankish state that posed the 
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greatest and most direct threat to the Muslim cities in Syria, their rulers must have 
been aware of Sokman’s major role in this happy turn of the events. Being only a lo-
cal emir, moreover, he must have appeared a more appealing source of help to the 
Syrian emirs than the Seljukid governor of Mosul, given their concern to preserve 
their newly found independence from the sultan in Baghdad.  
It remains to ask why Sokman himself was willing to go to the aid of Damas-
cus and Tripoli against the Franks. One immediate reason for this was that in this pe-
riod the Artukids were still basically chieftains of free-roaming nomads with a base 
in Diyar Bakr, rather than rulers of established principalities covering more or less 
defined territories in that region. We shall see that this was also the case with Ilghazi, 
who roamed between Mardin, Aleppo and Tiflis, or Belek, whose field of activity 
encompassed Kharput, Aleppo and Tyre. Just as in their case, however, there was 
probably more to Sokman’s decision to answer the summons to help. It might be tak-
en as evidence of his positive reaction to being regarded as the chief adversary of the 
Franks as well as the protector of the Muslims in the region. Moreover, he must have 
been aware that the fall of Tripoli and especially Damascus to the Franks would ren-
der them so powerful as to enable them to shift the balance of power in the region 
and even come to threaten his interests in Diyar Bakr. As we shall see in the subse-
quent chapters, this was also an important reason why Ilghazi and Belek took over 
Aleppo and why the latter agreed to bring help to Tyre when it was under Frankish 
siege.
96
    
 Ibn al-Qalanisi has provided us with a contemporary account of the event,
97
 
whereas Ibn al-Athir seems to have mainly summarized and to some extent reworked 
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the same or a similar account.
 98
 He also adds from other sources an exchange be-
tween Sokman and his men that shows the emir determined to wage jihad against the 
Franks even at the expense of his life. This is of course in keeping with the declara-
tion that Sokman had made according to the same historian on discovering the kid-
napping of Baldwin from his tent. However, the addition in question does not run 
counter to the spirit of Ibn al-Qalanisi’s original narrative either, for both chroniclers 
appear bent on representing Sokman as a model mujahid to be imitated by other 
emirs, always ready to wage Holy War and to aid their fellow Muslims against the 
Franks.  
Nevertheless, a certain nuance is still discernible in their reaction against the 
attitude of Tughtekin, who reportedly regretted at the last moment that he had sum-
moned Sokman, for fear that the emir would deprive himself of the city’s possession. 
Ibn al-Qalanisi relates this episode in a way that reveals that he did not find 
Tughtekin’s volte-face entirely unjustified, whereas Ibn al-Athir lets the contrast be-
tween Sokman and Tughtekin that is implicit in the storyline emerge more clearly: on 
the one hand, an emir committed to the cause of Muslim unity, and on the other 
hand, an emir ready to let selfish calculation interfere with that cause. This is hardly 
surprising in view of the fact that Ibn al-Qalanisi was himself a notable of Damascus 
who served under Tughtekin as well as under his heirs, and perhaps had a part to play 
in his city’s rapprochement with the Franks against Zangi. In contrast, Ibn al-Athir, 
writing a century later in Mosul, was not only unbound by the conditions and con-
nections of Ibn al-Qalanisi, but had also adopted it as a program to find out in the 
past good and bad examples of dedication to jihad and Muslim solidarity. He sought 
                                                 
98
 Ibn al-Athir, El-Kâmil fi’t-Tarih, X, 315-16 and Chronicle, 90 (498: 1104-1105) 
 149 
thereby to warn and exhort the emirs of his time, so lax in his view against the Frank-
ish and Mongolian threat at their door.  
 
We shall follow these general remarks with a comparative close reading and 
analysis of the accounts of Ibn al-Qalanisi and Ibn al-Athir to illustrate and explicate 
the points made so far, as well as to discuss the wider historical implications of the 
affair. Ibn al-Qalanisi relates that Tughtekin was seized in late 1104 by an illness that 
grew increasingly worse, so much so that he was concerned lest it prove fatal and 
deprive his family, troops and subjects of his protection. At this point Ibn al-Qalanisi 
refers back to the compact between Sokman and Chakarmish that the two emirs had 
made according to him before the Battle of Harran, swearing that they would “prose-
cute the Holy War against the polytheists and aid the Muslims.” He asserts that it 
was this pact that inspired Tughtekin with the idea of inviting Sokman to Damascus, 
so that he could “charge him and rely upon him in its defense.”99 Around the same 
time Tripoli was under siege by the Franks, and its emir, Fakhr al-Mulk ibn Ammar, 
kept sending around letters and envoys to all the emirs in the region, asking for help 
and reinforcements. These letters also reached Sokman, urging him to hasten to the 
aid of Tripoli and promising a large sum in return. Sokman agreed to both proposals, 
the chronicler states, and after hasty preparations set out for Damascus. He depicts 
Sokman on the march as a dedicated mujahid, “pressing on his journey night and day 
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in the intensity of his zeal and eagerness” to attack the Franks in defence of the Mus-
lims.  
Nevertheless, some in Damascus were not so sure that Sokman had entirely 
altruistic motives in hurrying to the city. When the news of his arrival in the nearby 
village of al-Qariatain was brought to the atabek, Ibn al-Qalanisi relates, Tughtekin 
was reprimanded for his rashness and poor judgement by his officers and associates. 
They reminded him of the sorry fate of Atsiz, a distinguished Seljukid commander, 
some twenty-five years before. “When the emir Sokman ibn Artuk reaches Damas-
cus, and deprives you of control of it, what will become of you and of us,” they re-
portedly asked. “Were you not acquainted with the fate of Atsiz, and how, when he 
called in the sultan Taj al-Dawla [Tutush], son of Alp Arslan, and handed over Da-
mascus to him, he at once proceeded to compass his destruction and spared neither 
him nor his family?”  
Interestingly, although Ibn al-Qalanisi had just portrayed Sokman as a model 
mujahid bent on helping other Muslims, he seems to have shared the concern of these 
advisors (perhaps he was even one of them), as his next statement makes clear: 
“Thereupon Zahir al-Din awoke to his error and realized the extent of his heedless-
ness and sorely repented, so that by reason of this to his bodily sickness there was 
superadded sickness of heart.” There is not the slightest grain of criticism here to-
wards the attitude of the worried Damascenes, but on the contrary Tughtekin is 
shown coming back to his senses and realizing the rashness and folly of his former 
decision. 
We have already pointed out that an obvious reason for this apparent contra-
diction might have been Ibn al-Qalanisi’s position as one of the notables who served 
under Tughtekin and his heirs. But there could be found a more subtle explanation as 
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well: perhaps the reason why Ibn al-Qalanisi refrained from passing judgement on 
either side was that such things as Tutush had done and Sokman was feared to do 
were considered by the contemporaries to lay in the very nature of the political con-
ditions and relations in the region. They were regarded as something that could not 
be changed, and accordingly it was also meaningless to make any reproaches about 
them. Consequently, Ibn al-Qalanisi and his fellow Damascenes may not have seen 
any contradiction in believing that Sokman had come to help their city against the 
Franks, and at the same time that he would try to secure its possession by depriving 
Tughtekin and his associates of their status, properties, and perhaps even their lives.  
Of course, considered from the point of view of the well-being of Muslims at 
large, what finally counted was the protection of the city itself rather than the specific 
emir and cadres who happened to rule it at the time. Accordingly Sokman would not 
be especially culpable for trying to displace Tughtekin and his associates even if he 
ventured to do so. But when considered from the point of view of those in power, its 
preservation in the Muslims’ hands would not bring them the least benefit if they 
themselves were deprived of its rule, and along with it, their status and livelihood as 
well. So they were just as justified on their part in trying to avoid such a prospect. As 
a result Ibn al-Qalanisi may not have perceived any paradox between portraying 
Sokman as a model mujahid bent on saving Muslim cities and endorsing the policy 
adopted by the Damascene notables on his approach.  
This attitude of Ibn al-Qalanisi also provides a revealing hint about why Mus-
lim Syria was so politically divided at this time and why its emirs failed to supersede 
these divisions even as they found themselves confronted with the Frankish threat at 
their door. Evidently, the fear of losing their city to a powerful Muslim emir from the 
East, who was in a position to dispossess them for good, could prove as strong an 
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incentive for them as the fear of losing it to the “infidels.” In this respect Michael 
Köhler considers Ibn al-Qalanisi’s account as a locus classicus for the grounds of the 
policy that the Muslim principalities in Syria adopted towards reinforcements com-
ing from the East. In Köhler’s words,  
All the interventions of the Turkish armies from the East confronted Damas-
cus, Aleppo and the lesser emirates with the dilemma of finding a balance be-
tween the possible advantages of cooperation with a “Counter-Crusade” 
against the Franks, and the danger that would be implied by a successful al-
lied enterprise for the autonomy of their own lordship. 
 We have seen that this dilemma is directly reflected in the attitude of Ibn al-
Qalanisi himself. Köhler also stresses the importance of the aforementioned fate of 
Atsiz as a contributory factor to this state of affairs, and points out that Tughtekin’s 
men had not referred to it in vain as they tried to dissuade him from receiving Sok-
man. The trauma of this event had left lasting traces on the attitude of the Muslim 
emirs towards making alliances with other Muslim powers.
100
     
 
 
Ibn al-Qalanisi relates that Tughtekin and his officers were thus left in dire 
straits, taking counsel about what to do regarding Sokman, when they received news 
that the emir had succumbed to a grievous illness while camping at al-Qariatain; he 
had been taken in a coffin to where he had come from. Ibn al-Qalanisi’s report of 
Tughtekin’s reaction to this news is also quite telling. Contrary to what might have 
been expected, the atabek was not troubled at all that once again he faced the pro-
spect of leaving his city defenseless, with nobody to protect it after his death against 
the Franks. On the contrary, he is said to have rejoiced greatly at this turn of the af-
fairs, so much so that “from this time began his fortune and the restoration of health 
to his body.” After benevolently removing the danger posed by Sokman, therefore, 
God had also removed the cause of concern that had led Tughtekin to summon him 
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in the first place: “Glory be to Him who orders the lives of His Creatures by His wis-
dom and who determines all events by His power.”   
Ibn al-Athir seems largely to follow Ibn al-Qalanisi’s account, albeit with 
some subtle subtractions and additions. One such modification, mainly of historio-
graphical interest, can be observed at the beginning of his account. Here the historian 
describes Tughtekin’s letter of invitation to Sokman, which reportedly informed the 
latter that “he was ill and on the point of death and that he feared, if he died without 
anyone to defend Damascus, the Franks would conquer it. He urged him to come in 
order to entrust him with what he would rely upon in the protection of the city.”101 At 
this point Ibn al-Athir seems to have integrated Ibn al-Qalanisi’s description of the 
conditions in which Tughtekin found himself, as well as the concerns and the idea of 
calling Sokman that these inspired, directly into the letter of invitation he had sent to 
Sokman. In a way not unlike the use of dialogues in medieval historiography, he thus 
represents the chronicler’s own explanation as the content of the letter itself.  
Another point where Ibn al-Athir diverges somewhat from Ibn al-Qalanisi’s 
report on this letter has attracted scholarly attention, so it should not remain unmen-
tioned here. Ibn al-Qalanisi’s account gave the impression that Sokman had received 
the letters of Tughtekin and Ibn Ammar around the same time and set out to go first 
to Damacus and then to Tripoli. But Ibn al-Athir states that the letter of Tughtekin 
arrived later, just as Sokman was preparing to set out for Tripoli, which suggests that 
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he changed his mind and decided to go first to Damascus instead. Basing himself on 
this latter version, Ali Sevim seeks to explain Sokman’s alleged change of mind by 
pointing out that “the protection of Damascus was more important for the world of 
Islam.”102 Of course this would have been a valid ground if such a change had indeed 
taken place, but as we have seen there is no evidence for it in Ibn al-Athir’s original 
source, Ibn al-Qalanisi, and it would be unwarranted to draw conclusions from Ibn 
al-Athir’s report alone. Moreover, regardless of whether Sokman had received the 
letters at the same time or not, it was in any case more convenient for him to go first 
to Damascus and then to Tripoli on his way west and south from Hisn Kaifa.  
Yet another notable point where Ibn al-Athir diverges from Ibn al-Qalanisi is 
that he neither suggests that it was the pact of jihad between Sokman and Chakarm-
ish that had inspired Tughtekin with the idea of calling Sokman, nor mentions the 
“zeal and eagerness” with which Ibn al-Qalanisi had shown him hurrying to the aid 
of Damascus. Could this be taken to mean that it was less of a concern for Ibn al-
Athir to represent Sokman as the mujahid par excellence? That this was not so is re-
vealed by the declaration of commitment to jihad that we shall see him attribute to 
the dying Sokman. Having reported that declaration, and busy with summarizing, the 
historian does not seem to have deemed it necessary to include additional details that 
would serve the same purpose.     
A significant divergence from Ibn al-Qalanisi’s account is found in the pas-
sage where Ibn al-Athir relates, in parallel with his source, how Tughtekin was dis-
suaded by his men from receiving Sokman into the city. In contrast to the Damascene 
chronicler, Ibn al-Athir does not drop any remarks to the effect that this debate 
caused Tughtekin to realize his error and rashness in having summoned Sokman. He 
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come of age.      
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only states that Tughtekin grew afraid of the consequences of what he had done and 
his illness was consequently aggravated. In keeping with this approach, Ibn al-Athir 
also discards Ibn al-Qalanisi’s thanksgiving to God for Sokman’s death as well as for 
Tughtekin’s recovery through his joy at this news. He contents himself with drily 
stating that Tughtekin and his men “enjoyed a relief they had never hoped for.” All 
this is hardly surprising. Ibn al-Athir, writing in the next century, had witnessed the 
time of Saladin, when the major part of Muslim Syria, Egypt and the Jazira had been 
united with happy results against the Franks. He lamented that the rulers of his own 
time were far from displaying the same degree of solidarity vis-à-vis the Franks as 
well as the Mongols. Accordingly, he shared none of Ibn al-Qalanisi’s understanding 
and sympathy for the dilemma in which the Muslim emirs of the early twelfth centu-
ry had found themselves, trying to preserve their cities both from the Franks and the 
other Muslim rulers including the sultan.     
These considerations find further corroboration in a significant addition that 
Ibn al-Athir makes to Ibn al-Qalanisi’s account, the report of an exchange between 
the ailing Sokman and his men as they tried to dissuade him from continuing his 
march to Damascus. The fact that Ibn al-Athir specifies Sokman’s illness as diptheria 
and counts the emir’s son Ibrahim among his retinue indicates that he drew upon an-
other, perhaps contemporary source for this report. Whether the report is true or not, 
just as in the case of Sokman’s declaration in the tent, Ibn al-Athir must have found it 
very conducive to his aim of promoting the cause of jihad and Muslim unity. He re-
lates that Sokman’s men counseled him to return to Hisn Kaifa, but the sick man re-
jected the offer and declared: “No, I shall go on. If I recover I shall fulfil what I have 
resolved to carry out. God Almighty shall not see me turn away with fear of death 
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from the burden of fighting with the infidel. Should death overtake me, I shall be a 
martyr while marching to jihad.” They continued their march upon this reply, and 
Sokman died after he had remained speechless for two days. Ibn al-Athir notes that 
this took place in the month of Safar (22 October – 19 November 1104), and Sokman 
was taken back in a coffin to Hisn Kaifa. He concludes with a final evaluation of the 
Artukid emir: “He was resolute and crafty, a man of good sense and many good 
works.” 
Ibn al-Athir touches upon Sokman’s death in a further passage as well, where 
he describes the state of Tripoli under Frankish siege as of 499/1105-6.
103
 Lamenting 
the death as a great misfortune for all Muslims, he states: 
One of the things that harmed the Muslims was that Ibn Ammar sought help 
from Sokman ibn Artuk, who assembled his troops and marched towards him, 
only to die on his way. If God Almighty wills something to happen, He pre-
pares the reasons for it.  
Were it not for this mishap, he seems to have believed, the Franks could not 
have captured the city a few years later. According to Ibn al-Athir, then, Sokman was 
the most effective bulwark against Frankish expansion at this time, both on the coast 
and in the interior. He cannot be deemed unjustified in these considerations. As Imad 
al-Din Khalil points out, if Sokman had been able to realize his plans regarding Trip-
oli and Damascus, this would have impacted seriously on relations and the balance of 
power between the Muslims and Franks, shaping these in the long run.
104
  
On the other hand, René Grousset contends that Sokman had come together 
with Ridwan of Aleppo and Fatimid Egypt to form a three-tiered coalition that aimed 
to split the Frankish establishments on the Lebanese coast. He states that this coali-
tion scored its first success in spring 1105, when it prevented the Provençals from 
capturing Rafaniya. But then the death of Sokman “put an end to this first embryo of 
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the Counter-Crusade.” Perhaps Sokman’s venture to raise the siege of Tripoli could 
be seen as a prior, unsuccessful attempt of this coalition. But the fact that the emir 
died in autumn 1104, no less than half a year before its “first success,” makes it ra-
ther difficult to speak about the existence of a “Counter Crusade in embryo.”105 
Two other chroniclers refer to Sokman’s campaign and death as well, briefly 
and in the context of Tripoli, without mentioning the matter of Damascus. Al-Azimi 
reports that Sokman crossed the Euphrates with ten thousand horsemen to raise the 
Frankish siege of Tripoli, but died on the way at Manazir (al-Qariatain).
106
 Matthew 
of Edessa similarly relates that Sokman died on his way to Tripoli as he went to at-
tack the Franks besieging that city. He adds a final evaluation of the emir which, as 
might be expected, does not resemble that of Ibn al-Athir: “An evil man and a blood-
thirsty beast.”107 We know however that the same historian did not withhold his 
praise from another formidable Artukid adversary of the Franks, Belek, and lauded 
that emir’s compassionate treatment of his Armenian subjects.108 Accordingly, his 
condemnation of Sokman may have had more to do with this emir’s treatment of the 
indigenous Christian population under his rule than with his confrontation of the 
Franks. 
 
With Sokman’s death a period came to an end. Now it was the turn of his 
brother Ilghazi to face the Franks, though he would adopt a very different policy to-
ward them in the first decade of his rule. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ILGHAZI: EQUIVOCAL SUPPORTER OF THE SELJUKIDS 
AGAINST THE FRANKS 
Sokman’s brother Ilghazi came to the Jazira in 1105, seeking to acquire a 
new base for himself in Diyar Bakr. Here he did not show himself particularly inter-
ested in fighting the neighboring Franks, and diverted an expedition of Ridwan 
against Antioch from that target to Nisibis, a town belonging to the Seljukid gover-
nor of Mosul. Nevertheless, Ilghazi may have been prevented from getting hold of a 
base in Diyar Bakr by the collaboration of his nephew Ibrahim ibn Sokman with Jos-
celin against him. Not long after he had finally established a principality in Mardin in 
1107-8, there began the series of Seljukid expeditions launched by Mawdud, the new 
lord of Mosul, under the aegis of the sultan. Ilghazi took part in the first of these, but 
thereafter adopted a more wary attitude and contented himself with sending a contin-
gent under his son. The present chapter considers the events of this initial period of 
Ilghazi’s reign in Diyar Bakr, his role in the campaigns and the reasons behind his 
cautious policy. We shall see that he was bent above all on preserving his de facto 
independence from the sultan and suspected rightly that one aim of the expeditions 
was to bring local emirs like himself to heel.   
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4.1 Ilghazi’s diversion of Ridwan’s expedition against the Franks upon Nisibis 
Sokman’s brother Ilghazi had been dismissed from the post of shihna in 1105 
upon the death of Barkyaruk and the accession of Muhammad Tapar as the sole sul-
tan in the western half of the Greater Seljukid empire. Upon his dismissal he came to 
Diyar Bakr to carve out a new existence for himself in this region like his brother 
Sokman and his heirs. But for at least three years, until he took hold of Mardin 
around 1108, he was without a fixed base and kept roaming the region with his 
Turkomans, attacking the towns and cities that were not already under Artukid con-
trol. He also served Ridwan, as he had been doing before going to Baghdad.
1
 It was 
at this stage of his career that he took part in a campaign launched by the latter prince 
against the Principality of Antioch.  
Our information about this expedition and Ilghazi’s role in it comes from Ibn 
al-Athir.
2
 The way he introduces the report is rather surprising: “In the month of 
Ramadan (6 May – 4 June 1106) Prince Ridwan Ibn Tutush besieged Nisibis. This 
came about because he was determined to wage war on the Franks.” But Nisibis was 
a Muslim city belonging to Chakarmish, the Lord of Mosul. So if Ridwan had set out 
to fight the Franks, how he had come to besiege Nisibis and not some town in the 
Principality of Antioch? The reason, we are given to understand, was none other than 
Ilghazi himself.   
Ilghazi (called the shihna of Baghdad by Ibn al-Athir, although in fact he had 
been dismissed from this post in the previous year), Ispahbud  Sabawa, and Alpi ibn 
Arslan Tash, lord of Sinjar and son-in-law of Chakarmish, had come together with 
Ridwan, ready to march against the Franks. But at this point, Ibn al-Athir reports, 
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Ilghazi suddenly came up with an alternative course of action: “The wisest thing to 
do,” he said to his allies, “is to attack the lands of Chakarmish and the neighboring 
regions in order to take control there and increase our strength with their troops and 
resources.” Alpi also supported this proposal, even though he was Chakarmish’s son 
in law, and as a result Ridwan
3
 marched to Nisibis at the head of 10,000 cavalry on 
the first day of Ramadan (6 May). By this time Chakarmish had gone off to the town 
of al-Hamma for a cure from its waters. But before going he had stationed two emirs 
and a troop of soldiers in the town,
4
 where they took up a strong position and en-
gaged those beyond the walls. Badly wounded by an arrow during this conflict, Alpi 
returned to Sinjar.  
Ibn al-Athir goes on to relate that Chakarmish, hearing about the siege, re-
turned to Mosul. He pitched camp before the gates of that town to prepare for the 
forthcoming battle against Ridwan. But he first tried the method of deception. Writ-
ing to the emirs of Ridwan’s army, he stirred up their greed until he was able to cor-
rupt them. Along with this, he also ordered his men in Nisibis carefully to offer their 
services to Ridwan and send out provisions to him. He then wrote in person to Rid-
wan to offer his services and submit to his authority. At the same time, he incited the 
prince against Ilghazi with the following words: “Sultan Muhammad [Tapar] be-
sieged me and achieved nothing. He withdrew on terms. If you arrest Ilghazi, of 
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whose wickedness and evil you and others are well aware, then I shall be with you 
and shall aid you with my men, my money and my weapons.”  
Ibn al-Athir notes that this offer came at a time when Ridwan’s attitude to-
ward Ilghazi had already changed. Now it deteriorated still further, and he resolved 
to arrest the Artukid. Summoning Ilghazi one day, he said: “This is a strong city. The 
Franks may perhaps take Aleppo. The politic course is to make peace with Chakarm-
ish and to bring him into our company, since he is going to march with numerous and 
outstandingly equipped troops. Let us return to fight the Franks, for that is something 
that will again unite the Muslims.” But reportedly even this appeal to Muslim unity 
did not move Ilghazi, who told Ridwan: “You came under your own command but 
now you are under my command. I cannot permit you to leave without taking this 
town. Either you remain or I shall be the first to fight you.” Ibn al-Athir attributes 
this temerity of Ilghazi to the large number of Turkomans who had flocked to him.  
Indeed the course of events showed that Ilghazi was not unjustified in this 
confidence in his Turkomans. Upon Ilghazi’s defiant answer Ridwan ordered his 
men to seize and put him into fetters, but when this became known to the Turko-
mans, who were firmly attached to Ilghazi as loyal followers, they clearly showed 
their opposition and resentment against this measure. Ibn al-Athir relates that they 
broke up with Ridwan and sought refuge within the walls of the town.  
Considering that the town was in the hands of their enemy Chakarmish, this 
last report seems rather puzzling. It might be presumed that the latter, by granting 
admission to the Turkomans fleeing from Ridwan, intended to divide the allies still 
further. This is supported by Ibn al-Athir’s following, unexpected report that Ilghazi 
ascended the citadel of the town at this point.
5
 Perhaps he had been freed from cap-
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tivity by some of the Turkomans, but it still needs explanation why Chakarmish had 
granted him admission to the citadel. The same ground seems valid here: after 
Chakarmish had stirred up Ridwan against Ilghazi, in an effort to divide the allies 
and save his skin, he proceeded to support Ilghazi against Ridwan for the same pur-
pose. Indeed we read next that the troops in Nisibis went out of the town to help 
Ilghazi.
6
 Apparently, Chakarmish had sent a contingent against Ridwan after he had 
deprived him of his ally. When the Turkomans saw this they were emboldened still 
more, as Ibn al-Athir relates how they dispersed and plundered whatever they could 
find, especially cattle. Ridwan immediately departed upon this and returned to Alep-
po, while Ilghazi seems to have been released by Chakarmish, now that Ilghazi  was 
alone and incapable of posing any threat to the town.    
 
Nevertheless, it is also possible to reconstruct an alternative version of this 
story, based on the different readings of the English translation.
7
 According to this, 
when the Turkomans protested against Ilghazi’s arrest, he was handed over to 
Chakarmish’s men who took him up to the citadel. Here he was imprisoned as a 
measure against possible attempts of the Turkomans to rescue him. In the meanwhile 
another contingent was sent out to help Ridwan against the Turkomans. Neverthe-
less, this version raises a number of difficult problems: how could the Turkomans 
have sought refuge from Ridwan in Nisibis if Chakarmish maintained a hostile atti-
tude toward Ilghazi and sent a contingent to help Ridwan against them? If the Turk-
omans had already been granted refuge in the city, how come that a contingent was 
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sent outside the walls to help Ridwan? How could the Turkomans have found the 
courage to disperse and carry out plunder while Ridwan was forced to depart if the 
contingent was sent to help him against the Turkomans? Finally, if Ilghazi had been 
taken up to the citadel as a prisoner and not as a refugee from Ridwan, how could he 
have departed freely afterwards? The first version gives rise to none of these ques-
tions. The only problem it raises is why Chakarmish had provided refuge to Ilghazi 
and then assisted his Turkomans against Ridwan despite his hostility to the Artukid 
emir that is evident in his letter to Ridwan. This is not a difficult problem to solve, 
however: considering that Chakarmish desparately tried to get rid of the besiegers at 
this time, his hostility against Ilghazi would not have prevented him from granting 
refuge and support to the emir if by this means he would be able to kindle the con-
flict between him and Ridwan and drive away the major part of the army that had 
laid siege to Nisibis.  
In this case it is evident that Ilghazi attempted to use the war against the 
Franks merely as a pretext to seize the lands of Chakarmish and to carve out a prin-
cipality for himself in Diyar Bakr. He was obviously insincere in arguing that it 
would be better to attack the Franks after reinforcing the army with the troops and 
resources of these lands. For otherwise he would not have proceeded to threaten 
Ridwan when the latter proposed to secure the same reinforcement by agreeing with 
Chakarmish, rather than by fighting with him. In this respect Grousset is not unjusti-
fied when he comments: “We see to which degree a common action against the 
Franks was becoming difficult. The holy war, jihad, was only a pretext for the Turk-
ish princes to rob each other.”8 Michael Köhler similarly points out the “rhetorical 
character” of the jihad idea and the appeal to the unity of Muslims which was of ser-
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vice to the emirs in North Syria only for the legitimization of their internecine 
feuds.”9 He adds that even for Ridwan, the only emir at that time who really wanted 
to fight the Franks, the call for jihad was only meant to recruit allies for his struggle 
with Tancred over contested territories.  
Perhaps it is this expedition that Osman Turan has in mind when he asserts 
that Ilghazi took part in jihad against the Franks while he was shihna in Baghdad. He 
seems to have been misled by Ibn al-Athir’s erroneous mention of Ilghazi as shihna 
while enumerating the emirs who joined this campaign in 1106.
10
 Significantly, he 
does not mention Ilghazi’s diversion of the campaign towards a Muslim town. Run-
ciman probably bases himself on the same error in Ibn al-Athir, which shows Ilghazi 
to be still in close connection with the sultan, when he writes: “the allies suggested to 
Ridwan and Alpi that it would be more politic and profitable to please the sultan by 
an attack on Chakarmish.”11 As we have seen, there is nothing in Ibn al-Athir’s ac-
count to suggest that Ilghazi or anybody else put forward such an argument to per-
suade Ridwan, still less that pleasing the sultan, who had dismissed Ilghazi from his 
post in Baghdad only the previous year, was anywhere in Ilghazi’s mind as he made 
the proposal. His purpose was rather to seize Nisibis and whatever else he could from 
Chakarmish by taking advantage of the already assembled Muslim army.  
Indeed there is a remarkable similarity between this episode and the one be-
fore the siege of Antioch during the First Crusade, when Ilghazi’s brother Sokman 
had urged Ridwan and other emirs to proceed to Diyar Bakr instead as they were 
prepared to march to Antioch to confront the advancing Crusaders. His purpose had 
been the same as that of Ilghazi in this case: using the Muslim army ready at hand to 
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carve out a principality for himself in Diyar Bakr. Thus for the second time a cam-
paign under Ridwan, which could have produced very serious consequences for the 
Frankish presence in Syria, was thwarted by an Artukid emir who attempted to use 
the assembled Muslim army for his personal aim of territorial self-aggrandizement in 
the Jazira.   
4.2 A possible campaign against Antioch planned but not carried out by 
Ilghazi and Chawli 
In 1107 Ilghazi joined forces with Chawli Saqawa, who had been sent by the 
Seljukids to replace Chakarmish in Mosul. When Kilij Arslan had come to occupy 
Mosul, in response to an invitation from the men of the deceased Chakarmish, 
Chawli had been forced to retire to Sinjar. Basing himself on Ibn al-Athir, Imad al-
Din Khalil states that here Ilghazi and Chawli came together in that town and made 
an agreement: they would first drive away Kilij Arslan from Mosul, and then proceed 
together to attack Antioch. But as soon as Kilij Arslan was defeated and Chawli en-
tered Mosul, he revolted against the Seljukids and forgot his agreement with Ilghazi 
to attack Antioch.
12
 However, in the editions of al-Kāmil fī’l-Tārīkh examined for the 
present study, no mention can be found there of such a plan of assault against Anti-
och that was made when Chawli and Ilghazi met in Sinjar against Kilij Arslan.
13
 In 
these it is only reported that at the same time as Ilghazi arrived in Sinjar Chawli re-
                                                                                                                                          
11
 Steven Runciman, A History of the Crusades (London, 1965), II, 108. 
12
 Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil fi’l-Tarikh, 12 vols. (Dar al-Taba‘a, Cairo, 1295 A.H.), X, 149 (al-Matba‘a 
al-Kubra), cited in Imad al-Din Khalil, Al-Imarat al-Artuqiyya fi’l-Jazira wa’l-Sham (Beirut, 1980), 
220-21. 
13
 Ibn al-Athir, El-Kâmil fi’t-Tarih, X, 342 and Chronicle, 114 (500: 1106-1107), both based on the 
edition of Dar Sadir (Beirut, 1965-1967), X, 426, as well as Kamel al-Tevarykh, RHC, Historiens Ori-
entaux I, 243. 
 166 
ceived a letter from Ridwan, asking for help against the Franks who could not be 
warded off by the Muslims
14
 in Syria. After this Chawli set out to besiege Rahba.  
Indeed the passage from Runciman which Khalil cites along with Ibn al-
Athir, and which is based on the same source,
15
 states that it was not Ilghazi but 
Ridwan of Aleppo who agreed with Chawli to attack the Franks in Syria. In this re-
port of Ibn al-Athir no explicit reference is made to Antioch, but it is related that dur-
ing the siege of Rahba Chawli promised Ridwan to march with him and drive the 
Franks out of his lands if he managed to capture the city. Ridwan agreed to this, and 
after they had concluded an agreement, joined Chawli in the siege. However, after 
Kilij Arslan I had been defeated by the coalition including Chawli, Ridwan and 
Ilghazi, Chawli rebelled against the Seljukids of Persia and forgot about his agree-
ment with Ridwan. This version of the events is supported by the consideration that 
at this time Ridwan was much more concerned than Ilghazi to attack the Franks in 
Syria, compelled as he was to defend himself against the expansionist policies of 
Tancred. We have seen in the previous section how he summoned his allies for an 
offensive against the Principality of Antioch, only to be thwarted by none other than 
Ilghazi, who seemed hardly concerned about the Frankish threat. Accordingly it 
seems that there is some kind of confusion in Imad al-Din Khalil’s account. 
4.3 Ibrahim ibn Sokman’s release of Joscelin, possibly as an ally against his 
uncle Ilghazi 
Although Ilghazi had failed to wrest Nisibis or anything else from Chakarm-
ish by taking advantage of Ridwan’s expedition, he finally acquired what he sought 
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some two years later –– one of the important cities in Diyar Bakr, one that was al-
ready possessed moreover by the Artukiids: Mardin. How did he accomplish this? 
Steven Runciman and Işın Demirkent argue that Ilghazi captured Mardin with the 
help of the financial and perhaps also military aid that he secured by releasing Josce-
lin of Tell Bashir in return for ransom and a promise of help.
16
 However, this asser-
tion is not supported by Ibn al-Azraq and Ibn al-Furat, who relate in different ways 
how Ilghazi took possession of Mardin.
17
 Even if it is accepted that Ilghazi secured 
Joscelin’s support but eventually did not use it to get hold of Mardin, there is the dif-
ficulty of figuring out how Joscelin might have passed from Ibrahim ibn Sokman’s 
hands to the possession of Ilghazi. For the latter came to Diyar Bakr only a year after 
Joscelin had been taken to Hisn Kaifa as Sokman’s captive in the Battle of Harran. 
Demirkent’s argument that after Sokman’s death his lands were divided between 
Ilghazi, who received Hisn Kaifa where Joscelin was imprisoned, and Ibrahim, who 
got Mardin, is not corroborated by the sources. The first important acquisition of 
Ilghazi in Diyar Bakr was not Hisn Kaifa but Mardin itself. Until then he had been 
roaming around with his Turkomans and attacking the towns in the region in an ef-
fort to get hold of a base for himself as well as to extend the area controlled by the 
Artukids.
18
  
All this implies that it could have been only Ibrahim himself who released 
Joscelin. An examination of the rather sparse and contradictory information given by 
the sources on this issue suggests that the people of Tell Bashir, by giving hostages 
to Ibrahim, obtained the release of their lord Joscelin sometime between Sokman’s 
death in late 1104 and Joscelin’s raid on the Aleppan territory in early 1107. So Run-
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ciman and Demirkent’s asertion that Ilghazi received Joscelin along with Hisn Kaifa 
and released him to secure the money and military aid necessary to seize Mardin 
from Ibrahim is not supportable. 
In fact rather the reverse may have been the case: Ibrahim ibn Sokman may 
have released Joscelin upon Ilghazi’s arrival in Diyar Bakr so that he could secure 
the money and military support necessary to keep his uncle at bay in case he tried to 
wrest Mardin from his hands. For Ilghazi could well be expected to try to carve out a 
new existence for himself in Diyar Bakr after his dismissal from the post of shihna of 
Baghdad in 1105. Indeed Hillenbrand points out that there must have been a struggle 
for the possession of Mardin between Ilghazi and Ibrahim, who wanted to go on con-
trolling the city from Hisn Kaifa as his father Sokman had done.
19
  
In support of this argument one can cite some other famous examples of a 
Muslim emir releasing a Frankish prince in order to secure his alliance against anoth-
er emir: Bohemond’s release by Danishmend, directed against Kiilj Arslan I, and 
Baldwin II’s release first by Chawli, directed against the new Seljukid appointee in 
his post, Mawdud, and then by Timurtash ibn Ilghazi, directed against the Arab 
chieftain Dubais ibn Sadaqa.
20
 If this was indeed also the case with Joscelin and Ib-
rahim ibn Sokman, the alliance seems to have been somewhat more profitable for 
Ibrahim than it turned out to be for the other emirs (although the ransom was proba-
bly not paid), since in the event Ilghazi could not get hold of Mardin for two or three 
years.
21
 If Lane-Poole’s association of Ibrahim’s death with Ilghazi’s takeover in 
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Mardin is correct, the lapse of Ibrahim’s agreement with Joscelin upon the former’s 
death may have rendered it easier for Ilghazi to get hold of the city.
22
  
 
It is time now to look more closely into the related source material. Most of 
the sources about the ransoming of the Edessene princes offer very limited material 
on Joscelin’s release. Matthew of Edessa is aware of the fact that Joscelin had been 
taken to Hisn Kaifa after the Battle of Harran, but contents himself with noting that 
he ransomed Baldwin from Chawli for thirty thousand dinars, and fails to make clear 
how and when Joscelin himself had been released.
23
 In parallel with Matthew, but 
mistaking Chawli for Chakarmish, Albert of Aachen writes that Joscelin ransomed 
Baldwin from the Muslim lord of Mosul for a hundred thousand Besants, but again 
omits to note how Joscelin himself had achieved his freedom before this.
24
 Similarly, 
Fulcher of Chartres indicates that Joscelin acted as a “most faithful helper” for Bald-
win during the latter’s escape from prison, once more without making clear how and 
when Joscelin himself got free.
25
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Ibn al-Athir offers somewhat more information when he notes that Joscelin 
had ransomed himself beforehand for twenty thousand dinars, although he again fails 
to denote when and from whom:
26
 he reports that Chawli, having been expelled from 
Mosul by the new Seljukid governor Mawdud, decided to release Baldwin. His inten-
tion was probably to win over the count as an ally against the Seljukids. He demand-
ed that Baldwin pay a ransom, free the Muslim captives he held in prison and, most 
importantly, give aid in person as well as with his troops and money whenever re-
quired. After the agreement the count was sent to the ruler of Qal‘at Ja‘bar, Salim ibn 
Malik, to wait until Joscelin would come there. It is at this point that Ibn al-Athir re-
minds his readers that Joscelin had been taken prisoner with the count in the same 
battle (at Harran), and that he had ransomed himself for twenty thousand dinars by 
this time.   
Although neither Ibn al-Athir nor the other sources examined so far indicate 
when Joscelin himself had first been released, there is a hint to be found in this re-
gard in a report of Ibn al-Qalanisi’s.27 According to this, while Chawli was besieging 
Rahba during his campaign against Kilij Arslan in 1107, he sent to Ridwan of Alep-
po, requesting support for his attack on the town. Ridwan agreed,
28
 and having made 
a truce with Tancred, joined Chawli with a large contingent before Rahba. But when 
he departed from Aleppo and Joscelin learned of his absence, Joscelin carried out a 
series of incursions into the territory of Aleppo. Since Ibn al-Qalanisi notes that 
Chawli remained before Rahba from the beginning of Rajab (25 February 1107) until 
22 Ramadan (16 May), and Ridwan must have joined him sometime between these 
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dates, it emerges that Joscelin was free by the spring of 1107 at the latest. So he must 
have been released sometime between 1104, when he fell captive and was taken to 
Hisn Kaifa, and early 1107. 
Further details about Joscelin’s release can be found in the Syriac accounts. 
Michael the Syrian
29
 writes that Richard of the Principate, who had been appointed 
over Edessa by Tancred, did not concern himself with the ransoming of Joscelin be-
cause of their previous dispute during the Battle of Harran. Consequently the people 
of Tell Bashir, Joscelin’s town, took the initiative and went to fix their lord’s ransom. 
While they remained in the prison as hostages, Joscelin was released with the prom-
ise to bring back the required amount of gold and obtain their freedom. But the hos-
tages fled by breaking through the wall of the building in which they had been im-
prisoned and consequently Joscelin found himself freed without ransom. It is note-
worthy that although Michael had erroneously reported that Joscelin was taken with 
Baldwin to Mosul after the Battle of Harran, in this passage he does not specify 
where the people of Tell Bashir went to secure Joscelin’s release, nor the identity of 
the Muslim emir who accepted it. Indeed the fact that he relates Joscelin’s release 
independently from that of Baldwin might be taken as evidence that Joscelin was re-
leased by the Artukid emir of Hisn Kaifa rather than the lord of Mosul. If Michael 
had still assumed that the two princes were imprisoned in the same place, he would 
also have mentioned the fixing of a ransom for Baldwin, but in the event he does not 
speak about the count at all. 
Although the account of the Anonymous
30
 generally parallels that of Michael, 
and seems to be partially based on a common source, it denotes the place from which 
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Joscelin was released explicitly as Mosul, which renders it more problematic. The 
Anonymous indicates like Michael that the Normans were unwilling to ransom 
Baldwin and Joscelin, although he gives slightly different reasons: Tancred was an-
gry with them, he says, while Richard was all too happy to hold their lands and use 
them as he liked. He asserts that both Baldwin and Joscelin were prisoners in Mosul 
at this time. Accordingly, whereas Michael related how the people of Tell Bashir 
took the initiative to ransom their lord, the Anonymous depicts the two captives as 
taking counsel in the prison about how they could get out. Reportedly, Baldwin 
pointed out that it would be more difficult to secure his ransom in view of his im-
portance as the count, and suggested that Joscelin should be ransomed first and then 
work for his release. Accordingly a ransom of twelve thousand dinars was fixed for 
Joscelin (compare this amount with the twenty thousand reported by Ibn al-Athir), 
and twelve respected men from amongst his associates were given as hostages. While 
Joscelin was preoccupied with collecting his and Baldwin’s ransom, the twelve hos-
tages in Mosul escaped from prison by breaking through the wall, so that no need 
was left to pay any ransom.  
This is the version of the Anonymous, but in the light of the separate tretment 
of Joscelin’s release by the other sources including Michael the Syrian, it seems ra-
ther implausible. It is undermined further by the consideration that the hostages’ es-
cape from prison would not have remained without consequences for Baldwin if he 
had been captive in the hands of the same emir as Joscelin. So the Anonymous’s ver-
sion seems to have been the product of a delibarate effort to remain consistent with 
his earlier statement that after the Battle of Harran both princes had been taken to 
Mosul to “reign topsy-turvily there as they had hoped.”31    
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As for the opposing argument that Joscelin was released by the Artukid lord 
of Hisn Kaifa, it is supported by both Ibn al-Athir and Matthew of Edessa as we saw 
in the last chapter. According to these authors, Baldwin and Joscelin were separated 
when the former was kidnapped from Sokman’s tent by the troops of Mosul and the 
latter was later taken by Sokman to Hisn Kaifa. There seems no reasonable ground to 
believe that after Sokman’s death his heir Ibrahim would have delivered this valuable 
captive to the lord of Mosul, especially since a rift had developed between his father 
and Chakarmish upon Baldwin’s kidnap. There is the additional evidence that most 
of the accounts examined here fail to offer any precise information about how, when 
and from where Joscelin was released, which stands in stark contrast to their treat-
ment of Baldwin’s ransoming. It seems reasonable to think that this would not have 
been the case if Joscelin had come to be imprisoned with Baldwin in Mosul and got 
released only a short time before him. This consideration also supports the conclu-
sion that Joscelin’s release must have taken place independently from that of Bald-
win, in the distant Hisn Kaifa.  
       
The course of events that emerges from these discussions is as follows: some 
time between autumn 1104 and spring 1107, and probably closer to the first, Ibrahim 
ibn Sokman, the Artukid Lord of Mardin and Hisn Kaifa, agreed to release Joscelin 
in return for a ransom of twelve or twenty thousand dinars and for his help against 
his own uncle Ilghazi. The latter had arrived in 1105 from Baghdad after his dismis-
sal from the post of shihna, and was on the lookout to carve out a new existence for 
himself in Diyar Bakr. For this purpose, he probably hoped to get hold of at least one 
of the important cities controlled by his family. Apparently, Ibrahim’s alliance with 
Joscelin was effective in preventing Ilghazi from realizing that, although the hostages 
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Joscelin had left in Hisn Kaifa escaped from prison and the ransom remained unpaid. 
For Ilghazi did not undertake any action or make any gain against his nephew until 
the latter died around 1107-8 and was succeeded by his brother Dawud at Hisn Kaifa. 
Ilghazi finally took over Mardin at this date, perhaps because it was considered his 
rightful inheritance as the eldest member of the family, but more probably because of 
the lapse of the alliance with Joscelin upon Ibrahim’s death and the reluctance or 
failure of his successor Dawud to renew it. Although there is admittedly no evidence 
about Joscelin actively helping Ibrahim in a conflict, the sole existence of such an 
accord may have been a sufficiently dissuasive threat for Ilghazi. 
4.4 Ilghazi’s role in the Seljukid expeditions under Mawdud  
We have seen in the last section how the Artukid principality was divided in-
to two, and for good, upon the death of Ibrahim ibn Sokman in 1107-8, with Ilghazi 
ruling in Mardin and his nephew Dawud in Hisn Kaifa. Whereas the latter tended to 
pursue an isolationist policy vis-à-vis the Franks in the following years, the situation 
was otherwise with Ilghazi. He pursued more active but widely divergent policies 
towards them, first allying with the Seljukids against the Franks during the expedi-
tions of Mawdud, governor of Mosul, in 1110-1113 and then with the Franks against 
the Seljukids in the campaigns of 1114-1115 after Mawdud’s death. Even when 
Ilghazi stood in alliance with the Seljukids, however, he struck an equivocal course, 
personally taking part only in the expedition of 1110 and thereafter contenting him-
self with sending a contingent under his son. The remainder of this chapter will con-
sider the Seljukid campaigns under Mawdud and Ilghazi’s role in them, mainly 
dwelling on the expedition of 1110 in which he participated in person.   
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4.4.1  The perspectives of the sources 
4.4.1.1 Ibn al-Qalanisi  
As in the case of the Battle of Harran, one of the earliest accounts about the 
expeditions of Mawdud in 1110 comes from Ibn al-Qalanisi,
32
 who again narrates the 
events from a strongly confrontational perspective, pitting “the army of Islam” 
against the “infidels.”  In the meanwhile he also lays special emphasis on the muja-
hid credentials of Tughtekin, the Lord of Damascus and his patron. Compared with 
this emir, Ilghazi and his northern neighbor Sokman al-Qutbi of Akhlat (not an 
Artukid) remain in a secondary role, and by reason of their quarrel appear in a rather 
negative light as agents of discord among the Muslim ranks.  
Ibn al-Qalanisi asserts that the expediton was initiated by the Seljukid Sultan 
Muhammad Tapar with a double purpose, jihad against the Franks and the defence of 
the lands controlled by the governor of Mosul: “In this year also the Sultan Ghiyath 
al-Dunya wa’l-Din wrote to the emir Sokman al-Qutbi, lord of Armenia and May-
yafariqin, and to the emir Sharaf al-Din Mawdud, lord of Mosul, commanding them 
to set out with their troops to the Holy War against the Franks and the defence of the 
territories of Mosul.” Apparently, what the sultan had in mind was not only to push 
back the Frankish expansion in Syria and the Jazira, but also, through the status of 
protector he would gain thereby, to resubjugate the local Muslim polities that were 
nominally attached to the Seljukid governor of Mosul but which had increasingly 
fallen apart from central control. Indeed the emirs of all these polities were sum-
moned to assemble under the command of the Seljukid governor, and they complied: 
“Having collected their troops and recruited their levies, [Mawdud and Sokman al-
Qutbi] set out and halted at Jazirat Bani Numair, until the governors of all the outly-
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ing districts had joined them, together with a great host of volunteers.” Cahen re-
marks in this connection that “jihad was an occasion for Mawdud to make his su-
premacy accepted as the lieutenant of the Sultan.”33 
Ibn al-Qalanisi notes that Ilghazi also came to join the Seljukid army at 
Jazirat Bani Numair with a “great host of Turkomans.” The result was such a great 
force of Muslims that “all the Franks would not suffice to withstand it.” Emphasizing 
the religious aspect of the confrontation, the chronicler states that this great Muslim 
force unanimously agreed to open the Holy War by blockading Edessa until God 
would facilitate its capture, for it was very strong, almost impenetrable. As a result of 
their tight blockade, beginning around 3-12 May and continuing for a long time, the 
city of Edessa began to suffer from shortage of provisions, with food prices soaring 
and the inhabitants reaching the verge of destruction. Nevertheless, Ibn al-Qalanisi 
makes clear that the Frankish adversaries of the Muslims were also united in their 
determination to defend the city: “In face of these circumstances unanimity was re-
stored between them; Tancred, lord of Antioch, the son of St. Gilles, lord of Tripoli, 
and King Baldwin, the chiefs of the governors of the provinces among the Franks, 
met together and made a solemn agreement with one another to remain steadfast in 
battle and to meet adversity with resolution.”34 Once “a clear understanding was es-
tablished between them,” the chronicler says, they set out for Edessa.  
In conformity with his focus on Tughtekin as one of the chief protagonists of 
the campaign, Ibn al-Qalanisi traces his steps from Damascus to the scene of the con-
flict and relates the events on this march in the form of news received by the atabek. 
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Thus he recounts how Tughtekin, learning the siege of Edessa and the rallying of the 
Franks, set out from Damascus and arrived in Salamiya. Here he was joined by a 
great army of volunteers coming from all parts of Syria, and received news of a 
skirmish near Rafaniya between the lord of that town and the Franks. The latter had 
then marched to the banks of the Euphrates to cross it. Tughtekin also marched to-
wards the river and crossed it near Raqqa and Qal‘at Ja‘bar, but heard that the enemy 
still desisted from crossing over. The reason was that squadrons and scouting parties 
of “the armies of Islam” had spread throughout all the region and along the roads east 
of the river.   
Ibn al-Qalanisi states that at this point the Muslims decided to yield a clear 
passage to the Franks and then attack them in the open ground left of the Euphrates, 
where their enemies’ routes of retreat would be cut off by the river. Accordingly the 
Muslim army departed from Edessa on 19 July, after a siege of around six weeks, 
and encamped in the plain of Harran. Bent on drawing the Franks into the trap, they 
refrained from attacking until the enemy would approach and Tughtekin would ar-
rive. The chronicler notes that Mawdud had granted the city of Harran to Ilghazi, 
which was probably what persuaded him to take part in the expedition.
35
 But we shall 
see that it also rekindled an existing rivalry between Ilghazi and Sokman al-Qutbi, 
Ilghazi’s main rival in eastern Asia Minor, and led to a quarrel. 
Ibn al-Qalanisi’s account after this point seems rather confused, for he does 
not explicitly state that the Franks fell into the trap and crossed the river, but relates 
that they became alarmed on discerning the intention behind the Muslim manoeuver, 
and apprehending disaster and defeat, “turned back in panic upon their tracks to the 
banks of the Euphrates.” However, it is evident from this last statement and the fol-
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lowing passages that by this time they had already crossed the river. Moreover, they 
had also already proceeded to Edessa and replenished its provisions. This confusion 
may have stemmed from Ibn al-Qalanisi’s desire to depict the Franks as cowards, 
and we shall see that the Latin chroniclers similarly showed the Turks fleeing before 
the Franks at the end of the campaign.  
Ibn al-Qalanisi goes on to relate that the Muslims pursued the Franks and 
overtook them with their leading cavalry when only some Frankish leaders had been 
able to cross the river. Consequently they “annihilated an immense number of their 
followers by slaughter, capture and drowning in the Euphrates” and seized their bag-
gage. Although the Muslim troops collected plenty of booty, livestock and captives, 
Ibn al-Qalanisi states that they were unable to cross the river and engage the rest of 
the Frankish army. They were eager besides to return to Edessa and resume the siege.  
Consequently, the Muslim army remained encamped a few days more on the 
riverbank opposite the Frankish army, and then withdrew to continue the siege of 
Edessa. But before crossing back over the river the Franks had evacuated all the ci-
vilians from Edessa, installed an Armenian garrison there, and replenished its stores 
with the provisions they had brought. Since the city’s powers of resistance were re-
freshed in this way, the siege became prolonged and it was now the provisions of the 
Muslim army that got depleted. As a result the Muslims were forced to break off the 
siege and disperse home, and only a detachment was left in Harran to harass Edessa. 
Ibn al-Qalanisi notes that by this time Tughtekin had already departed for Damascus, 
and the numerous contingent that he had left behind returned now as well.  
Before concluding his account Ibn al-Qalanisi reports a dispute that took 
place around this time between Ilghazi and Sokman al-Qutbi. “On account of an old 
quarrel which broke out afresh between them,” he states, “Ilghazi conceived an aver-
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sion to Sokman al-Qutbi, and fled from Harran to Mardin,” upon which Sokman 
seized Ilghazi’s nephew Belek and carried him in chains to his city.36 Belek was not 
to be released before the death of Sokman al-Qutbi a year later. It is not clear precise-
ly when this quarrel broke out. Since Ilghazi is stated to have fled from Harran, ra-
ther than from before Edessa, it could be when the Muslim army had retreated there 
in order to allure the Franks across the river, or alternatively when the second siege 
of Edessa had ended and the armies had begun to disperse. Since we know that 
Mawdud had granted Harran to Ilghazi, it is conceivable that after the siege he had 
preferred to return to this new town of his rather than directly to Mardin. Indeed he 
may have been in command of the the detachment that was stationed at Harran to 
harrass Edessa.  
Thus the second alternative for the time of the quarrel seems to be preferable. 
This is supported further by the consideration that the departure of two powerful 
chieftains with their numerous troops, who constituted a significant part of the Mus-
lim army, would have found a stonger echo in Ibn al-Qalanisi’s account if it had tak-
en place while the expedition was still in its full course. As the case stands, however, 
the chronicler contents himself with noting it at the very end of his account. He is 
joined in this by Matthew of Edessa, who similarly mentions Sokman’s capture of 
Belek at the end of his account. 
So Ibn al-Qalanisi’s testimony reveals that a second siege of Edessa did actu-
ally take place, and if it was broken off before long, this was because the provisions 
within the city had been replenished while those of the Muslim army were running 
short. It was not due to the quarrel of Ilghazi and Sokman al-Qutbi, for this seems to 
have broken out only after the end of the siege, when the army was dispersing. For 
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this reason Claude Cahen and Robert Nicholson do not seem justified when they as-
sert that the quarrel rescued Edessa from a second siege or when they state that it was 
this quarrel, along with the impatience of Mawdud’s troops, that caused the Muslim 
army to retire without inflicting any territorial losses on the Franks.
37
          
As Mükrimin Halil Yinanç suggests, the immediate cause of the quarrel may 
have been the concession of Harran to Ilghazi.
38
 But Ilghazi was already at logger-
heads with Sokman al-Qutbi by this time, because of their rivalry for the important 
town of Mayyafariqin and its dependencies. Sokman al-Qutbi had captured these in 
1108, and thereby entrenched his influence in Diyar Bakr vis-à-vis Ilghazi.39 When 
Mawdud granted Harran to Ilghazi, primarily to persuade him to join the campaign, 
but also to enable him to control the route between Syria and Iraq and observe the 
developments in the County of Edessa,
40
 this may have rekindled the existing rivalry 
between the two emirs and turned it into an open quarrel by the time the armies were 
dispersing. Considered in this light, Ibn al-Qalanisi’s report that Ilghazi escaped from 
Harran might suggest that it was precisely Sokman’s attack on his new possession 
that forced him to flee from there.  
In contrast with this interpretation, Gerhard Väth argues that the cause of the 
quarrel was the withdrawal of the Frankish army, for in his view this amounted to the 
failure of Mawdud’s expedition.41 But it seems difficult to consider the hasty retreat 
of the Franks vis-à-vis the intact Muslim army as a failure of the latter, particularly 
since the enemy thus abandoned the whole trans-Euphratean plain to them. Even if it 
were accepted as a failure, the author fails to make clear by the author how and why 
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this should have caused a quarrel between Ilghazi and Sokman, among all the other 
emirs.  
Notwithstanding Ilghazi’s retreat to Mardin, Harran does seem to have acted 
as a base for later raids on Edessene territory, since Ibn al-Qalanisi mentions contin-
uous raids made on the borders of the County. Nevertheless, these did not prevent 
Baldwin from returning to Edessa and entering it. As for Ilghazi, he did not leave 
Mardin to take part personally in Mawdud’s expeditions again. Accordingly, Ibn al-
Qalanisi does not make any mention of him in his accounts of the later expeditions.
42
  
4.4.1.2 Ibn al-Adim  
Ibn al-Adim’s account of Mawdud’s first expedition seems to be based to a 
large extent on that of Ibn al-Qalanisi,
43
 although there are certain differences. The 
most important of these is Ibn al-Adim’s explanation of the return of the Franks to 
the banks of the Euphrates after they had crossed it. We have seen Ibn al-Qalanisi 
attributes this to their realization of the trap set up by the Muslim army. Ibn al-Adim 
asserts instead that it was when the Franks learned about the junction of the army of 
Damascus with the Seljukid army that they resolved to retreat towards the river, im-
mediately after they had crossed it. This is also doubtful since, to begin with, we 
know from Ibn al-Qalanisi that the Franks did not begin to withdraw before they had 
marched to Edessa and replenished its provisions, evacuated the civilians and in-
stalled a garrison there. Moreover, although Tughtekin’s junction with Mawdud may 
indeed have caused some concern among the Franks, solely the addition of his forces 
to the already huge coalition army could hardly have forced the Franks to make so 
radical a change in their plans and to beat a hasty retreat toward the river. Previously, 
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at least, they had not flinched from advancing to Edessa despite the presence of the 
great Muslim army camping at Harran. Like Ibn al-Qalanisi, and for the same reason, 
Ibn al-Adim omits any mention of Ilghazi in his account of Mawdud’s second expe-
dition in 1111.
44
   
4.4.1.3 Ibn al-Athir  
There is no account of Mawdud’s first expedition in Ibn al-Athir’s chronicle. 
Nevertheless, he is the only Muslim source to mention the Artukids in the context of 
the second expedition.
45
 He states that at the start of that campaign, Ilghazi was 
among the local emirs who received instructions to join Mawdud’s army, but became 
the only one to refuse. Staying at Mardin himself, he merely dispatched a contingent 
under his son Ayaz.
46
 One reason for this might have been his wish to avoid meeting 
Sokman al-Qutbi, who had again joined the Seljukid army. He must still have been at 
loggerheads with Sokman since their quarrel in the campaign of the previous year, all 
the more so as his nephew Belek was still a captive in Sokman’s hands.  
Indeed an interesting report by Ibn al-Athir also suggests that this enmity was 
one reason why Ilghazi refrained from joining the expedition: the chronicler relates 
that Sokman fell ill while the army was encamped before Aleppo, and set out for 
home, but on the way died at the town of Balis. His men had placed him in  a coffin 
and resumed the journey home when they were attacked on the way by Ilghazi. Tak-
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ing their master’s coffin under protection in their midst, they fought against Ilghazi 
until they managed to put him to flight. After seizing as booty the baggages he had 
left behind, they proceeded to their lands.  
What could be the reason for this strange attack of Ilghazi on the forces of his 
deceased rival? Ibn al-Athir simply attributes it to his desire of capturing Sokman’s 
men and making booty of their belongings. But Carole Hillenbrand argues convic-
ingly that his main purpose was to destroy the fighting forces of this powerful Mus-
lim neighbor to his north. Thereby he would have removed an important obstacle to 
the expansion of his power in Diyar Bakr. Indeed, although the assault proved unsuc-
cesful in the event, Sokman’s son and heir Ibrahim would never pose a serious threat 
for Ilghazi.
47
 In parallel with Hillenbrand, Imad al-Din Khalil states that it was Ilgha-
zi’s “personal ambitions” that incited him to attack Sokman’s forces, so that he could 
take advantage of their master’s death for making new gains.  
Another reason, suggested by Väth, is that Ilghazi might have been trying to 
rescue his nephew Belek as well.
48
 This seems doubtful at first sight. As Ibn al-
Qalanisi and Matthew of Edessa make clear, Belek had been imprisoned by Sokman 
in Akhlat or Artchesh during the previous year, and he is unlikely to have been taken 
along as a captive to the expedition of 1111. But it is possible that Ilghazi had de-
signed to secure his nephew’s release by capturing an important personality from 
Sokman’s army, so that he could exchange him with Belek. Indeed Ilghazi seems to 
have thought highly of Belek and valued his military skills, as is evident from the 
fact that he took him along on several campaigns right up until his death. So the aim 
of securing the release of Belek may have really been another reason why he at-
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tacked Sokman’s men, along with those of seizing booty and reducing the power of 
his neighbor and rival. His failure to achieve this aim was compensated for by Ibra-
him’s release of Belek shortly after Sokman’s death.  
Evaluating the whole incident, René Grousset exclaims: “Such an act of ban-
ditry, such an outrage against the corpse of a leader who had died in Holy War, 
shows better than all commentary the impossibility of uniting Islam against the 
Franks.”49 But the fact that Sokman had died on a campaign against the Franks and 
that Ilghazi was in effect attacking the remains of a martyr could have meant little to 
him amidst these considerations. This is all the more so as the themes of divine rec-
ompense and martryrdom, in the context of the struggle against the Franks, would 
not be fully articulated before the second half of the century, when the Syrian ulama 
systematically worked out the jihad ideology in its resuscitated form under Nur al-
Din’s leadership.50   
4.4.1.4 Matthew of Edessa  
Among the Eastern Christian sources the most detailed account of Mawdud’s 
expeditions is offered by Matthew of Edessa.
51
 Again we shall be concerned here 
solely with his account of the first expedition in 1110, since this was the only one in 
which Ilghazi took part in person –– although his name, in contrast to that of his rival 
Sokman al-Qutbi, is not explicitly mentioned by the chronicler. Despite its informa-
tiveness, Matthew’s account is not free of certain passages of doubtful veracity. 
These seem to be the product of an intention to stress the importance of maintaining 
Christian solidarity against the “infidel” and to show the calamities brought upon the 
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heads of the Christians, particularly of the betrayers themselves, in the case of a 
breach in that solidarity.  
Thus Matthew claims that it was because Baldwin and Joscelin had appealed 
for Muslim support against Tancred that Mawdud, “a ferocious and mighty warrior,” 
launched the expedition. The author openly condemns this alleged case of treachery 
to the Christian cause, calling it “a plan unworthy of any Christian,” and attributes 
the motivation behind it to the “arrogant character” of the two princes. Nevertheless, 
this imputation against Baldwin and Joscelin should have raised a serious difficulty 
for Matthew: if Mawdud had indeed arrived in the region upon their summons, how 
to account for the fact that he laid siege to Baldwin’s city Edessa, of all places? Mat-
thew’s explanation is that Mawdud, having reached Harran, sent for the count to join 
him, but Baldwin, “being afraid, did not dare to come to the infidel chief.” Instead he 
sent Joscelin to get reinforcements and summoned King Baldwin to his aid. Upon 
this Mawdud realized that he had been deceived, and so advanced to battle against 
Edessa.  
Of course we have no good reason to assume that Mawdud’s expeditions 
would not have taken place without a call for aid from the Franks. Nevertheless, this 
does not exclude the possibility that some of the Frankish princes might have estab-
lished contact with the Seljukid army for their own profit. As for Matthew’s allega-
tion against Baldwin and Joscelin, it is difficult to assess its veracity, for we shall see 
that Albert of Aachen brings exactly the same charge against Tancred, accusing him 
of having summoned Mawdud’s army against the Edessene princes. A detailed as-
sessment of the meaning and veracity of these recriminations will be undertaken in 
the analysis of Albert’s account. Let it suffice here to point out that the interest of the 
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story lies in illustrating Matthew’s eagerness to stress the importance of Christian 
unity and the dangers awaiting those who would breach it. 
Probably owing to the fact that Matthew witnessed the siege of Edessa him-
self or at least had access to eye-witnesses, his account of the event is richer in de-
tails than that of Ibn al-Qalanisi. Whereas the latter indicated the duration of the 
siege as six weeks, Matthew asserts it to have lasted much longer, about one hundred 
days. He places special emphasis on the size of the Seljukid army, conjuring up a 
vivid impression of it that seems to have stemmed from firsthand witness:  
In the meantime the emir Mawdud arrived at the head of a countless number 
of troops which were spread over the vast plain of Edessa. His army sur-
rounded the city on every side, being dispersed over every mountain and hill 
in the area. The whole East gathered under Mawdud’s banner.  
He dwells on the violence and the incessant nature of the assaults made against the 
city, which caused much terror and suffering amongst the inhabitants. Due to the 
tight blockade, they soon began to suffer from famine as well.  
The populace outside the walls did not fare better: but much worse: Matthew 
states that the inhabitants of the entire country around Edessa fled and those who had 
not been able to do so were massacred. The region was largely depopulated as a re-
sult. Together with the later slaughter on the banks of the Euphrates, this depopula-
tion was so severe according to Grousset that the entire region between the upper 
bend of the Euphrates and the upper Balikh, from today’s Turkish-Syrian frontier up 
to Samosata, was emptied of the Armenian population that had constituted its main 
workforce. As a result the territory of the County east of the Euphrates, which com-
prised some of the richest lands in the Franks’ hands until that time, was ruined and 
Edessa itself was turned into a remote outpost in a “désert ennemi.”52 Runciman 
makes a similar observation when he writes: “The fierce elimination of these Arme-
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nian peasants, politically unreliable but prosperous and hardworking, who had been 
settled in Osrhoene since before the opening of the Christian era, dealt the province a 
blow from which it never fully recovered.”53  
Matthew also reports that the region was burned to such an extent that scarce-
ly any building remained standing, the orchards were completely destroyed, and all 
the monasteries in the mountains were razed to ground. Unexpectedly, however, the 
emir whom Matthew holds responsible for the destructiveness of the siege is not 
Mawdud himself but Sokman al-Qutbi: “All this was done at the behest of Sulaiman, 
the emir of the East.” That the “Sulaiman” in question refers to Sokman al-Qutbi 
emerges from the fact that he is reported to have imprisoned Belek at the end of the 
expedition. Matthew insists on this accusation against Sokman when reporting his 
death during the campaign of 1111, openly gloating over it: “In this period Sulaiman, 
the emir of the East, suddenly died while on an expedition. He well merited this sud-
den death brought about by the Lord, because of all the devastation and slaughter he 
had caused in the territory of Edessa.”54 
As Claude Cahen points out,
55
 the devastation and depopulation of the trans-
Euphratian lands of the County produced serious consequences: the prosperity that it 
had enjoyed through its years since its foundation gave way to poverty, and as a con-
sequence its economic resources dwindled. This development compromised the 
standing of the Franks in the eyes of the native Christians, mostly Armenians, in two 
ways: on the one hand, the Franks were compelled to increase their financial de-
mands on the already impoverished population in an effort to compensate for their 
diminished revenues. On the other hand, it reduced their capacity to provide effective 
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military protection against Turkish intruders, although this had been the primary rea-
son why they had been welcomed by the Armenians on their arrival. Both of these 
factors seriously undermined the firm collaboration between the Armenians and the 
Franks, although this was precisely what had constituted the power of the County.  
This devastation and depopoulation gave rise to yet another internal division 
that led to the decline of the County: Baldwin’s holdings beyond the Euphrates had 
been laid waste and his city Edessa turned into an isolated outpost in a threatened 
territory, but his vassal Joscelin’s cis-Euphratian holdings around Tell-Bashir re-
mained intact and consequently they grew in importance against those of Baldwin. 
Before long, this development strained the relations between the two princes, the rich 
vassal and the poor suzerain. This situation was aggravated by the fact that Joscelin’s 
still prosperous lands attracted masses of Franks from beyond the Euphrates, so that 
the defense of Baldwin’s holdings was neglected.  
As a consequence of these developments resulting from the devastation and 
depopulation that had been carried out by Mawdud’s army in 1110, the trans-
Euphratean portion of the County of Edessa seriously declined in terms of military 
power. Runciman even goes so far as to assert that “the Frankish domination beyond 
the Euphrates was doomed to inevitable failure,” even though “Frankish counts 
might rule on in Edessa itself for a few more years.”56 This state of affairs also ena-
bled the Turkomans of Diyar Bakr, who had not been able to go much beyond the 
region’s boundaries before this time, to penetrate the territory of the County.57  
Matthew continues with his account to report that an allied Christian army 
proceeded to the aid of Edessa upon the news of the invasion. He relates how King 
Baldwin, Joscelin of Tell Bashir and Bertrand of Tripoli first went to Antioch to per-
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suade Tancred to help them. After they had succeeded in this with some difficulty, 
they were joined on the way by the Armenian princes Vasil and Ablgharib. Grous-
set
58
 and Demirkent
59
 must be considered justified in finding this itineary via Anti-
och problematic, even though they are less justified in accepting Albert’s alternative 
report that the king crossed the Euphrates without Tancred and summoned him later 
to Edessa, in order to reconcile him with Baldwin du Bourg.
60
 For Baldwin I hurried 
to reach Edessa before it would succumb to the Muslims, as Grousset points out, and 
passing through the city of Antioch would have amounted to a considerable detour 
for him. Moreover Tancred was at loggerheads with both Joscelin and Baldwin du 
Bourg at this time, and probably it would not have been a very good idea for the king 
to go to Antioch with the former to persuade Tanred to help the latter. He was likely 
to fail, and then the time he had lost for the detour would have been wasted.  
Even if Baldwin succeeded in persuading Tancred, as Demirkent points out, 
there was the further problem that since 1108 Kogh Vasil and the other Armenian 
chieftains had been in alliance with Baldwin du Bourg and at loggerheads with Tan-
cred. Consequently, Tancred’s presence in his company could have raised difficulties 
as he proceeded to mobilize the Armenian princes. In the light of all these considera-
tions, it seems more plausible to assume that Baldwin marched towards the Euphra-
tes without passing through Antioch and was joined on the way by a reluctant Tan-
cred, who only acted under pressure from his entourage. 
 Matthew states next that the Christians passed with a tremendous army to the 
confines of Edessa. Unlike Ibn al-Qalanisi, he does not interpret the Muslims’ retreat 
to Harran as a move to allure the Franks to their side of the Euphrates, but reports 
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instead that Mawdud, on learning of their arrival, abandoned the siege and marched 
to Harran. What this implies is that the Franks had already crossed the river and were 
approaching Edessa when Mawdud learned about their approach and broke off the 
siege (as we shall see, this is precisely how the Anonymous Syriac relates the 
events). The two alternative versions are in fact not entirely irreconcilable: the large 
Frankish army could be expected to force a crossing despite the presence of the Mus-
lim scouts and squadrons on the east side of the river, and Mawdud may have wanted 
to avoid the risk of being trapped between the coming army and the garrison of Edes-
sa. Consequently he may have preferred to withdraw and let them cross without hin-
drance, so that he could lure them later to a suitable place in order to make a surprise 
attack, or at least to wait until their provisions ran out in the devastated region, and 
force them to retire.  
Matthew proceeds to relate that the Franks, arriving before Edessa, began 
preparations for battle on the next day. He reveals another trap set up at this point by 
the Seljukid army, which remains unmentioned in the Muslim sources: expecting by 
a clever strategem to defeat the Franks, who lacked knowledge of the terrain, the 
Turks installed many troops in ambush at Harran and withdrew from the town. 
Grousset observes that their intention in this maneuver was to renew the tactic that 
had been applied with so much success in the Battle of Harran: drawing the Franks as 
far as possible from their bases into the depths of Muslim territory, and then sudden-
ly attacking them –– provided, of course, that the latter would indeed be willing to 
give battle.
61
 Runciman suggests further that Mawdud’s final goal was to outflank 
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the Frankish army through a sudden swerve to the north,
62
 thereby cutting off their 
routes of escape across the Euphrates. But Matthew states that the Franks got wind of 
the Turks’ “treacherous designs.” In reaction they turned around towards the fortress 
of Shinaw
63
 in Muslim territory, and attacked it instead before they retreated west. 
Matthew has his own explanation to offer about the withdrawal of the Franks 
toward the Euphrates. We have seen Ibn al-Qalanisi attribute this move to their reali-
zation of the Muslim trap, and Ibn al-Adim to their learning of Tughtekin’s junction 
with Mawdud, neither of which is entirely convincing. But Matthew’s explanation 
seems even less credible at first sight. According to this, Tancred departed with his 
forces when he discovered a plot that had been hatched against him by the other 
leaders, and returned via Samosata (northwest of Edessa) to the banks of the Euphra-
tes; he was eventually followed by the rest of the army. At first sight, this version of 
the events seems little more than an extension of Matthew’s previous charge against 
the Edessene princes that they had summoned Mawdud against Tancred. Indeed Ni-
cholson interprets it as just another instance of Matthew’s pro-Norman bias. He 
points out Matthew’s report that the king had pressed for Tancred’s participation in 
the campaign, and argues that after this it would have been senseless for Baldwin and 
the other princes to conspire against Tancred. He adds that they would not have 
dared to weaken the strength of the Christians by such a move when it was clear that 
the participation of all present would be vital in the forthcoming battle. For this rea-
son he attributes Tancred’s departure to his “remnant of envy and grudge towards the 
Edessene counts,” like Bernhard Kugler.64 
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Despite these objections it might still be possible to find a grain of truth in 
Matthew’s story, assuming that the charge of conspiracy was aimed at the Edessene 
princes rather than the king himself. For they were still at loggerheads with Tancred 
after their sound defeat in the battle of 1108. Besides in that battle the two sides had 
not flinched from allying with Muslims, Chawli and Ridwan respectively.
65
 So it is 
not inconceivable that the two princes of Edessa, despite the closeness of the Muslim 
army and the perilous situation at hand, decided to face all risks and do away with 
Tancred. For he was found ready within their reach, an opportunity that they could 
not have expected to find often. So Matthew’s explanation of the Frankish withdraw-
al to the Euphrates cannot be dismissed so easily out of hand.  
Matthew goes on to relate that when the retreat of the Frankish forces was 
heard of by the inhabitants of Edessa and the countryfolk who had taken refuge in the 
city, these all departed as well, including women and children, and followed the 
tracks of the Frankish army. It is denoted neither by Matthew nor any other source 
that this exodus of the civilian population from Edessa and its surroundings was the 
result of a delibarate plan of evacuation on the part of the king and the count, but this 
is precisely how Runciman and Grousset interpret the event. Runciman asserts that 
Count Baldwin decided on the king’s advice that it was futile to try to defend the re-
gion east of the Euphrates. Accordingly, he resolved to quit guarding the frontiers 
and to content himself only with keeping garrisons in Edessa, Saruj and a few small-
er castles. For this reason the Christians of the countryside were advised to cross to 
the safe territory beyond the Euphrates and accordingly set out westwards.
66
 Grous-
set similarly argues that Tancred’s withdrawal on the one hand, and the Egyptian at-
tacks on the Kingdom of Jerusalem on the other, required the departure of the army 
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from the territory of Edessa. Since this would leave Count Baldwin incapable of de-
fending the plain against the Turkish armies from Mosul, the king and the other 
princes resolved to restrict the protection of the County to defending Edessa and the 
other strongholds. Accordingly, the Armenian and Jacobite population of the unforti-
fied towns and the countryside would be evacuated to the western side of the Euphra-
tes.
67
  
In this context Grousset suggests as well that the retreat of the Franks in a 
north-westerly direction towards Samosata was a delibarate move: the Armenian 
principality of Kogh Vasil was situated precisely in this direction, in the mountainous 
region of Commagene beyond the Euphrates. The strongholds of Kaisun and Ra‘ban 
here would be capable of providing shelter to the refugees brought from Edessa and 
the trans-Euphratian plain.
68
  
This thesis about the existence of a Frankish plan for evacuating the local 
Christians looks neat and coherent enough, but it is seriously undermined by the fact 
that neither Matthew nor the other sources offer any evidence in corroboration of it. 
In fact Matthew’s account would rather suggest that the Franks began their retreat 
towards the Euphrates suddenly, perhaps because of their hurry to rejoin Tancred and 
so to avoid an attack while still divided. When the residents and refugees in Edessa 
heard of this sudden retreat and grew apprehensive about the fate that awaited them 
in the hands of the Muslims, now that they had been abandoned by the Franks, they 
spontaneously followed the latter in order to reach safe territory under the escort of 
an army. 
Matthew introduces us with more betrayers of Christian unity at this point, 
namely two Franks who he says “did a very wicked thing”: repudiating Christianity, 
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these reportedly went to Mawdud to inform him about the hasty retreat of the Frank-
ish army. As we shall see, the Anonymous Syriac Chronicle has a similar story to 
offer. So the whole episode may well have a basis of truth. It is conceivable that the 
Franks in question grew convinced during the irregular, almost rout-like retreat that 
the army was stranded beyond the Euphrates and doomed to certain destruction. Un-
der the influence of despair and panic they may have decided to seek refuge with the 
enemy and betray the others in order to save their own skins. Converting to Islam 
would have been a good way of winning the Muslims’ confidence under these condi-
tions.  
Matthew relates the slaughter of those who were caught on the banks of the 
Euphrates in far more detail than the Muslim accounts. He states that the Franks had 
already completed their crossing by the time Mawdud reached the river in their pur-
suit, having killed and captured innumerable countryfolk on the way. As a result, the 
civilians following the army were caught defenceless on the riverbank and “the 
Turks massacred the Christian faithful who were huddled together like flocks of 
sheep on this side of the river.” Thus Matthew reveals that it was only the indigenous 
population of the County in the Franks’ tracks who got slaughtered, and in this he 
diverges from Ibn al-Qalanisi who stated that only some of the Frankish leaders had 
been able to cross by the time of the attack, with all the rest left behind. Matthew 
adds that the Franks could not do anything other than watch the massacre of the civil-
ians from the opposite bank, having no chance to assist them, and so “wept bitterly.” 
Like Ibn al-Qalanisi, Matthew states that an immense number of people were slaugh-
tered and just as much booty was captured. He depicts the mayhem very vividly, 
probably drawing upon eye-witness information: 
The wrath of God, manifested through Mawdud, fell upon the faithful with 
such force that the Euphrates was turned into blood. Many drowned in the 
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river. Those who tried to swim across were unable to reach the other side. 
Many tried to cross over in boats, but five or six of the boats sank full of peo-
ple, because too many persons got in them.  
On this day, the author asserts, “the entire territory of Edessa was devastated 
and depopulated.”  
Just before concluding his account, Matthew notes that Belek was imprisoned 
by Sokman al-Qutbi (“Sulaiman, the Emir of the East”), although he fails to mention 
the quarrel between Sokman and Ilghazi that had led to this. He relates that Sokman 
placed Belek in fetters and threw him “into the dungeon of the fortress of Aytseats in 
Taron.” This place was Artchesh, the present-day Erciş in Turkey. 
Although we have seen Ibn al-Qalanisi state that the Muslims besieged Edes-
sa for a second time after returning from the Euphrates, Matthew does not mention 
any such siege. Instead he concludes by noting that Mawdud returned via Harran to 
his country, along with the captives and booty he had taken. In fact the other sources 
save Albert of Aachen do not mention the second siege either. It is possible that these 
lacked information about it because of their distance in time or space, but this cannot 
be said for Matthew who relates the events in circumstantial detail based on eye-
witness information. However, there still does not seem sufficient grounds for dis-
missing Ibn al-Qalanisi’s testimony about the second siege. As Demirkent observes, 
it would have been unreasonable for Mawdud not to return to the siege of Edessa af-
ter the retreat of the relief force beyond the Euphrates.
69
 So it might be assumed that 
Matthew omitted this siege because of its relative shortness and ineffectiveness when 
compared with the first.  
Nevertheless, there could also be another, more subtle reason for this omis-
sion of Matthew’s: the dramatic scene of the local Christians being slaughtered on 
the riverside, while the Franks helplessly stood by and wept on the opposite 
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riverbank, would make a far better ending to his story than the anticlimactic second 
siege. It would help him throw into relief the point of his entire account, formulated 
in the concluding sentence: “So the Frankish forces, humiliated, returned to their ter-
ritories; for, instead of saving the Christian faithful, they had brought disaster upon 
them.” Indeed this remark could pass as the moral of Matthew’s entire work. At the 
time of the the First Crusade he had celebrated the Franks as saviors of the indige-
nous Christians, but now he seemed to be increasingly alienated from them as they 
turned out to be rather more of a liability for those they were supposed to protect. 
4.4.1.5 The Anonymous Syriac Chronicle  
The Anonymous Syriac Chronicle offers a rather short but valuable account
70
 
that diverges on some subtle points from those of the Muslim and Armenian sources. 
It also makes straightforward but sound-looking explanations regarding certain issues 
like the Franks’ retreat to the Euphrates. Moreover, like Matthew, the Anonymous 
shows himself critical about the conduct of the Franks, complaining that the local 
Christians fared worse because of their relief attempt. He also corroborates Mat-
thew’s report about the betrayal of the Frankish army in retreat.  
We have seen Matthew speak of relentless, violent attacks made against 
Edessa during the siege of the city. The Anonymous depicts the events quite differ-
ently. He begins by relating that Mawdud camped in the plain to the east of the city, 
around the castle of Kissos, and in order to ravage the land sent around many horse-
men who cut down the gardens and trees, spoiled the land and destroyed the con-
vents. This accords with the devastation of the countryside reported by Matthew, but 
the Anonymous goes on to assert that these troops “did not approach the city to fight 
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against it and set up engines of war; they just approached and went away.” Robert 
Nicholson questions the veracity of this assertion on the grounds of Ibn al-Qalanisi’s 
statement that the besiegers of Edessa “surrounded it on all sides like a girdle, pre-
venting all ingress and egress.”71 But in fact Ibn al-Qalanisi does not mention any 
direct assaults made against the city either, and only touches upon the dearth and 
famine that resulted from the blockade. So Matthew may have deliberately exagger-
ated the gravity of the siege by speaking of violent and relentless attacks directly un-
dertaken against the city. However, his version seems to find support from a passing 
statement of Albert of Aachen. As we shall see, this author indicates that the Mus-
lims were “provoking Baldwin through constant attacks as well as oppressing the 
city with many assaults.”  
Combining these, and drawing into consideration that by the early twelfth 
century the siege technology and skills of the Muslim armies were still far from the 
level of development they would reach at the time of Zangi, Nur al-Din and Sala-
din,
72
 it might be concluded that the siege was mainly directed at blockading Edessa 
and ravaging its countryside to starve those inside. Some attacks were also made 
against the walls, though they were not undertaken with full siege equipment and the 
aim of taking the city by storm, but rather to provoke Baldwin to make a sally as well 
as to spread terror among the inhabitants.          
The Anonymous goes on to relate that the Turks moved their camp a short 
distance, to the river Jullab, when the Franks crossed the Euphrates. This is a small 
tributary of the Balikh River that joins it after flowing south past Edessa and Harran, 
so the Anonymous seems to agree on this point with Ibn al-Qalanisi and Matthew of 
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Edessa who denote Harran as the new campsite of the Muslim army. He notes that 
the former site of the Muslim camp near the castle of Kissos was occupied upon this 
by the Frankish army. For the subsequent Frankish retreat toward the Euphrates the 
Anonymous has a quite straightforward explanation to offer. He points out that 
Mawdud’s army had already wasted the country and forced the villagers to seek ref-
uge in the town, which led to the result that the Franks could find neither corn for 
themselves nor forage for their animals. Suffering from scarcity and “having no pa-
tience, as is the bad habit of the Franks,” they determined to cross back to the west of 
the Euphrates, although they were still facing the enemy. This version of the events 
constitutes a plausible alternative to Matthew’s story about Tancred’s departure, 
dragging behind the rest of the army. Nevertheless, it fails to account for the apparent 
suddenness and haste with which the Franks turned on their tracks. The depletion of 
the provisions and forage should have been a gradual process, enabling the Franks to 
set out in time and retreat with due prudence, without exposing themselves as they 
did to an attack from behind. This issue will be discussed further below.   
We have already seen that the Anonymous joins Matthew of Edessa in attrib-
uting Mawdud’s pursuit to a betrayal from within the Frankish army. He relates how, 
“through the instrumentality of Satan,” a Frank became enraged with his lord and 
went to inform Mawdud about the retreat. The betrayer described the sorry state of 
the Frankish troops and the civilians following them, who were “faint from hunger 
and weakened by the fatigues of the way.” He urged Mawdud that if he pursued them 
in this condition he would be able to inflict great losses upon them. Nicholson rejects 
this report on the grounds that the Franks had already provisioned Edessa and so they 
could not have been starving.
73
 But considering that the region had been throughly 
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ravaged by this time, the Frankish army, with its numerous civilian following, could 
well have experienced difficulty finding provisions on the way. It cannot be taken for 
granted either that they had brought along so abundant provisions as to suffice them 
on the way back, after they had fully replenished the stores of Edessa. 
Nicholson also objects to the Anonymous’s explanation on the grounds that it 
implies that Mawdud’s retreat to Harran was unplanned and his attack upon the 
Franks opportunistic. Against this he cites Ibn al-Qalanisi’s “categorical statement” 
that both the retreat and attack were planned in advance. This objection is hardly 
more justified than the previous one. To begin with, it is not clear how the Anony-
mous’s attribution of the Muslim attack to the betrayal of a Frank could be taken to 
imply that not only the attack itself but also the previous retreat to Harran had been 
unplanned. Insofar as the attack itself is concerned, Nicholson overlooks the fact that 
the Anonymous’s version is corroborated by Matthew of Edessa, just as important a 
contemporary source as Ibn al-Qalanisi.  
There is also a second consideration: as we shall see further on, Fulcher of 
Chartres and William of Tyre suggest that the Muslims had based their strategy on 
detaining the Franks till they would have to depart either to answer the call of tasks 
elsewhere, or by the depletion of their provisions. At first sight this seems to support 
Nicholson’s rejection of the betrayal story, for in that case Mawdud would have fore-
seen in any case that the Franks would begin retreating towards the Euphrates at 
some point. But it must not be forgotten that the Muslims were still at some distance 
from the Frankish army, and therefore would have needed to be notified about their 
retreat in one way or another. As we have seen, Ibn al-Qalanisi does not specify how 
this happened, but only notes that Mawdud went on to the attack “on the receipt of 
information of their movement.” So it could well have been one or more betrayers 
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from amongst the Franks who took this information to Mawdud, either out of fear or 
on account of a personal resentment.   
The Anonymous goes on to relate that when the Franks reached the Euphra-
tes, unaware of the Turkish army in pursuit, the fighting men crossed first, leaving 
the footmen and baggage on the eastern bank. He adds that the Edessenes were in the 
majority there. So the Anonymous reveals the presence of Frankish footmen among 
the victims of the subsequent slaughter, and in this diverges from Matthew who stat-
ed that only the local Christians were stranded and got massacred. The Anonymous’s 
description of the conflict itself is vivid like that of Matthew, and notwithstanding its 
conciseness covers all that is related by the other sources: “Suddenly the Turks over-
took them, fell on them like butchers, killing without pity; still more were drowned, 
the Turks thrusting at them with lances; many were taken captive. The Turks fell on 
the spoil, stores and baggage.”  
The Anonymous’s final comments about the debacle bear a striking resem-
blance to those of Matthew: he attributes the disaster to “God’s anger with his peo-
ple, especially with the Edessenes,” and criticizes the Franks for the outcome of their 
relief operation: “the advance of the Franks had a bad end.”   
4.4.1.6 Fulcher of Chartres  
Fulcher of Chartres is another contemporary source of the expedition along 
with Matthew of Edessa and Ibn al-Qalanisi, and his account
74
 displays certain im-
portant parallels with that of the latter author. Among these are the spread of the 
Muslim scouts and squadrons on the eastern side of the Euphrates, the withdrawal of 
these troops upon the approach of the Franks, which Fulcher interprets as a conse-
quence of the Muslims’ fear of the Franks rather than as a deliberate move to trap 
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them, and the replenishment of the provisions of Edessa by the Frankish army. An-
other aspect in which Fulcher resembles Ibn al-Qalanisi, who presented his lord 
Tughtekin as the protagonist of the story, is his focus on King Baldwin, tracing his 
movements from Jerusalem to the scene of events and back. At first sight it might 
seem only too natural that Fulcher wrote from a Jerusalemite perspective, given that 
he resided in the Kingdom of Jerusalem. But we shall see that William of Tyre, who 
wrote in the same kingdom and used Fulcher as his chief source, did not share the 
same perspective while Albert, writing in Europe around Aachen, shared it. This may 
have been due in part to the narrower provenance of the sources available for Fulcher 
and Albert, but perhaps also due to their desire to portray Baldwin I as the effective 
leader of all the other Frankish princes, as the guarantor of Christian unity and soli-
darity in face of the “infidel.”    
Thus Fulcher starts his account with the victorious return of King Baldwin 
from the siege of Beirut. Following this, he says, the king began preparations to 
march against the Turks who had laid siege to Edessa.
75
 Surprisingly, he mentions 
only Tancred among the Frankish leaders who joined Baldwin at this stage or later, 
and passes over Joscelin, Baldwin du Bourg and Bertrand of Tripoli. As we shall see, 
this is probably what misled William of Tyre into assuming that the Edessene princes 
were still in prison and that Tancred was still ruling the County of Edessa as well. 
Fulcher goes on to relate that the Franks, having come together by the Euphrates, 
crossed the river and “immediately encountered the Turks whom they were seeking.” 
In a way that corroborates Ibn al-Qalanisi’s statement that the Turks had spread in 
squadrons and scouting parties throughout the entire region east of the river, he indi-
cates that they were scouring the country in bands. But probably misled by his Jeru-
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salemite perspective, the chronicler surmises that they must have been “looking for 
the arrival of the king,” although they were much more likely to be looking for plun-
der, as Matthew revealed. Unlike Ibn al-Qalanisi, on the other hand, Fulcher does not 
state that the Franks hesitated at first to cross the river in sight of these bands. Proba-
bly it would ill accord with his portrayal of the Franks on the move as “superb fight-
ers remarkable at slaying with the lance.”  
According to Fulcher, the Franks’ valor and skill at fighting with the lance 
was also the reason why the Muslim troops withdrew upon their arrival. Thus in con-
trast to Ibn al-Qalanisi, who interpreted this move of the Turks as a deliberate move 
to trap the Franks, Fulcher attributes it to their knowledge and fear of the Franks’ 
skills at fighting: “By clever flight they broke away, neither daring to fight nor caring 
to retire into their own lands.” Moreover, he seems to have believed that the Muslims 
intended to wait until the Franks would be worn down by their long detainment, with 
their provisions and forage being depleted, and finally feel themselves compelled to 
depart: “The Turks tried for a great many days to wear down our men by their tedi-
ous craftiness.” Indeed we shall see that this is precisely the meaning that William of 
Tyre would derive from the passage.   
Yet another event that is mentioned only by Fulcher, his follower William of 
Tyre and Ibn al-Qalanisi is the replenishment of the depleted stores and provisions of 
Edessa. Throwing the king’s role into relief at the expense of the other princes, Ful-
cher relates how Baldwin, “considering both what was necessary and the best thing 
to do, provisioned the city of Edessa with food, which the inhabitants much needed.” 
He explains that this need had arisen because of the devastation of the surrounding 
country and the capture of the villlagers who supplied the city’s food. What he does 
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not explain, in contrast to the Anonymous, is that it was partly due to the same rea-
son, the devastation and depopulation of the countryside, that the Franks withdrew 
back toward the Euphrates, a poorly executed maneuver that directly led to the fol-
lowing debacle. In contrast, Fulcher makes it appear as though the whole task of the 
Frankish army was completed once they had provisioned Edessa, rendering any fur-
ther delay unnecessary. Viewed in this light, their hasty retreat to the river in face of 
the invading Muslim army, without due protection of the rear or sufficient reconnais-
sance of the movements of the enemy troops, comes across as only too natural –– if 
only it had not been for the “craftiness” and “rapacity” of the Turks, who appeared as 
if out of the blue according to Fulcher and attacked the Franks. The chronicler notes 
that at this time the latter were crossing the river on a few small rafts.  
Since the results of the Frankish maneuver were probably much too embar-
rassing to relate in detail, Fulcher does not dwell long on the scenes of slaughter that 
followed. Indeed he does not even reveal that any bloodshed took place: “they seized 
many of our people who were on foot, namely
76
 the helpless Armenians whom they 
had already wickedly plundered, and carried them off to Persia.” So it seems as 
though plunder and banishment were all that the victims suffered on this occasion. 
Notably, the same passage reveals that these were all indigenous Armenians, which 
agrees with Matthew’s testimony. Fulcher ends his account by noting the grief of the 
Franks at being unable to help the victims. He attributes this to the difficulty of 
crossing back over the river at that time, but we shall see in Albert of Aachen’s ac-
count that it was rather due to the sinking of the boats or rafts used for crossing. Ful-
cher concludes that the Franks continued on their “appointed way” after this and re-
turned home, Tancred to Antioch and Baldwin back to Jerusalem. 
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4.4.1.7 William of Tyre  
In his account
77
 William of Tyre, writing much later, seems to have mainly 
drawn upon the account of Fulcher, with some embellishments and additions, but 
also not without certain misunderstandings. We have already seen how Fulcher’s 
failure to mention Count Baldwin and Joscelin among the participants misled him 
into assuming that they were still captives at the time of the campaign.
78
 Building 
further on this misunderstanding, William suggests that it was precisely the absence 
of Count Baldwin and Joscelin that led the Turks to attack the County: 
At this time, while… Count Baldwin and Joscelin, his kinsman, were still 
held prisoners by the enemy, a vast host of Turks assembled from the lands of 
the east in countless numbers. Seizing the opportunity presented by the ab-
sence of these princes, they went down into Mesopotamia and, with a strong 
hand, began to ravage the country round Edessa. 
 Wiliam relates how agricultural production ceased and the food began to fail 
as a result of the burning of villages and the capture of farmers, which rendered any-
where beyond the walls unsafe.  
It should be noted that William’s source Fulcher does not describe the state of 
affairs in the territory of Edessa like William, but true to his Jerusalemite perspec-
tive, immediately moves on to relating the king’s preparations. This is one of the 
many instances in which William’s perspective is revealed to be wider than that of 
somebody viewing the events in the distant north from the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 
although he resided there like Fulcher. It is also interesting that Albert of Aachen, 
writing in Europe, stood closer in this sense to Fulcher. Perhaps the reason for this 
was that William’s distance in time from the event enabled him to draw upon other, 
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local sources as well, whereas the contemporary authors Fulcher and Albert had to 
depend on whatever witness they could find at that time. Beyond the problem of 
sources, however, Fulcher and Albert had an apparent concern to show the king as 
the effective leader of the Frankish princes, protecting all Christians and securing 
Christian unity vis-à-vis the Muslims. Albert even used him as a mouthpiece to voice 
his direct pleas for Christian solidarity against the “infidels.” In contrast, William 
does not seem to have felt the need for such an agenda, as he wrote in the latter half 
of the twelfth century, when the king was already the unquestioned leader among the 
princes and the Franks were united by the growing power of the Muslims. 
In keeping with his wider perspective, William goes on to relate the state of 
affairs in Antioch. He reminds his readers erroneously that Tancred was still entrust-
ed with the government of the County of Edessa at this time, and asserts that it was 
this prince who sought King Baldwin’s aid against the depredations of the Turks 
around Edessa. Not content with this, he proceeds to relate that Tancred himself col-
lected a large force and “hastened thither [to the County of Edessa] in great anxiety 
about his country.” Robert Nicholson rightly points out that this tale runs counter to 
the tension and hostility we know to have existed before and during the expedition 
between Tancred and the Edessene princes.
79
 
After this point Wiliam follows Fulcher closely, albeit with some further ex-
plications. He relates how the Frankish forces, having met and crossed the Euphrates, 
came face to face with the Muslims. Nevertheless, he skips over Fulcher’s statement 
that the enemy troops across the river were “looking for the arrival of the king of Je-
rusalem,” probably because he did not share the latter’s Jerusalem-based perspective. 
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Instead he goes on to relate how the Turks recalled their troops and kept their  dis-
tance from the Franks.  
Like Fulcher, William attributes the the retreat of the Muslims to their fear 
and knowledge of the fighting skills of the Franks. And yet he tries to explain why 
they did not simply return to their lands but preferred instead to “wear down [the 
Franks] by their tedious craftiness,” as Fulcher had stated somewhat obscurely. Ac-
cording to William, the Turks were aware that the King and Tancred lacked the time 
to remain for long in that place, and so they tried to detain the Frankish leaders with 
the hope that they would grow weary and hasten to depart.
80
 After that, they them-
selves would be able to resume their depredations. William’s explanation constitutes 
a valid alternative to that of Ibn al-Qalanisi and Matthew of Edessa, who believed 
that the Muslims intended to attack the Franks directly. They could achieve just as 
efficient results at far less risk by simply wasting the lands, harassing the Franks, and 
waiting till the enemy would be forced to depart by the depletion of their provisions 
or the call of business elsewhere. 
But these considerations are not sufficient to invalidate the explanation of Ibn 
al-Qalanisi and Matthew either, for Mawdud may well have desired to give battle to 
the Franks if he could. Accordingly it would perhaps be best to combine the two ex-
planations offered for the Muslims’ retreat: Probably, their strategy was indeed based 
on waiting till the Franks would be forced to depart on the depletion of their provi-
sions or the call of business elsewhere. But in the meanwhile they were also on the 
lookout for an opportunity to lure the Franks into suitable, preferably Muslim territo-
ry and make a surprise attack. Although in the event the Franks did not fall into the 
trap, both of these designs were ultimately realized: they indeed departed for the Eu-
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phrates, because of the depletion of their provisions and other reasons, but beating a 
hasty retreat without due precautions, they also provided the Muslims with a golden 
opportunity to surprise them.  
William proceeds to relate that the Frankish chiefs discerned the Muslim 
strategy of avoiding battle and waiting for the Frankish army to have to withdraw, 
and in response adopted the “judicious plan” of provisioning Edessa and other 
strongholds in the region with plenty of food brought from beyond the Euphrates. 
Here William diverges from Fulcher in stating that other towns and fortresses in the 
region were supplied with provisions as well. The food in question was collected 
from the fertile region west of the Euphrates and transported across the river on vari-
ous beasts of burden.
81
 These additions of William need not be discarded out of 
hand, for it seems quite plausible that the provisions should have been brought in 
from the close fertile and unravaged lands west of the river.  
However, it seems much more doubtful whether they could obtain and bring 
enough provisions for all or most of the towns and castles east of the river as well as 
Edessa. Of course William could have used an additional source for this statement, 
but it is still worthwhile asking why he might have felt the need to elaborate in this 
way on Fulcher’s report about the provisioning of Edessa. The answer lies in a prob-
lem he had in common with Fulcher: to find a face-saving explanation for the hasty 
retreat of the Franks before the intact enemy forces in the territory of Edessa. As we 
have seen, Fulcher’s version of the events was calculated to give the impression that 
the Franks’ task was finished after provisioning Edessa and consequently they could 
afford to return without more delay. Interestingly, William does not content himself 
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merely with implying this idea, but puts it forward explicitly: “relieved of anxiety 
about the cities and fortresses, since these had been well supplied by arms, men, and 
food, the leaders returned to the Euphrates, for matters of greater importance de-
manded their attention.” This passage clearly reveals William’s motive for turning 
Fulcher’s report about the provisioning of Edessa into an extensive operation for 
supplying all the strongholds in the region with “arms, men and food.”82 This addi-
tional evidence would help show that the Franks had carried out all that could be 
done and therefore could not be criticized for beating a hasty retreat before the in-
vaders.  
If this evidence proved insufficient, then there was the additional ground that 
“matters of greater importance demanded their attention.” What these “matters of 
greater importance” were William does not specify, but Steven Runciman seems to 
fill in this part for him when he writes: “Tancred heard rumours that Ridwan of 
Aleppo was preparing to attack Antioch. Messengers came from Palestine to tell the 
King of a threatened Egyptian move against Jerusalem. The campaign in the Jazira 
was abandoned.”83 Nevertheless, it is not possible to find any indication in the ac-
count of William and the others to the effect that Tancred had heard rumors about 
Ridwan’s plans, or again that “messengers from Palestine” had arrived to inform the 
king on the Egyptian move. Consequently, these reasons put forward by Runciman 
seem rather like an ex-post facto rationalization for the Franks’ hasty departure, de-
rived from the reports on what they had to deal with after their return. Nor do they 
constitute a more satisfactory explanation than the ones that the Latin sources them-
selves offer for the Frankish retreat.         
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In the rest of the account William follows Fulcher closely. He relates how the 
Turks in pursuit attacked “some of the lesser people” who had remained on the east-
ern bank and were crossing the river in “little boats, frail and few in number.” A bit 
further on he clarifies that these “lesser people” were “poor Armenians who, in the 
hope of finding a safe place of abode, were fleeing before the devastation caused by 
the Turks.” However, differently from Fulcher, William does not try to cover up the 
ensuing massacre, but mentions the dead as well as the capured. He states that the 
Franks were prevented from going to their help by their inability to ford the river and 
the small number of boats available, and so had to return home “in deep anguish of 
heart over the fate of the poor people.” In conclusion he notes that “the chief men in 
charge of the region on this [western] side of the Euphrates were directed to exercise 
the greatest care in fortifying that locality.” Evidently, this was a step to prevent it 
suffering the same fate as the trans-Euphratian lands of the County. 
4.4.1.8 Albert of Aachen  
Albert’s account of Mawdud’s expedition in 111084 is the most detailed 
among the Latin accounts. Moreover, it agrees with the oriental sources on many de-
tails and provides additional information found nowhere else, like a defeat suffered 
by Count Baldwin at the Muslims’ hands. Significantly, Albert is the only one among 
the Latin and Eastern Christian sources to mention Ilghazi’s name among the partici-
pants in Mawdud’s campaigns, correctly for that in 1110 but incorrectly for the one 
in 1111.
85
  
We have seen that Matthew of Edessa accused Baldwin and Joscelin of hav-
ing called in Mawdud’s army against Tancred. Now Albert brings the exactly reverse 
                                                 
84
 Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana, 788-99 and Geschichte, II, 222-30 (XI.16, 19-25). 
85
 Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana, 810-13 and Geschichte, II, 239-40 (XI.38). 
 210 
charge against Tancred. According to him, the prince of Antioch summoned the 
Turks when his demand for tribute was refused by Count Baldwin, and was com-
pelled as a result to defend himself before King Baldwin at Edessa. Robert Nicholson 
rejects both of these contradictory charges on the grounds that Mawdud, with his 
“single-hearted policy of opposition to the Franks,” and having embarked on a Holy 
War, would never have allied with any of the Frankish princes, either Tancred or the 
Edessene princes.
86
 Beaumont rejects the likelihood of such an alliance on the same 
grounds, stating: “From what we know of Mawdud’s character, it seems extremely 
unlikely that he would ever have allied himself with a Christian.”87 
So was Mawdud in alliance with Tancred, the Edessene princes, or neither of 
these? Setting out to answer this question, it can firstly be observed that the lord of 
Mosul would have undertaken such an ambitious, large scale campaign, with the par-
ticipation of many other emirs, on the sultan’s instructions only, and not at the insti-
gation of this or that Frankish prince. Nevertheless, this does not exclude the possi-
bility that he may have entered negotiations with one or more of these princes during 
the campaign itself, as he approached the County of Edessa at the head of his army. 
Whatever the degree of Mawdud’s commitment to Holy War may have been,88 it 
would not necessarily have prevented him from trying to draw some of the Frankish 
princes to his side with the aim of dividing and weakening the Latin front. In this 
connection it seems hard to accept Beaumont’s argument that Mawdud’s “character” 
would never have allowed him to ally with a Christian, for in this case Muslims 
would have profited from such an alliance. 
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Thus it could well have been the case that the princes of Antioch, Edessa or 
both established contact with Mawdud while he was on the march. This would only 
be in keeping with their recent policy of allying with Muslim emirs against each oth-
er, in order to seek support against the opposite party as in the case of the battle of 
1108. To such diplomatic advances by Frankish princes the Muslim general could 
well have responded positively, in order to divide and weaken the Latin front, alt-
hough it was not at their incitement that he had launched the campaign. 
On the other hand, it seems difficult to identify the Frankish leaders who may 
have attempted an alliance with Mawdud. The most that can be said is the apt remark 
of Grousset: “It seems to emerge from these contradictory accusations that neither 
Baldwin du Bourg nor Tancred had a clear conscience. In their unfortunate quarrel, 
each of them had frequently appealed to the Turks. Now that the Turks had arrived, 
each of them accused the other of having provoked their intervention.”89 The con-
flicting accusations and biases found in the accounts of Matthew and Albert are only 
a reflection of this situation, and it would be futile to try to make a final judgement in 
favour of one against the other. More frutiful and interesting would be to observe 
how, using the princes’ betrayal of their fellow Christians and the resulting troubles 
as a central theme, they shape their accounts as a plea for the restoration and preser-
vation of Christian unity. We have already observed Matthew’s efforts in this direc-
tion. As we shall see, Albert goes still further, placing exhortatory speeches in the 
king’s mouth about the necessity of preserving Christian unity against the “infidels.”   
Like Fulcher, Albert begins his account with King Baldwin’s reception of the 
news about the siege of Edessa while he was besieging Beirut. He traces Baldwin’s 
steps back to Jerusalem after that siege, and then northwards to Edessa. Indeed 
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throughout the account the king occupies the center of the stage as in Fulcher’s ac-
count, reconciling the other princes, taking the necessary decisions, and repelling the 
Muslims. Although Albert was writing in far away in Aachen, his perspective in the 
narrative is thus centred much more on the king and Jerusalem than that of William 
of Tyre. As has already been pointed out, the reason for this should be sought as 
much in his agenda of promoting Christian unity as in the provenance of his sources. 
During the siege of Beirut, Albert relates, King Baldwin received the news 
that Mawdud, Ilghazi and Sokman al-Qutbi, moving on the incitement of Tancred, 
had besieged Edessa with a great army and devastated the entire region. They pro-
voked Count Baldwin through constant attacks and oppressed the city with many as-
saults. The Edessenes, suffering from famine and lack of adequate defence, were in 
great difficulty. Albert notes that the king kept this message secret until he had cap-
tured Beirut and returned to Jerusalem.There he revealed the situation of Edessa to 
Bertrand of Tripoli and the knights of Jerusalem, begging them to go to its assis-
tance. At this point Albert places in Baldwin’s mouth the first of his several speeches 
on the necessity of Christian solidarity: 
I seek the goodwill of all of you, and let there be no one who turns away, 
since they are our brothers, prepared to come to our assistance in any emer-
gency. For indeed it is imperishable love that we should assist and should not 
hesistate to lay down our lives for our brothers and friends. 
Carrying the same rhetoric outside the frame of the speech, Albert writes that upon 
these words the knights volunteered to “go on an expedition to Edessa and, in order 
to bring aid to their besieged fellow Christians, to wage war on the Turks and to lay 
down their lives for their brothers.”  
Albert goes on to relate that the army of Jerusalem, six hundred knights and 
three hundred footmen in all, arrived a month afterwards in the territory of Edessa; 
                                                                                                                                          
89
 Grousset, Histoire, I, 450. 
 213 
here they were joined by Franks and Armenian Christians from all the towns and for-
tresses in the area, which swelled their numbers to fifteen thousand. It must be noted 
here that according to Albert, in contrast to Fulcher and William, the king had 
crossed the Euphrates without the company of Tancred and his army. The reason for 
this difference will presently become clear. In conformity with the oriental sources, 
Albert states that the Turks, hearing about the arrival of the king from their scouts, 
lifted the siege and moved their camp to Harran, at one day’s distance from Edessa, 
where they intended to stay until they might assess whether they could confront his 
forces. He notes that their number was forty thousand, probably an exaggerated esti-
mate. The historian relates that this retreat of the Muslim army was reported to the 
king by Baldwin of Edessa, who joined him with the four hundred Franks and ten 
thousand Armenians under his command. Reportedly, Baldwin told the king in addi-
tion that the enemies had come to besiege Edessa at the instigation of Tancred, who 
was always opposed and hostile to himself.  
Albert then proceeds with a rather lengthy story about how the king sum-
moned Tancred from Antioch to Edessa upon this accusation and tried to settle the 
dispute. Although this episode seems to be of doubtful veracity, it was evidently val-
uable for Albert because of the fine opportunity it offered for stressing the necessity 
of Christian solidarity and brotherhood vis-à-vis the “heathens.” He relates that after 
some resistance Tancred arrived in Edessa with fifteen hundred of his men, in order 
to clear himself of the charges as well as to explain what grievances he held against 
Baldwin. When the king asked him why he had “led out the Turks against his broth-
ers and fellow Christians when he should rather have helped the Christians,” he did 
not try to excuse himself. Instead he complained that Count Baldwin failed to show 
him any respect, although Edessa and many other cities in the County had been pre-
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viously subject to Antioch and paid annual tribute to its lord. Here Tancred was not 
only referring to the recent years of his regency, during the captivity of Baldwin and 
Joscelin, as also evident from the king’s consequent rebuke of him for trying to in-
troduce “heathen” laws and principles into the Latin East. Grousset points out that 
Antioch’s claim of suzerainty over Edessa and the neighboring towns went back to 
the Byzantine and Turkish periods, when the region east of the Euphrates had been 
subjected to the duchy or emirate of Antioch.
90
   
Relating how the king responded to Tancred, Albert attributes to him a 
lengthy speech that gives the fullest and clearest expression to the moral of his entire 
account. Reportedly, Baldwin drew a sharp distinction between the laws of the “hea-
thens” and the Christians, and entreated the latter not to allow their cohesion and 
brotherhood to be disrupted through the introduction of such foreign and heathen 
principles into their relations. For these relations were based on the principle, accept-
ed at the start of the Crusade, that all would freely hold whatever they acquired from 
the heathens, stand on an equal basis unless a king was appointed over them, and 
help each other in time of need. Accordingly the king rejected Tancred’s claims to 
tribute, which the king took to be just another of these heathen laws, and implored 
him not to molest Baldwin any more. He also warned the prince that if he continued 
to ally with the heathens and to direct calumnies against Christians he could no long-
er remain their Christian brother, but all would join against him in defence of their 
brothers in Edessa. Albert depicts Tancred as being overcome by this speech. He re-
lates how the prince realized his error and was reconciled with Count Baldwin. Be-
fore concluding the episode, he drives his point home: 
Tancred, led by repentance for having plotted with the heathens against a 
Christian brother, promised that he would thenceforth remain a pure and loyal 
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assistant of his Christian brothers just as they had vowed at the start of the 
journey.  
It is interesting that Tancred, in this account, makes no concession about his claims. 
Albert next engages in showing his readers how this restoration of harmony 
among the Christians immediately brought the fruit of victory. He claims that the 
Turks, hearing of the Franks’ reconciliation, took to flight and dispersed through 
mountains and devious bypaths, with the king and Tancred pursuing them into the 
territory of Harran to join battle. He asserts that many of the Muslims were destroyed 
in the process while their animals and provisions were carried away by the Chris-
tians. 
The factual basis of this episode might be the tactical withdrawal of the Turk-
ish army to Harran and beyond either to lure the Franks away from their base or 
simply to wait for the Franks’ departure. Apparently, Albert preferred to represent 
this deliberate retreat of the Muslims as an ordinary rout, complete with the dispersal 
and destruction of their troops and the plundering of their provisions and animals, 
although these latter events remain uncorroborated by the other sources. So even if a 
confrontation did take place at this stage, it could not have been more than a minor 
skirmish. It seems reasonable to think therefore that Albert made up this clash or at 
least exaggerated its scale to demonstrate the immediate benefits of restored Chris-
tian solidarity, which had allegedly inspired the “heathens” with fear and brought 
victory against them.
91
 As Işın Demirkent points out, it is otherwise hard to explain 
the contrast between this tale of the Muslim rout and that which followed soon after, 
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the abrupt report that the king and Tancred returned with a forced march to the Eu-
phrates, pursued by the assembled Turks.
92
  
Following this episode of Turkish defeat Albert dwells further on the ad-
vantages of the restored Christian unity for the struggle against the Muslims. He re-
lates how the king, in the days after his return from the pursuit, busied himself with 
“repairing and reconciling the disagreements and enmities he found on all sides 
among the Christians” in the territory of Edessa. Thus the historian gives us to under-
stand that the king had observed the advantages of Christian solidarity after Tan-
cred’s reconciliation and their alleged victory against the Muslims, and accordingly 
proceeded to reconcile all Christians in the region as a further defense measure 
against subsequent Muslim invasions.  
Albert does not give any explicit reason for the hasty return of the Frankish 
army to the Euphrates. Like Fulcher and William, perhaps, he wished his readers to 
assume that the Franks had finished their task east of the Euphrates, after the alleged 
pursuit and destruction of the Turks as well as the reconciliation of Christians. How-
ever, he relates that by the time King Baldwin and Tancred reached the river with a 
forced march, the Turks had come together in hot pursuit to attack them. Realizing 
their approach, the king hurried to cross the river with the army, but there were only 
two boats. Overloaded with arms and knights, these capsized in the middle of the 
river. Although the major part of the army had already crossed by then, the remain-
ing part, about five thousand men, were left helpless on the opposite side. These were 
soon destroyed by the arrows of the Turks who arrived.  
It is noteworthy here that in contrast to Matthew, Fulcher and William, Albert 
does not reveal that these victims were mainly Armenians, instead giving the impres-
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sion that all of them were Frankish troops. This is especially so when he speaks of 
the king’s chagrin at having to watch the slaughter of “his men” from the opposite 
bank. Probably this should be ascribed to Albert’s lack of information on this point, 
for previously he had not failed to note the presence of ten thousand Armenians ac-
companying the Edessene army.           
Albert then relates that the Turks, while “returning to the territory of Edessa 
after this bloody massacre,” came across Baldwin of Edessa and his three hundred 
knights who were following the king’s army. Being unable to evade them, Baldwin 
was reportedly compelled to join battle with their vastly superior numbers, and losing 
all his men as a result, had to flee alone to the mountains. This report seems to con-
flict with Albert’s immediately preceding statement that Baldwin was following the 
king, who had already crossed the Euphrates. If that was true, how could he have 
confronted the Muslim troops at the eastern side of the river?  
According to Grousset, Baldwin had already crossed to the west of the Eu-
phrates following the king, but then he could no longer stand to see his lands being 
ravaged, and returned to the east with anger to challenge the Turks with his handful 
of men.
93
 But there is nothing in Albert’s report to indicate that Baldwin crossed riv-
er westwards or crossed back again eastwards, and moreover the author states une-
quivocally that Baldwin dared battle with the huge Turkish army only because of his 
inability to evade them. This clearly undermines Grousset’s claim that he desired to 
challenge the Turks in order to stop their depradations. Nicholson suggests on the 
other hand that Baldwin du Bourg was performing a rearguard duty for the king’s 
army with his men against the rapidly advancing Muslim cavalry.
94
 However, in that 
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case he would have intervened and it would have been his men who got massacred at 
the river. Neither of these theories seems sufficient to account for this odd episode.   
Albert goes on to relate that King Baldwin and Tancred received the news of 
the disaster on the next day. Finding new boats, they immediately crossed back over 
the Euphrates eastwards with their troops, determined to inflict due punishment on 
the Turks, wherever they would find them. But these were nowhere to be seen, and 
they came across Count Baldwin instead, who was “forsaken, dejected and tearful for 
the massacre of his men.” With a strong detachment they led him safe and sound to 
Edessa. 
Based on the apparent problems and contradictions of the story, which cannot 
be easily explained away, the veracity of the whole episode may be called into ques-
tion. Indeed the lack of information about this event in the other sources has also led 
scholars like Kugler and Hagenmeyer to reject it, the former on the grounds of its 
absence in Fulcher’s account and the latter on the grounds of its absence in the orien-
tal sources.
95
 Demirkent similarly rejects Albert’s story, and attributes it to the au-
thor’s “usual eagerness to cover up the defeats suffered by the Crusaders.”96 Whether 
it had a basis of truth in some minor skirmish or not, let it suffice to say here that it 
served Albert to stress in conclusion the examplary loyalty of the king and Tancred –
– the latter by now “corrected”–– toward their Christian brothers. 
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4.4.2 The reasons behind Ilghazi’s refusal to participate in the subsequent expe-
ditions 
Now it is time to discuss why Ilghazi failed to take part in person in the fol-
lowing expeditions of Mawdud. After the death of Sokman al-Qutbi in the expedition 
of 1111 and Belek’s release by his successor, it could be expected that Ilghazi would 
resume his role in the campaigns. But he did not accompany Mawdud in the latter’s 
siege of Edessa in 1112, and when he was summoned to join the next expedition in 
1113, he again declined and contented himself with dispatching a contingent under 
his son Ayaz.
97
 This gives sufficient reason to think that Ilghazi’s enmity with Sok-
man was not the only reason for his reluctance to join Mawdud. Indeed the death of 
this enemy itself may have provided him with a new incentive to remain in Mardin 
with the major part of his army. For Sokman had left behind him only a son of minor 
age, a situation that offered Ilghazi the long-sought opportunity to increase the pres-
sure on his northern neighbor. Declining to join Mawdud’s expeditions and sending 
only a small contingent would make available the large number of troops necessary 
for this purpose.  
Thus in 1112, the very year when Mawdud besieged Edessa in vain, Ilghazi 
succeeded in subjecting the cities of Bitlis and Arzan situated in the border area to 
the south of Akhlat.
98
 The lord of these cities at that time was Emir Husam al-Dawla 
Al-Tekin or Yeltigin (1085?-1113), coming from the long-lived Turkoman dynasty 
known as Dilmaçoğulları, who had been subjected to Sokman al-Qutbi since 1109. 
His son and heir Shams al-Dawla Toghan Arslan (1113-1134) began his career as a 
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vassal of Ilghazi and accompanied him in his subsequent campaigns against the 
Franks and Georgians.
99
  
Nevertheless, apart from these gains as well as the city of Harran previously 
granted by Mawdud, the area under Ilghazi’s control remained largely within its for-
mer bounds between 1110-1115. For during this period he had to dedicate most of 
his energies to the effort of preserving his position vis à vis the Seljukids and Franks.  
It was only in 1116, after the end of the Seljukid campaigns from Mosul that Ilghazi 
was able to resume the work of expanding his principality at the expense of his 
neighbors. In that year he seized eighty villages of Mayyafariqin from the weak Sel-
jukid governor of that city.
100
 
So the opportunity to make new territorial gains cannot be considered as the 
main reason for Ilghazi’s decision to remain at home either. As evident from the 
eventual abandonment of the expedition of 1111 by all emirs save Tughtekin, or 
again from the suspicions about the complicity of Tughtekin himself in Mawdud’s 
assassination in Damascus in 1113,
101
 the local emirs must have begun to realize that 
these almost yearly campaigns from Mosul were intended to curtail their freedom of 
action as much as that of the Franks, if not more. So it is all too understandable that 
Ilghazi, as one of the more powerful and ambitious amongst these emirs, should have 
soon preferred to stay aloof from the “Holy War” of the Seljukid governor. This was 
all the more so as two of Mawdud’s expeditions deliberately followed a more nor-
                                                 
99
 Adnan Çevik, “Selçuklular Zamanında Doğu ve Güneydoğu Anadolu’da Hüküm Sürmüş Bir Türk-
men Beyliği: Dilmaçoğulları,” Türklük Araştırmaları Dergisi 12 (2002), 130-31; Cahen, “Diyār 
Bakr,” 237. 
100
 Khalil, Al-Imarat al-Artuqiyya, 98, 219-20. 
101
 Ibn al-Qalanisi, Damascus Chronicle, 117 (504: 1110-1111); Ibn al-Athir, Chronicle, I, 157 (505: 
1111-1112), 163 (507: 1113-1114); Matthew of Edessa, Chronicle, 214 (III.63); Fulcher of Chartres, 
History, 211 (II.liii). 
 221 
therly route passing through Mardin on the way west, so that Ilghazi could be 
brought to heel.
102
 
This determination on the part of Ilghazi and other emirs of Syria and Diyar 
Bakr to preserve their de facto independence vis-à-vis the Seljukid sultan as well as 
to resist all efforts made through his governor in Mosul to bring them back to heel 
would have serious consequences for the degree of success attained against the 
Franks. Because Mawdud could not force these emirs into full obedience,
103
 whereas 
King Baldwin was more successful in assembling the Franks under his de facto lead-
ership,
104
 the achievement of the governor remained at a very modest level despite 
the sheer scale of the forces mobilized.
 
It was mostly restricted, as we shall see, to 
the effective devastation and depopulation of the trans-Euphratian lands of the Coun-
ty of Edessa, which left the city of Edessa as an isolated outpost in a hostile desert 
and opened the way for subsequent Turkoman invasions from Diyar Bakr. Signifi-
cantly, this was accomplished, in the first expedition, in which Ilghazi took part in 
person with the majority of his Turkomans, and the army remained intact up to the 
end.
105
 
However, there remains the fact that no decisive victory was achieved in 
these expeditions against the Franks, like the one that Ilghazi’s brother Sokman and 
Chakarmish of Mosul had scored in 1104. Indeed Sokman had played a chief role in 
that success, although his later dispute with Chakarmish and abrupt departure had 
probably thwarted the capture of Edessa. Ilghazi, in contrast, played nearly as im-
portant a role in Mawdud’s lack of success because of his eagerness for independ-
ence and territorial gain.            
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There is also a second line of argument that considers Ilghazi’s negative atti-
tutude toward Mawdud’s campaigns in the context of his personal relations with Sul-
tan Muhammad. Thus Grousset argues that the reason why Ilghazi did not want to 
join the expedition of 1111 in person was his irritation against the sultan for having 
dismissed him from the post of shihna of Baghdad in 1105.
106
 Similarly, Aydın Usta 
attributes Ilghazi’s failure to participate in the later expeditions to his resentment 
against the Seljukid sultan.
107
 Of course this interpretation begs the question why he 
did take part in the first expedition.  
Carole Hillenbrand offers a more sophisticated explanation designed to ac-
count for such inconsistencies in Ilghazi’s attitude. According to her, Ilghazi had in-
deed resented the preferment of Mawdud over himself as the new governor of Mosul. 
But trusting the exemplary attitude he had displayed during the years following his 
dismissal from Baghdad, he still harbored some hope that he would finally be re-
stored to the favor of the sultan. She argues that it was this indecision that lay behind 
the ambiguous attitude of Ilghazi, who withdrew from the first expedition and re-
frained from the second, but did not go so far in his opposition as to refuse to send a 
detachment.
108
  
But this explanation does not seem entirely convincing either. After his sup-
port of Sultan Barkyaruk’s son against Muhammad, and consequent dismissal from 
Baghdad,
109
 Ilghazi could scarcely have continued to harbor serious expectations 
about being appointed to such an important post as the governor of Mosul. Even if he 
harbored some hopes, it is unlikely that these would have been strong enough to ren-
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der him so disappointed as to make him change his policy toward the sultan when the 
latter did not fulfil them. Nor would they be strong enough as lasting remnants to 
prevent him from showing outright hostility after the preferment of Mawdud. It 
seems advisable therefore to be wary against such explanations of a personal, psy-
chological nature, and to stick instead with the more straightforward, strategical one: 
apparently, Ilghazi was concerned about the serious prospect that the sultan’s army 
might curtail his independence and even attempt to seize his possessions. He must 
have perceived that under these conditions both full obedience and full hostility to 
Mawdud would be dangerous, and therefore preferred to adopt an equivocal attitude. 
This attitude to Seljukid expeditions was to turn into outright hostility, as we shall 
see in the next chapter, when Ilghazi became rightly convinced that he was a direct 
target of the campaigns following Mawdud’s death.  
4.4.3 The course of events 
The foregoing considerations allow for the following reconstruction of 
Mawdud’s first expedition and Ilghazi’s role in it: in 1110 the Seljukid Sultan in-
structed his governor in Mosul and his loyal emir Sokman al-Qutbi to undertake an 
expedition against the Franks. However, the aim of the campaign was not only to 
push back the advance of the Franks but also to bring the local Muslim emirs under 
the sultan’s control, as these had made considerable advances toward de facto inde-
pendence during the intervening period of interregnum. Once the emirs were assem-
bled, and Ilghazi himself was persuaded to participate by the grant of Harran, they 
invaded the trans-Euphratean lands of the County of Edessa. Edessa itself was be-
sieged, but the Muslim forces mainly tried to blockade it into starvation rather than to 
take it by storm, despite some attacks they made to provoke Count Baldwin into a 
sortie.  
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When King Baldwin received the news from Joscelin of Tell Bashir, he set 
out with the latter as well as Bertrand of Tripoli. On the way he took along the Ar-
menian princes in the region, and before crossing the Euphrates was joined by a re-
luctant and resentful Tancred who had come under pressure from his retinue. On see-
ing their approach the Muslims withdrew from Edessa to Harran. Their immediate 
purpose in this maneuver was to avoid being trapped between the relief army and the 
garrison of Edessa. Strategically, they planned to wait until the Franks would be 
worn down and forced to depart through the depletion of their provisions, for the 
Muslims had already entirely devastated the region by this time. In the meanwhile, 
they would also be on the lookout for an opportunity to attack the Franks, if possible 
after having lured them into Muslim territory nearby. But the maneuver simply ena-
bled the Franks to reach Edessa and provision it with the food they had brought from 
beyond the Euphrates. The Muslims, bent on drawing them into a trap, set up an am-
bush in Harran and withdrew further south. But after an initial pursuit the Franks 
turned away from the trap and laid siege to the nearby castle of Shinaw instead.  
The siege was cut short, however, and the Franks suddenly began withdraw-
ing towards the Euphrates. The reason for this might have been the depletion of their 
provisions and forage in the devastated area. But the haste and abruptness of the re-
treat also suggest that this was due to a discord that developed between the princes of 
Antioch and Edessa, who had been at loggerheads since the Battle of Harran in 1104. 
Baldwin and Joscelin may have plotted against Tancred to eliminate him while he 
was within their reach. When Tancred, in reaction, separated with his troops from the 
main army, the rest had to follow him to the river in order not to be caught divided. 
As the news of this unexpected retreat reached the Armenian inhabitants and refu-
gees in Edessa, they grew apprehensive of being abandoned to the mercy of the Mus-
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lim invaders and sought refuge in the company of the Franks, following them from 
behind. Mawdud was informed by one or two Frankish betrayers about this hasty 
withdrawal of the Franks and Armenian civilians towards the Euphrates, and turning 
to pursuit, caught up with them by the riverbank. Most of the Frankish army had 
crossed over by this time, but then the few boats and rafts available had sunk under 
the excessive load, leaving the five thousand Armenians and some Frankish footmen 
stranded on the eastern bank. These were all massacred in sight of the Franks who 
watched helplessly from the opposite bank.  
Following this the two armies remained encamped against each other for 
some time. Then the Franks set out for home and the Muslims went back to resume 
the siege of Edessa, now that the relief army had departed, but they were eventually 
forced to abandon the siege of the city because of the preceding replenishment of its 
provisions and the depletion of their own. By the end of the expedition the rivalry 
between Sokman al-Qutbi and Ilghazi for supremacy in eastern Asia Minor erupted 
into a quarrel, perhaps partly because of Mawdud’s concession of Harran to Ilghazi 
as a reward for his participation. After the ensuing clash, in which Sokman may have 
atacked Harran, Ilghazi escaped from that town to Mardin, while his nephew Belek 
was taken prisoner.  
Ilghazi did not take part in Mawdud’s subsequent expeditions. The immediate 
reasons for this were initially his quarrel with Sokman al-Qutbi, and later his eager-
ness to take advantage of Sokman’s death in order to expand his territory. The essen-
tial reason, however, was his determination to preserve his de facto independence 
from the Seljukid sultan and his governor in Mosul. But being unwilling to provoke 
them further, he agreed to send a detachment under his son for Mawdud’s subsequent 
campaigns. The bulk of his forces thus became available for operations elsewhere, 
 226 
and he initially used these for an attempt to destroy Sokman’s troops as they returned 
home with their master’s coffin after the campaign in 1111. Then, in the following 
year, he deprived Sokman’s heir of the suzerainty of Bitlis and Arzan. It is signifi-
cant that in the same year, 1112, Mawdud had had to besiege Edessa on his own, 
without success. But Ilghazi’s territorial gains remained modest during these years, 
and he mainly occupied himself with trying to preserve his position vis-à-vis the 
Franks and the Seljukids by pursuing equivocal policies he deemed suited for this 
purpose.  
4.4.4 The consequences of the expeditions 
The other local emirs did not differ from Ilghazi in their willingness to pre-
serve their newly found independence and eagerness to make new gains. Although 
unlike him they did join Mawdud’s army at the start, they frequently abandoned him 
in the course of these campaigns and prevented them from reaching the goals set. As 
a result the first campaign of 1110, in which Ilghazi took part with the bulk of his 
Turkomans and the army remained intact until the end, remained the most succesful 
one in terms of lasting consequences. Although it could score no critical victory as in 
1104, the widespread devastation and depopulation it caused in the trans-Euphratean 
lands of the County considerably weakened this region in economic, demographic 
and military terms. The inflicted damages reduced the revenues available for the 
County and led to serious internal divisions, between the Armenians and Franks on 
the one hand and Baldwin and his vassal Joscelin on the other hand. Most of the 
Franks in the County flocked to Joscelin’s still intact and prosperous cis-Euphratean 
lands, with the result that Edessa was reduced to an isolated outpost in hostile territo-
ry and the doors were opened wide for Turkoman intrusions from Diyar Bakr.  
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Ilghazi had adopted a cautious, equivocal policy during the expeditions of 
Mawdud, but as we shall see in the next chapter his attitude would turn to one of out-
right hostility in the following campaigns launched by the sultan. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ILGHAZI: COMMITTED MEMBER OF THE ANTI-SELJUKID 
ALLIANCE WITH THE FRANKS 
Mawdud was murdered in Damascus following his last campaign in 1113, 
possibly with the complicity of Tughtekin who had begun to fear for his independ-
ence.
1
 This did not dissuade the sultan from continuing his efforts to subjugate the 
local emirs in Syria and Jazira through campaigns that were ostensibly against the 
Franks. On the contrary, he dispatched to the west two more expeditions in 1114 and 
1115, led respectively by Aksungur al-Bursuki, Mawdud’s successor in Mosul, and 
Bursuk ibn Bursuk, the lord of Hamadhan. Bringing the local emirs to heel was now 
the primary aim of these campaigns, the first of which directly targeted Ilghazi him-
self. Ilghazi’s reaction was correspondingly harsh, gathering his family to inflict a 
crushing defeat on Aksungur’s army. Against the retaliatory second campaign he 
made common cause with Tughtekin, the rulers of Aleppo and the Franks. The result 
was the defeat of Bursuk’s army and the end of this series of Seljukid expeditions. 
                                                 
1
 For the most unequivocal and detailed assertion of this claim see Matthew of Edessa, Armenia and 
the Crusades, Tenth to Twelfth Centuries: the Chronicle of Matthew of Edessa, translated by Ara Ed-
mond Dostourian (Lanham, New York, London, 1993), 214 (III.63). 
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The present chapter will consider these two campaigns and question whether there 
was a fundamental change in Ilghazi’s attitude toward the Franks at this point.  
5.1 The perspectives of the sources  
5.1.1 Ibn al-Athir 
Among the Arabic sources the most complete account of the Seljukid expedi-
tions of 1114 and 1115 comes from Ibn al-Athir.
2 
At the beginning of his account he 
notes that the Seljukid sultan Muhammad Tapar appointed Emir Aksungur al-
Bursuki to Mosul and ordered him to fight the Franks, also dispatching his young son 
Mas‘ud to him “at the head of a vast army.” As in the case of Mawdud’s expeditions, 
which had amongst their most important aims the rallying of the local emirs under 
the Seljukid banner, all of these emirs “were instructed by letter that they should 
obey Aksungur.” Among those who joined Aksungur in Mosul Ibn al-Athir mentions 
Tamirak, the lord of Sinjar, and Imad al-Din Zangi, the founder of the dynasty of at-
abeks in Mosul, whose descendants went to rule Mosul right up to the time of Ibn al 
Athir himself. Having worked for long years under the patronage of this house, Ibn 
al-Athir does not neglect to remark that Zangi, still a young man at this time, “was 
valiant in the extreme.”   
Ibn al-Athir states that Aksungur, setting out from Mosul with these emirs, 
and taking over Jazirat ibn Umar (Cizre) from Mawdud’s deputy, advanced to Mar-
din. But we learn from Ibn Shaddad
3
 that before arriving at Mardin Aksungur be-
                                                 
2
 Ibn al-Athir, El-Kâmil fi’t-Tarih Tercümesi, translated by A. Özaydın, A. Ağırakça et al., 12 vols. 
(İstanbul 1987), X, 399-401, 405-07 and The Chronicle of Ibn al-Athir for the Crusading Period from 
al-Kamil fi’l-Tarikh, Part 1, translated by D. S. Richards (Aldershot, 2006), 166-68, 172-74 (508: 
1114-1115 and 509: 1115-1116). 
3
 Ibn Shaddad, al-A‘laq al-Hatira, the Jazira section, manuscript f. 17 a-b, cited in Imad al-Din Khalil, 
Al-Imarat al-Artuqiyya fi’l-Jazira wa’l-Sham (Beirut, 1980), 228 and Gerhard Väth, Die Geschichte 
der artukidischen Fürstentümer in Syrien und der Ğazira’l-Furatiya (Berlin, 1987), 70. 
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sieged Harran, which had belonged to Ilghazi since 1110: advancing from Jazirat ibn 
Umar via Nisibis and Ra’s al-Ain to Harran, he waited for the Artukid troops to join 
him there, but receiving no response to his repeated demands for their participation, 
he laid siege to the town. Upon this Ilghazi’s governor established contact with 
Baldwin du Bourg to summon the Franks of Edessa to his aid, but the Muslim popu-
lace of the town and some of the functionaries got wind of his intentions. They urged 
Aksungur to go to attack and, rebelling against the governor, helped the sultan’s ar-
my get hold of the town. Nevertheless, even the capture of Harran did not prove suf-
ficient to persuade Ilghazi to send his troops. So Ibn al-Athir reports that Aksungur 
marched against Mardin and besieged it until Ilghazi finally gave in and contributed 
a contingent under his son Ayaz.  
Claude Cahen reverses the order of the sieges of Harran and Mardin: alt-
hough Ilghazi agreed to send along a detachment when he was besieged in Mardin, 
the scholar states, “his subordination was perhaps still not profound, for when Ak-
sungur arrived before Harran, which belonged to Ilghazi, the governor refused to let 
him pass for a long time and even intrigued with the Franks.”4 However, it does not 
sound plausible that the governor of the town could have been in a position to deny 
passage to Aksungur’s huge army. So although the relative positions of Mardin and 
Harran on the way west might seem to support Cahen’s version at first sight, on clos-
er consideration the following course of events seems more plausible: Ilghazi’s 
troops had still not joined Aksungur’s army by the time it arrived before Harran, and 
when repeated demands for their arrival met with no response, Aksungur chose to 
besiege that town as the nearest of Ilghazi’s possessions. But even its capture did not 
                                                 
4
 Claude Cahen, La Syrie du Nord au temps de Croisades et la Principauté Franque d’Antioche (Paris, 
1940), 270. Also see his “Diyār Bakr au temps des premiers Urtukids,” Journal Asiatique 227 (1935), 
235.  
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break Ilghazi’s resistance, so Aksungur was compelled to return east and lay siege to 
Mardin before the emir could be brought to heel.
5
 
From Mardin the army proceeded to Edessa, Ibn al-Athir relates, with a cav-
alry of 15,000, and laid siege to it during the month of Dhu’l-Hijja (28 April – 26 
May 1114). Although the siege went on for more than two months, no result could be 
achieved because of the stout resistance of the Franks. When the supplies of the Mus-
lim army were depleted at the end of this period, they moved onto Samosata, laying 
waste the lands of that town as well as of Edessa and Saruj. After receiving the alle-
giance of the Armenian lord of Mar‘ash here, Aksungur returned to the region of 
Shabakhtan, where he placed Ayaz ibn Ilghazi under arrest. He then proceeded to 
ravage the agricultural lands there. Ibn al-Athir states that the reason for these 
measures was Ilghazi’s failure to have participated in the campaign. Basing himself 
on this statement, Väth suggests that Aksungur made Ilghazi a scapegoat for the fail-
ure of the siege of Edessa and indeed of the entire expedition, notwithstanding the 
subjection of some relatively small fortresses like Mar‘ash, Kaisun and Ra‘ban.6 
But if this was so, an important question emerges: why did Aksungur choose 
to undertake such measures, whereas Mawdud before him, although not more suc-
cessful against the Franks, had contented himself with the detachment under Ayaz 
and avoided any attempt to punish Ilghazi for his attitude? A reason might be the 
previous hostility of Aksungur and Ilghazi, stemming from the replacement of one by 
the other as shihna of Baghdad. Another reason could be Ilghazi’s initial refusal even 
to dispatch his son Ayaz, eventually doing so only under the compulsion of a siege. 
                                                 
5
 In his article on Ilghazi’s deeds Ali Sevim misleadingly states that Ilghazi did not reject Aksungur’s 
call to participate in the campaign against the Crusaders but contented himself with sending a few 
troops under his son Ayaz. He fails to mention the fact that Ilghazi was persuaded to send even that 
contingent only after Aksungur had placed considerable pressure on him by besieging Harran and then 
Mardin. Ali Sevim, “Artuk Oğlu İlgazi,” Belleten 26 (1962), 666. 
6
 Väth, Geschichte, 71. 
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As we shall see, moreover, Michael the Syrian claims that Ilghazi established contact 
with the Franks against the sultan’s army and it was upon learning of this treachery 
that Aksungur suddenly grew so aggressive against the emir. However, the most im-
portant reason might be that Aksungur had received specific instructions from the 
sultan to bring Ilghazi to heel at all costs. Indeed the sultan’s choice of this enemy of 
Ilghazi as the new governor of Mosul may have been no simple coincidence.
7
 
Far from bringing Ilghazi to heel, Aksungur’s attack rendered him still more 
adamant in his defiance of the sultan’s authority. In particular, Shabakhtan was in-
dispensable for the agricultural production of the emirate of Mardin, and Ilghazi 
could not just sit back and watch it being devastated without undertaking any action.
8
 
Accordingly, Ibn al-Athir relates, Ilghazi went to Hisn Kaifa to ask for aid from his 
nephew Dawud ibn Sokman, who joined him at the head of a mighty host of Turko-
mans. Marching against Aksungur and the Seljukid army, the Artukids succeeded in 
defeating them in a fierce battle in which all held firm, and released Ayaz from cap-
tivity. Now Ilghazi was in a state of open rebellion against the sultan, from whom he 
received letters of threat. Fearful of retribution, he went to stay for some days with 
Tughtekin of Damascus, his father-in-law. Tughtekin had good reason on his part to 
fear
9
 the sultan, who charged him with the assassination of Mawdud. Ibn al-Athir 
states without comment that in view of this situation “Tughtekin and Ilghazi agreed 
to defend themselves as well as to have recourse to the Franks and seek protection
10
 
from them. They made overtures to the lord of Antioch and allied with him.” Ibn al-
Athir reveals his personal opinion about the alliance further on, at the beginning of 
his account of Bursuk ibn Bursuk’s campaign, where he reminds his readers of “the 
                                                 
7
 This issue will be discussed at length in section 4.4. 
8
 Väth, Geschichte, 71. 
9
 For istawḥasha min al-sulṭān, al-Kamil fi’l-Ta’rikh (Beirut: Dar Sadir, 1965-1967), X, 502, instead 
of “had fallen out of favor with the sultan,” as in the English translation. 
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rebellion that Ilghazi and Tughtekin made against the sultan and how the Franks 
grew powerful.” Meeting by Lake Qadas near Hims, the two emirs and the prince of 
Antioch renewed their oaths. Ilghazi then headed to Diyar Bakr in order to muster 
Turkomans before returning to Syria.      
Ilghazi’s plans were thwarted however, when, stopping for a rest by al-
Rastan, he was surprised by Khir Khan ibn Karaja, the lord of Hims, while the 
Artukid troops were in a scattered condition, and imprisoned along with several of 
his retinue. Ibn al-Athir does not indicate the fact that the emir was in a state of in-
toxication when this happened, which we learn from Ibn al-Qalanisi. The reason for 
this attack was that Khir Khan, unlike his father and predecessor Karaja, did not want 
to accept Tughtekin’s suzerainty.11 Accordingly, he was trying to use the Seljukid 
expeditions as a lever with which to secure his independence from Damascus. Cap-
turing Tughtekin’s ally Ilghazi at a time when the two were joined in open rebellion 
against the sultan’s authority had probably appeared to him as good way to realize 
this aim. Sending a message to the sultan, he informed him about Ilghazi’s capture 
and requested him to quickly send his troops before Tughtekin could recover Ilghazi 
by force. Indeed Tughtekin did not take long to appear before Hims, demanding 
Ilghazi’s release, but he had to return empty-handed when Khir Khan showed him-
self determined to shed Ilghazi’s blood unless he withdrew quickly.  
But the sultan’s troops were still not in sight, and Ibn al-Athir states that Khir 
Khan grew concerned lest his men should be corrupted by Tughtekin and deliver the 
city to him. Giving up his previous plans, therefore, he consented to a settlement with 
Ilghazi on the condition that he would free him, take his son Ayaz as a hostage, and 
wed him with his daughter, while Ilghazi would repay him by protecting him from 
                                                                                                                                          
10
 For iḥtima’, al-Kamil fi’l-Ta’rikh, X, 502, instead of “support,” as in the English translation. 
11
 Cahen, Syrie du Nord, 272. 
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Tughtekin and others. Appearing to agree with these conditions, Ilghazi handed over 
his son and left Hims once they had sworn mutual oaths. Immediately thereupon he 
went back on his word however, and collecting Turkomans from Aleppo,
12
 returned 
with them to besiege Hims. His purpose was to force Khir Khan to release his son. 
But he had to break off the siege upon the arrival of the new Seljukid army led by 
Bursuk ibn Bursuk, lord of Hamadhan. Although the commander of this expedition, 
differently from the previous ones, was from far east and south, the basic forces still 
originated from Mosul.    
Ibn al-Athir indicates that the sultan, having heard of the rebellion of 
Tughtekin and Ilghazi, had formed a new army out of the troops of Mosul and the 
Jazira and placed Bursuk at its head, along with others like Emir Juyush Bey and 
Emir Gundoghdi. Their orders were “first of all to engage Ilghazi and Tughtekin and, 
when they had dealt with them, to march into Frankish territory, wage war on them 
and besiege their cities.”13 As Hillenbrand observes, the order of priorities here is not 
without significance.
14
 As it turned out, however, after the sultan’s emirs set out in 
February 1115, they directly crossed the Euphrates and marched against Aleppo. 
They ordered Lu’lu’ the Eunuch, the effective ruling authority, and Shams al-
Khawass, the commander of the local troops, to hand over the city to them, produc-
ing the letters of the sultan to this effect. But delaying them with a deceitful answer, 
Lu’lu’ and Shams al-Khawass sent for help to Ilghazi and Tughtekin, who succeeded 
in entering the city with two thousand horsemen. Now that they were strengthened 
                                                 
12
 The fact that Ilghazi could muster Turkoman troops from Aleppo seems to reveal that already by 
this time Badr al-Din Lu’lu’ of Aleppo had joined Ilghazi and Tughtekin in the alliance against the 
Seljukids. 
13
 For hasarū bilādahum, al-Kamil fi’l-Ta’rikh, X, 508, instead of “harass their lands,” as in the Eng-
lish translation. 
14
 Carole Hillenbrand, “The History of the Jazira, 1100-1150,” Unpublished PhD Dissertation  (Edin-
burgh University, 1979), 130. 
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by this reinforcement, the defenders of Aleppo went into open rebellion and turned 
down the demands of the army outside.  
In retaliation, Bursuk moved to Tughtekin’s city Hama, where the latter’s 
baggage was deposited, and after storming and sacking it, delivered it to Khir Khan, 
who gave him Ayaz ibn Ilghazi in return. For the sultan had commanded that every 
town they were to capture should be turned over to Khir Khan. Nikita Elisséeff sug-
gests that the purpose behind this command was to reinforce Khir Khan’s position 
against Aleppo and Damascus as well as against the Franks who coveted his fortress 
Hims.
15
 As Grousset observes, another reason was probably that after Bursuk had 
been deprived of the support base of Aleppo, he could only rely upon Khir Khan and 
the Banu Munqidh of Shaizar, these latter threatened by both Aleppo and Antioch.
16
 
Thus Khir Khan’s plan of securing his independence against Tughtekin by loyally 
serving the sultan had  turned out to be an even more fruitful policy than he could 
have expected. But the sultan’s command alienated the other emirs and perhaps con-
tributed to the eventual failure of the expedition. For “seeing this,” observes Ibn al-
Athir, “the emirs became dispirited and their purpose faltered, inasmuch as the towns 
were being taken and handed over to Khir Khan.”17 Why should they bother to take 
cities on his behalf when they had no hope of gaining anything therefrom?  
Ibn al-Athir notes that by this time Ilghazi, Tughtekin and Shams al-Khawass 
had proceeded from Aleppo to Antioch, in order to seek the protection of its lord 
                                                 
15
 Nikita Elisséeff, Nur ad-Din: Un Grand Prince Musulman de Syrie au Temps de Croisades (Da-
mascus, 1967), II, 312. 
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 René Grousset, Histoire des Croisades et du Royaume Franc de Jérusalem, 3 vols. (Paris, 1934-
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 The English translation for bihaythu tu’akhkhadhu al-bilādu wa tusallamu ilā Khīr Khān reads “in-
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Roger. They also intended to ask for his help to defend Hama, as they were still un-
aware of its fall. The allies were joined there by King Baldwin, the count of Tripoli, 
and “other Frankish devils” as the chronicler calls them. Considering the great num-
bers of the Muslim army and believing that it would disperse by the beginning of 
winter, they decided to avoid battle, and so remained by the fortress of Apamea for 
about two months. Ibn al-Athir seems unaware of the temporary retreat of Bursuk 
reported by the other sources, for he writes that the Frankish allies disbanded in mid-
September when they saw that the sultan’s troops intended to stay. Nevertheless, it 
would hardly have been sensible for them to disband with the huge Seljukid army in 
their territory, allowing it to roam freely and lay sieges without a counterbalancing 
force. So they must have disbanded supposing that the Seljukid army was gone for 
good, as the other sources attest, with the result that the Seljukid general, on return-
ing from his probably tactical retreat, found himself free to act as he liked.   
The first step taken by the Seljukid army under these conditions was to be-
siege Kafartab. “When the blockade intensified and the Franks saw destruction fac-
ing them,” Ibn al-Athir relates, “they slew their women and children and burnt their 
possessions.” All those remaining were killed, including the lord of the town, when 
the Muslims made a forced entry into it. Their next goal was Apamea, but perceiving 
it to be strongly defended, they proceeded to Ma‘arrat al-Nu‘man, also a Frankish 
possession; here Juyush Bey parted from the main army to take control of the Butnan 
valley. Intending to settle accounts with Aleppo, now that Ilghazi and Tughtekin had 
returned home, the Seljukid army set out for that city next. Their baggage and 
mounts were going before them, as was the normal practice, while the troops fol-
lowed from behind; as these “felt secure, not imagining that anyone would dare to 
                                                                                                                                          
the ardor of his lieutenants who saw themselves frustrated beforehand of the eventual profit of the 
campaign.” 
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approach them,” they were marching in disorder. The men going ahead had pitched 
the tents and were waiting for the fighting men to arrive, but it was the troops of An-
tioch that arrived instead. For Prince Roger, on hearing the siege of Kafartab, had set 
out with an army of five hundred knights and two thousand infantry and come across 
the Muslim baggage without any previous knowledge of its whereabouts. Perceiving 
the tents to be devoid of troops, he set about plundering their tents as well as killing 
the camp followers and army pages. When the Muslim troops began to arrive, still in 
disorder, they were cut down as well.   
Ibn al-Athir proceeds to relate that Bursuk arrived at the head of a hundred 
horsemen, and seeing the spectacle, climbed a nearby hill with his brother Zangi ibn 
Bursuk. Here they were surrounded and prevented from descending by some of the 
camp followers and pages seeking refuge by their side. Although advised by his 
brother and others to go down and save his life, Bursuk reportedly made a heroic 
declaration of the kind that we saw Ibn al-Athir attribute to Sokman ibn Ilghazi: “I 
shall not do so. I shall be slain on the path of God and be a sacrifice for the Mus-
lims.” Nevertheless, he was eventually persuaded to give up this intention, and made 
his escape along with his retinue. They were pursued for about a league by the 
Franks, who then returned to complete the plunder and slaughtering. The rest of the 
Muslim army was scattered along different routes of escape. Ibn al-Athir notes that 
the Frankish prisoners taken in Kafartab were massacred in retaliation, and Ayaz ibn 
Ilghazi was executed as well for the same reason. Following this, the Muslim troops 
retired to their own lands.        
Before concluding his account, Ibn al-Athir offers a description of how he 
thought the Muslim population reacted to the defeat of the Seljukid army: “The 
population of Aleppo and other Muslim towns in Syria were fearful. They had been 
 238 
hoping for aid and a victory
18
 from this army, but what they had not reckoned with
19
 
befell them.” This testimony of Ibn al-Athir has been challeged by Grousset, who 
argues that the historian is misleading “when he pretends that the inhabitants of 
Aleppo and other Muslim cities were in consternation.” He continues, not entirely 
without justification: “Ibn al-Athir often brings into the history of the first half of the 
twelfth century an ‘Ayyubid mentality’ which falsifies its meaning. A panislamism 
in the manner of Saladin, a sentiment of Muslim unity, were very indifferent con-
cepts for the Turco-Arab feodality of 1115.” He points out in addition that shortly 
before this passage Ibn al-Athir had shown “the Aleppans and Damascenes raising 
the standard of revolt against the sultan and fraternizing with the Franks.” This is 
probably a reference to the passage relating how Lu’lu’, Shams al-Khawass, 
Tughtekin and Ilghazi had defied Bursuk’s demands to deliver the city. Grousset 
goes even so far as to assert that the Frankish victory “saved the Muslims of Syria as 
well as the Franks.”20  
The problem with Grousset’s line of argument is that he utterly fails to distin-
guish between “the Turco-Arab feodality of 1115” on the one hand, and the Muslim 
population at large on the other; between the emirs of Aleppo and Damascus on the 
one hand, and the resident population of these cities on the other. What Ibn al-Athir’s 
statement implies in fact is that the Muslim population in Syria disagreed strongly 
with the policy of Tughtekin, Ilghazi and the Aleppan rulers against the Seljukid ar-
my. This is quite plausible, since the prospect of a Frankish conquest was only too 
real for the common folk who had nothing to gain from it and so wished to see seri-
ous resistance put up against the Frankish advance. However, the policy of the emirs 
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19
 For ma lam yakun fī’l-ḥasāb, al-Kamil fi’l-Ta’rikh, X, 511, instead of “counted upon,” as in the 
English translation. 
20
 Grousset, Histoire, I, 510-11. 
 239 
reduced the chances of realizing this to naught, causing them serious concern. For 
while the replacement of a local emir with a Seljukid governor would have amounted 
to little or no change for the Muslim population at large, this could not be asserted 
with equal confidence for the replacement of Muslim by Frankish rule, especially 
insofar as the townsfolk were concerned. It suffices to remember in this connection 
how the Muslim populace of Harran rebelled against Ilghazi’s governor who collud-
ed with the Franks against Aksungur.  
For the local emirs, in contrast, the situation was quite otherwise. These re-
garded the prospect of losing their city to the Seljukids no differently than losing it to 
the Franks, and accordingly resisted both dangers as well as they could. They allied 
with the Franks when the Seljukid threat proved too strong, and abandoned that alli-
ance as well when the Franks grew too powerful in turn.   
Ibn al-Athir ends his account by noting the death of Bursuk and his brother 
Zangi in the year 510 (1116-1117), stating that “Bursuk was a good, pious man.” He 
adds that the emir was “full of remorse for this defeat and was preparing to make a 
repeat expedition when his appointed time came.”  
5.1.2 Ibn al-Qalanisi 
Rather surprisingly, no proper account of either of the Seljukid campaigns in 
1114 and 1115 is found in the chronicle of the contemporary author Ibn al-Qalanisi. 
Eager as ever to cover up the inconvenient facts that might have tarnished his lord 
Tughtekin’s reputation as a zealous mujahid and as the unifier of the Muslims against 
the “infidel,” this chronicler singularly fails to make mention of the Franko-Muslim 
alliance in which we saw the atabek play a prominent part along with Ilghazi.  
The only agreement between the Franks and Muslims around this time that 
Ibn al-Qalanisi mentions is a peace treaty made between Tughtekin and King Bald-
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win.
21
 We shall see Albert of Aachen state that the two rulers were bound with oaths, 
and Ibn al-Qalanisi’s report might be related to that pact. Alternatively, it might per-
tain to the agreement that Tughtekin and Ilghazi concluded with the prince of Anti-
och after Ilghazi’s arrival at Damascus, as related by Ibn al-Athir. More probably, it 
may be referring to the oaths of peace and alliance sworn at Apamea between the 
Turkish and Frankish leaders including Baldwin I, as we shall see some Christian 
sources relate. But in any case the chronicler represents this agreement merely as a 
simple truce that Tughtekin concluded to secure the safety of the region and enable 
the resumption of agricultural production. Neither Ilghazi nor the sultan nor the 
prince of Antioch find any mention in the report.  
  Although Ibn al-Qalanisi thus passes over Ilghazi’s presence and complicity 
in the alliance with the Franks, he does mention how he fell captive to Khir Khan ibn 
Karaja;
22
 as we know from Ibn al-Athir, this was an event that took place while 
Ilghazi was returning to Diyar Bakr after the conclusion of the alliance. Ibn al-
Qalanisi also reveals certain unsavory details of the incident that show Ilghazi in a 
quite negative light. In contrast to Ibn al-Athir, who denoted al-Rastan (13 km north 
of Hims) as the place where Ilghazi fell captive, Ibn al-Qalanisi states that the event 
took place before Hims itself, and indicates the date as January 1115. “Now when 
Najm al-Din drank wine and it got the better of him,” he explains, “he habitually re-
mained for several days in a state of intoxication, without recovering his senses suf-
ficiently to take control or to be consulted on any matter or decision.” That Ilghazi 
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indeed had such a habit is supported by the testimony of Usama ibn Munqidh, who 
reports a similar period of intoxication that the emir underwent after the Battle of 
Ager Sanguinis some years later.
23
 Khir Khan was also aware of this “disgraceful 
habit and unexampled heedlessness in him,” Ibn al-Qalanisi affirms, and upon learn-
ing that Ilghazi was in such a state again, he made a surprise attack, caught him, and 
carried him back into the town. The reason behind Ibn al-Qalanisi telling such a sto-
ry, whether true or not, might be the implicit rivalry between the Artukid and his lord 
Tughtekin, as we shall see him assign the chief role in the future victories of the two 
emirs to the atabek and attribute their failures to his absence from the field.    
Ibn al-Qalanisi diverges from Ibn al-Athir also in his account of how Ilghazi 
was released: reportedly Tughtekin, receiving news of the event, wrote to Khir Khan 
to upbraid him and express his displeasure at the treatment he had accorded to Ilgha-
zi. Khir Khan’s attitude changed as a result, and he released Ilghazi only after a few 
days of detention.        
Thus Ibn al-Qalanisi conceals that Tughtekin went to Hims to secure the re-
lease of Ilghazi, but had to return with empty hands when Khir Khan threatened to 
execute his prisoner. Nor does he mention the fact that it was above all the Seljukid 
army’s delay that moved the lord of Hims to come to an agreement with Ilghazi. On 
the other hand, his emphasis on Tughtekin’s role is not entirely false either, because 
Khir Khan’s fear that the displeased atabek could corrupt his men was what eventu-
ally led him to abandon the idea of waiting for the sultan’s army. Behind this partial 
distortion may have been Ibn al-Qalanisi’s wish to cover up the fact that Khir Khan 
openly defied his lord Tughtekin and yielded in the end only for fear of his cunning. 
This was a situation that would hardly help him foster the image of the atabek as a 
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powerful and respected emir in Syria. Yet another motive of Ibn al-Qalanisi was per-
haps his unwillingness to make any mention at all about the Seljukid army under 
Bursuk ibn Bursuk, so that he could avoid revealing the role played by Tughtekin in 
the disaster that befell it. 
In keeping with his agenda of concealing this role of Tughtekin and repre-
senting him as an unexceptionable mujahid, Ibn al-Qalanisi attempts to attribute the 
alienation of the sultan from Tughtekin to the calumnies of certain emirs in his court. 
In a blatant reversal of the facts, he asserts that these emirs had grown “jealous” of 
Tughtekin  for his successes in jihad against the Franks. Having passed over Bur-
suk’s defeat in silence, he relates how Tughtekin recovered Rafaniya from the Franks 
(22 October 1115) and then declares: “The loins of the army were strengthened in the 
cause of the Holy War and the raiding [of the infidels].” In the same bombastic vein 
he continues: 
When the report was received abroad in the districts of Iraq and the court of 
the Sultan of the vigour and boldness with which God had endowed Zahir al-
Din Atabek in fighting against the abominable Franks and what He had grant-
ed him of victory over them and slaughter among them, in the defence of the 
people of Syria and warding off the Franks from them, and of his upright 
government over them, so that men blessed his name in the assemblies of the 
citizens and merchants and spoke of him with gratitude in the companies of 
traders from all ports, a number of high officers at the court of the Sultan 
Ghiyath al-Dunya wa’l-Din became jealous of him and sought to disparage 
and calumniate him, desiring to do him an injury, and with the design of 
thwarting his hopes and undermining his position with the sultan.24 
What these officers actually tried to do was probably nothing else than draw 
the sultan’s attention to the hostile policies that Tughtekin and Ilghazi had  been pur-
suing against the Seljukid court and its armies. At any rate, Ibn al-Qalanisi ends his 
account by relating how Tughtekin had to exonerate himself by travelling to Bagh-
dad in person. 
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5.1.3 Ibn al-Adim 
If Ibn al-Qalanisi thus disappoints us by withholding a full account of the Sel-
jukid expeditions from the perspective of Damascus, Ibn al-Adim compensates for 
this to a degree with his account of the expedition of Bursuk ibn Bursuk from the 
Aleppan perspective.
25
 He begins by stating that a split had developed by this time in 
the government of Aleppo: while Shams al-Khawass, the chief commander of the 
Aleppan army and administrator of military fiefs, conducted himself with moderation 
and wisdom, Badr al-Din Lu’lu’, formerly regent of Seljukid princes and currently 
the effective ruler, had entrenched himself in the citadel, from where he conducted 
affairs without ever going out. Ibn al-Adim claims that it was at Lu’lu’s instigation 
that Bursuk and his army were dispatched: “deceptively” sending a letter to the sul-
tan, he had promised to cede Aleppo as well as the treasures of Ridwan and his heirs. 
But when the sultan’s army arrived, he went back on his word and turned to 
Tughtekin of Damascus with the same promise. In return for the cession of Aleppo, 
he requested the atabek’s help against the Seljukids and a town in Aleppan territory 
for compensation.  
Given Lu’lu’s later firm collaboration with Ilghazi, Tughtekin and the Franks 
against the Seljukid army, and in consideration of the fact that the Artukids’ defeat of 
Aksungur was a sufficient reason by itself for the launch of Bursuk’s campaign, this 
imputation against Lu’lu’ does not seem plausible, even when his alleged rivalry 
with Shams al-Khawass is taken into account. Nevertheless, it is also possible that 
the story might have a grain of truth to it, although in a quite different connection and 
at a later stage of the expedition, as we shall see in the following discussion of Usa-
ma ibn Munqidh’s testimony.          
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Ibn al-Adim goes on to relate that Tughtekin accepted Lu’lu’s proposal and 
eagerly set out for Aleppo. When the news of his arrival reached the troops of the 
sultan, who were also on their way to Aleppo, they changed course and went instead 
to Hama. Having captured the town, they gave it to Khir Khan, along with the town 
of Rafaniya which they had received from the sons of Ali the Kurd. This information 
is reconcilable with Ibn al-Athir’s version, according to which the Aleppan rulers 
summoned Tughtekin and Ilghazi while they delayed the Seljukid army, and Bursuk 
was compelled by their arrival to turn around to Hama. Ibn al-Adim’s failure to men-
tion Ilghazi at this point may have been due to the fact that from the perspective of 
Syria the Artukid was still the emir of a distant province at this time, rather than an 
important local emir like Tughtekin. For the same reason most other accounts simi-
larly relegate Ilghazi to a secondary place, even failing to mention his name.       
Ibn al-Adim’s story of the Muslim allies’ request for help from the Franks is 
somewhat different from Ibn al-Athir’s version. Whereas the latter contended that 
this request was made to prevent Hama from being captured by the sultan’s army, as 
Tughtekin and Ilghazi had not yet learned of its fall, Ibn al-Adim explains it by 
Tughtekin’s fear that Bursuk would target Damascus next. Probably both motives 
played a part in their move. Taking along Shams al-Khawass and the Aleppan army, 
the two emirs joined forces with the Franks and marched with them to Apamea. In 
the meanwhile Bursuk advanced to the territory of Shaizar.  
At this point Ibn al-Adim lets drop a pithy but brilliant remark about the in-
tentions of Tughtekin, which no doubt applies to Ilghazi and the Aleppan rulers as 
well: “The atabek prevented the Franks from marching against the enemy, fearing 
that they would get hold of entire Syria if they emerged victorious, or that the army 
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of the sultan would occupy his possessions if the Franks were defeated.”26 This 
statement could well act as a key to grasp the whole import of the policies followed 
at the time by the local Muslim emirs, squeezed as they were between the Frankish 
and Seljukid onslaughts, and faced with the dilemma of either allying with the 
Franks and saving their possessions from the Seljukids, only to see these taken later 
by their “allies,” or vice versa.  
Ibn al-Adim does not explicitly speak of Bursuk’s retreat, but relates that the 
Seljukid army, growing weary of the protracted waiting, went to attack Hisn al-
Akrad and almost captured it. This report is corroborated by no other source, but Ibn 
al-Adim proceeds to state in parallel with the other accounts that the allied Franko-
Muslim army decided to disband after Bursuk’s departure. He also notes that Shams 
al-Khawass was arrested by Lu’lu’ upon his arrival in Aleppo. After reporting Bur-
suk’s return and capture of Kafartab, but without mentioning his unsuccesful siege of 
Apamea, Ibn al-Adim relates how the Seljukid troops advanced to the lands of 
Ma‘arrat al-Nu‘man. Here they spread in a false sense of security, preoccupying 
themselves with drinking and plunder, and bickered over the booty they had gath-
ered.  
At this point Ibn al-Adim reveals the reason why a detachment of the army 
led by Juyush Bey proceeded to the valley of Butnan and got hold of it, as Ibn al-
Athir reports and as Ibn al-Adim himself states further on, when noting this detach-
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ment’s return to join the defeated main army. Reportedly, a secret messenger from 
Shams al-Khawass arrived in the Seljukid camp, informing them that he had been 
imprisoned by Lu’lu’ and offering them his iqta‘, the valley of Butnan. Perhaps in an 
effort to rouse them still further, Shams al-Khawass added that Lu’lu’ inquired of the 
news about them and regularly supplied the Franks with this information. After 
Juyush Bey’s departure, Ibn al-Adim continues, the main army led by Bursuk and 
Jamidar (called Sungur Diraz by Usama ibn Munqidh), the lord of Rahba, set out for 
Aleppo, and on the morning of Tuesday, 23 Rabi‘ II (14 September 1115)27 arrived 
at Danith on their way.  
The troops had once again dispersed in Danith and immersed themselves in 
drinking and plunder, Ibn al-Adim states, when they were attacked from the direction 
of Jabal Summaq by the Franks. The latter had caught up with them thanks to the al-
most hourly information provided by Lu’lu’. Incapable of resistance, the Muslims 
were forced to flee towards Tell al-Sultan. Those trying to hide in the country were 
robbed and chased away by the peasants, who, along with the Frankish troops, took 
an immeasurabe quantity of booty from the goods, arms and equipment they had 
abandoned in flight. Despite this, Ibn al-Adim asserts, the losses remained at a mod-
est level: while no emir or other notable person had died, there were about five hun-
dred dead and just as many prisoners. The troops that had come together at Tell al-
Sultan, on the other hand, betook themselves in a disordered state to Naqira, where 
they pitched camp. Here, Ibn al-Adim relates, they were joined by Juyush Bey 
(whom he calls “Unba”, corrupting Juyush Bey’s Turkish name Uzba or Uzbak) as 
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well as his companions who had proceeded to Buza‘a before the main army. From 
Naqira the Seljukid troops returned home. Tughtekin, on his part, recovered Rafaniya 
from its Seljukids garrison and gave it to Shams al-Khawass, who had come to join 
him after his release by Lu’lu’.    
5.1.4 Usama ibn Munqidh 
Usama ibn Munqidh is another contemporary Muslim witness who mentions 
the expedition of Bursuk in his Kitab al-I‘tibar. The author’s purpose in this work 
was to offer edificatory and exemplary anecdotes based on his own experiences and 
observations rather than to provide full accounts of historical events. In the present 
case, for example, he touches upon Bursuk’s siege and capture of Kafartab in the 
context of a series of anecdotes meant to demonstrate the importance of individual 
feats of valor. One of these depicts a Turkish soldier who mounted the walls of the 
castle on his own and brought about its fall. But it is still possible to glean some cor-
robatory and additional details about the expedition from Usama’s writings. Among 
the emirs who joined Bursuk, he counts Amir-al-Juyush Uzba or Uzbak, the “Unba” 
in Ibn al-Adim’s account, who had replaced Aksungur as the governor of Mosul; 
Sungur Diraz, the “Jamidar” in Ibn al-Adim’s account, who was the lord of al-Rahba; 
the aforementioned emir Gundoghdi; Tamirak of Sinjar; Zangi ibn Bursuk, whom he 
calls “a veritable hero;” and two other emirs not mentioned by the other Muslim 
sources, al-Hajib al-Kabir Beytimur and Ismail al-Bekji.
28
 Usama indicates the date 
of the arrival of the sultan’s army before Hama as 19 Muharram 509 (13 June 1115).  
Touching upon the initial stage of the expedition, when the two armies 
camped at Apamea and Shaizar opposite each other, Usama reveals that Ilghazi came 
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there in the company of Robert of Zardana. He is also the only source besides Walter 
the Chancellor to report an attack carried out around this time by Tughtekin and 
some of the Frankish leaders against the castle of Hisn al-Jisr, which protected the 
lower town of Shaizar that was situated on the opposite bank of the citadel. This in-
cident will be discussed further on, in the analysis of Walter the Chancellor’s ac-
count.
29
  
As for the second stage of the expedition, when the Seljukid troops had re-
turned to the region after their  initial retreat and the disbanding of the Franko-
Muslim forces, Usama dwells at length on the siege and capture of Kafartab and the 
subsequent defeat of the Seljukid army. His testimony is that of a first-hand witness, 
for a detachment from Shaizar including Usama and led by his father had joined the 
army.
30
 Among other things, Usama reveals that the Frankish garrison in the castle 
was commanded by the two brothers of a certain Theophile.
31
 He relates how the 
troops from Khurasan began to dig a tunnel from inside the trench and the desperate 
Franks, having set fire to the buildings within the walls, remained clinging to the top 
of the castle. Then the Turkish troops mounted the walls in great numbers, led by a 
brave individual who, as the protagonist of the story, serves Usama to illustrate his 
point about the worth of individual valor. Thereupon the remaining Franks surren-
dered the castle and were taken as captives to Bursuk’s tents. Usama gives the date 
of the capitulation of Kafartab as Friday, 12 Rabi‘ II (3 September 1115).32 
  While Usama himself remained behind at Kafartab to guard it until it could 
be rebuilt, and was busy bringing out the captives from the castle, his father had 
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joined the main army that proceeded to Tell Danith. “By the decree of Allah,” Usama 
says, “[our troops] were surprised to meet early Tuesday morning, 23 Rabi II (14 
September 1115), the army of Antioch. The Emir al-Sayyid was killed, together with 
a large body of Muslims.” Usama’s father himself lost all the tents, loads, mules, 
camels and baggage he had in the process, and his army was dispersed. Usama’s 
mention of the death of Emir al-Sayyid seems to give the lie to Ibn al-Adim’s claim 
that no noteworthy person had died in the debacle. But otherwise his personal, first-
hand testimony corroborates the accounts of Ibn al-Athir and Ibn al-Adim; it affirms 
that on an early Tuesday morning at Tell Danith the Seljukid army was taken by sur-
prise and scattered by the army of Antioch, while all the equipment and baggage they 
had abandoned in flight were plundered. Usama’s father went back to Kafartab to 
collect his son and others, and like the other survivors who disbanded and went 
home, he returned to Shaizar. Usama notes that Kafartab itself was rebuilt and re-
populated by the Franks after their departure. 
Usama offers his own version of why the Muslim army was surprised by the 
Antiochene army, attributing it in the first place to Lu’lu’s collaboration with the 
Franks. This is in keeping with the explanation of Ibn al-Adim, who stated that 
Lu’lu’ was informing the Franks hour by hour on the movements of the Seljukid ar-
my. But Usama goes further in speaking of a plot that Lu’lu’ prepared in collusion 
with the Franks, with the aim of dividing the Seljukid army and thereby making it an 
easy prey for the army of Antioch. Sending a message to Bursuk ibn Bursuk, accord-
ing to Usama, Lu’lu’ requested him to dispatch an emir at the head of a contingent. 
He was to deliver Aleppo to this emir, and by his help overcome any possible re-
sistance from the populace. Accordingly Bursuk dispatched Emir Juyush Bey at the 
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head of three thousand horsemen, who were surprised and defeated by Roger 
“through an execution of the divine will.”  
This version of the story seems quite doubtful at first sight, for we know from 
the mutually corroborative accounts of Ibn al-Athir and Ibn al-Adim that the detach-
ment under Juyush Bey was dispatched not to take over Aleppo as requested by 
Lu’lu,’ but to get hold of the Butnan valley as requested by Shams al-Khawass. It 
was the main army under Bursuk himself that set out for Aleppo and suffered defeat 
on its way there at Tell Danith. This is corroborated further by Ibn al-Adim’s report 
that after the defeat Juyush Bey’s detachment returned from the Buza‘a to join the 
remnants of the main army at Naqira. There is yet another problem with Usama’s 
claim: if Shams al-Khawass had indeed alerted Bursuk against Lu’lu’s service of in-
formation to the Franks, as Ibn al-Adim testifies, how could it have been possible for 
the Seljukid commanders to believe in Lu’lu’s promise that he would deliver Aleppo 
to them? 
Nevertheless, another statement of Ibn al-Adim, of doubtful value in its origi-
nal place, could give some support to Usama’s version if brought into relation with 
this part of the story. We have seen Ibn al-Adim suggest that it was when Lu’lu’ “de-
ceptively” sent a letter to the sultan and promised to surrender Aleppo that Bursuk’s 
army was dispatched, but that on its arrival Lu’lu’ went back on his word. This can-
not be accepted as a valid cause of the campaign, as already discussed, but it can still 
be taken to support Usama’s story if it is assumed that Lu’lu’ sent the message to 
Bursuk himself at this later stage of the expedition, rather than to the sultan before its 
beginning. As we have seen, Ibn al-Adim placed Lu’lu’s invitation of the Seljukid 
army in the context of his rivalry with Shams al-Khawass, and the latter’s call for 
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help in the context of his imprisonment by Lu’lu’ after his return to Aleppo. The crit-
ical question to ask here is whether this rivalry between the two notables and the re-
sulting imprisonment of Sahms al-Khawass were indeed real or rather parts of a 
strategem they undertook in collaboration to divide the Seljukid army, a ruse of the 
kind related by Usama.  
Indeed this story of rivalry and imprisonment seems quite doubtful when con-
sidered in view of the fact that right from the beginning Lu’lu’ and Shams al-
Khawass acted in firm concert with Ilghazi, Tughtekin and the Franks against the 
Seljukid army, and forewent their chances of being compensated with some other 
town by defying the sultan’s army. At any rate, the danger of losing their city to the 
Seljukids, from whom they could no longer expect mercy or compensation, should 
have been threatening enough to make them forget any differences they might have 
had previously. It does not make sense either that Lu’lu’ should have continued to 
collaborate with the Franks after imprisoning Shams al-Khawass who had previously 
joined the allies at Apamea against the Seljukid army. After such a move, if it was 
genuine, Lu’lu’ would have been expected to swerve to the side of the Seljukids who 
had resumed the field. This was all the more so as the Aleppan army was now de-
prived of its commander, and could neither effectively defend the city against Bur-
suk, nor support the Franks against him. Added to all this is the fact that immediately 
after the defeat of the Seljukid army, as Ibn al-Adim notes, Lu’lu’ released Shams al-
Khawass and restored his iqta‘  to him, which bolsters the impression that his im-
prisonment had been little more than a mise-en-scene.     
A possible scenario that emerges from these considerations is that the mes-
sages of Shams al-Khawass and Lu’lu’ were parts of a common strategem against the 
Seljukid army: while Shams al-Khawass invited them to take over Buza‘a and de-
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nounced Lu’lu’ to win their confidence, Lulu requested them to send a contingent to 
Aleppo to deliver the city. In this way they could guarantee that the sultan’s army 
would get divided, one part heading for Buza‘a and the other for Aleppo. The Frank-
ish army would then be directed upon the latter division by hourly information. The 
Seljukid commanders may not have believed Lu’lu’s promises, but they were proba-
bly determined at any rate to advance on Aleppo and settle accounts with the city, 
now that the Frankish and Turkish allies had returned home. So both Ibn al-Adim 
and Usama could be half-way correct, but Usama seems to err when he asserts that it 
was Juyush Bey’s detachment rather than Bursuk’s main army that was surprised by 
the Franks on the way to Aleppo. Admittedly, it is astonishing how he could confuse 
the two, given that his own father was in the army that made for Aleppo. But it must 
not be forgotten that Usama was setting down these memories some seventy years 
after the events, in the 1180s, and due to this reason he may have confused the direc-
tions in which Bursuk and Juyush Bey headed.   
All this duplicity on the part of the rulers of Aleppo, if this scenario is indeed 
true, shows to what lengths the local emirs were ready to go to ensure Seljukid fail-
ure. 
5.1.5 Michael the Syrian 
Michael the Syrian cites at length from an unknown Arabic source about the 
Seljukid expeditions in 1114-15, and especially the first one led by Aksungur al-
Bursuki, which provides valuable information on the actions of the Artukids as well 
as other details not found in other sources.
33
 It must be noted that the source in ques-
tion confuses Aksungur al-Bursuki with Zangi’s father Qasim al-Dawla Aksungur, 
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 Michael the Syrian, Chronique de Michel le Syrien, edited and translated by J. B. Chabot, 3 vols. 
(Paris, 1899-1910), III, 216-17. 
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who had been executed long ago by Tutush ibn Alp Arslan, and assumes wrongly 
that it was not Aksungur but Sultan Muhammad’s son Mas‘ud, only a boy of six at 
this time, who acted as the chief commander of the army.  
Michael’s source relates that the Seljukid army, after picking up Zangi and 
Tamirak Arslan from Mosul, proceeded to Jazirat ibn Umar and then to Nisibis, both 
of which were peacefully handed over by the garrisons previously installed there by 
Mawdud. We have seen that the army’s takeover of the former town is also men-
tioned by Ibn al-Athir. When the army went to Mardin, the source goes on to relate, 
Ilghazi came to the service of Prince Mas‘ud and dispatched his son Ayaz at the head 
of three hundred horsemen. Notably, he omits to mention the fact that a siege of Har-
ran and then Mardin had proved necessary before Ilghazi could be persuaded to do 
this.  
Michael’s source also skips over the army’s two-month siege of Edessa and 
subsequent withdrawal to Samosata that are reported by Ibn al-Athir, and continues 
with the arrest of Ayaz ibn Ilghazi while the army was in Shabakhtan. According to 
Ibn al-Athir, as we have seen, this was because Aksungur laid the blame for the fail-
ure of the siege on Ilghazi, who had refused to support Aksungur with his full forces 
and in person. Michael’s source brings a different explanation for the arrest of Ayaz. 
No need to say, he attributes it to Prince Mas‘ud rather than to Aksungur, as he sup-
poses the prince to be the commander in chief. When the army passed on to Sha-
bakhtan, he relates, Ilghazi sent message to the Franks to reassure them, although he 
does not reveal about what Ilghazi reassured the Franks. Perhaps the point in ques-
tion was the genuineness of Aksungur’s withdrawal from the territory of Edessa, as 
against the possibility of a feigned retreat, or alternatively his own determination not 
to ally sincerely with the invaders against them. When this contact became known to 
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the sultan’s son (in reality Aksungur himself), Michael’s source states, he arrested 
Ayaz, after which the army razed Ilghazi’s lands and laid siege to Dara. This was a 
castle between Mardin and Nisbis, about thirty kilometers’ distance from the former. 
Its siege remains unmentioned in the other resources.         
In contrast to Ibn al-Athir’s report that Ilghazi went to Hisn Kaifa to summon 
his nephew Dawdud to aid, Michael’s source asserts that he proceeded to Shahrzor 
(near Sulaimaniya in modern Iraq) instead, where he assembled a great army, includ-
ing innumerable footmen, and was joined by Dawud and his other nephew, Belek ibn 
Behram. Marching with them to confront the sultan’s army and rescue his son, he 
arrived at Qurdis, in the neighborhood of the besieged Dara. Here the Artukids came 
across a part of the Seljukid army, including the lords of Sinjar and Nisibis, who 
were encamped without an inkling of their arrival. These were all surprised and cap-
tured by a group of Ilghazi’s horsemen, relates Michael’s source, and when the news 
of this defeat reached the troops before Dara, they fled to Nisibis. Obviously, this 
account of the battle is much different and far less dramatic than Ibn al-Athir’s ver-
sion, who spoke of a “fierce battle in which all held firm” rather than a surprise at-
tack on a part of the army that the Artukids hit upon by chance.  
Michael’s source also relates in circumstantial detail how Ayaz ibn Ilghazi  
got free: as he saw the Seljukid troops flee in haste at night, with nobody caring 
about his neighbor, the young man threw himself from the mule upon whose back he 
had been seated, and weighed down by chains, hid in a synagogue there. He was 
picked up from this place by ten men sent by Ilghazi, who had been informed by a 
Kurd about the whereabouts of his son. Michael’s source notes that Ayaz’s return 
became a great source of joy for the Artukids.  
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The account offered by Michael’s source about the second expedition under 
Bursuk is far more summary in comparison and adds little new to what we know 
from other sources, as well as containing some errors. He mentions the threats of the 
sultan against Ilghazi “for having despised the sultanate of the Turks,” and the result-
ing alliance made between Ilghazi, Tughtekin and the Franks. In parallel with Ibn al-
Qalanisi he relates how Ilghazi was surprised and captured by Khir Khan who, com-
ing upon him one night, “found him drunk with wine and not even aware of where he 
was.” In conformity with Ibn al-Athir he reports that Ilghazi was released on condi-
tion, leaving his son Ayaz
34
 as hostage, after which he mustered troops and harried 
the lord of Hims to secure his son’s release. Nevertheless, he states falsely that Khir 
Khan called for the sultan’s aid when Ilghazi besieged Hims, rather than after he had 
captured the Artukid. His assertion that Ilghazi and Khir Khan made peace upon the 
arrival of the sultan’s troops and that Ayaz was received after the peace is also 
wrong. 
Michael’s source gives short shrift to the events following the arrival of the 
Seljukid troops. He merely notes that they entered Frankish territory for plunder, on-
ly to be cut down by the Franks, and that three thousand Muslims were burnt alive.         
5.1.6 Matthew of Edessa 
Matthew of Edessa also offers a short account of both expeditions,
35
 provid-
ing a number of original details in the process. Relating Aksungur al-Bursuki’s expe-
dition, he corroborates Ibn al-Athir’s report about the siege of Edessa, altough he as-
serts its duration to have been exactly one rather than around two months. Again like 
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 The name of this son who was left hostage is actually given by Michael’s source as Izza, but Ilghazi 
seems to have had no son with this name (see Cahen, “Diyār Bakr,” 168). In view of the fact that all 
the other sources accept this son to have been Ayaz, and that the latter is not encountered in the 
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Ibn al-Athir, he reports how Aksungur ravaged the districts along the Euphrates riv-
er, but adds the significant detail that the general advanced past Samosata to the cas-
tle of al-Bira. Here, he relates, all the Frankish troops on the opposite river bank 
joined forces, without daring to cross and join battle. So Aksungur returned via Edes-
sa to Nisibis. However, Matthew fails to mention Aksungur’s arrest of Ayaz or his 
siege of Dara. He also diverges from Michael the Syrian, who related the Seljukid 
troops’ flight to Nisibis after their defeat by the Artukids. Matthew, in contrast, cre-
ates the impression that the battle took place when the Seljukid army had already ar-
rived at Nisibis. Having omitted Ayaz’s arrest, Matthew also fails to supply any other 
reason for the conflict. Instead he simply reports that Ilghazi and Belek united their 
troops to confront Aksungur, and makes no mention of Dawud ibn Sokman.  
Matthew asserts in parallel with Ibn al-Athir that the clash was a “formidable 
battle” with the full Seljukid army under Aksungur, rather than a surprise attack 
against a section of it at Dara, as in Michael the Syrian’s version. Nevertheless, the 
comparative lack of circumstantial detail in Matthew’s testimony renders it less plau-
sible than that of Michael. Matthew also contends that the Artukids captured Prince 
Mas‘ud and afterwards released him, but this seems unlikely if it was not the main 
army that they had attacked. 
Matthew’s account of the second expedition under Bursuk ibn Bursuk, alt-
hough brief, does supply some original details such as Bursuk’s feigned retreat and 
the participation of Baldwin of Edessa in the final battle. He refrains from making 
any explicit comments about the Franko-Muslim alliance, but, insofar as the most 
recent edition and translation of the chronicle is correct, reveals his disapproval by 
representing the mutual oaths of alliance sworn by the Frankish and Turkish leaders 
                                                                                                                                          
sources after the son in question was killed during Bursuk’s campaign next year, it seems necessary to 
consider this as a mistake.  
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as if they had been sworn among the Muslims only. He attempts to explain Ilghazi’s 
participation in the alliance by reference to his enmity with Aksungur al-Bursuki, as 
he supposes this emir to have been the leader of the second expedition as well.    
Thus Matthew begins his account of this expedition by reporting that Aksun-
gur al-Bursuki (sic.) once again mustered his army, and after halting for a few days 
before Edessa, proceeded to Aleppo. He fails to mention the fall of Hama and Ra-
faniya to the Seljuk army, and mistakes its encampment at Shaizar for the capture of 
this town. Despite this, he seems justified in suggesting that Bursuk’s intention was 
to use it as a base to attack Tell Bashir and the entire territory of the Principality. 
Matthew indicates the mustering place of the Franks and their Muslim allies as also 
the territory of Shaziar, rather than the town of Apamea. Noting Ilghazi’s arrival in 
the Frankish camp with a large number of troops, he asserts that this was because 
Ilghazi was “a rabid enemy of al-Bursuki,” whereby he confuses Bursuk ibn Bursuk 
with Aksungur al-Bursuki. The latter was indeed at loggerheads with Ilghazi since 
his replacement of the Artukid as the shihna of Baghdad in 1105. Evidently, Mat-
thew was making an effort to explain away the alliance between the Franks and the 
“infidels” as a consequence of the petty rivalries amongst the latter.  
Indeed there are more signs of Matthew’s embarrassment and disapproval 
concerning the alliance. According to Dostourian’s translation based on the Etchmi-
adzin edition of the text, Matthew states that after Tughtekin’s arrival in Apamea he 
and Ilghazi “made peace and formed an alliance wih one another, taking a very sol-
emn oath.” It is difficult to figure out why Matthew says “with one another” here, 
rather than “with the Franks.” It seems highly unlikely that Tughtekin and his son-in-
law Ilghazi felt the need to make peace and form an alliance with each other at this 
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point, while the Franks were standing by. Indeed the RHC (Delaurier) edition and 
translation of the text offers a different, more expected reading, which makes it clear 
that it was between the Turkish chiefs and the Christians that the oaths were sworn: 
“They joined the Christians and formed with them an alliance and friendship ce-
mented by a solemn oath.”36 This reading is supported moreover by the immediately 
following sentence in Dostourian’s translation, which smoothly and logically con-
nects to this one: “in the same manner the emir of Aleppo joined the Franks.” But if 
there is not an error in the Etchmiadzin edition or Dostourian’s translation, this oddi-
ty can perhaps be taken as evidence that Matthew was embarrassed to show the 
Franks and “infidels” swearing mutual oaths of peace and alliance, and preferred to 
make it appear as if these had been sworn between Ilghazi and Tughtekin only.  
Matthew drops yet another hint of his disapproval of this Franko-Muslim pact 
when, ignoring the presence of these “infidel” allies, he states that “the infidel army 
and the Frankish army confronted one another for four months, without the Turkish 
forces daring to give battle.” If he had not omitted the presence of other “infidels” 
accompanying the Franks, it would have been much more difficult for him to pit the 
“infidel army” against the Frankish army and so to represent the campaign as a con-
frontation between two religious fronts, which it was of course not. The length Mat-
thew gives for the waiting period is also rather doubtful, being twice as long as that 
given by Ibn al-Athir; it is hard to believe that the two armies remained stationed op-
posite each other in Shaziar and Apamea for no less than four months. 
Matthew is the sole author amongst the oriental sources to state that Bursuk 
made a temporary retreat, while Ibn al-Adim had him attack the castle of Kerak and 
Ibn al-Athir did not even mention that he moved away from Shaizar. He goes on to 
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 “Ils se joignirent aux chrétiens et contractèrent avec eux une alliance et une amitié cimentées par un 
serment solennel.” Mathew of Edessa, RHC, Historiens Arméniens I, 115. 
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relate that Bursuk, learning of the departure of the allies for home, turned back 
against Antioch to ravage its territories. Living in the County of Edessa himself, Mat-
thew represents Count Baldwin as the chief protagonist of the events that followed. 
He relates that Baldwin went from Edessa to Antioch, upon receiving the news of 
Bursuk’s return. Taking along Roger and seven hundred knights from there,37 he sur-
prised and routed the unprepared Turkish army in the territory of Aleppo. Matthew 
adds that the Franks plundered the Turkish camp and took many captives, including 
eminent officers, while the remnants of the army “departed in humiliation.”  
5.1.7 Fulcher of Chartres 
In his account of Bursuk ibn Bursuk’s expedition38 Fulcher of Chartres as-
sumes a cool and objective tone when reporting the Franko-Muslim alliance, going 
so far as to imply that the Muslim and Frankish rulers together would be more capa-
ble of resisting the Seljukid army. Indeed a covert uneasiness can still be noted in his 
comment that it was the trust in their swollen numbers that had cost the Franks God’s 
support in the initial part of the campaign. But still he does not hold the presence of 
the Muslim troops directly responsible for the Franks’ lack of success at this stage. 
An important aspect of his account is that in parallel with Ibn al-Athir and other Lat-
in authors, and in contrast to Ibn al-Adim and Usama ibn Munqidh, he represents 
Roger’s surprise attack on the Seljukid army as the result of an unanticipated encoun-
ter, and fails to mention his communication with Lu’lu’ of Aleppo. Some other nota-
ble features in his account are his failure to note Ilghazi’s presence alongside 
Tughtekin; his attribution of Tughtekin’s alliance with the Franks to the atabek’s al-
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 See Mathew of Edessa, RHC, Historiens Arméniens I, 115, which seems much more plausible than 
the corresponding passage in the modern English translation, which reads: “When the count of Edessa 
heard this in Antioch, he returned to Edessa, and taking with him Roger and seven hundred horse-
men…”     
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leged murder of Mawdud; and his persisting focus on the king as the protagonist of 
the story.  
Passing over Bursuk’s entanglement with Aleppo and his capture of Hama, 
Fulcher begins his account from the point where the Seljukid army had camped be-
fore Shaziar, facing the Franks at Apamea. He reminds his readers that this was a 
repetition of the situation four years earlier, during Mawdud’s second expedition. It 
is notable that Fulcher fails to mention Ilghazi among the allies of the Franks, con-
centrating instead on Tughtekin. This must have been due to the fact that the atabek 
was the ruler of the neighboring Damascus rather than a local emir of the distant 
Jazira, as Ilghazi was at this time. In the way Matthew of Edessa had attributed 
Ilghazi’s alliance with the Franks to his personal hatred of Aksungur, Fulcher as-
cribes Tughtekin’s alliance with them to his fear of the Muslim army. Because of his 
complicity in the murder of Mawdud, the chronicler states, the atabek of Damascus 
had become “no less odious to these Turks than to us Christians.” Fearing total de-
struction in Bursuk’s hands if caught alone, he made peace with King Baldwin and 
Roger of Antioch. At this point Fulcher drops a remark which reveals that unlike 
Walter the Chancellor, who believed that the alliance would absolutely bring disaster 
upon the Christians, he thought it could perhaps benefit the Franks: “Tughtekin made 
peace with King Baldwin and with Roger, Prince of Antioch, so that, joined to those 
two as the third ally, they would become like a triple cord so as not to be broken easi-
ly by the Turks afterwards.”39  
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 For “Fecit cum rege Balduino et Rogero principe Antiocheno pacem, ut eis adjunctus duobus terti-
us, quasi funiculus triplex efficerentur, ne a Turcis postea facile rumperentur,” RHC, Historiens Occi-
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was made which could not afterwards be easily broken by the Turks,” as in the English translation. 
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About Bursuk’s retreat, Fulcher offers a different version from that of Ibn al-
Adim. He asserts that the Seljukid troops, retiring very silently, entered certain cav-
erns not very distant from the Franks. Nevertheless, he interprets this move as a re-
sult of their cowardice. According to him, when the Turks heard that the king, ex-
pected by the Antiochenes and Damascenes for almost three months, had already ap-
proached, they grew “fearful for their lives if they fought so many,” even though 
they were numerous themselves.
40
 This is not the first time Fulcher attributes a re-
treat of the Turkish army simply to their cowardice, as we have seen in his account of 
Mawdud’s first expedition. As in that case, moreover, Fulcher’s ascription of the 
Turks’ retreat to their fear of King Baldwin serves to stress his power and im-
portance, in conformity with the historian’s Jerusalemite perspective.  
Fulcher goes on to relate that when the king and his allies departed, suppos-
ing that the Turks were gone for good, the latter returned to their former position and 
scoured the region. Nevertheless, he does not mention their capture of Kafartab or 
attack on Apamea. When the Antiochene army received the news, the chronicler re-
lates, they quickly turned back to confront the Turks. They found the Turkish camp 
to be closer than they had imagined, near the town of Sarmin. Thus there is an ele-
ment of chance encounter in Fulcher’s version, as in that of Ibn al-Athir’s, in contrast 
to the testimonies of Ibn al-Adim and Usama ibn Munqidh. As we have seen, these 
latter attributed the Franks’ successful pursuit of Bursuk’s army to their collaboration 
with the Aleppans. It could be pointed out that this was something that could only be 
known to those in direct contact with the closest circle of the Muslim and Frankish 
leaders in action, and that the account of Walter the Chancellor, who was in the im-
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mediate retinue of Roger of Antioch, similarly supports the version of chance en-
counter. However, given the unconcealed aversion of that author to the alliance with 
the Muslims, it is quite possible that he preferred to suppress information on this con-
tact with Aleppo. This issue will be discussed in detail in the analysis of Walter’s 
account.  
Fulcher proceeds to relate that the Franks immediately formed battle lines and 
attacked the Seljukid camp despite furious resistance from Turkish archers. “Stirred 
by a mighty spirit of courage,” he says, they assailed the enemy ranks “in wondrous 
manner” wherever these were the thickest, being determined to bring the six year 
long conflict with the Seljukids to a final conclusion, whether favorable or not: 
“[They] chose to conquer if God willed or be conquered if He permitted, rather than 
be thus molested by the Turks every year.” After resisting a little while, he says, the 
Turks turned in flight, leaving behind three thousand dead and many captured. This 
number is sixfold the number given by Ibn al-Adim. The Turks had also left behind 
their tents, Fulcher notes, together with their wives and maid-servants, captives and 
animals, as well as money worth three hundred besants. He gives the date of the bat-
tle as 14 September 1115.  
  The moral Fulcher derives from this account is that it was in God rather than 
in their own numbers that the Franks should trust: “While the men of Jerusalem 
along with those of Antioch and Damascus were prepared for battle they accom-
plished nothing whatever,” he observes, and reminds his readers of the “Maccabees, 
Gideon, and many others who confided not in their own strength but in that of God 
and in that way overcame many thousands.” “For when did the victory of a fighter 
ever depend upon the number of men!” he exclaims. Nevertheless, it is notable that 
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unlike Walter the Chancellor Fulcher does not combine this theme with a direct criti-
cism of the alliance with the Muslims. He does not seem to have believed that the 
presence of the Muslims was sufficient per se to cost the Franks God’s support, 
above and beyond its immediate effect of swelling their numbers and inspiring undue 
self-confidence. Nevertheless, there might still be lurking behind these remarks some 
degree of uneasiness about the Muslim alliance, although not voiced openly as in the 
case of Walter.  
5.1.8 Albert of Aachen 
Albert of Aachen’s account of Bursuk’s expedition41 diverges in a number of 
ways from all the other sources, more often than not erroneously, but also offers cer-
tain interesting details unavailable in any other source. Perhaps the most important of 
these is his testimony about Tughtekin’s participation in the Battle of Tell Danith 
alongside Roger of Antioch. He presents the collaboration of this Muslim emir with 
the Franks as the result of his bloodfeud with Mawdud’s relatives in the Seljukid 
empire, while he fails to note the role of Ilghazi and Shams al-Khawass of Aleppo in 
the alliance. 
Although Albert, like Fulcher, does not mention the capture of Hama by the 
newly arrived Seljuk army, he does offer detailed information about its activities fol-
lowing this event. He relates that the army advanced with great strength into the terri-
tory of Antioch and camped for eleven weeks on the plains of the towns of Rugia and 
Rubea to the south of the city. If these towns are indeed the same as Rossa and Roida 
(Riha and Ruwayha) in the Ruj valley, as the editor Susan Edgington suggests,
42
 Al-
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bert diverges somewhat from the other sources who denote Shaizar as the place of 
Bursuk’s camp. Nevertheless, this difference may have been due to the large size of 
the army, which perhaps caused its area of encampent to spread north from Shaizar 
into the Ruj valley. While encamped here, Albert states, the Turks unsuccesfully at-
tacked Apamea, devastated the whole region, and captured a number of fortresses 
with their lords, enslaving and killing the rest of the population. It must be pointed 
out here that the Ruj Valley was quite a fertile area and therefore of some importance 
to the Frankish economy.    
Like Fulcher, Albert attributes the reason for Bursuk’s eventual retreat to the 
arrival of King Baldwin, which he similarly dates to a later time than the oriental 
sources. When King Baldwin was “summoned to assist Christ’s soldiers,” according 
to Albert, he set out for Antioch at the head of five hundred horsemen and a thousand 
footmen, along with Pons of Tripoli who headed two hundred cavalry and two thou-
sand infantry. Apparently unaware of the activities of Ilghazi and Tughtekin and their 
union with Roger at Apamea, Albert claims that Tughtekin was in the company of 
King Baldwin on this journey north, having been bound by an oath to him. As we 
have seen, this oath might be the same as that mentioned by Ibn al-Qalanisi. He does 
not reveal either that for the next few months the Franks and their Muslim allies re-
mained encamped at Apamea against Bursuk’s army. He reports instead that Baldwin 
and his companions, arriving at the fortress of Talamria,
43
 joined forces with Roger 
of Antioch and Baldwin of Edessa, who on their part were leading ten thousand men, 
and encamped there for a period of only eight days. Like Fulcher Albert attributes the 
retreat of the Turks to their fear of the strength of Baldwin’s forces, but asserts that 
they fled to the mountains in the direction of Melitene.  
                                                 
43
 It emerges from Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana, 374-75 that this castle was situated in 
mountainous country not vey far from Ma‘arrat al-Nu‘man. 
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Immediately after Baldwin’s departure, Albert relates, Bursuk returned to at-
tack Frankish towns like Baghras and Harim, and devastated their lands. Realizing 
that the king was already far away, and summoning him back would only cause loss 
of time, Roger of Antioch and Baldwin of Edessa mustered an army of fifteen thou-
sand Franks and Armenians. The Turks, on their part, he asserts, were divided into 
three armies above the river Orontes, at the point where it makes a channel between 
Apamea and Caeserea Stratonis.  
Obviously, this is a location quite far away from Sarmin and Tell Danith in-
dicated by the other sources. Nevertheless, the information Albert gives about the 
course of the battle is not irreconcilable with that of Ibn al-Athir, who stated that the 
baggage and army pages had gone ahead and pitched the tents to wait for the troops 
following them. It is possible to match the former group with the first of the three 
divisions Albert speaks about, and the latter with the second and third divisions. For 
when Albert dwells upon the destruction of the “first army,” he relates how Roger 
and Baldwin attacked the Turks in their camp, killing fifteen thousand (sic.) of them, 
while losing only a few troops themselves. Then still in parallel with Ibn al-Athir, 
who stated that the Frankish army next attacked the troops arriving at the camping 
location, Albert relates how Roger made for the “second army” amidst great shout-
ing. Much more doubtful is his following assertion that the terrified enemy fled to-
ward the river Orontes and lost five thousand by drowning, for the actual site of the 
battle near Sarmin was quite distant from this river.  
The most original but just as doubtful point in Albert’s account is his story of 
what he says happened to the “third army,” probably the Muslim rearguard. “Dumb-
struck by this triumph of the Christians,” he relates, this division had dispersed along 
obscure paths when it arrived by chance in the region of Camolla, a valley next to the 
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castle of Mehelbeh. As the editor Edgington indicates, the region in question might 
be the plain around Akkar in northern Lebanon, and the castle in question Qal‘at al-
Muhailba or the Balatunus castle on the Jabal Ansariyya in Syria.
44
 Here they were 
reportedly attacked by Tughtekin with his force of eight thousand, and in the ensuing 
hard battle three thousand of them fell dead while another one thousand were taken 
captive. Like Fulcher, Albert attributes Tughtekin’s alliance with the Franks to his 
complicity in Mawdud’s assassination, but goes further in depicting the entire cam-
paign in the garb of a bloodfeud. Among the Seljukid troops there were many of 
“Mawdud’s offspring and blood,” he affirms, who had been complaining to the small 
and great in Khurasan about “Tughtekin’s treachery and the wicked murder of their 
kinsman, and demanding vengeance for their kinsman’s murder.” Tughtekin, on his 
part, being already careful and suspicious for this reason, stuck to his allies the king 
and “the Christian faithful” all the more completely, and “did not desist from harm-
ing the Turks in every way he could.” So like the other Chistian authors Albert at-
tributes the willingness of certain local emirs to ally with the Franks to the existence 
of personal resentments among Muslims.     
What is more important, Albert is the only source to testify that Tughtekin 
did not retire for good to Damascus after Bursuk’s feigned retreat, but played an ac-
tive role in the battle with the Seljukid army. We have no chance of testing the accu-
racy of this claim, for the only source that could help us arrive at a final judgement 
on this matter, the Damascene author Ibn al-Qalanisi, is exceedingly elusive and reti-
cent about Tughtekin’s role in the whole affair, as we have seen. So let it suffice to 
remark that there does not seem any good reason to reject Albert’s testimony out of 
hand, for the Muslim sources could well have been reluctant to reveal that the alli-
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ance of the Muslim emirs with the Franks had gone as far as actually attacking fellow 
Muslims on the battlefield along with “infidels.” The Christian sources may have 
been similarly unwilling to confess the share of some Muslims in the victory over 
other Muslims. Indeed, as we shall see presently, Walter the Chancellor prefers to 
cover up Tughtekin’s participation in an attack against Shaizar during the initial part 
of the campaign. He also shows himself eager to point to the absence of Muslims in 
the final battle as a main cause of the victory. Hence Walter’s failure to mention the 
atabek’s presence in the battle, despite his status as an eye-witness, is not enough to 
invalidate Albert’s testimony.45  
It might also have been the case that Ilghazi had not parted ways with 
Tughtekin after Bursuk’s retreat and returned to Mardin, but was still in his company 
when the attack on the Seljukid troops took place. For that matter Albert never men-
tions the Artukid emir, even when it is certain from other sources that he was along-
side Tughtekin. In the absence of further evidence, though, this must remain a con-
jecture.   
5.1.9 Walter the Chancellor 
The longest and most detailed Latin account of Bursuk’s expedition belongs 
to Walter the Chancellor, who was a first-hand witness in his function as the chancel-
lor of the prince of Antioch, Roger of Salerno.
46
 Nevertheless, this does not neces-
sarily render his testimony final and decisive on issues where his account diverges 
from the others. An example is his dating of Bursuk’s arrival in Syria two months 
after the assembly of the Muslim and Frankish forces in Apamea, in contrast to the 
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testimony of other sources who affirm that the assembly in question took place only 
after Bursuk’s advance into the region. Another example is his assertion that the first 
Frankish attack was made against Bursuk’s already drawn-up army on Tell Danith, 
rather than against the Muslim camp and the troops who followed from behind.  
As in most other sources, on the other hand, the role of Ilghazi and his troops 
in the Franko-Muslim alliance finds scanty mention in Walter’s account, although 
the Artukid was to play the role of bête noire in his story of the Battle of Ager San-
guinis some years later. Like the majority of the Christian sources, Walter accords 
the chief role in this alliance to Tughtekin and the Damascene troops instead. Signif-
icantly, however, he offers only grudging acknowledgement of the presence of the 
Muslim allies, and celebrates their departure from Apamea as the separation of Belial 
from the Franks. Indeed Walter emerges as the Christian author who expresses his 
disapproval of this alliance with Muslims most clearly. He not only imagines the 
Muslim allies to be polytheists, but also accuses them of trying to lead the Franks 
into disaster in bad faith, and goes so far as to question their efficiency in war.   
Walter launches into the main narrative of the expedition after a prelude on 
the consequences of a devastating earthquake that shook Syria around this time. He 
relates how Prince Roger, installing garrisons in Antioch and praying in its various 
churches, set out to join the army he had sent ahead. The Antiochene army then hur-
ried to al-Atharib, having heard from scouts that Tughtekin and Ilghazi had arrived in 
Aleppo with ten thousand soldiers. We know from the Islamic sources that their pur-
pose was to prevent the city from falling into the hands of Bursuk, and Walter re-
veals that he was partly aware of this by remarking that their arrival was “on account 
of the fealty of Ridwan’s son.” Precisely, of course, it was on account of their alli-
ance with the de facto rulers of Aleppo, Lu’lu’ and Shams al-Khawass. Nevertheless, 
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Walter assumes this to have been a pretext only, and asserts that their actual purpose 
was to deliver the city to the sultan. For he claims that the emirs had already ap-
peased the sultan for their (sic.) role in Mawdud’s assassination. According to him, it 
was for this reason that the Antiochene army began marching to the frontier with 
Aleppo: their purpose was to provoke a battle and thereby prevent its delivery to the 
sultan’s army.  
It is probably this passage in Walter’s account that Claude Cahen relies on 
when he writes that Roger had come to Artah in order to prevent “the vague attempts 
of Ilghazi and Tughtekin to establish contact with Bursuk’s army against himself.” 
He adds that Bursuk was not convinced by these attempts and attacked Hama in-
stead, throwing Ilghazi and Tughtekin into Roger’s arms.47 Nevertheless, it is quite 
doubtful that the two emirs attempted at all to be reconciled with the sultan’s army. 
They could hardly have had any motives for doing that, since, as Grousset points out, 
their purpose was to defend the Syrian status quo against the threat of subjugation to 
the Seljukids and consequent territorial redistribution.
48
 Grousset himself is unjusti-
fied on his part when he affirms that they might still have cherished hopes for “a rec-
onciliation of the last moment with the court of Isfahan.” It is clear that this was well 
nigh impossible after Ilghazi’s defeat of Aksungur and their open defiance of the sul-
tan’s orders to deliver Aleppo to Bursuk. As Ibn al-Athir reveals, moreover, the 
emirs were already in “Roger’s arms” when they came to join him at Apamea, previ-
ously having sworn alliance with him by Lake Qadas. For this reason Walter’s claim 
that the Muslim emirs’ real intention was to make peace with the sultan seems little 
more than a reflection of his general distrust and disapproval toward the Muslim al-
lies, an attitude we shall soon observe more clearly.  
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We have seen the Arabic sources relate that upon the capture of Hama by 
Bursuk, or alternatively because of Tughtekin’s concern that the Seljukids would tar-
get Damascus after Aleppo, the atabek and Ilghazi came to join Roger in accordance 
with their previous agreement by Lake Qadas. Walter offers a quite different version 
from this: he suppresses the fact that the Turkish leaders had already made an agree-
ment with Roger before Bursuk’s expedition, and attributes their alliance with the 
Franks simply to their fear of the latter. Despite their previous intention of surrender-
ing Aleppo and going over to the Seljukids, he says, Ilghazi and Tughtekin grew 
fearful upon the Franks’ approach and so sent them messages of peace, professing to 
have come there in order to conclude an alliance with them against the “Persian en-
emy.” Although well aware that Tughtekin had more to fear from the Seljukids than 
from the Franks, Walter prefers to argue that it was only in bad faith that the emir 
approached the Franks, with the purpose of bringing disaster upon their heads, and 
that his peace with them was in pretence only.
49
 There is also covert criticism in 
Walter’s report that the Turkish and Frankish leaders assembled in the designated 
place, where, they “confirmed agreements and became as if they were friends.” 
Asbridge and Edgington draw attention to the fact that Walter concentrates 
his attacks on Tughtekin in this context, rather than upon Ilghazi.
50
 We have seen 
that this is a common characteristic with the other sources of the expedition of 1115, 
some of whom do not even mention Ilghazi. As in those cases, Walter’s attitude can 
be explained by the fact that for the inhabitants of Syria Ilghazi was still the lord of a 
distant province in the Jazira by this time, and had not yet become a local emir of 
Syria as in the period of his forthcoming reign in Aleppo. 
                                                 
49
 “Tughtekin, moreover, although he feared the formidable power of both of them, Christians and 
Persians, yet he preferred to be united with the Christians in a pretended peace, so that he might lead 
them to disaster, rather than to make an agreement with the Persians, whom he knew to be much more 
cruel towards him in peace than in war.” Walter the Chancellor, The Antiochene Wars, 88. 
 271 
Walter goes on to relate how it was predicted to Roger that the enemy would 
come through Salamia or Shaizar. Accordingly the prince decided to move towards 
that side, so that he could assault them more quickly. Walter observes that Tughtekin 
showed himself far less eager on this issue, and remarks critically that the Dama-
scene emir considered it “more advantageous for him and his men to go to places of 
both sorts of fortune.” Obviously, the author believed that Tughtekin indulged in 
double-crossing and was quite unwilling to attack the enemy. This view accords re-
markably well with that of Ibn al-Adim, who asserted that Tughtekin wanted neither 
side to gain a decisive victory and so tried to restrain the Franks from attacking. Wal-
ter continues with his covert criticisms as he relates that the two sides assembled in 
Apamea, “where they seemed to come together in companionship, hospitality and 
even a bond of complete love, just like sons and parents.”51 He states next that alt-
hough Roger’s men amounted to two thousand against the ten thousand troops of his 
Muslim allies, the latter side was “less in worth.” It must be noted that although Wal-
ter thus emerges as the Latin chronicler with the most critical stance against the Mus-
lim alliance, he still contents himself generally with such side-remarks, probably for 
fear of embarrassing Prince Roger, and refrains from directly condemning the alli-
ance or attacking the prince on its account.
52
  
Asbridge and Edgington state that this union of the allies in Apamea must 
have taken place in June 1115, considering Walter’s note that the allied armies 
camped at Apamea for two months up to August, when they learned about Bursuk’s 
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arrival and ravages in Syria.
53
 However, there is a conflict here with the Islamic 
sources, Ibn al-Athir and Ibn al-Adim, who assert that it was only when Bursuk had 
already turned from the gates of Aleppo and was besieging Hama that Tughtekin and 
Ilghazi went to join the Franks at Apamea, rather than two months before his arrival 
in the region. Their testimony on this issue is corroborated by those of Matthew of 
Edessa and Fulcher of Chartres, who date the Seljukid army’s arrival in Syria before 
the union of the Frankish and Turkish forces at Apamea. It seems that their version 
must be preferred to that of Walter, for otherwise it becomes hard to explain why the 
two Muslim emirs, before going to Apamea, hurried to Aleppo to deliver it to the sul-
tan’s army as Walter himself claims, or to avert its capture as was the actual case. 
Walter’s lack of self consistency on this issue renders his version less reliable than 
that of the Muslim sources.  
Walter proceeds to relate that Roger, having received the news of Bursuk’s 
arrival, summoned the king of Jerusalem and the count of Tripoli. He sent message 
that the enemy troops were encamped at Salinas,
54
 where they indulged in drink and 
other pleasures while “awaiting the augury of the crescent moon.” This last is a ref-
erence to the supposed religious practices of the Muslims, whom Walter imagined to 
be polytheists. The king set out without delay, Walter states, and warned Roger “with 
an oath of Christianity and by the bond of brotherly affection” not to venture an at-
tack upon the enemy before his arrival. In the meanwhile, the author notes, the ene-
my went via Salamiya to Hama. They stormed the town when their demands for sur-
render were rejected, robbing and expelling its lord and prominent citizens and in-
stalling their own garrison.      
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According to Walter the sack of Hama did not remain without consequences 
for the Muslim army, for when they proceeded to Shaizar with the purpose of billet-
ing themselves upon its emir, who was Usama bin Munqidh’s uncle, he denied them 
entry for fear of seeing his city plundered and being killed himself. Instead he pre-
ferred to offer them provisions while they were stationed outside, in the caves around 
the town. Walter also notes that the emir sent his brother (Usama’s father) with many 
gifts to secure the goodwill of Bursuk and other generals. Also an agreement was 
made to the effect that the emir himself would stay in the town while his brother 
would join the Seljukid army to act as a guide for them. This is corroborated by 
Usama ibn Munqidh’s testimony, as we have seen before.  
While the Muslims were thus encamped before Shaizar, Walter relates, they 
tried to provoke the Franks into a battle, but these attempts proved fruitless due to the 
strict orders of Roger to desist from any fight. In this he was acting in accordance 
with the promise he had made to the king to wait for his arrival. Walter is the sole 
source to reveal that Kafartab was attacked by the Seljukid army before its initial re-
treat as well: he reports that the Turks proceeded to assault that town as a further 
provocation, but failed to take it for the time being. Perceiving that the Frankish ar-
my could not be tempted in any way, and hearing of the king’s imminent arrival, they 
undertook a last, desparate attempt directly upon the Frankish camp. But this too 
failed to tempt the Franks into battle, mainly because of the threats and insistent 
warnings of Roger not to budge. Walter remarks that the Muslims were amazed at 
this, since otherwise they knew the Franks to be “always ready for war and intolerant 
of injury.”    
Walter relates that in view of this failure and the rumors that King Baldwin 
and Count Pons would shortly arrive Bursuk concealed “his wickedness for the time 
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being,” as he was “a general of deceitful cunning,” and pretended to flee to his home-
land by dispersing his forces through the territory of Shaizar. His intention was to 
destroy the maritime towns of the Franks once their forces had disbanded. So Walter 
seems to have believed that the purpose of the Seljukid commander was to sever the 
maritime connections of the Franks with Europe and to cut off all the support they 
received from there in terms of men and equipment. In this way he would acquire a 
chance of ending the sovereignty and even the presence of the Franks in Syria. That 
Walter believed the Seljukids’ aim to be the destruction of the Frankish states is also 
revealed when he asserts that the sultan intended to take advantage of the damages 
that a recent earthquake had inflicted on the Frankish strongholds to restore his rule 
over Syria.
55
 However, we know from the Muslim sources that it was as much the 
local Muslim emirs as the Franks whom Bursuk intended to subjugate, and as Thom-
as Asbridge puts it, “there is no evidence that Bursuk actually attacked any coastal 
towns during this campaign.”56  
Walter is the sole source to relate that the Franks, before disbanding after 
Bursuk’s retreat, undertook a last attempt to draw the Seljukid troops back from 
where they had retreated: being ignorant as to the whereabouts of the enemy, they 
resolved in a war council assembled upon the king’s arrival that they would attack a 
certain castle called Gistrum, subdued previously by the Muslims, in order to tempt 
them into a battle. Asbridge and Edgington suggest that this castle may have been the 
citadel of Shaizar itself, or Tell ibn Ma’shar, built by Tancred near Shaizar in 1111, 
or again Jisr al-Sughur to its north, lying on the Orontes.
57
 Considering that the Sel-
jukid army never took possession of the citadel of Shaizar itself, as Walter himself 
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makes clear, and in view of the resemblance between “Jisr” and “Gistrum,” Jisr al-
Sughur would seem to be the more likely alternative among these. But the aforemen-
tioned testimony of Usama ibn Munqidh about the attack that Tughtekin and the 
Franks made against Shaziar at this time suggests that the castle in question might in 
fact be Hisn al-Jisr. This fortress protected the lower town of Shaziar, which was sit-
uated on the opposite bank from the citadel.  
If this identification is indeed correct, it means that Walter suppressed the 
participation of Tughtekin and his troops in the assault, which is another sign of his 
negative attitude toward the Franks’ Muslim allies. In an effort to prove that the pre-
vious inaction of the Franks had not stemmed from cowardice, as it might have 
seemed to the enemy,
58
 Walter reports that the Turks, although they saw the confla-
gration of the castle and its suburbs, feared to approach the Franks, realizing “what 
they had taken for idleness and cowardice before the camp to be of a courageous and 
worthy nature.”59   
When the attempt to draw the Seljukid army back thus ended in failure, Wal-
ter relates, a discussion was held about the course of action to adopt. When those ea-
ger to return home and protect their posessions from the powerful enemy overcame 
those eager to pursue and dispossess them, everybody went home including the 
troops from Damascus. Deeply annoyed about the Muslim alliance, Walter mentions 
the presence of the latter only for the second time since his mention of their union 
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with the Franks at Apamea,
60
 while he omits to mention the presence of the Artukid 
troops altogether. Immediately after this passage, indeed, Walter gives the fullest 
vent to his disapproval of the alliance with the Muslims, making the following com-
ment about the Muslim troops’ departure from Apamea: “We realize that this was 
done not by the power of these men, but doubtlessly by His power who wanted to 
separate the fellowship of Belial from our men.”61 
After the Franks and their Muslim allies had disbanded, Walter continues, the 
enemy troops reappeared in the region and “made a dreadful attack, as was their ty-
rannical practice,” upon Kafartab. The town was captured when its walls were 
breached by petraries and other engines. Again in corroboration of Ibn al-Athir and 
Ibn al-Adim, Walter states that the Muslim army next proceeded to Ma‘arrat al-
Nu‘man, which he says had been previously devastated by the Muslim army. In a 
way reminiscent of Ibn al-Adim’s remark that the Turks had spread over the territory 
of Ma’arrat al-Nu‘man in a sense of security, he states that they behaved here “as if 
they were still on their lands.” These remarks suggest that the town had indeed been 
captured some time before this point, although the precise time cannot be determined 
clearly.
62
 Omitting mention of the unsuccesful Muslim attack on Apamea that is re-
ported by the other sources, Walter notes that the Muslims, secure in Ma‘arrat al-
Nu‘man, set about building siege-engines with the aim of attacking Zardana.   
When Roger heard of these events, Walter relates, he withdrew to Rugia and 
summoned his men from Antioch. Among them was Patriarch Bernard, who offered 
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a remission of sins for those to die in the forthcoming battle and commended the 
troops to the care of Bishop William of Jabala before he returned to Antioch. No re-
sult was obtained next day from a quick march to somewhere that the enemy had 
been rumored to have reached, so the Frankish army pitched camp outside Hab. Wal-
ter relates with importance how the Franks received the permission, advice and bless-
ing of Bishop William and adored the Holy Cross in the Mass of the Exaltation of the 
Cross on the day of battle (14 September). Then they sent scouts ahead, drew up the 
battle lines with Count Baldwin on the vanguard, and took to the road.  
At this point, Walter notes, one of the scouts returned to report in joy that the 
enemy had begun to pitch tents in the valley of Sarmin, which was precisely where 
they themselves intended to camp. Upon this Roger ordered the troops to prepare 
quickly for battle, and after listening to the exhortations of Bishop William, as well 
as adoring the cross he took around the lines, the knights, “marked by the sign of the 
cross” mounted their horses. Before going on to relate the battle, Walter halts to re-
port a further hortatory speech delivered by the prince himself, which was supported 
by the bishop’s threats of bodily punishment and eternal damnation.      
Thus Walter’s version of how the Franks caught up with the Seljukid army 
represents it as a chance encounter, rather than the result of a deliberate planning and 
collaboration between the Frankish and Aleppan leaders. Walter’s tesimony is espe-
cially important in this matter insofar as he was Roger’s chancellor and therefore in a 
good position to be privy to such matters. However, given Walter’s all too evident 
reluctance to acknowledge the support of Muslim allies, it is quite conceivable that 
he preferred to suppress this collaboration as well, presenting the encounter as a 
lucky coincidence. Another notable point in this passage is that Walter reveals in ac-
cordance with Ibn al-Athir and Albert of Aachen that initially the Franks came across 
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the non-combatant portion of the Muslim army carrying the baggage and the tents. 
But in the following passages we shall see him diverge from these two sources in as-
serting that the initial Frankish attack was directed against Bursuk’s troops on Tell 
Danith rather than on the camp.          
Walter relates that Bursuk initially mistook the Frankish army for a group of 
soldiers guarding the frontiers, and he had just given orders for their capture when 
the banners of the prince came into view. Walter asserts that these gave the Muslims 
the impression that the whole land was covered with white-clad knights, probably 
alluding to that episode in the Battle of Antioch when the Frankish army had been 
supposedly reinforced by a heavenly host clad in white.
63
 He reports that Bursuk and 
all his men climbed Tell Danith in order to withstand the Franks. While on the top of 
the hill, he adds, the Muslims, being “steeped in the rottenness of error, made calcu-
lations from the stars and summoned the auxiliary troops of their false gods to defend 
them,”64 whereby he reveals once more his highly inadequate knowledge about Is-
lam.  
Beside this force upon the hill, Walter notes that a second division of three 
hundred knights under Tamirak of Sinjar was hiding behind the same hill. The rest of 
the Muslim army remained in the camp, on account of their greed for the “riches pre-
sent” according to Walter. These last, he asserts, were “waiting arrogantly for their 
comrades, trusting very greatly, moreover, in the forces of their princes, although
65
 
they were not aided by penitence, because it was too late, nor were they relieved
66
 by 
the protection of their comrades, because it was lost.” When the bugles sounded, he 
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relates, Roger directed the march towards the hill “on which the enemy’s standard 
and strength were assembled.” Count Baldwin and Guy Le Chevreuil undertook the 
first attack, one head-on against the hill-side, and the other from the flank.     
This version of the events is of course quite different from the account of the 
battle offered by Ibn al-Athir. According to the latter, the Franks had already at-
tacked the camp and the troops behind when Bursuk arrived with his retinue to see 
the rout of his forces, and took refuge atop Tell Danith. Walter’s version, in contrast, 
gives the impression that the three divisions of the Muslim army had already been 
stationed on the top of the hill, behind it, and around the camp when the Franks 
joined battle with an attack against the division on the hill, allegedly the most nu-
merous one. At first sight it seems hard to figure out which of these two versions 
should be true. But considering the surprise nature of the Frankish attack agreed up-
on by all sources, Albert’s corroborating testimony that the Franks attacked the camp 
first, and finally Walter’s own previous note that it was the Muslim camp that the 
Frankish scouts initially came across, Ibn al-Athir’s version seems the more plausible 
of the two. Moreover, it is difficult to believe that the top of the hill could accommo-
date Bursuk and “all his men” or “the enemy’s strength” as Walter claims; Ibn al-
Athir’s statement that there were only about a hundred men with the commander 
seems more plausible, and this bolsters the possibility that Bursuk had urgently taken 
refuge on the hill with his immediate retinue, rather than stationing himself before-
hand with a sizeable division.  
So, taking Ibn al-Athir’s version as a basis and adding details from Walter’s, 
such a course of events could be assumed for the start of the battle: Bursuk and his 
retinue of a hundred men ascended Tell Danith to escape the sudden Frankish assault 
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on their camp and vanguard, while another three hundred who did not fit on the 
hilltop took refuge with Tamirak behind the same hill, and the troops arriving from 
behind tried to defend the camp under attack. 
This conclusion could be challenged by pointing out that Walter was in the 
Antiochene army and therefore a direct eye-witness of the events, but this is by no 
means a decisive argument. It may have suited the tastes of Walter and his audience 
better to present the victory as the result of a regular pitched battle fought against a 
fully prepared foe, rather than a surprise attack made on enemy troops caught una-
wares, as they were marching in disorder. This is not much different from Walter’s 
suppression of the probable fact that they had ambushed Bursuk’s army thanks to the 
collaboration of Aleppo. Also to be taken into consideration is the difficulty of the 
participants in making sense of the course of a pitched battle that involved many dif-
ferent divisions and great numbers.
67
     
Not surprisingly, Walter’s depiction of Bursuk’s attitude in face of the Frank-
ish attack is much different from that of Ibn al-Athir. According to the latter, the 
commander had initially declared his firm determination to be a “sacrifice for the 
Muslims,” and was persuaded only with great difficulty to flee and save his life. Ac-
cording to Walter, in contrast, he came down the hill with his brother and household 
“as if he were about to join battle,” but was in fact “wounded by the dart of divine 
terror” and “resolved to escape with whatever he could,” although he ordered the rest 
to “fight manfully and defend the hill.” In the meanwhile Count Baldwin and Guy Le 
Chevreuil had engaged in fight at close quarters, killing and routing those facing 
them. Seeing this, Walter relates, Tamirak attacked from the left side with “a magni-
ficient battle-array of three hundred knights,” and initially made for the battle lines of 
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the prince. Nevertheless, they were unable to attack Roger’s lines, and could not pre-
vent the latter from charging by the shower of arrows they sent. Consequently they 
turned against the Turcopole archers instead, driving them back into the Frankish 
ranks. Walter relates that upon this they came face to face with Robert fitzFulk’s co-
hort heading from the right, with immense bloodshed resulting on both sides.  
The victory for the Franks came according to Walter when they made a final 
charge into the midst of the Turkish ranks. With rhetorical flourish, he states that this 
transformed their “previously terrifying and very loud din” into “the constant sobs of 
dying men,” as some of them became “fodder of death” while others, “struck by the 
dart of divine vengeance,” turned their backs in flight. Having been victorious 
“through the virtue of the Holy Cross,” Walter relates, the prince occupied the battle-
field for three days so as to seal his victory according to the custom of the time. Wal-
ter concludes by relating that Roger instructed his men to pursue the Turks in flight, 
which they did for three kilometers beyond Sarmin, killing “innumerable enemies” 
against only a few losses from their own numbers. Laden with immeasurable quanti-
ties of booty, and having slaughtered innumerable enemies against only a few losses, 
they returned to Prince Roger, who shared out the spoils after taking his own part.      
5.1.10 William of Tyre 
William of Tyre’s account of Bursuk’s campaign68 is a combination of the 
accounts of Fulcher of Chartres and Walter the Chancellor. It is mainly based on Ful-
cher, up to the encounter of the two armies and the resulting engagement, and then 
draws upon Walter to fill in the details about the course of the battle. Another notable 
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feature of William’s account is that the author discards the criticisms or even the 
signs of annoyance found in his sources about the Muslim alliance, especially in 
Walter’s account. He also drops the latter’s disparaging remarks about Islam. Like 
Fulcher, on the other hand, he fails to mention the role of Ilghazi and his Turkomans 
in the alliance.  
Following Fulcher, William’s account begins with the report that Bursuk’s 
army entered the region of Antioch and then encamped between Aleppo and Damas-
cus, where they waited for an opportunity to carry out raids. Explicating Fulcher’s 
statement that Tughtekin realized himself to be more odious to the Seljukid army 
than to the Christians, William offers an analysis that is still valid today: “Then 
Tughtekin, king of Damascus, was alarmed, being very distrustful about their cam-
paigns and fearing that they had assembled there more with the intention of inflicting 
damage on him and his kingdom than advancing to fight the Christians whose 
strength they had often tested.”69 It is another point of interest that unlike Fulcher 
William reports Tughtekin’s complicity in Mawdud’s assassination as a widely held 
belief rather than as a fact.  
When relating the alliance that Tughtekin (and Ilghazi) made with the Franks, 
William discards Fulcher’s explanation about the atabek’s calculations to bolster 
himself with Frankish support. He prefers instead to focus on the terms included in 
Tughtekin’s offer of peace. He states that the atabek sent messengers and gifts to the 
king and the prince of Antioch to request a truce. In return he offered hostages and 
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promised to observe the alliance with the Christians in the entire Frankish domain. 
Before this, Walter notes, Prince Roger had summoned the king to aid, knowing that 
the enemy was near and raiding his lands. Now that they were bound by an alliance 
with Tughtekin, he summoned him as well, and the latter complied quickly. Unlike 
Walter and Fulcher, who respectively dated the king’s arrival at Apamea to two and 
three months after the assembly of the Antiochene and local Muslim forces there, 
William dates his arrival to only a few days after that union. It is also notable that 
although Walter’s account was available to William, he prefers to follow Fulcher in 
dating the union of the Frankish and local Muslim forces to the aftermath of Bur-
suk’s arrival in Syria and not to two months before it. He also follows Fulcher in 
dropping any mention of Ilghazi that he must have encountered in Walter’s account, 
probably because he considered the Artukid emir to have been a marginal figure at 
this time, given Walter’s scant mention of him. 
     In relating the retreat of Bursuk’s troops William departs once more from 
his sources, who attribute this move solely to their fear of the king’s reinforcements 
on the way. Although he accepts that the move was due to fear, he still acknowledges 
it to have been tactical in nature. According to his version, the retreat took place 
when the Frankish and Muslim allies advanced from their camping place
70
 upon Sha-
izar, where the Seljukid army was stationed. When the Turks realized that they could 
not oppose the advancing forces without serious danger, he says, they “pretended to 
retreat as if with no intent of returning.” Skipping over Walter’s report about the al-
lies’ attack on Gistrum, William states that the latter disbanded and returned home 
after Bursuk’s departure. Significantly, he also discards Walter’s celebration of the 
“separation of the fellowship of Belial,” that is the Muslim allies, from the Franks.  
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Following Fulcher, William goes on to relate that Bursuk realized that the al-
lies would not be able to reassamble their forces, and returned to overrun the lands of 
Antioch. There he devastated the countryside and killed or captured the inhabitants. 
Turning to Walter’s account at this point, William mentions the capture and destruc-
tion of Kafartab. Probably misinterpreting Walter’s report that the Turks next ad-
vanced to Ma‘arrat al-Nu‘man, which they had formerly devastated, William dates 
the capture of that town to this time as well. Continuing to follow Walter, he then 
relates Roger’s preparations for the forthcoming battle, stating that the prince assem-
bled his forces in Rugia and sent scouts against the enemy. He places somewhat 
more emphasis than Walter on Count Baldwin’s role, noting his summons by Roger 
as well as his “loyal aid” in the arrangement of the battle lines and other prepara-
tions. William then cites Walter’s report about how the Franks rejoiced upon learning 
that the Turks had camped in the valley of Sarmin.    
Relating the course of the battle, William again prefers Walter’s version to 
that of Fulcher who, in conformity with Ibn al-Athir and Albert, had it begin with an 
improvised Frankish attack on the Turkish camp. William states instead that Bursuk, 
learning about the Franks’ approach, put his troops into battle array and mounted the 
hill of Danith before the battle was joined. Nevertheless, he diverges from Walter on 
a number of important points about Bursuk’s ascent of the hill, probably in an effort 
to present what he thought to be a more plausible version of the events. According to 
Walter’s version, the Turkish commander had mounted the hill with a considerable 
body of men, indeed the “strength” of the Muslim army, in order to offer resistance 
to the Franks. William states in contrast that it was only with his brother and some 
friends that Bursuk took possession of the hill, and that his purpose in this was to se-
cure his safety as well as to instruct his men more fully from an elevated position 
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about the necessary order of battle.
71
 Quite interestingly, William also discards Wal-
ter’s statement that the Turks consulted the stars on the hilltop and called their false 
gods to aid, being aware that Islam was not a polytheistic religion.
72
 William also 
omits Walter’s report that a division under Tamirak was stationed behind the hill. 
William considerably shortens Walter’s account of the engagement itself, and 
contents himself with reporting the initial charge of Count Baldwin in the van and 
then the final, united charge of the Frankish troops that broke and routed the Turkish 
lines.
73
 At this point William inserts an interesting remark meant to underline the 
justness of the war: “They fought with swords in a hand-to-hand fight, determined to 
avenge the wrongs which had been inflicted with such license upon the villeins and 
the poor.” The wrongs in question refer to the earlier depredations of the Seljukid 
army following its return from the feigned retreat. Whereas Walter took special care 
to depict Bursuk as a materalistic and treacherous coward, William contents himself 
with noting that he deserted his standard, camp and baggage when he saw the Franks 
gain the upper hand, and saved his life by taking to flight.  
The rest of William’s account is mostly a replication of Walter’s account. He 
tells how the fleeing Turks were pursued and massacred while Prince Roger re-
                                                 
71
 For “de belli ordine necessario suos plenius instruere,” RHC, Historiens Occidentaux I, 497, instead 
of “give the necessary instructions for carrying on battle,” as in the English translation. 
72
 Rainer Christoph Schwinges, Kreuzzugideologie et Toleranz: Studien zu Wilhelm von Tyrus (Stutt-
gart, 1977), 121-24. William deliberately avoided terms that showed Islam as a “pagan,” polytheistic 
faith, and in this respect he was ahead of most of his contemporaries. For William’s knowledge of and 
approach to Islam in general see the same work, 105-41.   
73
 The corresponding passage in William’s original text reads: “Hostes itaque primis congressionibus 
resistendi spem habentes, proterve nimis a se tentabant propulsare: sed tandem nostrorum vires, impe-
tus et admirabilem stupentes constantiam, dissolutis penitus eorum agminibus, in fugam versi sunt,” 
RHC, Historiens Occidentaux I, 497. This can be rendered as follows: “So the enemies, hoping to 
resist the initial attacks, endeavored most valiantly to repulse our men; but, finally, in consternation at 
the strength, the onrush, and the marvellous perseverance of our men, their lines of battle collapsed 
entirely and they turned in flight.” But interestingly, the English translators offer a different rendering 
(italics are mine): “At first, the infidels, strong in the hope of resistance, endeavored most valiantly to 
repulse the Christians; but, finally, in consternation at the strength, the onrush, and the marvellous 
perseverance of the foe, they turned and fled in uter disorder.” Notably, the translators have substitut-
ed the words “infidels” and “Christians” for William’s religiously neutral words “hostes” and “nostro-
 286 
mained behind to hold the battlefield, and notes Roger’s distribution of the rich booty 
collected from the Turkish camp to his troops. In keeping with his earlier statement 
that the Franks fought to avenge the villeins and the poor who had been victimized 
by the enemy, William explicates Fulcher’s brief note about the captive Franks and 
Syrian Christians who had been left behind by the fleeing Muslims: “These were sent 
back to their homes rejoicing, together with their wives and children and their ani-
mals.” He concludes the account by telling how Roger entered Antioch “as victor, 
amid the joyous acclamations of the people.”    
5.2 The reasons behind the negative stance of Ilghazi and Tughtekin toward 
the expeditions, and their collaboration with the Franks   
It is time now to ask why Ilghazi and Tughtekin assumed such a hostile 
stance towards these campaigns and collaborated with the Franks against them. Imad 
al-Din Khalil explains the hostility on Tughtekin’s part by his fear of retribution for 
the murder of Mawdud. As for Ilghazi’s hostility, he traces it to three factors: the 
enmity that arose between Ilghazi and Aksungur when the latter attacked the Artukid 
possessions before those of the Franks; Aksungur’s use of compulsion to persuade 
Ilghazi to dispatch Turkoman troops; and Aksungur’s arrest of Ayaz ibn Ilghazi.74 
But the enmity between the two was not new, as it probably stemmed from their past 
rivalry. Hence there is good reason to believe that Ilghazi’s hostility preceded Ak-
sungur’s aggressive actions and was not something that only appeared in reaction 
against them. 
Indeed Sevim, Stevenson and Hillenbrand argue that what lay behind Ilgha-
zi’s negative stance toward the campaigns was his resentment against the sultan’s 
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preferment of Aksungur over himself as the shihna of Baghdad and then as the gov-
ernor of Mosul. Thus Sevim attributes Ilghazi’s hostile attitude to his bitterness 
against Sultan Muhammad for having dismissed him from the post of the shihna of 
Baghdad in 1105. Although this attitude “did not become a Turkoman Bey,” Sevim 
comments, it should have been related with the fact that he was very “angry and dis-
appointed” with the Sultan.75 Stevenson contents himself with remarking that “al-
Bursuki’s advancement by the sultan was viewed with jealousy by Ilghazi of Mar-
din,”76 whereas Hillenbrand offers a more detailed analysis of the personal factors 
that she believes were behind Ilghazi’s attitude. According to her, Ilghazi was al-
ready resentful against Sultan Muhammad for having been ignored at the time of 
Mawdud’s appointment to Mosul, and this resentment grew upon being ignored once 
again as Mawdud was succeeded by Aksungur al-Bursuki, none other than the emir 
who had replaced Ilghazi as shihna of Baghdad in 1105. Seeing his short-lived at-
tempt at complying with the sultan’s wishes once more remain fruitless, Ilghazi re-
fused the next call to arms from Baghdad, and by putting Aksungur’s forces to rout, 
allowed his half-hearted support of the sultan to turn into into open defiance.
77
  
Thus all three scholars agree that Ilghazi’s attitude was a result of the person-
al relations between him, Aksungur and the sultan, and that he went into rebellion 
primarily because of his feelings of jealousy, resentment and disappointment at being 
dismissed from the post of Baghdad and then passed over for the post of Mosul. Alt-
hough such feelings as they emphasize might have played some role in shaping 
Ilghazi’s negative attitude, probably the significance of these should not be exagger-
ated. It had been Ilghazi’s policies against Sultan Muhammad that became the cause 
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of his dismissal from the post of shihna of Baghdad in the first place. He had first 
supported Barkyaruk and then his son against Barkyaruk’s step brother Muhammad, 
the present sultan, so there could not be any reason for him to be too surprised or re-
sentful when Muhammad drove him out of Baghdad in turn, as soon as he was in a 
position to do so after Berkyaruk’s death.78 Nor did he have any valid grounds there-
after to harbor great expectations from the sultan or to be disappointed when these 
were not fulfilled. On the contrary, Ilghazi should have been quite aware that after 
his career in Baghdad Muhammad would never trust him, and even would try to dis-
place him from whatever lordship he had carved out for himself in Diyar Bakr.  
And even if Ilghazi had not been at loggerheads with the sultan over this is-
sue, he would still have had enough reason to fear being dispossessed. As Grousset 
indicates, what the Seljukid government had in mind as it launched one expedition 
after another to Syria was not a “Counter-Crusade” but “a wider operation, destined 
to bring back all Syria under the authority of the central Seljukid government: not 
only Frankish Syria, but also Muslim Syria,” and the emirs in the region were well 
aware that “the restablishment of the authority of the sultan of Persia could only take 
place through their own eviction.” Especially Ilghazi saw himself on the brink of be-
ing deprived of his principality in Diyar Bakr.
79
 Michael Köhler similarly stresses 
that “the ‘Counter-Crusades’, once stripped of their propagandistic cover, were only 
functions of the power interests of the princes of Mosul and the sultan.” Like Hillen-
brand he points out the order of priorities in the sultan’s command to subdue Ilghazi 
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and Tughtekin before attacking the Franks, and argues that Bursuk’s campaign was 
“nothing more than an attempt of the sultan to extend the Great Seljukid power to the 
west and to rearrange Syria politically in accordance with his wishes.”80 Thus Ilghazi 
had good reason to fear that the armies of Mawdud, Aksungur and Bursuk would try 
to dispossess him as soon as they had rendered the Franks harmless, and perhaps 
even arrest him by taking advantage of his presence in their camp. It was also for this 
reason that he avoided taking part in Mawdud’s campaigns after 1110 in person, as 
we saw in the last chapter.  
But the question to ask here is why Ilghazi adopted a much more stringent 
policy against Aksungur’s expedition than he had against those of Mawdud, initially 
refusing to send him even a contingent under his son, finally doing so only under 
compulsion, and then negotiating with the Franks against him. And it is necessary to 
ask why Aksungur adopted a similarly harsh attitude against Ilghazi, arresting his son 
and attacking his territories, although the contribution he exacted from the emir was 
no more or less than that Mawdud had received in his later campaigns. Was Ilghazi’s 
attitude the result of his disappointment on being passed over for a second time for 
the governorship of Mosul, as Hillenbrand holds? Ilghazi could not have had any 
such expectations. Rather, his suspicion that the actual aim of the Seljukid expedi-
tions was to dispossess and evict him from Diyar Bakr must have appeared con-
firmed to him as he saw his archenemy Aksungur appointed to Mosul and ordered to 
advance west with a huge army. It was probably for this reason that he rejected send-
ing his son with a detachment, fearing that they could be taken captive and used 
against him, and also established contact with the Franks against the sultan’s army.  
                                                                                                                                          
al-Mulk in 1192, as well as its lasting effects on the strength of the central government, that enabled 
the emirs of the outer provinces to acquire a de facto independence. 
 290 
Indeed the development of the events revealed that Ilghazi was not mistaken 
in his apprehensions: to begin with, Aksungur failed to reward him in advance for his 
contribution, as Mawdud had done by the grant of Harran. He then showed himself 
all too insistent on his personal participation or at least dispatch of a contingent, even 
besieging his towns for this purpose; arrested Ayaz on his return from the unsuc-
cesful siege of Edessa; and set about destroying the economically important agricul-
tural lands of Mardin, perhaps in preparation for a planned siege. Seeing his worst 
fears realized, and becoming sure now that the sultan’s real intention was to evict 
him and other local emirs from his western territories, Ilghazi decided to defend him-
self with all his powers. Assembling all the other Artukids, he inflicted a crushing 
blow on Aksungur’s forces. The fact that the sultan promptly dismissed Aksungur 
from the governorship of Mosul upon his failure to subdue Ilghazi also suggests that 
this had been the principal task assigned to him. Ilghazi perceived that he had burnt 
all bridges with the sultan now, and that the only way to save his skin was to join 
forces with the other local emirs or even with the Franks. His ally Tughtekin had 
similar fears on his own part, especially because of the rumors about his complicity 
in Mawdud’s murder, and so similarly cemented an alliance with the Franks.  
In this connection Michael Köhler speaks of the establishment of a “pan-
Syrian solidarity” that had developed in the fifteen years following the First Crusade 
and passed beyond the mere constitution of a modus vivendi. The presence of the 
Franks in Syria seemed to be less of an evil to the local Muslim leaders when com-
pared with the extension of the power of the Seljukid sultanate or the Fatimid cali-
phate. So they came to look upon the Frankish principalities not only as possible 
partners in peace teaties, but also as potential allies against any threat that might 
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come from those external Muslim powers. Both sides of this common understanding, 
the Franks as much as the Muslims, pursued what Köhler calls the lā-maqām policy: 
this entailed an alliance of all the polities in Syria against the threats posed by extenal 
powers, in this case the Seljukids, and was based on an awareness that if any of the 
two sides in Syria, the Franks or the Muslims, went under, the other side too would 
no longer be able to find any place (“lā-maqām”) there.81 
Accordingly the hostile policy of Ilghazi and Tughtekin against the cam-
paigns of Aksungur and Bursuk were due less to personal-psychological factors than 
to structural ones: the weakening of sultanic authority during the interregnum period 
1092-1105 and the corresponding emergence of centrifugal tendencies in the outer 
provinces of the empire. These factors brought about the result that Ilghazi, like the 
other local emirs, was fully determined to defend his newly acquired independence 
and possessions against the sultan’s attempts to reestablish his authority in Syria and 
the Jazira. For this purpose he was also ready to ally with the Franks if need be, and 
rightly so: he must have known quite well that if the sultan realized his aim, this 
would lead sooner or later to his replacement by a more docile emir and the loss of 
everything he had gained since his arrival in Diyar Bakr ten years before.  
5.3 The course of events 
The foregoing considerations allow for the following reconstruction of 
events: after Mawdud’s death the Seljukid sultan sent a new army to the west under 
the command of the governor’s successor Aksungur al-Bursuki. As before, he was 
trying to re-establish control over Syria and the Jazira by checking the Frankish ad-
vance and subjugating the local Muslim emirs there. As this was known very well to 
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Ilghazi, and Aksungur was his old enemy since his days in Baghdad, he not only de-
clined to participate in the expedition but also refused to send any troops. Only Ak-
sungur’s siege of Harran and then Mardin could persuade him to dispatch a contin-
gent under his son Ayaz. Ilghazi’s governor in Harran even tried to enlist the support 
of the Franks of Edessa against Aksungur’s army before he was overcome by a rebel-
lion of the populace. Having besieged Edessa in vain for one or two months, Aksun-
gur finally withdrew through Saruj and Samosata, ravaging the eastern side of the 
Euphrates. At al-Bira he also briefly confronted the Franks who were assembled on 
the opposite riverbank.  
Arriving back in the territory of Mardin, Aksungur placed Ayaz ibn Ilghazi 
under arrest. This was probably because he laid the charge for the failure of the siege 
at the feet of Ilghazi, who had refused to support him in person and full force. Per-
haps he had also learned that the emir had established contact with the Franks against 
him. He then proceeded to ravage the agricultural lands in the region of Shabakhtan 
and laid siege to the fortress of Dara, situated between Mardin and Nisibis. Upon this 
Ilghazi joined forces with Dawud ibn Sokman and Belek ibn Behram, his nephews, 
and set out to confront him. Coming across a part of the Seljukid army camping at 
Qurdis, near Dara, the Artukids routed them, while the rest of the army under Ak-
sungur fled from Dara to Nisibis. Ayaz escaped in the melée and was later picked up 
by Ilghazi’s men.  
Ilghazi’s defeat of the Seljukid forces amounted to open rebellion. Receiving 
letters of threat from the sultan, he sought refuge at Tughtekin’s side in Damascus. 
Here they made contact with Roger of Antioch against the forthcoming Seljukid ex-
pedition, and meeting him near Lake Qadas, confirmed their alliance by mutual 
oaths. Thereupon Ilghazi set out for Diyar Bakr to enlist Turkoman troops, but while 
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resting near Hims in an intoxicated state, he was caught by the emir of that town, 
Khir Khan ibn Karaja. Khir Khan saw a good opportunity in this move to secure the 
sultan’s support and completely shirk off the suzerainty of Damascus. Accordingly 
he rejected Tughtekin’s demand to release Ilghazi and sent an urgent message to the 
sultan to dispatch his troops. But the Seljukid army delayed in coming, and fearing 
Tughtekin’s machinations, he released Ilghazi on terms, receiving his son Ayaz as 
hostage. Ilghazi collected troops from Aleppo and returned to besiege Hims, with the 
purpose of rescuing Ayaz, but he had to abandon the siege before long.  
This was because the sultan’s new army, led by Bursuk ibn Bursuk, the Lord 
of Hamadhan, arrived at this point. Marching first to Aleppo, Bursuk demanded the 
delivery of the city, but its regent Lu’lu’ and the commander of its forces, Shams al-
Khawass, prevaricated until Ilghazi and Tughtekin could enter it with two thousand 
troops. After this they were able to ward off the sultan’s army. In retaliation Bursuk 
proceeded to attack Hama, where Tughtekin’s baggage was deposited, and after 
sacking the city for three days, turned it over to Khir Khan; it was the sultan’s order 
to give every town they captured to this emir. The sultan’s intention in this was prob-
ably to turn Hims into a central base against both the rebellious emirs and the Franks, 
but his order seriously diluted the motivation of the Seljukid emirs who saw their 
hopes for personal gain reduced to naught. In the meanwhile Ilghazi and Tughtekin, 
together with Shams al-Khawass, had left Aleppo to join Roger of Antioch and his 
forces at Apamea. Their immediate purpose was to get help to prevent the capture of 
Hama and avert a possible attack on Damascus, but probably this was also a move 
agreed beforehand in the alliance concluded by Lake Qadas. At Apamea the two 
sides confirmed the oaths of alliance sworn at that time.  
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In the meantime the Seljukid army had also taken Rafaniya and proceeded to 
encamp around Shaizar. The Munqidhite lords of this town were hard pressed by 
both Antioch and Aleppo, against which they relied on the sultan’s army for protec-
tion. For about two months the two sides remained facing each other at Apamea and 
Shaizar, as in Mawdud’s second campaign four years before. During those two 
months the Seljukid troops carried out various incursions and skirmishes and made 
an unsuccesful attack on Kafartab to provoke the Frankish-Muslim army into joining 
battle before reinforcements would arrive. Indeed Roger had requested help from 
Baldwin I and Pons of Tripoli, who had set out at once for Apamea. As the king sent 
ahead strict instructions not to join battle before his arrival, and the Muslim allies at 
Apamea, unwilling to see either the Franks or the Seljukids win a decisive victory, 
also had a restraining influence, the Franks resisted the temptation to join battle. 
When the Frankish reinforcements finally arrived the Seljukid army withdrew from 
the area, perhaps with the intention of returning in case the Franks and their allies 
dispersed, and could not be lured back by an assault undertaken against Hisn al-Jisr, 
the fortress protecting the lower town of Shaizar. Thereupon the allies disbanded, 
with everybody returning home.  
When Bursuk learned that the enemy forces had dispersed, he returned to 
ravage the lands of Frankish Syria. After capturing and sacking Kafartab and attack-
ing Apamea, the Seljukid army encamped on the territory of Ma‘arrat al-Nu‘man, 
which they had taken some time before. At this point two messages arrived at the 
Seljukid camp from Aleppo. One of these came from Shams al-Khawass, who in-
formed them that he had been imprisoned by Lu’lu’, warned them that the latter was 
sharing information about their movements with the Franks, and asked them to seize 
Buza‘a, which was his iqta‘  from Aleppo. The other message was from Lu’lu’, who 
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offered to hand over Aleppo in return for a portion of its territory as compensation. 
In response a part of the Seljukid army under Juyush Bey, the new governor of Mo-
sul, set out for Buza‘a and got hold of it, while the main army under Bursuk set out 
for Aleppo, determined at any rate to settle accounts with the defiant city. There is 
some possibility that these massages were only parts of a strategem intended to di-
vide the Seljukid army, and Shams al-Khawass’ imprisonment may only have been a 
pretence to render the ruse more convincing, since he was promptly released and his 
iqta‘  restored after the defeat of the Seljukid forces. Whatever the case, Lu’lu’ in-
deed maintained contact with the Franks, informing them hourly on the whereabouts 
of Bursuk’s army.  
By this time  Roger of Antioch and Baldwin of Edessa had reassembled their 
forces, perhaps taking along Tughtekin as well, and set out in pursit of the Seljukid 
army. Helped by the information supplied by Lu’lu’, they caught up with the Selju-
kid troops near the town of Sarmin, by Telll Danith. The Muslim army was in a quite 
unprepared condition. The baggage and army pages had been sent ahead and pitched 
camp at Sarmin, where they were waiting for the troops who marched in disorder and 
with a false sense of security; Bursuk and his retinue were following from behind.  
The Frankish army attacked the camp first, with the Edessene forces in the lead, and 
proceeded to assault the troops who had begun to arrive at the campsite. Arriving to 
see what happened, Bursuk sought refuge upon Tell Danith with his brother and a 
retinue of around a hundred men, where they were joined by a crowd of army pages 
in flight. Another force of three hundred men under Tamirak of Sinjar positioned 
themselves behind the same hill. Although these latter eventually made a sally 
against the Franks, killing some, a final charge of the entire Frankish army finally 
broke all resistance of the Muslims and put them to rout.  
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The Seljukid troops in flight were pursued for three days. They may also have 
been attacked by Tughtekin and his forces if indeed he had rejoined the Franks. Rog-
er himself remained behind to claim the battlefield as the victor, and the immense 
riches found in the Muslim camp were plundered. In retaliation the Frankish captives 
and Ilghazi’s son Ayaz, who had previously been delivered to Bursuk by Khir Khan, 
were massacred by the Seljukid detachment stationed at Kafartab. This town was 
then abandoned to the Franks. 
Meanwhile Bursuk had succeeded in making his escape from Tell Danith to 
Nisibis, together with the remnants of the main army. Here they were joined by the 
detachment under Juyush Bey that had returned from Buza‘a. Although Bursuk was 
weighed down by the disaster and planned to embark on a new campaign, he was 
prevented from doing so by his death shortly afterwards, and the expediton of 1115 
turned out to be the last one launched by the Great Seljukids.           
5.4 The consequences of the expeditions  
The failure of the Seljukid expeditions under Aksungur al-Bursuki and Bur-
suk al-Bursuk had serious consequences. The defeat met by the former in the hands 
of the Artukids offered Baldwin the opportunity of avenging himself on the Armeni-
ans who had lately been showing themselves insubordinate. Kogh Vasil’s widow had 
even sought support from Aksungur against the Franks of Edessa.
82
 Baldwin seized 
the lands and castles that had previously belonged to Kogh Vasil, as well as other 
lesser, independent Armenian cities of suspicious loyalty, and consequently the 
County of Edessa grew in power.
83
 The defeat of Bursuk ibn Bursuk, on the other 
hand, has been compared in importance to the Frankish victories scored during the 
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 Ibn al-Athir, El-Kâmil fi’t-Tarih, X, 399-400 and Chronicle, 166-67 (508: 1114-1115). 
83
 Işın Demirkent, Urfa Haçlı Kontluğu Tarihi (Vol. 1: İstanbul, 1974, Vol. 2: Ankara, 1994), I, 149. 
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First Crusade, and especially to the Battle of Doryleum, as it put a definite end to the 
attempts made by the Seljukids to check and repulse the Frankish advance.
84
 As Har-
old Fink observes, the Frankish states were to enjoy “more security than they had 
ever known before,” up to the battle of Ager Sanguinis four years later.85  
But even more importantly, Bursuk’s defeat also put an end to the simultane-
ous attempts of the Seljukids to subdue Ilghazi and the other Muslim emirs of the 
outer provinces, who found themselves practically independent as a result. For the 
campaigns of 1114 and 1115 represented the last efforts of the Seljukid sultanate to 
retighten its hold on its western territories, after the period of interregnum following 
the deaths of Nizam al-Mulk and Malikshah in 1092. The failure of these efforts 
compelled the sultan to abandon his claims of real as opposed to nominal suzerainty 
over the territories west of the Euphrates, and his direct rule became permanently re-
stricted to the areas east of that river. From this time onwards the emirs of Syria and 
the Jazira were left alone by the Seljukids, but also left alone against their former 
Frankish allies. Accordingly it was to be local dynasties like the Artukids, Burids (of 
Damascus), Zangids and Ayyubids who would henceforth confront the Franks.
86
 
5.5 The attitude of Ilghazi and Tughtekin after the end of Seljukid expeditions  
Tughtekin was not late in realizing this new situation and its implications. In 
October 1115, as we saw Ibn al-Qalanisi report, the Franks attacked Rafaniya and 
temporarily occupied the castle, which necessitiated the Damascene emir to under-
take prompt action and drive them away. This must have been enough to show him 
                                                 
84
 Grousset, Histoire, I, 510-11, and Cahen, Syrie du Nord, 274-75. 
85
 Harold S. Fink, “The Foundation of the Latin States,” in A History of the Crusades (London, 1969), 
I, 404-05. 
86
 Khalil, Al-Imarat al-Artuqiyya, 233-34. 
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that he stood alone against the Franks after Tell Danith,
87
 so he hastened to Baghdad 
to make his peace with the sultan. Being closer in Damascus to the Frankish territo-
ries, as Hillenbrand points out,
88
 he risked to lose far more than Ilghazi in the case of 
a complete break with the Seljukids. Ilghazi himself was more distant from the 
Frankish territories, and since he no longer had to fear any repraisals from the sultan, 
he felt no need to effect such a reconciliation. Nevertheless, Hillenbrand seems to be 
on less sure ground when she suggests that Tughtekin and Ilghazi might have been 
afflicted with a certain feeling of guilt and remorse for having fought with Christians 
against fellow Muslims. She asserts that because of such feelings as well as the in-
creased Frankish threat they avoided any further provocation of the sultan and did 
not collaborate with the Franks against him any longer.  
Admittedly, Hillenbrand is not the only scholar to lay stress on the fact that 
Ilghazi and Tughtekin did not ally with the Franks ever again. Harold Fink, for one, 
mentions the “deep impression” made by the Battle of Danith on the Muslims, and in 
this connection points out Tughtekin’s peace with the sultan as well as the fact that 
Ilghazi never allied with Roger again.
89
 Similarly, Grousset asserts that the two emirs 
“suddenly realized that the victory of their saviors was too complete,”90 while Ste-
venson states that the victory was “a warning to the Muslims to close their ranks.”91 
Imad al-Din Khalil goes the furthest in this direction; in his view, “this experience 
taught Ilghazi and Tughtekin a hard lesson” and they “realized the error in their atti-
tude,” since it did not bring them any benefit while it enabled the Frankish principali-
ties in the north to reach the peak of their power and inflict still other defeats upon 
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 Elisséeff, Nur ad-Din, II, 313. 
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the Muslims. It was for this reason that Tughtekin was reconciled with the sultan and 
Ilghazi turned to jihad, inflicting one defeat after another on the Franks.
92
    
Nevertheless, there is good reason to think that this emphasis on the two 
emirs’ change of heart and policy might rather be exaggerated. For it is not easy at all 
to assert with confidence that Ilghazi and Tughtekin would have refrained from ally-
ing with the Franks if the sultan had sent new armies to subjugate them. If they did 
not fight on the same side with the Franks ever again, this might be simply because 
no Seljukid armies were dispatched to the west after the Battle of Tell Danith, and 
consequently they no longer needed to ally with the Franks to defend their independ-
ence against the sultan. As far as Ilghazi is concerned, it cannot be argued either that 
he avoided provoking the sultan by continued defiance. His capture of eighty villages 
of Mayyafariqin from the feeble Seljukid governor of that city in 1116,
93
 as well as 
his capture of the city itself shortly after the next sultan’s accession,94 could well be 
considered acts of defiance and provocation in their own right.  
In contrast to the arguments of Hillenbrand and other scholars, therefore, 
Tughtekin and Ilghazi’s attitude after Tell Danith do not seem to reveal signs of a 
profound change of heart, a realization and regret of their “mistake” in allying with 
the Franks. The case was rather that they adapted themselves to the demands of the 
new situation when the expeditions from Mosul ceased for good and the Franks re-
mained their only rival in the struggle for control over the former districts of the Sel-
jukid empire. In this connection Köhler refers to “the limits of pan-Syrian solidarity 
possible in the Frankish-Islamic system of Syrian statehood.” He points out that the 
previous alliance between the local emirs and the Franks had not been the product of 
                                                 
92
 Khalil, Al-Imarat al-Artuqiyya, 233-34. 
93
 Khalil, Al-Imarat al-Artuqiyya, 98. 
94
 Cahen, Syrie du Nord, 274-75; Cahen, “Diyār Bakr,” 236 and n.2. The sultan eventually acknowl-
edged Ilghazi’s fait accompli and made over the city to him.  
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any real friendship or ideology of tolerance, as the mutually hostile comments of 
contemporary chroniclers make clear, but was only formed ad hoc, out of sober polit-
ical calculation. So when the external threat against which they had joined forces was 
removed, the two sides were bound to resume their former struggle for territorial ag-
grandizement at each other’s expense.95  
Cahen gives succinct expression to this fact: “Once the danger from the Sul-
tan had been removed, [Ilghazi] abandoned the friendship of the Franks –– now un-
easy at their power –– to resume, on his own account and at the call of the Aleppans, 
the Holy War which was to redound to his benefit.”96 But the reverse of this is equal-
ly true: in case a new external power came to threaten the region, like the Zangid 
Mosul of the 1130s and earlier 1140s, the local Muslim and Frankish leaders could 
just as easily reunite against it, only to break up again after its removal. The case 
would not have been different if new armies of the sultan had been sent from Mosul 
against Tughtekin, Ilghazi and their Frankish neighbors.  
Perhaps it would even be wrong to exaggerate the threat posed by the Frank-
ish neighbors in the couple of years following the Battle of Tell Danith, although this 
is commonly presented as what moved Ilghazi and Tughtekin to realize their mistake 
and renounce their alliance with them. Despite Grousset’s dramatic depiction of a 
Muslim Syria, “fragmented, divided,… incapable of defending itself” against the 
Franks who “seemed to have acquired a definitive superiority over Islam,”97 Steven-
son draws attention to the fact that from Tancred’s death in 1113 until 1117 there 
were no hostilities between Antioch and Aleppo and friendly relations were main-
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tained even after Tell Danith.
98
 This was not to change until the following year, when 
Aleppo came under attack from Antioch. That will be the subject of the next chapter. 
                                                 
98
 Stevenson, Crusaders in the East, 100, 101 and n.1.  
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CHAPTER 6 
ILGHAZI: SAVIOR OF ALEPPO 
Aleppo had been in an exceedingly weak state since Ridwan’s death in 1113, 
with depleted treasures, ravaged lands and bickering factions. Finally the Franks 
moved to take advantage of this situation, encouraged no doubt by the local rivalries 
that had come into existence once the Seljukid expeditions ceased after the debacle 
of 1115. Franks made a systematic effort to encircle Aleppo, probably with the ulti-
mate purpose of capturing it. Since Seljukid help was no longer available, it seemed 
quite likely that they would succeed in this undertaking. But at this point they saw 
their way blocked by none other than their former ally against the Seljukids, Ilghazi. 
It will be argued here that the reason for this was his awareness that the capture of 
Aleppo by the Franks would bring about a major shift in the power balance of the 
entire region, rendering them all too powerful. As a result, he and the other local 
emirs could perhaps see themselves confronted with the danger of a Frankish he-
gemony just when they had averted the reestablishment of the former Seljukid he-
gemony.  
Ilghazi had been summoned with extreme reluctance by the people of Alep-
po, only when they had not been able to find anybody else to protect them against the 
impending Frankish threat. Coming with much hesitation, because of the sorry state 
304 
 
of the city and its depleted treasures, he eventually succeeded in assuming full con-
trol of the government. Then he immediately set about the task of breaking the tight-
ening Frankish stranglehold on the city, surrounded as it was from three sides and 
especially threatened from the west from the Frankish-occupied castles al-Atharib 
and Zardana. Collecting Turkoman troops from his base in Diyar Bakr and invading 
the principality of Antioch, he inflicted a defeat of unprecedented severity upon the 
forces of Antioch, taking advantage of the mistakes of their prince Roger, and single-
handedly achieved a degree of success far beyond those of the Seljukid expeditions 
of the period from 1110 to 1115.  
Thus Ilghazi not only managed to relieve the pressure on Aleppo before it 
came under direct attack, despite a second battle that put a stop to his campaign, but 
also proved that a local emir of the Jazira could well score victories against the 
Franks that had been denied the Seljukid forces. This lesson was not lost on Ilghazi’s 
contemporaries and made him a precursor of later emirs like Zangi and Nur al-Din, 
who achieved still more successful results against the Franks by using the local re-
sources of Syria and the Jazira. The present chapter will trace these events from the 
state of Aleppo before Ilghazi’s takeover up to the end of his Syrian campaign, which 
comprised the battles of Ager Sanguinis and Tell Danith.  
 
6.1 The Aleppans’ invitation of Ilghazi; the significance of Ilghazi and Aleppo 
for each other  
By the time of Ridwan’s death and during the following regency of the eu-
nuch Lu’lu’, who “administered badly as was his habit,” according to Ibn al-Adim,1 
                                                 
1
 Kamal al-Din Ibn al-Adim, Zubdat al-Halab fi Tarikh Halab, RHC, Historiens Orientaux III, 606. 
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Aleppo was in considerable difficulties indeed. As we have seen in the last chapter, 
there was a split in its ruling structure: whereas the sultan and the regent controlled 
the citadel, but nothing else, the local notables under the leadership of the ra’is held 
sway over the city itself. The scanty economic resources that remained after the rav-
ages since the death of Malikshah and the First Crusade were also far from being ad-
equate to ward off the advancing Frankish menace.
2
 “The land produced little in the 
province since the Franks occupied a major part of it and threatened the rest,” Ibn al-
Adim notes, and “the money necessary to maintain the army was lacking.”3 It was 
hardly surprising under these conditions that when Lu’lu’ invited Tughtekin and oth-
ers to Aleppo to drive away the Franks, none of them responded. The local emirs 
must have been aware that their own resources would hardly suffice to defend Alep-
po against the serious threat it faced, and the scanty resources of the city itself were 
also quite inadequate for the task.  
Ilghazi was no exception at first, but finally did agree to come to aid of Alep-
po, both because he could draw upon the human and financial resources of his base 
in Diyar Bakr and because he did not want to see the Franks acquire hegemony in 
Syria and the Jazira by seizing the strategic keypoint of Aleppo. Indeed he saved the 
city from almost certain capture through his undertakings in the last four years of his 
life, as we shall examine in the present and the following chapter. In the present sec-
tion we shall first examine the course of events that led to Ilghazi’s takeover of 
Aleppo, and then discuss the precise significance held by Aleppo and Ilghazi for 
each other. In the process we shall also be tackling the question whether it was a ra-
tional decision on the part of Ilghazi to get involved with the affairs of Aleppo at all.  
                                                 
2
 Claude Cahen, La Syrie du Nord au temps de Croisades et la Principauté Franque d’Antioche (Paris, 
1940), 269-70. 
3
 Ibn al-Adim, RHC, Historiens Orientaux III, 606-07. 
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6.1.1 The course of developments 
The most detailed account of the conditions under which Ilghazi was sum-
moned to Aleppo and took over the city issues from the Aleppan chronicler Ibn al-
Adim.
4
 He relates how Aleppo had been reduced to a bone of contention between the 
Franks, Ilghazi, Khir Khan of Hims and Tughtekin and Aksungur at this time. Alt-
hough the Aleppans initially relied on Frankish support against the local Muslim 
emirs and Aksungur, the Seljukid sultan’s agent in Rahba, they had to turn in des-
paration to Ilghazi when their former Frankish allies decided to take advantage of 
their weakness and went on to the attack, ravaging Aleppan territory and besieging 
Azaz. The other, brief accounts of the events in question by Ibn al-Athir,
5
 Ibn al-
Qalanisi,
6
 al-Azimi
7
 and Ibn abi Tayyi (cited by Ibn al-Furat)
8
 add little that is new to 
Ibn al-Adim’s version. Accordingly we shall mainly follow Ibn al-Adim’s account, 
referring to the others where they stand in contrast or contribute additional infor-
mation.  
Lu’lu’ did not live long after the Battle of Tell Danith in 1115 and was mur-
dered in April 1117; his authority had been on the wane for some time, as Cahen 
points out,
9
 not least because he had aroused the religious conservatism of the Alep-
pans by building the first khaniqa (dervish lodge) in the city. His rival for power was 
Ibn Badi‘, the de facto ruler of the city. To Lu’lu’s great annoyance, he began col-
                                                 
4
 Ibn al-Adim, RHC, Historiens Orientaux III, 610-15. 
5
 Ibn al-Athir, El-Kâmil fi’t-Tarih Tercümesi, translated by A. Özaydın, A. Ağırakça et al., 12 vols. 
(İstanbul 1987), X, 422-23 and The Chronicle of Ibn al-Athir for the Crusading Period from al-Kamil 
fi’l-Tarikh, Part 1, translated by D. S. Richards (Aldershot, 2006), 187 (511: 1117-1118). 
6
 Ibn al-Qalanisi, The Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades, translated by H. A. R. Gibb (London 
1932), 155-56 (510: 1116-1117), 156-57 (511: 1117-1118). 
7
 Al-Azimi, Azimî Tarihi: Selçuklular Dönemiyle İlgili Bölümler, H.430-538, edited and translated by 
Ali Sevim (Ankara, 1988), 33 (Arabic) and 40 (Turkish) (510: 1116-1117), 33 (Arabic) and 41 (Turk-
ish) (511: 1117-1118). 
8
 Ibn al-Furat, II, 32, cited in Imad al-Din Khalil, Al-Imarat al-Artuqiyya fi’l-Jazira wa’l-Sham (Bei-
rut, 1980), 99, n. 5. 
9
 Cahen, Syrie du Nord, 276-77. 
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lecting partisans around Sultanshah, the six-year old brother of the murdered Alp 
Arslan ibn Ridwan. Sultanshah had been excluded from power by Lu’lu’, but now 
the latter was compelled to acknowledge the prince’s authority. It was at this point 
that Lu’lu’ left the city, only to be killed on the way by the castle of Nadir, between 
Aleppo and Balis, in April 1117.  
Different reasons are adduced by the sources for Lu’lu’s departure. Accord-
ing to Al-Azimi, he had left Aleppo for a journey to the pilgrimage location Siffin, 
which was probably no more than a pretext, while Ibn al-Athir asserts that his inten-
tion was to go to Qal‘at Ja‘bar to meet with its lord, Salim ibn Malik. Ibn al-Adim 
himself offers two different versions. According to one of these Lu’lu’ was indeed on 
the way to meet Salim ibn Malik to get back a sum of money which he had given to 
be deposited the Castle of Dawsar (Ja‘bar), but was killed by a group of his own 
companions. These had been bribed by Aksungur al-Bursuki, who planned to secure 
the posession of Aleppo in this way.
10
 Nevertheless, both Aksungur and a group of 
his soldiers who had treacherously come to a separate agreement with the mur-
dererers were outstripped by the eunuch Yaruktash, a long-time officer of Lulu’s, 
who managed to reach and occupy Aleppo before them.  
According to the other version cited by Ibn al-Adim, Lu’lu’ had left Aleppo 
for good because of his fear of Ibn Badi‘’s activities, planning to bring his treasures 
to safety in the East. He was killed by the castle of Nadir, when a Turkish officer 
called Sungur al-Chakarmish urged his companions to avange the murder of Alp 
Arslan ibn Ridwan and to prevent Lu’lu’ from getting away with the sultan’s treas-
ures. This is supported by Ibn al-Qalanisi, who asserts that the assassination was car-
                                                 
10
 Basing himself on Ibn al-Qalanisi, Cahen asserts in the same place that Aksungur had in fact ob-
tained the concession of Aleppo from Sultan Muhammad. But no such affirmation could be found in 
this source, either in the location Cahen indicates (Damascus Chronicle, 154-55) or elsewhere.  
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ried out in vengeance for Lu’lu’s murder of Alp Arslan by the latter’s former offic-
ers. Ibn al-Athir presents a slightly different explanation on the same lines, stating 
that Lu’lu’ was murdered by Sultanshah’s men upon their discovery of his design to 
eliminate the prince, just like he had previously done to the latter’s brother Alp Arl-
san. Two days after Lu’lu’s flight from Aleppo, Ibn al-Adim continues with his ac-
count, Yaruktash arrived to get hold of the citadel and took measures against those 
associated with Lu’lu’s murder. Some of these fled to Balis to join Aksungur, who 
had failed in his initial plan of seizing Aleppo (5 May 1117). He still sent a demand 
for the surrender of the city, but this was rejected.  
From both versions cited by Ibn al-Adim, it emerges that Aksungur might in-
deed have had something to do with Lu’lu’s murder. He had probably won over a 
group of Turkish troops in the Aleppan army including Sungur al-Chakarmish, who 
moved on the pretext of avenging Alp Arslan’s murder or, according to Ibn al-Athir, 
preventing the murder of his brother Sultanshah. Lu’lu’s departure from Aleppo to 
meet with Salim ibn Malik might also have been due to his having an inkling about 
the existence of such a plot against himself. Nevertheless, Aksungur, being a loyal 
representative of the Seljukid sultan in the region, was absolutely unwanted in Alep-
po, and Yaruktash turned to his sworn enemy Ilghazi as well as to Roger of Antioch 
to ward him off.  
Ilghazi’s response is not indicated by Ibn al-Adim; possibly he did not re-
spond at all, or answered in the negative, upon which Yaruktash turned to Roger in-
stead. If this was the case, it might be taken as evidence that the events of 1115 had 
modified Ilghazi’s negative attitude toward the Seljukid presence in Syria, especially 
if one considers his personal enmity with Aksungur. But it might equally have been 
the case that Yaruktash wrote simultaneously to both rulers in a state of panic and 
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Roger, being much closer to the scene of events, was quick to act while Ilghazi was 
still busy with the preparations and the collection of troops in Diyar Bakr. Indeed he 
eventually did come to Aleppo as we shall see. 
When Roger arrived to take hold of the eastern districts of Aleppan territory, 
Ibn al-Adim continues, Aksungur was compelled to leave Balis, having despaired of 
acquiring the city. Thus the Muslims of Aleppo still showed themselves as deter-
mined as ever to resist any attempts of the Seljukids to restore their control over the 
region. The events of 1115 do not seem to have made a serious impact on their atti-
tude in this respect. Nor was this to be the last time that the Aleppans put up a 
staunch resistance against Aksungur.  
Ibn al-Adim goes on to relate that Aksungur proceeded from Balis to Hims, 
where he was welcomed by another emir loyal to the Seljukids, Khir Khan; together 
they went to Damascus to meet Tughtekin. By this time the atabek had made his 
peace with the Seljukid sultan and then succesfully joined forces with Aksungur 
against a Frankish attack from Tripoli (1116).
11
 So he received them well, promising 
to support Aksungur in his attempts on Aleppo. On the other hand Roger was re-
warded bountifully for having driven off Aksungur and concluded a treaty with Ya-
ruktash, who granted him a sum of money, the fortress of al-Qubba, and the right to 
levy taxes of usage (mukūs) from the pilgrims and other caravans passing by that cas-
tle. It was a very serious concession, as Cahen points out,
12
 for all of the three roads 
from Aleppo to Damascus via Ma‘arrat al-Nu‘man, Sawran and al-Qubba had now 
come under Frankish control. Since Yaruktash lacked a clientage in the city, howev-
er, he was also ousted from power and banished like Lu’lu on his attempt to get hold 
of the citadel (where Ridwan’s family resided). This happened one month after his 
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 Ibn al-Qalanisi, Damascus Chronicle, 153-55 (510: 1116-1117). 
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takeover. The tasks of government and the command of the army were then entrusted 
to the inspector of the army, Al-Amid abu’l-Ma‘ali Muhsin ibn Milhi. Ibn al-Adim 
asserts that under the mediocre administration of this man Aleppo was weakened and 
impoverished while its territories fell into a state of ruin.  
It was at this point that Ilghazi entered the scene for the first time as another 
claimant to Aleppo. Upon arriving in the city he was denied access to the great cita-
del, since the Aleppans were at first reluctant to allow him full control of the admin-
istration by enabling him to oust the existing rulers. Accordingly he settled in Qal‘at 
Sharif, a fort situated just outside the southern walls of the city, and took over the 
government as well as the tutelage of Sultanshah (511: 1117). Eventually he was en-
trusted with the great citadel and the castle of Balis as well, and placed Ibn Milhi un-
der arrest. But this first stay of Ilghazi in Aleppo was not to last long: the economic 
situation of the city was far from being at a level that would enable him to meet the 
needs of his Turkoman troops, and as he failed to bring about any improvement in 
the prevailing conditions, Ibn al-Adim says, he came to fear a possible attack from 
the populace and the local troops. In the same connection Al-Azimi notes that Ilgha-
zi’s position in the city deteriorated, and Ibn al-Qalanisi states that “his plans miscar-
ried.” So, after having ruled the city for the period of Safar (24 June – 22 July) he 
returned to Mardin, but the citadel
13
 and the castle of Balis remained in his posses-
sion.  
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 Cahen, Syrie du Nord, 276-77. 
13
 Actually Ibn al-Adim writes al-qalīʿa, which has been interpreted as referring to a place called 
Qulay‘a in the French translation in RHC; Gerhard Väth (Geschichte, 74) transcribes it as Qal‘iya, 
taking it as a location noted in Yaqut’s Buldan, IV, 396. However, in view of the fact that Ibn al-Adim 
does not speak of Ilghazi taking hold of such a place before, but mentions instead the concession of 
the citadel of Aleppo (al-qalʿa) to him, I assume al-qalīʿa to be a misspelling for al-qalʿa. This is all 
the more as no other source notes Ilghazi’s possession of such a place called Qal‘iya or Qulay‘a 
alongside Balis. 
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Ibn al-Adim goes on to relate that Ibn al-Milhi was released after Ilghazi’s 
departure and restored to his post. When the Artukid troops installed in Balis got 
news of this they began to ravage the territory of Aleppo, and the Aleppans respond-
ed by summoning the Franks to their aid; apparently, the Aleppans were still bent on 
the increasingly desparate struggle to save their own skins by pitting the powers in 
the region against each other. Together with a Frankish detachment the Aleppan 
troops laid siege to Balis, but they had to withdraw when Ilghazi reappeared on the 
scene with a group of Turkomans. After selling Balis to Salim ibn Malik, who in turn 
conceded it to the Aleppans, Ilghazi returned to Mardin, but he left behind his son 
Timurtash as his deputy
14
 in the city. According to the Aleppan author Ibn abi Tayyi 
(cited by Ibn al-Furat), however, the first son Ilghazi installed in Aleppo as his depu-
ty was not Timurtash, as stated by Ibn al-Adim, Ibn al-Athir, Ibn al-Qalanisi and Al-
Azimi, but his youngest son Sarim al-Din Kizil Arslan. He was succeeded by Timur-
tash only when he died in 513 (1119-1120), to the great sorrow of the Aleppans be-
cause of the excellent conduct Kizil Arslan had shown towards them.
15
 
It was not only against Ilghazi that the Aleppans continued to rely on Frank-
ish support. Ibn al-Adim relates that in the same year Aksungur approached the city 
again, this time with Tughtekin in his company, in order to demand their submission. 
Once more he met with a firm rejection from the people of the city, who declared: 
“We do not want anybody from the East!” –– meaning presumably anybody associ-
ated with the Great Seljukids. Then they invited the Franks of Antioch to ward off 
Aksungur and Tughtekin, who returned home to Rahba and Damascus. Al-Azimi and 
                                                 
14
 The precise word used by Ibn al-Adim here is in fact rahīna, meaning hostage. Similarly, the verb 
rahana is used by al-Azimi. Probably this should be taken to indicate that the son in question was left 
behind both as Ilghazi’s representative and as a guarantee that he would return immediately to help the 
city if it found itself in difficulty again. 
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Ibn al-Qalanisi, relating the same event, do not mention the presence of Tughtekin or 
the Aleppans’ invitation of the Franks, but content themselves with noting that Ak-
sungur “approached” (Al-Azimi) or indeed “besieged” (Ibn al-Qalanisi) the city to 
take it, but was forced to depart when the affair did not turn out as he had hoped.    
Shortly after this the economic conditions in Aleppo deteriorated still further, 
because of a great draught, so the inhabitants turned this time to Khir Khan ibn Kara-
ja. Ibn al-Adim explains that this was owing to the good order he had brought to 
Hims, his own town, which he had also fortified. He relates that Khir Khan complied 
with the request and arrived at Aleppo; he settled in the citadel for fear of Ilghazi, on 
account of the old enmity between them. Ilghazi’s son Kizil Arslan was also turned 
over to him.
16
  
Although shortly before Tughtekin had received Khir Khan along with Ak-
sungur hospitably at Damascus, he did not tolerate this last step by Khir Khan. He 
may have considered that Khir-Khan’s takeover of Aleppo without any challenge 
would not be received well by Ilghazi, his ally and son-in-law. Aksungur was admit-
tedly also an enemy of Ilghazi’s, but Tughtekin’s recent good relations with the Sel-
jukid sultan and the help he had received from Aksungur in repelling the attack of the 
Franks from Tripoli necessitated him to support that emir, whereas he had no such 
reason to adopt a similar attitude towards Khir Khan as the latter acted alone. Khir 
Khan was little more than a minor local emir who had been trying to secure his inde-
pendence from Damascus by supporting the Seljukid sultan against him, but now that 
Tughtekin had made up his differences with the sultan, he had no motive to indulge 
his once rebellious emir. Accordingly he marched to Hims to ravage its territory, and 
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 For two other short reports concerning Ilghazi’s takeover of Aleppo see Chronique de Michel le 
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although Ibn al-Adim does not openly indicate so, this movement must have forced 
Khir Khan to abandon Aleppo and return to his town. For we hear no more of him in 
connection with that city. Tughtekin, on his part, was forced to return to Damascus 
upon receiving the news of a Franish attack upon the region of Hawran (mid-1118).  
 It was also around this time that the Franks of Antioch attacked a caravan 
that had set out for Aleppo, carrying provisions and money to relieve the city in its 
dire straits. After levying the taxes of usage from it at al-Qubba, in accordance with 
the treaty they had made with Yaruktash, the Franks returned to attack and capture 
the travelers and their possessions. They imprisoned the captives at Apamea and 
Ma‘arrat al-Nu‘man until they would fix the price of their ransom. But Roger re-
turned all the captives and goods upon the protests of Ibn Milhi, who sent many gifts 
in return. Ibn Milhi himself was arrested sometime after this; he had tried to stir up 
the anti-Turkish sentiments of the Aleppans in an effort to deflect their hostility 
against his Damascene origins. He was replaced by Karaja, a black eunuch appointed 
by Sultanshah.
17
  
Ibn al-Adim observes that the restoration of the caravan by the Franks had not 
changed the fact that their apetite for Aleppo was greatly whetted by the weakness of 
the city and by its failure to secure aid from other Muslim emirs. Accordingly they 
broke the truce and invaded the territory of Aleppo, seizing an immense amount of 
booty. In face of this treachery at the hands of long-time allies, the Aleppans turned 
to Tughtekin for help, but he was defeated by Joscelin of Tell Bashir. Ready even to 
abandon their anti-Seljukid policy, the Aleppans turned this time to the lord of Mo-
sul, Juyush Bey, but he was preoccupied with the complications following the sul-
tan’s death in Baghdad. In the meanwhile the Franks of Antioch, accompanied by an 
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Armenian detachment under the Rupenid prince Leo,
18
 proceeded to lay siege to 
Azaz, to the north of Aleppo. The castle came to the brink of capture. “The hearts of 
the Aleppans sank upon this news,” Ibn al-Adim states, “as there was no backing left 
for Aleppo except for that coming from Azaz and its lands. The rest of the Aleppan 
territory was in the hands of the Franks and the east of the province was ruined and 
desolate.” The conditions within the city were also very grave, with provisions de-
pleted and grain and food prices soaring.   
As a desparate last resort in this situation, the Aleppans decided to appeal 
once more to Ilghazi and sent a deputation of notables and officers to Mardin. Trust-
ing that he would arrive at the head of an army large enough to relieve the city, they 
promised him a sum to pay his troops, which was to be levied from the townsfolk. 
Great was their disappointment, therefore, when Ilghazi appeared with only a small 
contingent. One reason for this may have been his desire to avoid losing further time 
while collecting Turkomans from Diyar Bakr, which could perhaps cause him to lose 
Aleppo to another Muslim emir or even to the Franks. Another reason may have been 
his knowledge that under the economic conditions prevailing in Aleppo he would 
barely manage to feed a great army for a long time, as he had learned the last time at 
his own expense. Whatever Ilghazi’s reasons for bringing along a small force may 
have been, the Aleppans were extremely discontented. He was initially denied entry 
into the city, and a new dispute broke out about whether he ought to be received at 
all. The emir had already departed for Mardin when a group of notables, headed by 
the qadi Ibn al-Khashshab, the effective administrator of the city at the time, caught 
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 Cahen, Syrie du Nord, 278. 
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 Armenia and the Crusades, Tenth to Twelfth Centuries: the Chronicle of Matthew of Edessa, trans-
lated by Ara Edmond Dostourian (Lanham, New York, London, 1993), 222-23 (III.78).  
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up with him. Through demonstrations of kindness and friendship, they managed to 
persuade him to return to Aleppo. 
After Ilghazi entered the city, Ibn al-Adim relates, he set about establishing 
his authority there. He got hold of the great citadel, expelled Ridwan’s family, troops 
and companions from it, and extorted whatever remained of Ridwan’s treasures from 
the associates of the eunuchs who had been administering the city since his death. He 
also placed under arrest his precedessors in government, Yaruktash, Ibn al-Milhi and 
Karaja. After this Ilghazi turned to the matter of Azaz and offered the money he had 
extorted in this way to the Franks who besieged the castle, in order to buy off their 
departure, but they refused to pay heed. Writing from a perspective of religious con-
frontation, Ibn al-Adim attributes this to “the strength of their aspirations against the 
cause of Islam.” The practical reason seems to be that the fall of the town being im-
minent, the Franks had nothing to gain and much to lose by accepting the proposal. 
They must also have been aware that Ilghazi had arrived with too few troops to offer 
them any serious resistance; indeed even with this small force he was unable to feed 
his horses, as Aleppo stood on the verge of total ruin. According to Ibn al-Athir, this 
state of affairs resulted from the ravages and indifferent administrators of the last 
years, as well as from Lu’lu’s distribution of Ridwan’s treasures to preseve his posi-
tion. When the garrison in Azaz learned of the miserable condition of Aleppo, Ibn al-
Adim reports, they despaired of any relief from Aleppo, and surrendered the castle to 
the Franks.  
After the fall of Azaz, the Franks no longer had any reason to reject a truce, 
though Ibn al-Adim still remarks with obvious relief that “they accepted it by God’s 
grace.” Peace was concluded on the following terms: the surrender of the fortress of 
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Hiraq;
19
 the abandonment of the districts to the north and west of Aleppo to the 
Franks; and finally a payment spread over four months for the recompense of war 
expenses, amounting to a total of one thousand dinars. This last was the sum that 
Ilghazi had mulcted from the servants of Lu’lu’ and other eunuchs. Ibn al-Athir notes 
that it was sufficient to buy only a short truce, intended to last until Ilghazi could col-
lect troops from Mardin and return to Aleppo. Following the conclusion of the 
agreement, Ibn al-Adim reports, Ilghazi set out for Mardin and Aleppo was supplied 
with enough food to satisfy the hunger of its starved inhabitants. As for the Franks, 
he relates that they returned to Antioch after having tilled the lands of Azaz and reas-
sured the Muslim peasants there that they could stay.  
6.1.2 The significance of Ilghazi and Aleppo for each other 
Now the Franks had come to batter the gates of Aleppo from nearly all sides, 
and the city found itself in a very precarious situation. The fall of Azaz allowed the 
Franks to gain mastery of the entire plain to the north of the city, as well as to take 
control of the direct route of communications between Antioch and Tell Bashir. The 
castle of Hiraq had had to be ceded by the truce, and the valley of Butnan, to the 
northeast, was also ravaged or occupied by the Franks. Thus in Cahen’s words the 
city, “almost encircled, cut off from its most important routes of communication, 
seemed to be on the brink of succumbing.”20  
An important question that has been raised in connection with this onslaught 
of the Franks is whether their intention from the start was to capture Aleppo, or ra-
ther to try to gain ground without causing a major upheaval, an aim which failed 
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when they went too far in these efforts and through needless agression pushed Alep-
po into the arms of Ilghazi and his Turkomans. René Grousset, in conformity with 
his view of the Latin settlements as model proto-colonies, contends that the Franks of 
Antioch had established a protectorate over Aleppo that functioned well despite some 
abuses that were eventually corrected, like the capture of the caravan from Damas-
cus. But it still wore down the Aleppans in the end, he says, and preferring a Muslim 
suzerain, they summoned Ilghazi. He argues that even after the capture of Azaz Rog-
er could have remained “the arbitrator of Muslim Syria,” if he had had the wisdom to 
stop there. But then he committed a serious mistake by adding to his conquests 
Buza‘a and a castle in the outskirts of al-Bab, which amounted to the encirclement of 
Aleppo. Reducing the Arab population of Aleppo in this way to a situation of ex-
tremity, according to Grousset, Roger threw the weak city-republic ruled by eunuchs 
into the arms of its “savage” Turkoman protectors.21  
Michael Köhler goes still further: although he admits that Roger’s efforts of 
territorial aggrandizement at the expense of Aleppo constituted a deviation from the 
line of coexistence maintained by means of truces and tributes, he insists that all that 
the prince in question wanted was “a change in the status quo, without attacking 
Aleppo directly.” But the conditions in Aleppo were arguably so aggravated as a re-
sult of this that the citizens were compelled to seek help from outside.
22
         
Given the Franks’ systematic efforts to encircle Aleppo from all sides howev-
er, in which they must have invested a lot in money, manpower and time,
23
 despite 
the undeniable profits they also gained in the process, it does look like as if they were 
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 René Grousset, Histoire des Croisades et du Royaume Franc de Jérusalem, 3 vols. (Paris, 1934-
1936), I, 548-49. 
22
 Michael Köhler, Allianzen und Verträge zwischen fränkischen und islamischen Herrschern im Vor-
deren Orient. Eine Studie über das zwischenstaatliche Zusammenleben vom 12. bis ins 13. Jahrhun-
dert (Berlin, 1991), 138-39. 
318 
 
deliberately striving to capture the city. This is only too understandable, given the 
considerable advantages they would gain from the major shift in the power balance 
that would occur in the region as soon as this strategical keypoint had changed hands. 
As things stood by the end of 1118, there was still a state of equilibrium in this re-
spect, admittedly with an advantageous position for the Franks because of the har-
mony prevailing among their leaders at the time. As Gibb puts it,  
Jerusalem faced Damascus, Antioch faced Aleppo, and Tripoli faced the 
group of lesser cities in the upper Orontes valley. Although Aleppo lay be-
tween Antioch and Edessa, they, too, lay between Aleppo and the Muslim 
principalities to east and north, as Jerusalem lay between Damascus and 
Egypt.
24
  
The external powers were not in a position to disturb this equilibrium either, as the 
Seljukids had given up all their ambitions for Syria after the debacle of 1115, and the 
Turks and Byzantines in Anatolia balanced each other. Since Aleppo formed the piv-
otal point of the whole system, its annexation by any of the powers in the region 
would lead to a major reshuffling of the cards and provide that polity with a great 
advantage over the others, allowing it to establish ultimate hegemony in Northern 
Syria.
25
 The Franks could not have been unaware of his fact, and accordingly went 
into attack once they found Aleppo almost helpless and ripe for encircling and cap-
turing.  
   The result that emerges from these considerations is that there was indeed a 
real danger that Aleppo could fall to the Franks, and among the emirs of the Syria 
and Mesopotamia, only Ilghazi seemed to be in a position to prevent this. As Väth 
observes, the power vacuum created in the Jazira because of the weakness of Aksun-
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gur’s successor in Mosul, Juyush Bey, had been filled by the Artukids. By dint of the 
numerous power bases they possessed in the region, they had become the greatest 
emirs of the Jazira and an ultimate source of help for the Muslim rulers in Syria, in 
case every other remedy failed.
26
 Indeed we have seen that Ilghazi was the very last 
alternative to whom the Aleppans turned in desparation, after they had been unable 
to find any other Muslim emir willing to ward off the Franks from Azaz –– the last 
bastion before they would be in a position to attack Aleppo itself.  
Ilghazi, on his part, scarcely had any other option than to accept the invitation 
and assume the defense and administration of Aleppo. Otherwise there was a serious 
probability that this key to hegemony in Northern Syria could fall to the Franks, 
causing a serious shift in the power balance of the region that could bring danger as 
far as the gates of Mardin. For this reason, even though Ilghazi’s own base was in 
Diyar Bakr, and Aleppo had been impoverished and its surrounding area devastated, 
he could not have afforded to sit back and watch it being captured if he did not wish 
to see his territories become the butt of Frankish aggression in turn. All this shows 
that Carole Hillenbrand is not quite justified when she criticizes Ilghazi for having 
behaved with poor judgement and with having committed a serious blunder by his 
involvement in the affairs of Aleppo, and considers this move in the same category 
as his expedition to Georgia, as a reckless striving for territories outside Diyar 
Bakr.
27
  
In fact Ilghazi seems to have responded to the invitation from Aleppo with 
considerable hesitation, rather than with a foolhardy appetite. If the Aleppan chroni-
cler Ibn abi-Tayyi (cited by Ibn al-Furat) is to be lent credence, this attitude even 
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went so far as offering the city to Tughtekin: in a letter he wrote to the atabek at this 
time, Ilghazi reportedly notified him that Aleppo had come into his hands, and in 
case Tughtekin wanted the city, he would gladly hand it over to him.
28
 Some of the 
reasons for Ilghazi’s hesitant attitude are self-evident: there was now constant Frank-
ish pressure up to the outskirts of Aleppo, rendering it a dangerous place to own, 
while its economy was in a miserable state because of the past ravages and misrule.
29
 
In addition to these military and economic problems, Imad al-Din Khalil points out 
Ilghazi’s general aversion towards fighting the Franks, evident since his takeover of 
Mardin. He suggests that this trait, “a psychological characteristic of Ilghazi in the 
first period of his political life,” may also have played a role in his hesitation to ac-
cept the invitation from Aleppo.
30
  
This line of argument seems hard to accept, however. Ilghazi’s aversion to-
wards fighting the Franks in the past years had not stemmed from “psychological” 
causes, but rather from his resistance to the attempts of the Seljukid sultan and his 
governors in Mosul to bring him to heel. At that time he had nothing to gain by 
fighting the Franks, and much to gain on the contrary from making common cause 
with them. But now the attempts of the sultan to restore control over the region had 
ceased for good, and Ilghazi was left alone. If the reestablishment of Seljukid he-
gemony had not suited his interests, neither would the establishment of a Frankish 
hegemony bound to replace it as a result of the fall of Aleppo. It was for this reason 
that despite his misgivings that stemmed from the Frankish pressure on the city, the 
bad state of its economy, and the difficulty of paying his Turkoman troops, Ilghazi 
felt compelled to accept the invitation.    
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Although Ilghazi thus took over the rule of Aleppo, he treated it only as a re-
mote dependency. He avoided dedicating more time and resources to it than was 
strictly necessary or desirable. He governed the city through deputies, his son and 
then his nephew, and contented himself with visiting it from time to time, mainly in 
the context of his efforts to restore the status quo before its encirclement by the 
Franks.
31
 In fact Ilghazi did not have any other option, such as turning Aleppo into 
his main base. The Turkomans constituting the backbone of his family’s power were 
still based in Diyar Bakr in this period, and although they had already begun to infil-
trate Syria, their transfer and permanent settlement there in substantial numbers 
would have to await the time of Zangi and Nur al-Din.
32
 Since the Turkomans were 
notoriously reluctant to remain away from Diyar Bakr for long periods, Ilghazi 
would have found it well nigh impossible to shift his center from Mardin to Aleppo, 
even if he had wanted to do so in view of the largeness and prestige of the latter city.  
Thus Hillenbrand is not justified in praising Ilghazi for the astuteneness of his 
decision to keep with Mardin as his center, rather than moving to an Aleppo threat-
ened by the Franks and Ismailians, a decision that secured the future of his dynasty in 
her view.
33
 This was not so much a matter of personal decision as the result of struc-
tural and demographic factors. In any case, the result that emerges once again from 
these considerations is that Ilghazi’s involvement in the affairs of Aleppo cannot be 
considered in the same category as his expedition to Georgia, as a reckless craving 
for spoils, prestige and perhaps also new lands. It was a responsible undertaking to 
                                                                                                                                          
30
 Khalil, Al-Imarat al-Artuqiyya, 239, n. 1. 
31
 Claude Cahen “Diyār Bakr au temps des premiers Urtukids,” Journal Asiatique 227 (1935), 236; 
Hillenbrand, “History of the Jazira,” 142. 
32
 Cahen, Syrie du Nord, 185-86, Faruk Sümer, Oğuzlar (Türkmenler): Tarihleri – Boy Teşkilatı – 
Destanları  (İstanbul, 1992), 117. 
33
 Hillenbrand, “History of the Jazira,” 139, 142. 
322 
 
which the emir did not dedicate more effort and resources than was necessary and 
possible. 
But Hillenbrand also goes to the other extreme in an effort to illustrate the 
secondary rank Ilghazi accorded to Aleppo. She maintains that he valued his posses-
sion of the city so little that during the campaign to Georgia he offered it to his son-
in-law Dubais, in return for the latter’s aid in a planned attempt to capture Antioch.34 
But it seems rather doubtful that this report of Ibn al-Adim can be considered in the 
way Hillenbrand does. Antioch was a still greater prize than Aleppo, and one that 
would be even harder to keep in hand, so Ilghazi’s readiness to replace Aleppo with 
Antioch would hardly show that he attached little importance to having possessions 
in Syria in general. Furthermore, it emerges from the rest of Ibn al-Adim’s report that 
on the way home from Georgia Ilghazi changed his mind about his former proposal, 
perhaps because he had no longer sufficient forces to attack Antioch, and sought 
some pretext to go back on his word. For this purpose he reportedly instructed his 
son in Aleppo to stage a fake revolt, which was then turned into a real one.
35
 Wheth-
er one accepts the detail about the rebellion or not, the result that emerges from this 
anecdote is that unless Ilghazi saw any chance to receive a greater prize than Aleppo 
in Syria, he was not ready at all to forgo the city.  
For this reason, Ibn al-Adim’s story about Ilghazi’s proposal to Dubais can-
not be taken as evidence for his lack of interest in possessing Aleppo. Even though 
he was initially slow to take over Aleppo, and then accorded it only a secondary rank 
beside Mardin, he still seems to have regarded the city as an important possession 
and would not so easily forsake it unlike his son Timurtash later. Once he had taken 
over Aleppo he did not attempt to withdraw from Syria thereafter, and steadfastly 
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continued to defend it against the Franks. He also tried to make gains to secure it and 
make it more viable. 
On the other hand, it would also be an exaggeration to argue like Imad al-Din 
Khalil that Aleppo, with its secure and central strategic position greatly conducive to 
fighting the Franks, paved the way for its rulers Ilghazi and Belek to take the leader-
ship of jihad.
36
 The intention of these two Artukid emirs was rather to defend Aleppo 
against the encirclement of the Franks, especially by pushing back its western fron-
tiers, and thereby to prevent them tilting the power balance of the region in their own 
favor. There is no evidence beyond this to suggest that they ever thought of using 
Aleppo as the base for a major “Counter-Crusade” against the Frankish presence in 
Syria, quite apart from the opportunity it offered for some good fighting against “in-
fidels.” These points will become clear in the subsequent discussion.  
Even if Ilghazi was slow to take over and govern Aleppo, and it was the 
Aleppans who needed him against the Franks, this should not be taken to mean that 
everybody in the city was eager to accept him, especially when they saw the small 
reinforcements he brought. Indeed we saw that he was at first denied entry even 
when Azaz was about to fall, and it was a group of notables led the qadi Ibn al-
Khashshab that persuaded him to stay. As Emmanuel Sivan indicates,
37
 the qadi was 
not only the de facto administrator of the city at that time, but also the leader of the 
pietist circles among the indigenous notables and their popular clientage. These had 
gained in power after Ridwan’s death, and now successfully promoted the newly re-
suscitated jihad ideology in defence against the advancing Franks. It was also in this 
connection that the circles in question played a major role in the invitation to Ilghazi. 
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But even at this time they were still far from enjoying the support of the majority of 
the populace, who remained untouched by the jihad ideology and still showed them-
selves willing to rely on Frankish support against Ilghazi and other Muslim emirs. 
Prince Roger successfully collaborated with such factions to bar the way of powerful 
rulers-to-be like Ilghazi.
38
  
As a result of this situation the Artukid emir was compelled to leave the city 
after only a short time, and the Aleppan troops besieged his garrison in Balis together 
with the Franks. Indeed it was not until the last minute, when the Franks’ intention 
was made fully clear by the siege of Azaz, that the pro-jihad circles finally managed 
to get Ilghazi accepted. Even at this hour of pressing danger though, they met with 
serious opposition.  
In this connection Sivan observes that this was not the first time that the weak 
ruler of a besieged city was replaced by a powerful foreigner, as Tughtekin had re-
placed the Fatimid governor of Tyre in 1112. But he draws attention to the fact that 
Ilghazi’s replacement of Karaja in Aleppo represented the first such change that was 
carried out by a popular opposition animated by the slogans of jihad and led by the 
avowed protagonists of that idea among the notables. Indeed after Ilghazi’s takeover 
Ibn al-Khashshab and his followers kept up the jihad propaganda and presented 
Ilghazi’s actions in the garb of Holy War. How far Ilghazi himself shared in this 
view of his struggle against the Franks is a different matter that will be discussed at 
the end of the next chapter. 
Whatever their ideological motivations, time showed that Ibn al-Khashshab 
and his followers were not mistaken in their invitation of Ilghazi. Although the im-
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portance of Aleppo remained limited for the Artukid emir, the reverse was not true: 
his short reign turned out to be of great significance for the city. As we shall see, he 
saved it from almost certain capture by his victory in the Battle of Ager Sanguinis, 
and secured its western frontier against the encroachments of Antioch. After his 
death, this policy was succesfully continued by his nephew Belek. Admittedly, as 
observed by Gibb, the Artukid rule of Aleppo was far from providing the city with a 
perfect shelter from the Frankish threat. Among the reasons for this were the divi-
sions within the Artukid family as well as the undisciplined nature of their Turkoman 
troops in search of booty, hard to keep in the field for extended periods.
39
 But still 
the epoch-making significance of the Artukid period for Aleppo cannot be overesti-
mated, and goes beyond the personal achievements of Ilghazi and Belek.  
Cahen and Grousset, in particular, have analysed this importance in its vari-
ous dimensions: the rule of Aleppo by the Artukids meant that henceforth it entered 
the protection of the local emirs of Syria and the Jazira, rather than the remote and 
ineffective protectorate of the Seljukids, which had been rejected long ago by the 
Aleppans. As a result of that rejection, Aleppo had been isolated and reduced to 
seeking continuously shifting alliances with other local polities in order to avert cap-
ture. Now, with the Artukid rule, the city was once again attached to a local power of 
the Jazira, as in the period of the Marwanids and Uqailids (late tenth-eleventh centu-
ry). 
This was a change for the better, for the Artukids and their similarly local 
successors in Aleppo proved capable of establishing a much closer relation between 
Syria and the Jazira than the Seljukid governors of Mosul, and consequently man-
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aged to achieve much more substantial results against the Franks than they had ever 
done. The aforementioned scholars have also sought the reasons for this difference: 
the first among these was distance, both physical and psychological. The expeditions 
launched under the aegis of the Seljukids remained the interventions of a distant 
power, however colossal, and had an alienating effect on the Muslims of Syria. They 
also lacked effectiveness because of the fact that the interests and commitments of 
the emirs who took part in these expeditions lay elsewhere. This made them bent on 
returning home before long, especially when the campaign did not seem to be prom-
ising in terms of personal profit. In contrast, the physical and psychological distance 
was considerably reduced when the external power was indigenous to the Jazira.  
The local polities in this region admittedly looked minute in comparison with 
the Seljukid Empire, but they had the advantage that they could concentrate most of 
their energies on the affairs of Syria. Another factor that helped the local emirs in 
this respect was that they were no longer compelled to defend their indepenence 
against the sultan’s attempts to reestablish his authority. Despite their modest size, 
these polities also possessed the economic means needed to intervene in Syria, for 
unlike Muslim Syria, the eastern Jazira had been spared the ravages of the Frankish 
wars. The establishment of an alternative political link between the two regions, now 
via polities independent of Mosul and the Seljukids controlling it,  allowed more lib-
eral use of the resources of the one to defend the other, and in the age of the Crusades 
this new link was realized for the first time by the Artukids. 
But it was not only the economic resources of the Jazira that the Artukids 
used to defend Aleppo against the Franks. They were also the first to introduce the 
Turkoman troops of Diyar Bakr into Syria since the establishment of the Seljukid 
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dominion. Before them the Turkomans had been temporarily present in the area, but 
were then replaced by local units paid by the Seljukids. These in turn had declined in 
power, when the revenues of the provinces had decreased. Now, with the reign of 
Ilghazi and Belek in Aleppo, the Turkomans were introduced once more into North-
ern Syria, and this time their presence did not remain a temporary phenomenon as 
before. Continuing to stream in from Diyar Bakr at the time of Zangi and Nur al-Din, 
they were gradually settled in the country, especially in the border areas of Muslim 
Syria with Frankish territory. The establishment of this army of volunteers in North 
Syria would alter the numerical and social balance in the Muslims’ favor. Indeed the 
demographic change in question provided the Zangids and Ayyubids with a signifi-
cant support in their confrontations with the Franks.
40
  
Even before that stage, however, the establishment of a new independent link 
between Syria and the Jazira after Ilghazi’s takeover of Aleppo bore its first fruits in 
the offensive he soon launched against the Principality of Antioch. It is to this subject 
that we shall now turn. 
6.2 Plans and preparations for the offensive against Antioch; an important 
peace treaty with the Franks of Edessa.  
The present section will first relate the preparations that Ilghazi and his ally 
Tughtekin undertook for their planned campaign against the Principality of Antioch, 
and then proceed to discuss their specific reasons and motives for launching the of-
fensive. Lastly, it will dwell upon the significance of a treaty that Ilghazi concluded 
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with the Franks of Edessa while marching from Diyar Bakr to invade the Principali-
ty. 
6.2.1 Preparations for the planned campaign 
 “By 1119 the Frankish danger [to Aleppo] had become so serious,” remarks 
Cahen, “that Ilghazi decided to put all at stake.”41 Ibn al-Athir relates how the Franks 
invaded and devastated districts of Aleppo when the truce expired. Having captured 
Buza‘a, among other places, they proceeded to lay siege to Aleppo itself, which 
scarcely had supplies to last a month. Greatly afraid of the Franks, the people of 
Aleppo agreed to share even the produce of the lands before the gates of Aleppo. An 
appeal made to Baghdad, where Sultan Muhammad had died last year, produced no 
result.
42
 
In the meanwhile Ilghazi was in Mardin, busy with the preparations for a 
counter-offensive against Antioch. While still in Aleppo he had established contact 
with Tughtekin, who was in trouble on his part with the Franks of Jerusalem; only 
lately they had defeated his son Buri near Ascalon. Proceeding to Aleppo, Tugtekin 
had asked for aid from Ilghazi, who had promised to cooperate with him against the 
Franks. While in Aleppo they had also received news of a Frankish raid against 
Hawran, a district of Damascus’s territory. Accordingly they had agreed that 
Tughtekin would return to Damascus to protect his lands, while Ilghazi would return 
to Mardin to raise troops. After that they would meet to fight the Franks.
43
  
Basing himself upon this report of Ibn al-Athir, Robert Nicholson argues that 
the original plan made by Ilghazi and Tughtekin was to launch an operation against 
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the Franks of the south, but then these plans were soon discarded in favor of a cam-
paign against Antioch.
44
 The case seems rather to have been a pact of mutual aid, 
Ilghazi promising to help Tughtekin against Jerusalem in return for assistance in the 
campaign against Antioch. After the latter campaign ended succesfully there re-
mained no need for Ilghazi to support Tughtekin against the Franks of Jerusalem, for 
King Baldwin was distracted from territorial aggrandizement by the necessity of re-
covering Antioch’s losses.  
However, Ibn al-Qalanisi tells a somewhat different account of this agree-
ment. He also notes the troubles of Damascus with the Franks: “Owing to the neglect 
of Islam to make raids upon them and prosecute the Holy War,” he says, the Franks 
were preparing for a large-scale campaign to capture Muslim cities and devastate 
their territories. Getting news of this, Tughtekin warned the commanders and offi-
cials of his districts. In contrast to Ibn al-Athir, however, Ibn al-Qalanisi asserts that 
Ilghazi went to Damascus to meet with Tughtekin and deliberate about the course to 
be adopted against the Franks. Before setting out, he adds, Ilghazi had sent a message 
to the Turkomans of Diyar Bakr, “inviting them to carry out the obligation of Holy 
War and urging them to instigate one another to enroll for that purpose and to assem-
ble their forces.” He relates the agreement between the two emirs in line with Ibn al-
Athir, though in a notably confrontational language: reportedly, the two emirs agreed 
that they would devote their entire means and energies to fighting the “infidel ene-
my,” in order to ward them off before they could realize their plans, and also that 
Ilghazi would proceed to Mardin and assemble Turkomans by urging them “to de-
stroy the factions of infidelity and error.” Differently from Ibn al-Athir, however, Ibn 
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al-Qalanisi asserts that Tughtekin would also come with Ilghazi to assist him in gath-
ering the Turkoman troops.  
Ibn al-Qalanisi proceeds to report that the two emirs accordingly set out for 
the Jazira during the first ten days of Ramadan 512 (16-25 December 1118), and that 
Tughtekin stayed there until his return in Safar 513 (14 May – 11 June 1119). Again 
in a language replete with tones of religious confrontation, the chronicler states that 
they resolved with the Turkomans that the latter would “set their affairs in order and 
make preparations for moving into Syria with their numerous hosts and invincible 
determination, so that they might unite for the succour of the Faith and the rooting-
out of the stiff-necked misbelievers.”45 Despite Ibn al-Qalanisi’s tone, however, it 
remains a rather moot point how far the emirs themselves drew upon jihad propagan-
da to rally Turkoman troops. The chronicler may only have been grafting his own 
jihad rhetoric, perhaps colored by his later experiences under Nur al-Din, on to ar-
guments of quite another kind that were actually used by the leaders –– such as 
promises of abundant payment and booty. But Al-Azimi testifies that the qadi Ibn al-
Khashshab also went east to join Ilghazi and returned to Aleppo with the Artukid 
troops.
46
 So the jihad propaganda mentioned by Ibn al-Qalanisi may have been car-
ried out by this leader of the jihad proponents in Aleppo rather than by the emirs 
themselves, and we shall see the same happen before the Battle of Ager Sanguinis.  
As for the question of whether it was Ilghazi who came to visit Tughtekin, 
and more importantly, whether the latter really accompanied Ilghazi to the Jazira to 
assist in the assembly of Turkoman troops, it is difficult to assert anything for cer-
tain. At first sight it would seem rather implausible that Tughtekin should have aban-
doned Damascus to go east for several months (from December 1118 to May 1119) 
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while his southern frontier was being threatened by the Franks of Jerusalem. As usu-
al, Ibn al-Qalanisi may have been trying to magnify his patron’s role here, first in 
having Ilghazi come to him, rather than the reverse, and then having Tughtekin play 
a prominent role in the mobilization of Turkomans through jihad propaganda. But 
Ibn al-Adim’s testimony does seem to give support to Ibn al-Qalanisi, at least on the 
latter point. After Ilghazi had marched east, according to this source, Tughtekin went 
to meet him at Qal‘at Ja‘bar (Dawsar), and once the two had agreed on a common 
plan, they proceeded to Mardin. There they assembled a great army by corresponding 
with the Muslim troops and Turkomans near and far.
47
 It could be accepted in the 
light of these considerations that Tughtekin probably met with Ilghazi at Aleppo or 
Qal‘at Ja‘bar, and spent a rather short time with him in Diyar Bakr, before he went 
back to his threatened city.      
6.2.2 The reasons and motives behind the campaign 
Returning to Cahen’s statement about the seriousness of the Frankish danger 
in Aleppo, it is time now to examine the factors that caused Ilghazi and Tughtekin to 
embark on preparations for such an ambitious offensive against the Franks. This is 
all the more necessary as they had remained neutral or on the defensive since the first 
Battle of Tell Danith in 1115, even after their abandonment of the Frankish alliance. 
The answer to this question lies in the extremely precarious situation of Aleppo, as 
indicated by Cahen, and also in the newly found albeit dangerous freedom of these 
two emirs once the Seljukid claims and protectorate on their territories had vanished 
for good with the death of the sultan. Added to this may be the close collaboration 
between the two emirs that had been going on for some time.  
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In this connection Runciman asserts that the capture of Buza‘a by the Franks 
proved to be “more than Ilghazi could endure,” as it caused Aleppo to be encircled 
from three sides.
48
 But this happened only in spring 1119, when Ilghazi was already 
preoccupied with the collection of troops in Diyar Bakr. Therefore the cause of the 
campaign cannot have been the capture of Buza‘a. On the same issue Carole Hillen-
brand contents herself with pointing to Ilghazi’s “heightened awareness of the dan-
ger” posed by Roger of Antioch, insofar as this prince, by uniting the Franks in 
Northern Syria and exploiting the divisions between the Muslim rulers, had come to 
threaten Aleppo itself.
49
 On the other hand, both Runciman and Hillenbrand place 
special emphasis on the new freedom that the two emirs had found after the death of 
Sultan Muhammad in 1118, which had rendered them more confident and ambitious. 
Runciman also suggests that it was because of this ambition that Ilghazi wanted to 
secure the possession of Aleppo for himself, and argues with some degree of exag-
geration that the goal in question turned out to entail “the destruction of Frankish 
states” that threatened the city –– although he admits that this had not been Ilghazi’s 
primary aim from the beginning.  
But still the two scholars do not seem to have discerned the full significance 
of Aleppo as the chief factor behind the campaign, whereas Cahen made the apt ob-
servation quoted at the beginning about Ilghazi’s determination to “stake all” to avert 
its capture. It is nevertheless Thomas Asbridge who has best discerned this point, of-
fering a convincing and detailed analysis of the specific goal Ilghazi had in mind 
when embarking on the campaign.
50
 He explains that the goal in question was to cap-
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ture al-Atharib and Zardana, and thereby to establish some degree of control over the 
frontier line between Antioch and Aleppo that ran through these castles. This line 
began southwards from Azaz and passed east of the hilly, rocky region of Jabal Ta-
lat, which formed a natural barrier between Aleppo and the Principality. There was a 
second frontier line passing west of Jabal Talat, running through Artah, Imm and Ha-
rim. Tancred had captured al-Atharib and Zardana in early 1111
51
 and his successor 
had taken Azaz in late 1118, so by 1119 the eastern frontier of Antioch had expanded 
eastwards from the second, westerly line to the first, easterly one. This situation 
posed a serious threat to Aleppo while it offered considerable protection to Antioch. 
For once the Franks controlled the easterly line they had only to cross a flat plain of 
thirty kilometers to reach the gates of Aleppo, while their own territories lay safe be-
hind natural defence of Jabal Talat and the castles to its west.  
In the light of these considerations, Asbridge convincingly argues that Ilgha-
zi’s goal in his campaign of 1119 was to push back the western frontier of Aleppo 
with Antioch from the east to the west of Jabal Talat and thereby to guarantee the 
continued security of the city. In addition to the formidable danger from the west, the 
city was also encircled from the north and east after the fall of Azaz and Buza‘a. 
Consequently it found itself in a Frankish stranglehold, isolated and vulnerable 
against a direct attack. It was to break this stranglehold that Ilghazi launched his of-
fensive against Antioch. Tughtekin on his own part helped him because if Aleppo 
fell, Damascus was bound to be next in line, and a close coperation had developed 
between the two emirs in the last decade.  
In the previous section we have seen Imad al-Din Khalil argue that the pos-
session of Aleppo caused Ilghazi and his successor Belek to assume the position of 
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leadership in jihad against the Franks. It emerges from these considerations that what 
Ilghazi had in mind was to safeguard his new possession Aleppo against Frankish 
threat, rather than to use it as a base for waging Holy War per se. And it is hard to 
assume like Runciman that safeguarding Aleppo necessarily entailed the destruction 
of the Frankish states, although he admits that Ilghazi may not have initially aimed at 
this. Of course the campaign ended up inflicting considerable damage on the Frank-
ish principality, above all on its manpower, but it can hardly be argued that Ilghazi 
was striving at the destruction of this state as the only way to safeguard Aleppo. He 
was only trying to push back its eastern frontier.  
But this does not necessarily mean either that the campaign was unrelated 
with the motivation of jihad, notwithstanding the possible use of this concept to mo-
bilize the Turkoman masses, or that the leaders had “more strategical considerations 
in mind.”52 Such an approach is based on the unwarranted assumption that jihad 
should have always acted as an independent motivation completely detached from 
any strategical considerations. It ignores the possibility that for Ilghazi and his con-
temporaries jihad may have been the form in which the strategical task of defending 
a Muslim city was perceived and understood whenever the enemy happened to be 
Christian. A fact that seems to support this possibility is that it was none other than  
the pietist, pro-jihad circles in Aleppo headed by Ibn al-Khashshab who invited 
Ilghazi against the Franks: insofar as they constituted the local circle that held the 
political power in this period, it is quite possible that they may have determined or at 
least helped Ilghazi to determine the aforementioned strategical aim of the cam-
paign.
53
 Indeed Sivan observes that the influence of the jihad ideology and pro-jihad 
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circles in Aleppo was directly proportional to the threat it faced at the time from its 
Frankish neighbors.
54
  
Thus it would be unjustified to believe that the contemporaries understood ji-
had in the sense of a selfless, idealistic, wholesale onslaught on the “infidel” enemy, 
without the pursuit of any specific interests or strategical aims, and on these grounds 
argue that any campaign taking such factors into account could not have anything to 
do with jihad. This concept could have had many other ways to function than as an 
independent motivation to extirpate the “infidels.”55 This issue wil be discussed at 
greater length in the final section of the next chapter. 
6.2.3 Galeran’s raid into Artukid territory and Ilghazi’s peace treaty with Edessa 
We have seen that Ilghazi had proceeded east to his home territory Diyar 
Bakr, possibly in the company of his father-in-law Tughtekin, in order to collect 
troops for their planned campaign against Antioch. While he was still there, in March 
1119, a raid was carried out against his territory by Galeran, lord of al-Bira. Galeran 
was acting at the time as regent for Baldwin du Bourg, recently crowned as Baldwin 
II of Jerusalem. It might well be that he undertook this raid to distract the new lord of 
Aleppo from his preparations for the campaign against Antioch, and also to reduce 
the military forces at his disposal by striking them at home in Diyar Bakr. 
The Anonymous Syriac Chronicle reports that Galeran assembled as many 
forces as he could, and attacked the camps of the unsuspecting Turkomans in the 
plains of Mount Hisma to the east of Edessa, on the borders of Ilghazi’s territory. 
Killing many of them and taking five hundred prisoners, as well as capturing innu-
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merable horses, camels, cattle and sheep, he brought these back to Edessa.
56
 As it 
emerges from the reports of two Muslim chroniclers, however, Galeran did not only 
raid the Turkomans at this time, but also attacked a castle in the region. For Al-Azimi 
notes among the events of the year 512/1118-19 that the Franks captured the castle of 
Sinn and killed Mani‘ ibn Utair al-Numairi there.57 That the individual in question 
was the emir of this castle is revealed by Ibn al-Athir.
58
 This chronicler reports 
among the events of the same year that Ilghazi’s envoy reached Baghdad to gather 
troops against the Franks, declaring that they had seized a castle by Edessa and killed 
its emir, Ibn Utair. The envoy also complained of what the Franks had done to the 
Muslims in the Jazira, which might be referring to Galeran’s raid upon the Turko-
mans in the region. Letters to this effect were also sent to the new sultan Mahmud, 
away from Baghdad at the time. This summons of help from the Seljukids seems 
surprising at first: had not Ilghazi been covertly or openly resisting their armies for 
the last decade?   
Imad al-Din Khalil suggests that by stressing the Frankish danger impending 
against the Jazira, Ilghazi was trying to awaken the Seljukids to the fact that the Cru-
sader army had come to beat against the gates of Seljukid Iraq itself.
59
 The Artukid 
emir may have thought that this was the best and perhaps the only way to secure re-
inforcements from the sultan, even though there is no evidence in the sources that 
any eventually arrived from the East. Ilghazi’s previous attitude against the Seljukid 
armies under Aksungur and Bursuk would have been enough reason to dissuade the 
                                                                                                                                          
55
 Sivan remarks in this connection: “Attempting to detect an act that is due to the idea of jihad taking 
effect at a ‘pure state’ would therefore be a vain enterprise; it would be similarly in vain to desire to 
separate the influence exercised by this factor from that of the others.” L’Islam et  le Croisade, 205. 
56
 “The First and Second Crusaders from an Anonymous Syriac Chronicle,” translated by M. A. S. 
Tritton with notes by H. A. R. Gibb, JRAS 92 (1933), 87-8; Anonymi Auctoris Chronicon ad A.C. 
1234 Pertinens, translated by A. Abouna (Louvain, 1974), 60-1. 
57
 Azimî Tarihi, 34 (Arabic) and 42 (Turkish) (512: 1118-1119). 
58
 Ibn al-Athir, El-Kâmil fi’t-Tarih, X, 433 and Chronicle, 197 (512: 1118-1119).  
337 
 
new sultan from sending any reinforcements, despite Ilghazi’s efforts to win his fa-
vor by warning him about the Frankish danger and stressing his own efforts to ward 
off their attacks.
60
 Even if the Seljukid sultan had been willing to dispatch a contin-
gent of his own, he would scarcely have found any to spare from his struggle against 
his rebellious brother Tughril and his uncle Sanjar.
61
 In the light of these considera-
tions, an alternative and perhaps a more likely explanation is that Ilghazi’s envoy 
was in Baghdad solely to request permission to gather troops from there as well, ra-
ther than ask for a new army to be sent west –– which is what Ibn al-Athir himself is 
saying in effect.  
It seems that Ilghazi had almost finished collecting troops by the time of Ga-
leran’s attack, being ready to set out for Aleppo. So in retaliation he first marched 
with his army to Edessa and pitched camp in its neighborhood, while it was still har-
vest time (April 1119). The Anonymous Syriac, apparently unaware that Ilghazi had 
long been preparing for a campaign against Antioch, represents the emir’s mustering 
of the army and march upon Edessa simply as a result of his anger at Galeran’s raid, 
which he says became “the cause of evils.” Nevertheless, he states that Ilghazi kept 
his distance from the fields and crops, and after securing the release of the Turko-
mans captured, departed without inflicting any damage on the city and its lands. This 
measured retaliation of Ilghazi against Edessa may be taken as evidence that he 
wanted to avoid distractions from his intentions against Antioch, underlining the se-
riousness of the latter.  
Ibn abi Tayyi (cited by Ibn al-Furat) offers a generally parallel, though slight-
ly different and more detailed account of Ilghazi’s dealings with the Franks of Edes-
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sa.
62
 In contrast to the Anonymous he asserts that Ilghazi did graze his horses on the 
crops and fertile lands of Edessa; this was to bolster their strength, as there was a se-
vere drought that year. Growing afraid of Ilghazi’s movements at the head of numer-
ous troops, the Franks reportedly sent to ask for reconciliation and offered to return 
the Muslim captives in their hands. Ilghazi agreed to the offer only on condition that 
they would stay in their lands and refrain from aiding Roger of Antioch when he 
joined battle with the prince. 
Thus the Franks of Edessa managed to avert a siege of their city at the ex-
pense of leaving the Antiochenes alone against Ilghazi’s offensive. That this caused 
some degree of embarrasment in the County is evident from the testimony of Mat-
thew of Edessa, who contents himself with noting that Ilghazi remained four days 
before the city without being able to inflict any harm on it.
63
 Living in the County of 
Edessa at the time, Matthew would have been in a better position than most to know 
that this was only thanks to the agreement made in betrayal of Antioch with Ilghazi. 
So for understandable reasons he seems to have passed over the agreement in silence. 
This measured policy that Ilghazi adopted toward the Franks of Edessa, de-
spite their recent raid and capture of the castle of Sinn, hardly stands in need of ex-
planation. He had little time to lose with them, and in order to gain ground and pos-
sibly a victory against the Franks of Antioch, he also had to ensure that they would 
not get help from those in Edessa. Striking an astute course of action, therefore, he 
preferred to arrive at a separate agreement with the County of Edessa, without more 
ado, and, in Khalil’s words, “was able by this apt move to isolate one of the most 
important Crusader powers” from its neighbor on the eve of his campaign.64 This 
                                                 
62
 Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh II, 25; cited in Khalil, Al-Imarat al-Artuqiyya, 241 and Väth, Geschichte, 76. 
63
 Matthew of Edessa, Chronicle, 223 (III.79). 
64
 Khalil, Al-Imarat al-Artuqiyya, 241. 
339 
 
achievement was all the more significant if Galeran’s raid had indeed been undertak-
en to help Antioch by hindering Ilghazi’s efforts to muster troops and launch a cam-
paign against it. Now the Franks of Edessa would have to stand aside and passively 
watch the outcome of the affair.   
Setting out from Edessa and crossing the Euphrates in the company of his 
vassal Toghan Arslan, emir of Bitlis and Arzan, Ilghazi arrived in North Syria at the 
beginning of May 1119, as previously agreed with Tughtekin.
65
 Apparently unaware 
that Ilghazi had already got hold of Aleppo some months before, the Anonymous re-
ports that he first proceeded to Harran and took hold of it, and thence advanced to 
Aleppo to occupy the city and its territory. “He became more powerful than all the 
Turkish chiefs,” the author comments; “even the governors of Assyria and the East 
obeyed him. He assembled innumerable troops and invaded the territory of Antioch.” 
Despite this chronological error of the Anonymous, it is still interesting to note his 
observation that Ilghazi had become the most powerful chief in the East through his 
occupation of Aleppo, confident and strong enough to attack Antioch itself. Of 
course the Anonymous is much less astute with his simplistic attribution of the attack 
to Ilghazi’s anger at Galeran’s raid, as we have seen earlier.   
It was apparently a similarly simplistic explanation for Ilghazi’s campaign 
against Antioch that is offered by Matthew of Edessa,
66
 who attributes it to Ilghazi’s 
anger at Roger’s capture of Azaz. He relates that “a deep conflict developed between 
the emir Ilghazi and Roger” following the fall of Azaz. “The two had formerly been 
very intimate friends,” the chronicler explains, “but now became enemies, because 
both Aleppo and Azaz belonged to the Turkish emir Ilghazi, the son of Artuk. So 
Ilghazi fulminated with rage [over this matter].” Collecting a tremendous army of 
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eighty thousand men, as a result, he marched against Roger.
67
 Matthew’s theory 
about the cause of the campaign seems relatively closer to the truth though than that 
of the Anonymous, for Ilghazi had indeed begun preparations for his campaign after 
his invitation to Aleppo during the siege of Azaz. Nevertheless, the chronicler is mis-
taken in reducing Ilghazi’s motivation to his personal feelings of resentment toward 
Roger for dispossessing him of a castle.  
It is still interesting to see Matthew claim that Ilghazi and Roger had been 
“intimate friends” before the fall of Azaz, even though we cannot know whether this 
statement is only based on their past alliance against the Seljukid armies (in 1115), or 
whether their “friendship” indeed went deeper than that, approaching any degree of 
intimacy. The second possibility would seem far more doubtful. As Michael Köhler 
observes,
68
 the alliance of Ilghazi, Tughtekin and Roger back in 1115 was far from 
being the result of a new ideology of tolerance for “Frankish-Muslim friendship;” it 
was merely the product of sober political calculation. No wonder that another such 
story of “friendship” dating from that alliance, the one between Tughtekin and Rob-
ert fitzFulk, lord of Zardana, would end up with the execution of the latter at the very 
hands of his “friend.”69 Matthew’s statement that the “intimate friendship” between 
Ilghazi and Roger instantly turned to enmity once the latter took hold of Ilghazi’s 
possession is also proof that their friendship was not much different in this respect.  
This much said, it remains interesting how Matthew could state at all that the 
Turkish and Frankish rulers had been intimate friends before they joined battle. It is 
possible to observe here the traces of a secular rather than a religiously confronta-
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tional view of the battle and its causes: the author describes a battle that did not break 
out because of the antagonism between the Christians and “infidel” aggressors, but 
rather because one of two “intimate friends” who happened to be of different reli-
gions laid hands on the property of the other, who thereupon grew angry as was only 
too natural. This is not a view one would normally expect to find in the account of 
Matthew, a cleric, considering the perspective of religious confrontation often patent 
in his work.      
6.3 Ilghazi’s Syrian campaign and the Battles of Ager Sanguinis (Tell Afrin) 
and Tell Danith  
A great number of sources touch upon Ilghazi’s Syrian campaign — Arabic, 
Latin, Syriac and Armenian — which is in itself a sign of the importance accorded to 
it by contemporaries. As before, we shall analyze in order the accounts of the Arabic, 
indigenous Christian and Latin sources about the campaign and the resulting battles.    
6.3.1 The perspectives of the sources 
6.3.1.1 Ibn al-Adim  
The most detailed Muslim account of Ilghazi’s campaign and the resulting 
battles of Ager Sanguinis and Tell Danith belongs to Ibn al-Adim,
70
 which is no sur-
prise given that he was the local chronicler of Aleppo, Ilghazi’s city at the time of the 
campaign. Ibn al-Adim relates that after Ilghazi had crossed the Euphrates he spread 
his forces over the territory of Tell Bashir and Tell Khalid to plunder and take cap-
tives. At this time envoys from Aleppo arrived to summon him back, informing him 
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of the incessant attacks made against the city from al-Atharib; these had driven the 
populace to the brink of despair.  
Upon this news, Ibn al-Adim relates, Ilghazi marched to Marj-Dabiq and 
thence to Muslimiya and Qinnasrin at the beginning of June, and dispatched raiding 
parties against the Franks in the Ruj valley. Here Ilghazi’s troops also captured the 
castle of Qastun. This incursion was dictated by the best strategy, Grousset observes, 
for the district of al-Ruj, filled with Frankish castles and covering Antioch from the 
south, constituted a stronghold of primary importance for them, while it also secured 
the lines of communication between Antioch and Apamea.
71
 Ibn abi Tayyi (cited by 
Ibn al-Furat) adds that Ilghazi also carried out attacks against Harim and Jabal Sum-
maq from his base at Qinnasrin.
72
 In response Prince Roger advanced to the Iron 
Bridge and thence to Balat, where he pitched camp on Friday 9 of Rabi‘ I (20 June 
1119). Ibn al-Adim notes that Balat was situated between two mountains near Darb 
Sarmada, to the north of al-Atharib.    
Ilghazi intended to wait for Tughtekin, Ibn al-Adim states, so that they could 
deliberate about the course to adopt. But his emirs, vexed and frustrated by the pro-
longed immobility imposed on them, came together and urged him to join battle 
without waiting any longer for the atabek. It might be suggested, however, that the 
actual cause of the emirs’ impatience was their reluctance to share the expected 
spoils with the troops of Damacus; that would have considerably reduced their share 
of the booty. Thinking no differently perhaps on this matter, Ilghazi consented to 
their demand and had them renew their oaths; namely that they would be earnest in 
the battle, stand their ground when fighting the enemy, and sacrifice their lives in 
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waging jihad. Like the exhortations that Ibn al-Qalanisi said were deployed by Ilgha-
zi and Tughtekin as they collected Turkoman troops from Diyar Bakr, these oaths are 
important insofar as they contribute to the discussion of how far Ilghazi himself sub-
scribed to jihad ideology and propaganda –– an issue examined in section 7.8.       
After the emirs had sworn their oaths in good faith, Ibn al-Adim continues, 
the Muslims, having left their tents in Qinnasrin, marched in detachments on Friday 
16 Rabi‘ I (27 June), and spent the night in close proximity to the Franks. Ibn al-
Adim is the only source beside Walter the Chancellor to report that the Franks had 
begun to construct a castle commanding Tell Afrin. The chronicler notes that the 
Franks supposed that the Muslim army was besieging al-Atharib or Zardana, and so 
hardly noticed anything before the morning, when they saw themselves surrounded 
on all sides by the Muslim army.  
At this point another important piece of evidence is provided by Ibn al-Adim 
about the use of jihad propaganda in Ilghazi’s campaign, although its authenticity is 
again doubtful for reasons that will be discussed in section 7.8. The qadi Ibn 
Khashshab, with a lance in his hand, reportedly mounted a mare and began exhorting 
the troops for the fight. But one of the Turkomans exclaimed in contempt: “We did 
not come from our country for the sake of this turbaned fellow!” Nevertheless the 
qadi did not heed this utterance, and approaching the troops, “delivered them an elo-
quent address in which he aroused their determination and stirred up their ardor, go-
ing between their ranks; he thus caused the troops to weep, and attained to great stat-
ure in their view.”    
Then the attack was launched with the emir Toghan Arslan in the van, who 
went around behind the Franks and descended upon their tents; plundering these, he 
killed those inside. The Franks who rushed to the tents in flight were also killed. 
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“God granted the victory to the Muslims,” Ibn al-Adim remarks, and relates that at 
this point the entire Turkish army, “showing themselves loyal to the oaths they had 
sworn,” made a common charge from all sides and showered the Franks with arrows, 
putting them to flight. The Frankish cavalry was overwhelmed by the arrows, while 
the infantry as well as the body of camp-followers and servants were utterly de-
stroyed. All the surviving enemy troops were captured, and Roger was killed in the 
battle. Ibn al-Adim notes that a mere twenty men were lost by the Muslims, whereas 
only twenty Franks survived, with losses amounting to almost fifteen thousand 
troops on their side.  
At this point Ibn al-Adim briefly turns to reflect on the confrontation from the 
perspective of the Aleppans, who were anxiously awaiting the outcome of a battle on 
which their whole fate hung. They had been assembled in the Great Mosque for the 
ritual prayers of noontime, with the battle still in full course, when they heard the 
great outcry of victory from the west, and a messenger arrived to bring the glad tid-
ings of victory. No soldiers were to arrive however before the ritual prayers of after-
noon. The way Ibn al-Adim brings the time of the arrival of the news of victory and 
that of the first victorious troops explicitly in relation to the ritual prayers of noon-
time and afternoon, and the way he depicts the people of Aleppo prostrate in prayer 
in the Great Mosque, are probably not merely straightforward indications about the 
time of the events: they rather seem like conscious devices meant to stress the im-
portance of the battle for the liberation of Aleppo from the “infidels,” as well as to 
demonstrate God’s support for the victory. 
Returning to the battlefield, Ibn al-Adim relates that Ilghazi had settled in 
Roger’s tent to receive the booty and captives brought in by the troops. Nevertheless 
he returned all of these to his soldiers, except for some arms that he intended to send 
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as gifts to other Muslim emirs. Of course Ilghazi did not really have any other option 
here, for these goods were the primary reason why the Turkomans had come all the 
way from their home territory in Diyar Bakr.  
But Roger’s tent also serves Ibn al-Adim as the scene for yet another episode 
that is intended, like the previous one in Aleppo, to underline the importance of the 
victory for the Muslims and to demonstrate God’s support for their cause. Among the 
captives brought before Ilghazi, there was reportedly a man of great stature and re-
markable strength, who had been captured surprisingly by a short, weak, badly armed 
man. Asked by the Turkomans whether he was not ashamed to be captured by such a 
weak man, while he himself was clad in iron, the man reportedly answered: “By 
God, it is not this man here who captured me, and it is not he who is my master; the 
case was rather that a tall man of greater stature and strength than my own captured 
and delivered me to this one. He wore a green dress and under him there was a simi-
larly green horse.” This anecdote, representing the battle as a religious confrontation 
in which God and the Muslim saints assisted the Turkish army, seems to be a Muslim 
version of the tale about white-clad hosts supporting the Crusader army in the Battle 
of Antioch.
73
  
After the battle, Ibn al-Adim continues, the Muslim troops spread over the 
territory of Antioch, which was still tranquil as the news of Frankish defeat had not 
reached it yet, and took innumerable captives, animals and booty. One of these raid-
ing parties reportedly came across King Baldwin and Count Pons near Jabala, on 
their way with reinforcements for Roger. Attacking the Franks, they killed and plun-
dered some, while the king and the count were compelled to seek refuge in the 
mountains. Baldwin hastened from here to Antioch, Ibn al-Adim states, while Ilghazi 
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advanced upon Artah; he was joined there by Tughtekin and his forces. A compari-
son with the Latin sources reveals that the chronicler drew upon a remarkable 
amount of information about the measures taken by the king once he reached the 
city. After receiving Roger’s treasures and possessions from his widow, Ibn al-Adim 
relates, Baldwin got hold of the houses and possessions of the slain, and wed their 
wives to the survivors. Reconstituting the cavalry and assembling new troops after 
this, he made himself master of Antioch.  
At this point Ibn al-Adim does not spare Ilghazi a direct criticism: if instead 
of making for Artah he had headed for Antioch and reached it before Baldwin, the 
chronicler asserts, the city could not have resisted him. As we shall see, Walter the 
Chancellor also counts the delay of Ilghazi before Artah as a cause of his failure to 
march against Antioch. Walter adds to this Ilghazi’s habit of heavy drinking and the 
dispersal of his troops after acquiring booty, which are also reasons brought forward 
by Usama ibn Munqidh and Ibn al-Qalanisi respectively. Further on, in section 6.3.2 
we shall discuss the justice of such criticisms, which have been put forward by many 
other historians, contemporary and modern alike. 
Ibn al-Adim proceeds next to relate the siege and capture of al-Atharib and 
Zardana. We have seen in the last section that these castles constituted the expanded 
eastern frontier of the Principality, located east of Jabal Talat, and were therefore 
Ilghazi’s chief targets since the start of the campaign. Accordingly he turned around 
to besiege al-Atharib, and attacking its lower town, killed and robbed whoever he 
could lay his hands on. But Ibn al-Adim indicates that it was not before a body of 
ahdāth (urban militia) had arrived from Aleppo and made a breach in the walls that 
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the garrison consented to surrender and demanded safe conduct. The emir granted it 
to them and took hold of the town.  
Ater this Ilghazi proceeded to Zardana, the defences of which had been forti-
fied and bolstered by the Franks. When the news of the siege of Zardana reached its 
lord, Robert fitzFulk, he urged the king and other Franks to set out for its relief, par-
ticularly since they had learned that the Turkomans had dispersed home with the 
booty they had collected, leaving Ilghazi with only a small number of troops. On re-
ceiving the news of this exchange Ilghazi pressed on with the siege, and spent all his 
effors against the castle until its garrison too was compelled to demand safe conduct. 
The dispersal of the Turkomans and Ilghazi’s haste to capture Zardana under these 
conditions are also reported by Walter the Chancellor. 
Thus the major part of Ilghazi’s Turkoman army had already scattered at this 
stage, before the following Battle of Tell Danith and while he was attacking his prin-
cipal targets, the key Frankish positions neighboring Aleppo. This points once again 
to the considerable difficulties involved in keeping the Turkomans on campaign for 
long periods. Another interesting fact revealed here is that both the Muslim and 
Christian sides were very well aware of what was going on in the opposite camp, 
down to what the Frankish leaders discussed among themselves. This could be due to 
an extended network of spies deployed by both sides, and indeed we shall see Walter 
the Chancellor relate how Ilghazi used spies disguised as bird-sellers to gather in-
formation about the composition and movements of the Frankish army. 
Ibn al-Adim reports that Ilghazi granted safe conduct to the garrison of Zar-
dana and sent them to Antioch, but on the way they were robbed and some of them 
killed by a group of Turkomans. As we shall see, Walter the Chancellor accuses 
Ilghazi of having deliberately sent these men after the Franks. After Ilghazi had gar-
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risoned Zardana and sent his baggage and tents back to Qinnasrin, Ibn al-Adim pro-
ceeds, he set out for Tell Danith, accompanied by Toghan Arslan, Tughtekin and 
their troops. Reaching Tell Danith on the same day, 4 Jumada I (13 August 1119), he 
found that the Franks had pitched camp there on the very day of his capture of Zar-
dana. They had two hundred tents, more than four hundred horsemen, and numerous 
infantry forces.  
Ibn al-Adim offers a fairly detailed account of the rather confused and unde-
cisive Battle of Tell Danith fought on the next day. When the fight began, he relates, 
Robert of Zardana and the major part of Frankish cavalry made a charge upon the 
troops of Damascus and Hims as well as a group of Turkomans, defeating and rout-
ing them. Then the lord of Zardana hurried to relieve his town, expecting besides to 
plunder the baggage of the Muslim army too, but he was compelled to return upon 
learning that the town had already been captured by the Muslims and that their bag-
gage had been sent to Qinnasrin. Back on the battlefield, in the meantime, the rest of 
the Muslim army had attacked the king and his troops, killing some and throwing 
back the others. At this point, Ibn al-Adim relates, the three emirs Ilghazi, Tughtekin 
and Toghan Arslan charged with their remaining forces against the Franks and de-
feated them, killing the major part of the infantry and part of the cavalry. They pur-
sued the fugitives until these sought refuge in the castle of Hab, and collected most 
of their belongings as booty. Returning after this to the battlefield at Danith, the 
emirs came across Robert fitzFulk and the other Franks in his company, who were 
coming back with empty hands from Zardana. They defeated these forces too, killing 
many of them, while the rest similarly fled to the castle of Hab.  
Thus the Turks returned home victorious and laden with booty, Ibn al-Adim 
states, but the outcome of the battle was not so unequivocal as he has it. We shall see 
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that some other Muslim sources represent the outcome of the battle rather as a draw, 
while the Latin sources claim victory for their own side. But Ibn al-Adim’s account 
does offer some hints as to why there was so much ambiguity about the result. Ap-
parently the reason was that both armies had routed some part of the opposing army, 
while a part of their own ranks had also been put to flight by the enemy. As a result, 
the news of these various events with contrasting results reached those behind the 
front separately and at different times, giving rise to considerable confusion. Thus 
the detachment entrusted with the baggage at Qinnasrin, on learning that the lord of 
Zardana had defeated the Muslim forces opposing him, forwarded this news to Alep-
po where it raised the utmost alarm. But two hours later a new message arrived, this 
time bringing the news of the success won by Ilghazi, Tughtekin and Toghan Arslan, 
which “turned their sorrow to happiness and their distress to joy.” Reportedly, the 
reverse of this happened on the Frankish side: the news of the success of the lord of 
Zardana caused them to decorate their cities with “joy and happiness,” but these feel-
ings turned to “sorrow and distress” when Pons of Tripoli arrived with the news of 
the defeat of his contingent.  
Ibn al-Adim notes that Robert of Zardana was also captured upon falling 
from his horse and brought to Ilghazi; sent by the latter to Tughtekin, he was killed in 
captivity. Among the other Frankish captives, he notes, Ilghazi released the castel-
lans, the officers, “the son of Bohemond, lord of Antioch” (sic.) and the envoy of the 
Byzantine emperor,
74
 along with a small number of men possessing money, which he 
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took as the price of their ransom. He had the thirty remaining captives slaughtered, 
and then set out for Mardin in Jumada I 513 (August-September 1119). According to 
Ibn al-Adim his purpose was to collect a new body of Turkoman forces and then to 
return with them to Aleppo, for the city was still economically in too weak a state to 
support his stay there. 
6.3.1.2 Usama ibn Munqidh  
We have seen Ibn al-Adim criticize Ilghazi for his apparent failure to reach 
Antioch before Baldwin, which allegedly cost him the golden opportunity of captur-
ing the city. A similar criticism is brought against the emir by a contemporary of the 
event, Usama ibn Munqidh.
75
 Relating the battle of Ager Sanguinis, Usama states 
briefly that “by the decree of Allah” Ilghazi killed Roger and slaughtered all his 
troops save twenty in an engagement at Tell Danith. He reports immediately after 
this that Baldwin marched to Antioch to get hold of it, and was able forty days later 
to stand in battle array against Ilghazi. This way of telling the story is obviously in-
tended to raise the question of what Ilghazi had been doing in the meanwhile, and 
Usama seems sure that he has the answer for it. He claims that after his rout of the 
enemy Ilghazi fell to drinking wine and entered one of his habitual periods of intoxi-
cation that was said to last for twenty days. By the time he could recover from this 
state, King Baldwin had already reached Antioch with his army. The charge implied 
here is that because of his prolonged drunkenness Ilghazi had lost a golden oppor-
tunity to capture Antioch. 
Admittedly Ilghazi’s habit of intoxication is attested by other sources as well, 
notably by Ibn al-Qalanisi as in the case of his capture by Khir Khan in 1115. But it 
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seems necessary to seek other reasons for Ilghazi’s apparent failure to attack Anti-
och, for all the other sources including Ibn al-Adim testify that he was far from being 
in a state of drunken stupor throughout the period between his victory at Ager San-
guinis and his confrontation with the king at Tell Danith. As Thomas Asbridge points 
out, he was in fact busy at this time with the siege and capture of al-Atharib and Zar-
dana, among others, which had been his principal goal from the start. Consequently 
Usama’s anecdote should rather be attributed to his desire to tell an entertaining sto-
ry, or to his general hostility as an Arab noble towards a Turkoman chieftain.
76
  
Usama’s evaluation of the Battle of Tell Danith, although brief, seems far 
more sound. He states that the results of this second battle were even: “Certain 
Franks routed certain Muslims, and other Muslims routed other Franks… from both 
sides a large number were killed.” He adds that the Muslims captured Robert of Zar-
dana.   
6.3.1.3 Ibn al-Athir  
Ibn al-Athir’s account,77 although shorter than Ibn al-Adim’s, provides a 
number of original details about the battle of Ager Sanguinis, and some of these are 
also corroborated by the Latin sources. He relates that the Franks “realized the 
strength of Ilghazi’s purpose to fight them” when he crossed the Euphrates with 
twenty thousand men, accompanied by Toghan Arslan. Consequently, they pitched 
camp with three thousand cavalry and nine thousand infantry near al-Atharib, at a 
place called Tell Afrin. Ibn al-Athir indicates that this was situated amidst mountains 
and could be accessed by only three routes.  
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Because of the difficult access to the region, Ibn al-Athir relates, the Franks 
supposed that nobody could move against them. Having recourse to delaying tactics, 
“as was their habit,” they sent a message to Ilghazi: “Do not fatigue yourself by 
marching towards us; we shall come to you.” According to Ibn al-Athir, then, this 
message was a trick of the Franks to dissuade Ilghazi from advancing against them, 
so that they could wait in their supposedly safe position until the Turkomans would 
disband or their own reinforcements would arrive. But we shall see it emerge from 
Walter the Chancellor’s account that the Franks were indeed actively seeking battle 
and preparing to move against the Muslim army. Ibn al-Athir goes on to relate that 
Ilghazi informed his followers about the Franks’ message and consulted them about 
the course to adopt; their answer was that they had better attack the Franks at once. 
This is in accordance with Ibn al-Adim’s report that it was the emirs in Ilghazi’s ar-
my who urged him to join battle without furher delay.  
The chronicler states that Ilghazi set out immediately upon this, and while the 
Franks still imagined that nobody could reach them in their secluded position, his 
army infiltrated Tell Afrin through the three narrow paths leading there. Before the 
Franks were aware of it, the Muslim vanguard was upon them. This must have been 
the contingent under the command of Toghan Arslan, as Ibn al-Adim’s account re-
veals. But Ibn al-Athir’s version of what happened next is quite different from that of 
Ibn al-Adim, who stated that Toghan Arslan’s contingent successfully attacked the 
Frankish tents, followed by a united charge of the entire Turkish army. In parallel 
with Walter the Chancellor, Ibn al-Athir asserts instead that the troops in the Muslim 
vanguard were put to flight by a charge of the Franks –– carried out by the battle 
lines of St Peter (an elite fighting group) and Geoffrey the Monk, according to Wal-
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ter –– and turned back only when they met the rest of the Turkish army charging in 
waves. In the intense battle that ensued, he continues, the Franks were surrounded 
from all sides and “the sword fell upon them from all directions.” Only a small group 
escaped, all the others being slain or captured. More than ninety leading knights 
among the captives were taken to Aleppo, while Roger himself was killed and his 
head taken. Aware of the importance of the battle, and interpreting it as the triumph 
of Islam over Christianity, Ibn al-Athir also quotes a number of verses from al-Azimi 
that celebrate the victory and praise Ilghazi:  
Say what you will. Your words are the welcome ones.  
After the Creator our reliance is upon you. 
The Koran rejoiced when you brought it victory.  
The Gospel wept for the loss of its followers.  
The aftermath of the battle of Ager Sanguinis finds only short shrift in Ibn al-
Athir’s account, and his chronology is confused, as he erroneously relates the con-
quest of al-Atharib and Zardana after the Battle of Tell Danith. All he has to say 
about the latter battle is that the survivors of the first battle joined with “others” but 
were again met and defeated by Ilghazi. There is no explicit mention of King Bald-
win and the Count of Tripoli, and the outcome is indicated without further details as 
an unequivocal victory for Ilghazi. Ibn al-Athir concludes his account by noting that 
Ilghazi returned to Aleppo to put its affairs in order, and then went back to Mardin.  
6.3.1.4 Al-Azimi  
The author from whom Ibn al-Athir cited the verses above, the Aleppan 
chronicler Al-Azimi, who was an exact contemporary of Ilghazi, also offers an ac-
count of the battle in his short chronicle.
78
 Although this account is quite brief, in 
keeping with the sparse character of the work, it is still quite detailed in comparison 
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with the average, one-sentence length of the other reports, a fact that reveals the im-
portance given by Al-Azimi to the event. It even includes some more celebratory 
verses from the author on the victory. Al-Azimi first states in his usual laconic style 
that Najm al-Din (Ilghazi) and (Toghan Arslan) Ibn Husam al-Dawla attacked the 
Franks of Antioch at Tell Afrin, “so that not a single Frank was able to escape.” Then 
he proceeds to note that before the battle he had written a qasida inciting Ilghazi to 
confront the Franks; from this poem he cites the following verses:  
Tell the raging polytheists that one by one  
You shall take our revenge from them.  
Not even a single messenger escaped amongst them  
Since snares surrounded them in your hands.  
Al-Azimi swears that the matter actually turned out just as he had foretold 
here, adding the dictum “the prophecy of poetry never lies.” Halving the number of 
survivors and losses given by Ibn al-Adim, he asserts that among the Franks nobody 
but ten men could escape, who died on reaching Antioch, whereas scarcely ten were 
killed on the Muslim side.  
Relating the aftermath of the battle of Ager Sanguinis, Al-Azimi indicates 
that Ilghazi captured al-Atharib and Zardana, and then another group of Franks went 
forth to engage him at Tell Danith. He remarks that “this was a strange battle,” in 
reference without doubt to its equivocal outcome whereby each side defeated and 
was defeated by the other. Nevertheless, he still contends that “the majority of the 
Franks perished in it.”   
6.3.1.5 Ibn al-Azraq  
Whereas al-Azimi leaves his normally laconic style to dwell a bit longer and 
even to wax rhapsodic on Ilghazi’s victory against the Franks, the chronicler Ibn al-
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Azraq, who served Ilghazi’s son and successor Timurtash, offers a surprisingly short 
and dry account of the event. This is all the more interesting as the victory in ques-
tion saved Aleppo, Timurtash’s one-time possession before his abandonment of it 
and withdrawal to Mardin. All that the chronicler has to say on this important event 
is the following: “Ilghazi remained [in Syria] until the year 513 [1119] when he took 
possession of Aleppo and fought the Franks, inflicting a decisive defeat on them, 
plundering their possessions and taking a great number of them prisoner. This was 
the defeat at Balat.”79  
But the brevity of the account and its lack of any rhetorical flourish still con-
stitutes interesting evidence insofar as it demonstrates how little interest the chroni-
cler’s patron Timurtash had in fighting the Franks, even when it was strictly neces-
sary to protect his possessions, and how little he took his father as an example in this 
sense. Were it otherwise, the chronicler might have deemed it profitable to expatiate 
at some length on the achievement of Ilghazi, possibly drawing upon what he had 
heard from the mouth of Timurtash himself, who was sufficiently grown up at the 
time of the battle to remember the events. This last point may again be taken to show 
how little one spoke of the Franks and Ilghazi’s exploits against them in Timurtash’s 
circle.  
All this is hardly astonishing, for we shall see in chapter 9 that Timurtash 
abandoned Aleppo to its fate just at a time when it was besieged by the Franks, refus-
ing to bring reinforcements from the Jazira. This was of course an attitude that stood 
in stark contrast with Ilghazi’s reaction to the Aleppans’ summons of aid against the 
siege of Azaz. Perhaps it was none other than this contrast that led Ibn al-Azraq to 
give short shrift to the event.  
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6.3.1.6 Ibn al-Qalanisi  
Throughout his account of the battles of Ager Sanguinis and Tell Danith
80
 Ibn 
al-Qalanisi places Tughtekin, rather than Ilghazi, under the spotlights. Although 
Ilghazi was in fact the victorious general Ibn al-Qalanisi hardly even mentions his 
name, and, as we have already seen to some extent in his account of the preparations, 
traces Tughtekin’s movements from Damascus to Diyar Bakr, then back to Damas-
cus, thence to Aleppo, and after the battle once more to Damascus, keeping him in 
the centre of the stage as the protagonist of the story. Moreover, he seems to narrate 
Tughtekin’s movements immediately before the Battle of Ager Sanguinis in a man-
ner calculated to give the impression that he was actually present in the engagement, 
and reveals his absence from the battle only when, in an effort to stress the im-
portance of Tughtekin’s role still further, he offers it as a reason for the failure of the 
Muslims to capture Antioch.  
Thus Ibn al-Qalanisi states that Tughtekin, after having returned from Diyar 
Bakr before Ilghazi, remained at Damascus until the appointed time of meeting drew 
near, and set out for Aleppo on Rabi‘ I 513 (12 June, 1119). When the atabek arrived 
at Aleppo “to join forces with Najm al-Din (Ilghazi), according to the plan arranged 
between them, at the expiration of the period specified in their deliberations,” Ibn al-
Qalanisi states in an effort to underline Tughtekin’s punctuality, “he found the Turk-
omans already assembled thither from every quarter and every direction, in vast 
numbers and manifest strength, as lions seeking their prey and gerfalcons hovering 
over their victims.”  
The problem here is of course that Tughtekin did not appear on time, as we 
know from the other Muslim sources. Perhaps the reason for this delay was a conflict 
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that Fulcher reports to have taken place by the river Jordan between the troops of 
Damascus and the forces of Jerusalem under King Baldwin.
81
 Fulcher asserts that the 
king set out north to comply with Roger’s call for aid only after driving off the Dam-
ascenes, and it could be imagined that Tughtekin was likewise able to set out to meet 
Ilghazi only after this time, missing his appointment as a result. It is also possible 
that Tughtekin’s skirmish with the king of Jerusalem actually played a very useful 
role (conceivably a planned one) in preventing the king of Jerusalem from reinforc-
ing Prince Roger before Ilghazi could attack him. This is supported by Fulcher’s 
mention of the king “driving off” the Damascenes, implying that the latter were the 
aggressors. Whatever the reason for the delay, we know from Ibn al-Adim’s account 
that Ilghazi was forced by his emirs to move against the Franks without waiting fur-
ther for Tughtekin in Qinnasrin.  
Notwithstanding Ibn al-Qalanisi’s insistent emphasis, therefore, Tughtekin 
could not have arrived at Aleppo at the time they had specified, assuming that Alep-
po was indeed the agreed meeting place. Even if he did show up in the city, he could 
not have seen the innumerable Turkoman troops there, for by this time they had de-
parted with Ilghazi to confront the Franks. But taking refuge behind the ambiguity of 
pronouns,
82
 Ibn al-Qalanisi still continues to tell the story as if Ilghazi and Tughtekin 
had indeed met at Aleppo, for he next states that the news reached “them” of Roger’s 
departure from Antioch with twenty thousand men, “completely equipped and per-
fectly armed,” to pitch camp at Danith.    
As so often, Ibn al-Qalanisi uses a rhapsodic language replete with terms of 
jihad ideology and religious confrontation when relating the armed clash itself.  
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When the Muslims learned the whereabouts of the Frankish army, he writes, “they 
flew towards them with the wings of hawks flying to the protection of their nests,” 
and upon approaching the enemy “they charged upon them and encompassed them 
on all sides with blows of swords and hails of arrows.” Despite the rhetoric, Ibn al-
Qalanisi’s account of the battle is still in conformity with the other Muslim sources 
who indicate that the Franks were suddenly surrounded from all sides by the Turks. 
“God Most High, to whom be the praise, granted victory to the party of Islam against 
the impious mob,” Ibn al-Qalanisi declares, representing the victory as the triumph of 
Islam over the “impious” like Ibn al-Adim, Ibn al-Athir and Al-Azimi. He depicts the 
defeated Frankish army as “one prostrate mass, horsemen and footmen alike, with 
their horses and weapons, so that not one man of them escaped to tell the tale, and 
their leader Roger was found stretched out among the dead.” He claims that the 
Franks were laid to the ground when scarcely one hour of the day of battle had 
passed, but this must be considered an exaggeration in view of Ibn al-Adim’s testi-
mony that the Aleppans heard the cry of victory at noontime, and the first troops re-
turned only by the afternoon.     
Like the other Muslim authors, Ibn al-Qalanisi celebrates the victory in extol-
ling terms, declaring: “This victory was one of the finest of victories, and such a tri-
umph
83
 was never granted to Islam in all its past ages.” In similar rhetoric he goes on 
to reflect upon the consequences of the victory for Antioch, suggesting like Ibn al-
Adim and Usama ibn Munqidh that the opportunity was ripe for an attack against the 
city: “Antioch was left without protection and bereft of its defenders and menfolk, 
emptied of its valiant men and heroes, the prey of whoever rushed for it, and the op-
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portunity of whoever desired it.”84 But the opportunity was wasted, Ibn al-Qalanisi 
states, and for this puts forward two reasons different from those offered by Ibn al-
Adim and Ibn Munqidh.  
According to Ibn al-Qalanisi the first of these reasons was the absence of the 
atabek from the battle, and this is indeed the first place in the account where 
Tughtekin’s absence is revealed. The cause of Tughtekin’s failure to participate, Ibn 
al-Qalanisi explains, was that the Turkomans had “hurried ahead to engage the 
Franks without making preparation for the battle.” This accords well with the ac-
count of Ibn al-Adim, but of course conflicts with what Ibn al-Qalanisi had said be-
fore about the Turkomans in Aleppo. The second reason according to Ibn al-Qalanisi 
was the preoccupation of the Turkoman troops with taking possession of the spoils, 
“wherewith their hands were filled and their spirits fortified, and with whose beauty 
their hearts were rejoiced.”85 Neither of these reasons put forward by Ibn al-Qalanisi 
is supportable, however, since Ilghazi had his own reasons for choosing not to attack 
Antioch, as we shall see in section 6.3.2. 
It is also noteworthy that throughout the account of the battle Ibn al-Qalanisi 
keeps speaking of “the Muslims” or “the Turkomans” as the subjects of the action, 
but never explicitly mentions Ilghazi’s name –– at least not after the point where he 
relates how Ilghazi and Tughtekin agreed upon a meeting time in Syria. This interest-
ing attitude on Ibn al-Qalanisi’s part might be interpreted in various ways: as a result 
of the chronicler’s willingness to leave his patron Tughtekin as the only important 
leader on the scene; as evidence of the embarrasment and jealousy caused in Damas-
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cus by Ilghazi’s great victory in a battle in which Tughtekin had failed to take part, or 
as a sign of the indignation aroused there by Ilghazi’s failure to wait for Tughtekin.  
All of these interpretations suggest in fact that there was some degree of ri-
valry for prestige and power between the two emirs, at least as far as Tughtekin was 
concerned. Nevertheless, Ilghazi’s relationship with Tughtekin as his son-in-law ap-
parently set limits to this rivalry, as it emerges from Ibn abi-Tayyi’s aforementioned 
report about his offer of Aleppo to the atabek.
86
 This is probably why Ibn al-Qalanisi 
avoids directly charging Ilghazi for what he regarded as the waste of a golden oppor-
tunity for taking Antioch. Without endorsement from Tughtekin himself, it would 
have been inadvisable for a discreet chronicler associated with the atabek to deni-
grate his son-in-law.             
Probably due to the equivocal results of the following Battle of Tell Danith, 
and especially because a part of the Damascene army had been defeated in that battle 
by the lord of Zardana, Ibn al-Qalanisi omits to mention it altogether. Instead he con-
cludes his account with āyats from the Qur’an, “These are dwellings wasted,” and 
“Praise be to God, Lord of the Worlds.” Lastly, he traces Tughtekin back to Damas-
cus, which he says the atabek entered on 6 September. 
6.3.1.7 Matthew of Edessa  
After reporting Ilghazi’s halt before Edessa, as we saw in the last section, 
Matthew of Edessa proceeds to relate the rest of the campaign.
87
 He states that Ilgha-
zi crossed the Euphrates and devastated the territories of Tell Bashir and Tell Khalid 
before coming to Buza‘a to pitch camp there. Then he embarks on a criticism of the 
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mistakes of Prince Roger, whom he holds primarily responsible for the following de-
bacle. He points out Roger’s arrogance and pride; being overconfident in his 
strength, according to the chronicler, he had neglected to take any precautions. Still 
more interestingly, Matthew criticizes the prince for his racial pride and correspond-
ing contempt for the Turks: “He remembered the pride of the race from which he de-
scended and profoundly despised the Turks.”88  
But the Turks were far from deserving this contempt, Matthew gives to un-
derstand, noting that they “prepared themselves in every possible way and even set 
up ambushes in a number of places.” In stark contrast, Roger showed himself care-
less enough to go into battle against them “without taking any precautionary 
measures, witout gathering a sufficient number of troops around him, or without 
even summoning other Franks to his aid.” Matthew also gives detailed information 
about the composition of the Antiochene army: reportedly this consisted of six hun-
dred Frankish horsemen, five hundred Armenian horsemen, four hundred infantry, 
and a mixed rabble of around ten thousand men.   
   Matthew’s account of the battle itself, which he locates near al-Atharib, 
conforms with the other testimonies we have seen. He relates that in the “frightful 
and violent battle” all the Christian faithful were enveloped by the innumerable 
Turkish forces, being unable to find a means of escape, and were massacred by the 
sword. While “the great Frankish count” Roger was killed together with his troops, 
very few could escape. Since the whole Frankish army had thus been practically an-
nihilated, “the Turks ravaged all the country from the Euphrates River to the Medi-
terranean Sea, bringing bloodshed and enslavement to all the districts they invaded.” 
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In contrast to the Muslim sources, however, Mathew does not suggest in any way 
that this situation left the city of Antioch defenceless and exposed it to a Turkish at-
tack. Nor does he mention the capture of the castles of al-Atharib and Zardana.  
Matthew then goes on to relate the Battle of Tell Danith, noting that King 
Baldwin arrived at Antioch, and collecting the remnants of the Frankish forces, 
marched against the Turks. His evaluation of the outcome of the battle is confused: 
on the one hand he openly admits like Usama ibn Munqidh that “neither side was 
fully defeated or victorious,” since both sustained heavy losses and turned to flight. 
But on the other hand Matthew also stresses the high number of the Turks slain, who 
reportedly amounted to five thousand. However, he omits the number of Frankish 
losses, which must have been comparable. Also interesting is Matthew’s note that the 
Turks lost their men not only “by the sword but also through suffocation from the 
intense heat,” as if the Franks would not have suffered from the same factor. Not 
content with all this, he states in conclusion that Ilghazi returned to his country “hav-
ing been shattered by the king of the Franks.” Thus it seems as though Matthew was 
aware that the outcome of the battle amounted to a draw, but still tried as hard as he 
could to represent it as a victory for the Franks.   
6.3.1.8 The Anonymous Syriac Chronicle  
In his account
89
 the Anonymous also assumes a critical approach to Prince 
Roger, but represents the outcome of the second battle as an unequivocal victory for 
the Franks. We have seen in the last section how he related that Ilghazi, angered by 
Galeran’s raid, first marched against Edessa, then crossed the Euphrates and occu-
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pied Aleppo, thus becoming the most powerful leader in the region, confident 
enough to invade the lands of Antioch. When Roger heard of this invasion, the 
Anonymous states, he marched to meet Ilghazi. In striking resemblance to Matthew’s 
evaluation of Roger’s attitude, he asserts that “the proud young man… thought that 
he could defeat the Turks alone and keep the glory and victory,” and so without wait-
ing for the arrival of King Baldwin and Galeran, imprudently drew near the Muslim 
camp.  
Interestingly, the Anonymous asserts that Galeran set out at this point to bring 
aid to Roger, although we have seen Ibn al-Furat report that the Edessenes had 
agreed with Ilghazi to refrain from assisting Antioch. This action of Galeran is not 
mentioned anywhere else, not even in Matthew’s chronicle, so it seems sensible to 
assume that it is a mistake on the Anonymous’s part. Alternatively, it may have been 
the product of a delibarate effort to conceal the Edessenes’ betrayal of Antioch, much 
as Matthew had suppressed the agreement made with Ilghazi while he was encamped 
before Edessa.  
Of course there is also the possibility that Galeran broke his promise to Ilgha-
zi and set out for Antioch at the same time as the king, but arrived like the latter only 
after the battle. Nevertheless, this latter possibility is ruled out by the testimony of 
Fulcher of Chartres. The latter reports that after his arrival in Antioch the king sent a 
delegation to Edessa, summoning its army to join himself at Antioch by a forced 
march. It emerges from here that in contrast to the Anonymous’s testimony Galeran 
could not have set out for Antioch before the first battle. He had remained loyal 
therefore to his agreement with Ilghazi. Nevertheless, he did obey King Baldwin’s 
summons before the second battle, as reported by the Latin sources. 
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The Anonymous states that the Turks were equally desirious of fighting be-
fore the arrival of Frankish reinforcements. In accordance with the other sources, he 
relates how they “surrounded Roger like a ring and showered on the camp arrows 
like clouds of hail.” Resorting to his usual manner of accounting for the result of bat-
tles between Christians and Muslims, he remarks that “God was angry with the 
Franks and turned his face from Roger.” In an effort perhaps to imply that the death 
of this prince was not an ordinary one, but rather the consequence of divine punish-
ment, the Anonymous asserts in contrast to the other sources that Roger vanished and 
“was never found, neither among the dead nor the prisoners.” The author also notes 
that all the baggage and possessions of the Franks were seized as booty by the Turks, 
but he omits any mention of their depredations or the capture of al-Atharib and Zar-
dana.  
The Anonymous goes on to relate that the king arrived at Antioch with the 
count of Tripoli and was joined there by Galeran. After assuming the rule of the city, 
Baldwin mustered the troops that were still available and marched to meet Ilghazi. 
“God was angry with the Turks this time,” the Anonymous remarks in keeping with 
his previous interpretation, and  Ilghazi was defeated as a result. Having lost many of 
his troops, he barely escaped with a few followers to Aleppo. Thus, among the 
sources examined so far, the Anonymous goes the furthest in representing the out-
come of the second battle as an unequivocal victory for the Franks. But in doing so 
he clearly oversimplifies the events. For even among the Latin sources only Walter 
the Chancellor claims that Ilghazi and Tughtekin were so heavily defeated as to re-
turn with a handful of men to Aleppo. Even if it is accepted that Ilghazi and 
Tughtekin had only a few men with them as they entered Aleppo, this may well have 
been due to the dispersion of the Turkomans in search of plunder, a notorious habit 
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of these troops after battles, rather than to a disastrous defeat that deprived them of 
the major part of their army.    
6.3.1.9 Michael the Syrian  
In Michael the Syrian’s account90 the Battle of Ager Sanguinis finds rather 
short shrift. The author relates that Ilghazi (whom he confuses with Gumushtekin 
Ghazi Danishmend) invaded the region of Antioch with an army of seven thousand, 
and Roger set out to meet him with numerous infantry. But then the prince fell into 
the midst of an ambush set up by the Turks, who encircled the Franks and massacred 
many of them, including Roger himself. This is all that Michael has to say about the 
Battle of Ager Sanguinis, but some pages later he also cites a more detailed account 
of this battle, found in an Arabic source he drew upon.
91
 Interestingly, this source 
claims that Ilghazi made a final attempt to conclude peace with the Franks, after he 
had arrived back in Aleppo and captured Nisibis (14 April). But the two sides failed 
to reach an agreement, the story goes, so Ilghazi assembled a great number of Turks, 
“since they were very docile to him.” Due to the huge number of these troops, they 
could not even all be counted, save for the one thousand emirs present among them.  
This account by Michael’s Arabic source does not seem plausible. Ilghazi had 
begun collecting troops from Diyar Bakr already by the beginning of the year, as the 
Muslim sources reveal, and not only after the failure of this alleged attempt to make 
peace with the Franks following his return to Aleppo in the spring. Once he had ar-
rived with the Turkomans at Aleppo, moreover, he stood little chance of making 
peace with the Franks and sending the troops home. As always, they had consented 
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to abandon their home territory only in return for the rewards they were promised. If 
now Ilghazi sent the Turkomans home without the battle that would have provided 
them with the booty they sought, he would have to compensate them out of his own 
resources for their expenses and time. This was certainly beyond his powers in view 
of the sorry state of the Aleppan treasury. It was also unlikely that the Franks could 
be persuaded to pay so hefty a sum for peace. There is little possibility therefore that 
Ilghazi could have restarted negotiations with the Franks after his return to Aleppo 
with the troops he had collected. In relating the battle itself, Michael’s source, like 
Matthew and the Anonymous, streseses Roger’s neglect to wait for the arrival of the 
king, which he says was the reason why the prince was cut into pieces and Ilghazi 
obtained a triumph.        
  In his own account Michael proceeds to relate the depradations of the Turk-
ish troops after their victory. Although the author does not explicitly mention the 
capture of al-Atharib and Zardana, he does indicate that they captured the fortified 
places in the region, and adds that they killed a great number of the monks in the 
Black Mountain (Amanus) as well. He states that the Turks stayed there for a long 
time and “committed ruthless crimes,” until King Baldwin arrived from Jerusalem 
upon receiving the news.  
Although still brief, Michael’s account of the Battle of Tell Danith itself 
seems a plausible alternative to that of Ibn al-Adim’s. He reports that the Turks set 
ambushes for the king as they had previously done for Roger. When compared with 
Michael’s account of the previous battle, this could be taken to mean that Ilghazi’s 
troops tried to encircle the forces of the king from all sides, just as they had done to 
Roger’s forces in the Battle of Ager Sanguinis. This stands in remarkable conformity 
with Walter the Chancellor’s version, as we shall see. Like the latter chronicler, 
367 
 
moreover, Michael omits any mention of the lord of Zardana and the Frankish troops 
accompanying him, and concentrates instead on the actions of the king. We have 
seen Ibn al-Adim relate that Ilghazi, Tughtekin and Toghan Arslan attacked the 
king’s forces, defeating them, killing most of the infantry, and throwing them back to 
the castle of Hab. Michael relates in contrast that the king advanced against the Turks 
and defeated them, while a group of the Turks in ambush massacred his infantry 
from the rear. Noticing this, the king turned round to annihilate these troops in am-
bush also. He then pursued Ilghazi, who escaped with some of his forces from the 
battlefield, while others sought refuge in Aleppo.  
The only common point with Ibn al-Adim’s account here is Michael’s admis-
sion that the Franks lost the major part of their infantry. He asserts that otherwise 
“the Turks suffered a great defeat on this day.” Further discussion of the precise 
course of the battle will have to await the examination of the Latin sources, particu-
larly Walter the Chancellor. For now let it suffice to say that although Walter similar-
ly shows Baldwin playing a crucial role that saved the day, even he concedes that the 
king had to withdraw to Hab at some point, despite adducing various pretexts for this 
retreat. Fulcher of Chartres admits as well that the Turks scattered a part of the 
Frankish army up to the gates of Antioch. Hence Michael’s assessment of the out-
come of the battle appears rather lopsided, even in comparison with the Latin 
sources.  
In conclusion Michael relates how the Frankish captives were set free and 
how the survivors of the first battle entered Antioch with the king. The account of yet 
another Syriac author, Bar Hebraeus,
92
 is merely a summary of Michael’s, and adds 
nothing new of interest.     
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6.3.1.10 Fulcher of Chartres  
 “We do not wish to encumber our history by enumerating all the unfortunate 
events that took place that year (1119) in the region of Antioch.” Fulcher begins his 
account
93
 with these words, revealing his intention to describe the Frankish disaster 
at Ager Sanguinis very briefly and to focus instead on the “sins” of Roger of Antioch 
and his men as the cause of their defeat. Accordingly, he contents himself with stat-
ing that Roger went out to fight the Turks but was killed near Artah. He also gives 
the number of the slain, seven thousand Franks against twenty Turks; the last number 
conforms with the one given by Ibn al-Adim.  
If Fulcher knew more indeed about “the unfortunate events… in the region of 
Antioch” than he reveals here, his reticence can be taken as evidence that the crush-
ing defeat and decimation of the Normans of Antioch was felt all too painfully as a 
great disaster even in the distant Kingdom of Jerusalem. This point is important also 
for Fulcher’s account of the Battle of Tell Danith, for if Fulcher had indeed felt Ager 
Sanguinis to be too embarrassing an event to relate, it would only be a natural reac-
tion for him to exaggerate the gains of the Franks in the second battle. He would then 
present it as an unequivocal triumph, in an effort to prove that they had taken full 
vengeance for the initial disaster. This is all the more so as the second battle was led 
by the King himself, whom Fulcher always liked to place in the forefront of his ac-
counts as the leader of all Franks and the savior of those in difficulty.    
After passing over the disaster of Ager Sanguinis with a single sentence, Ful-
cher embarks on an enumeration of the “sinful” acts of Roger and his men. For like 
Matthew of Edessa and the Anymous Syriac he regarded these sins as a direct cause 
of their subsequent defeat in the battle. It was not to be wondered that God had al-
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lowed Roger and his men to be confounded in this way, he declares solemnly, be-
cause “reveling in riches of all kinds, they did not fear God or respect man.” He ac-
cuses them of neglecting moderation “in the midst of copious delights,” of “living in 
pride and luxury.” He also charges them with having committed many other sins, 
particularly touching upon Roger’s adulterous behavior and his alleged deprivation 
of Bohemond II of his inheritance. These accusations of Fulcher were also taken up 
by Willim of Tyre, as we shall see. 
Fulcher reassures his readers that the massacre of the Antiochenes was fol-
lowed by “a second great victory which through the favor of God very marvelously 
fell to the people of Jerusalem.” He relates that the king received Roger’s call to aid 
while fighting the troops of Damascus by the Jordan. Driving them off, he hurried 
north in the company of the count of Tripoli and two hundred and fifty knights, also 
taking along the bishop of Caeserea with the Holy Cross. Upon arriving at Antioch 
he summoned the forces of Edessa as well to join his planned campaign against the 
Turks. After the Franks of Edessa and the survivors of Ager Sanguinis joined the 
king, Fulcher relates, the battle was joined near Zardana. He gives the number of the 
Frankish knights as seven hundred, which seems realistic, but he exaggerates that of 
the Turks as twenty thousand. This was obviously an effort to magnify what Fulcher 
wished to represent as a bright victory in vengeance of the preceding disaster.     
At this point Fulcher returns to his argument that it had been the sinfulness of 
the Franks that had brought about their crushing defeat in the first battle. This time 
he expresses the idea through the mouth of a certain Turkish soldier. Reportedly, the 
day before the battle this man declared to a Frankish colleague: “Your God has 
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abandoned you, seeing that you do not keep your law as you used to,
94
 nor preserve 
faith and truth among yourselves.” Because of this reason, he said, and also because 
of their superiority in numbers, the Muslims would doubtless overcome the Franks, 
who toiled in vain with their many sins and few troops, making a fool of themselves. 
Fulcher closes this episode by pointing out the shame for Christians in being re-
proached by “the faithless” for their faith, and finally by calling his readers to correct 
their errors by tearful penitence. He seems to imply that this was precisely what the 
Franks did before the second battle, as they attained to victory by God’s help, while 
the Turks were defeated because of their boastful pride in their numbers.    
Despite its relatively greater length, Fulcher’s account of the Battle of Tell 
Danith is quite confused. Although he asserts that the victory went to the Franks, he 
also speaks of the dispersion of Frankish troops in a way that tends to corroborate 
those accounts that represent the outcome of the battle as a draw. In any case, it 
emerges from the account that Fulcher’s primary concern was not to offer a detailed 
rendering of what actually happened on the battlefield, but only to depict a confron-
tation of the “faithless” and the Christian faithful, in which God fought alongside the 
latter and the Holy Cross played the chief role in the final victory. Although this fea-
ture is also present in the other Latin accounts, notably that of Walter the Chancellor, 
it is not their almost exclusive concern as in Fulcher’s case.  
Fulcher states that in the “very severe struggle” that took place on the battle 
day
95
 “victory for either side was for long in doubt until the Almighty compelled the 
Turks to flee and invigorated the Christians magnificiently against them.”96 Howev-
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er, he does reveal that both sides suffered rout and dispersion at some point: on the 
one hand, he says, the Turks “attacked the Christians and scattered them so much in 
companies that they did not stop till Antioch and failed to rejoin their comrades in 
battle.”97 But on the other hand “God did disperse the Turks,” he says, as some of 
them went inside Aleppo for safety and others fled home to Persia (sic.). All this 
does not conflict with the testimony of Ibn al-Adim. As we have seen, this chronicler 
asserted that Robert of Zardana and a great part of the Frankish cavalry routed the 
Muslim forces before them, while Ilghazi and his companions routed the Frankish 
troops led by Baldwin and Pons, pursuing them up to the castle of Hab. Nevertheless, 
Fulcher insists like the other Latin sources that Baldwin and his companions stood 
their ground on the battlefield, “fighting around the Holy Cross constantly and gal-
lantly and not deserting it.” 
Indeed the Holy Cross and its influence on the course of the battle constitute 
the centerpoint of Fulcher’s narrative, much in the same way as he depicts it standing 
at the center of the battlefield: “Through the power of this most holy and precious 
Cross,” which Baldwin, Pons and their men “had carried forth into battle just like 
servants carrying their mistress,…98 God Almighty snatched them powerfully from 
the grasp of the abominable race of the Turks, and preserved them for some future 
business of his own.”99 After the king stood guard on the battlefield for two days and 
no Turks appeared for fight, Fulcher concludes, he took up the Cross and marched to 
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Antioch. The account ends with the relation of how the king, the patriarch of Antioch 
and the Bishop of Caeserea adored the venerable Cross in tears, offering thanks and 
prayers to God for having granted the victory to the Christians through its power.  
6.3.1.11 Orderic Vitalis  
The account of Orderic Vitalis
100
 adds little that is new to what we have 
learned from the sources so far. The only exception is his report of an attack against 
Antioch made after the Battle of Ager Sanguinis, which is also mentioned by Walter 
the Chancellor. But his rendering of the events still remains interesting and valuable 
insofar as it shows how a contemporary historian in Europe, a Norman moreover like 
the victims of Antioch, regarded this fateful battle and its aftermath.  
It is immediately observable in this context that Orderic views the events 
from a sharp perspective of religious confrontation, depicting an outremer Christiani-
ty that was defended by its able princes against the “pagan” enemies who were al-
ways on the lookout for an opportunity to attack it. Accordingly, he attributes Ilgha-
zi’s campaign to the death of the “unconquered princes” Bohemond and Tancred, 
who he says had resisted the “infidels” for many years, but then passed away “after 
many struggles and triumphs in the name of Jesus”: they had left their place to Rog-
er, a prince “dogged by misfortune.” The news of their death, Orderic explains, 
“caused pagans to rejoice” and encouraged Ilghazi, “a nephew of the sultan,” (sic.) to 
launch a war against the Christians. Accordingly, he took a huge army and besieged 
Zardana. As we shall see, Walter the Chancellor reports a siege of al-Atharib just be-
fore the Battle of Ager Sanguinis, and we have already seen Ibn al-Adim state that 
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before the clash the Latins supposed the Muslims to be besieging al-Atharib and Zar-
dana. So there might indeed be a grain of truth in Orderic’s testimony.   
Like most other Christian sources Orderic accuses Roger of being responsible 
for the following debacle, but as in the case of Matthew and the Anonymous, his crit-
icisms tend to focus on the character defects of this prince, which led him to move 
without waiting for the reinforcements, rather than on his “sins” as emphasized by 
Fulcher. But while the indigenous Christian authors mainly dwelt on Roger’s pride, 
Orderic asserts that he was also “unreliable, obstinate and rash,” character traits that 
he says prevented the prince from being the equal of his precedessors despite his dar-
ing and courage. Thus he relates in parallel with Walter the Chancellor that Richard 
refused to pay heed to Patriarch Bernard’s advice to wait for the already summoned 
king and set out prematurely for war. At this point Orderic attributes to Bernard a 
lengthy speech in which the prelate reportedly begged Roger to wait for the rein-
forcements, pointing out the fates of ancient kings defeated because of their rash 
haste, and warned him that he would drag his subjects with himself into a disaster of 
the same kind. But “the proud prince set out heeding nothing,” and pitched his tents 
in the plain of Sarmada (sic.) with seven thousand men. 
Next thing, Orderic proceeds, the enemy raised the siege and suddenly at-
tacked the Franks. “Ilghazi and huge squadrons of pagans (ethnicorum) swept down 
unexpectedly from the mountains nearby into the plain,” he says, and “covered the 
face of the earth like locusts with their swarms.” In a way reminiscent of the account 
of Ibn al-Adim, who told how Toghan Arslan began the attack by suddenly descend-
ing upon the Frankish tents, Orderic asserts that the enemy ferociously rushed upon 
the tents of the Christians while they were still unprepared. Not going into further 
detail, however, he states that they slew Roger along with seven tousand of his men 
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on the field of Darb Sarmada. He notes besides that about one hundred and forty men 
happened to be outside the camp at this time, in search of forage or for hawking. On 
seeing the sudden Turkish attack these fled to Antioch to warn the populace, “being 
preserved through God’s mercy to protect the faithful.” Among these were Roger of 
Vieux Pont, who also appears in Walter the Chancellor’s account as the hero of a 
skirmish preceding the battle. 
Not at this point but slightly further on in his work
101
 Orderic notes the pres-
ence of a Byzantine envoy sent to Antioch among those captured in the battle, which 
is corroborated by Ibn al-Adim as we have seen. He reports that the envoy in ques-
tion, named Ravendinus, had been sent by emperor Alexius to request the hand of 
Roger’s daughter for his son, John. There are some problems in this statement, for 
Alexius died in 1118 and if it was really he who had sent the messenger, this must 
have taken place on the very eve of his death. Moreover, John Comnenus was al-
ready married by this date, so the prince who was to marry Roger’s daughter should 
have been another son of Alexius.
102
  
According to Orderic, the reason for this offer made by the emperor was his 
desire to acquire Antioch by means of a marriage connection, after he had despaired 
of winning it by force of arms. But Ilghazi went on to the attack while Ravendinus 
was still waiting for the Normans to agree on an answer, and the Byzantine envoy, 
setting out with Roger against the Muslim army, was taken captive. Orderic indicates 
that “the Turks did him no harm because he was a Greek,” and “spared him as much 
out of respect for a neighboring people as for securing the goodwill of the emperor.” 
Accordingly they let him go in safety, after the payment of a ransom of fifteen thou-
sand bezants. This concern of Ilghazi to avoid alienating the Byzantine emperor is 
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quite significant, and we shall see in section 6.3.2 that it can be brought into relation 
with his decision not to attack Antioch.     
Orderic is the only Christian source examined so far who states that Antioch 
was left defenceless and faced with the danger of capture after the debacle. He relates 
that upon receiving the news Patriarch Bernard took active measures to defend the 
city, helped by all the clergy and laity he could find, while Roger’s widow Cecilia, in 
an effort to fill the places of the slain knights, invested a number of squires with 
knighthood. Among these Orderic mentions a certain Gervase of Dol, a semi-
legendary character who generally appears in chanson-like contexts in the author’s 
work.
103
 But Orderic also goes beyond the Muslim sources in reporting that the Turk-
ish troops actually attacked the battlements of Antioch. “Elated by the massacre of 
Christians,” he asserts, “the pagans (gentiles) hurried en masse to the city and plotted 
to kill the defenders and enter it by surprise; but by God’s providence and the 
strength of a few Christians they were thrown back from the battlements of Antioch.” 
This statement seems highly dubious however, as we know from the other sources 
that Ilghazi undertook no such attack against Antioch, but preferred instead to be-
siege al-Atharib and Zardana. So the attack reported by Orderic, even if true, must 
have been no more than the initiative of some Turkoman bands dispersed in the area 
in search of plunder. That this was indeed so is revealed by Walter the Chancellor’s 
testimony, as we shall see presently. 
Orderic’s narrative of the Battle of Tell Danith, like that of Fulcher, is obvi-
ously not intended to be a detailed account, but instead to offer relief to the readers 
by functioning as a triumphant assertion of final Christian victory against “pagan 
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might.” He states that Baldwin and Pons converged on the Castle of Hab, rather than 
the actual site of the battle at Tell Danith, and “invoking the name of merciful Jesus,” 
joined battle with the enemy. Orderic has no doubts about the outcome of the battle: 
“They conquered, breaking the wings of the pagan army.” He does not neglect to 
have his hero Gervase slay Ilghazi, whereby, he asserts, “Christian courage brought 
down pagan might.” The author concludes his account by noting how “the Christians 
were enriched in the spoils of the pagans and gladly gave thanks to God.” 
6.3.1.12 Walter the Chancellor  
Walter the Chancellor’s account104 is the most detailed one amongst those of-
fered by the Latin sources, and as in the case of the first Battle of Tell Danith, is also 
valuable insofar as it comes from the pen of an eyewitness of the events, at least up 
to the end of the Battle of Ager Sanguinis in which the author fell captive.
105
 In the 
prologue to the second book of his work, which handles Ager Sanguinis and its af-
termath, Walter puts forward what he thought to be the main causes of the Franks’ 
defeat after their victory in 1115. He declares that this was nothing other than pride 
in their own good deeds, by which they became “both ungrateful to God and unmind-
ful of His kindness.” “Because we put the success of the earlier war down to the vic-
tory of our forces,” he explains, “in the second detestable war some of us fell sudden-
ly, having become the stuff of death, others indeed were kept alive for long and 
dreadful torture.”  
Walter then embarks on his main narrative, stating: “Ilghazi, prince of the de-
lusion and dissent of the Turkomans, had reached the borderlands of the Antiochene 
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lordship in battle array.” As Asbridge and Edgington point out in the notes to the 
translation,
106
 it is noteworthy here that Walter immediately vilifies Ilghazi, whereas 
he had spoken of him only briefly and in neutral terms in his narrative of the first 
Battle of Tell Danith in 1115. There, as we saw, Tughtekin occupied the center of the 
stage, and Ilghazi, at that time not the ruler of Aleppo but the emir of a distant prov-
ince in Diyar Bakr, found only marginal mention. Since Walter had written that part 
before the events of summer 1119, as it emerges from the absence of any forward 
references to these events in the first half of his work, he felt no need to denigrate 
Ilghazi. But now this emir was the possessor of Aleppo, the greatest obstacle before 
the Franks in North Syria, and, by the time Walter wrote the second part, he was also 
the Muslim ruler who had inflicted the greatest damage on the Principality of Anti-
och since the Battle of Harran. So it is not astonishing that the account directly opens 
with Ilghazi, and he is depicted as “the prince of delusion and dissent” rather than 
simply as “the emir of the Turkomans.”      
When Roger received the news of Ilghazi’s arrival, Walter continues, he as-
sembled his forces and proceeded to Artah. But although the prince asked Patriarch 
Bernard to accompany him to the town, he did not want to listen to the prelate’s ad-
vice to wait for the king there. In support of the advice of Bernard, whom he uses 
besides as a mouthpiece for his own opinions, Walter enumerates the advantages of 
the Franks’ position at Artah. He points out that food and drink were abundant in the 
region and that the approach there from the direction of Antioch was open and safe. 
From the direction of Aleppo, in contrast, it was very forbidding and dangerous on 
account of the mountains and the dense vegetation of the valleys in between. This 
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rough ground offering protection to Artah from the east was of course the aforemen-
tioned Jabal Talat.  
As had often been the case during the Seljukid expeditions between 1110-
1115, the Frankish army normally avoided a pitched battle with the Muslim forces 
and preferred to assemble their forces at a well-fortified and well-supplied place like 
Apamea. In this way they were able to limit the movements of the invading army un-
til it had to withdraw without having accomplished much. The patriarch, as far as it 
emerges from the account of Orderic Vitalis as well, seems to have argued for the 
maintenance of that policy in this case too: while waiting for the king to arrive, it 
would be sufficient for them to preserve their position until Ilghazi’s impatient Turk-
omans disbanded to return home. But Roger “disregarded the warnings of the father-
ly priest in favour of his own temerity,” Walter states, “and he did not seem to be in-
spired by fear of the enemy or in any way to be able to be prevailed upon.” Nor could 
the pious advice and requests of many others dissuade the prince from his decision, 
Walter notes, and, endangering the safety of both himself and his men, he insisted 
that they should not wait there any longer.  
Despite his crticisms of Prince Roger, Walter also points out in his defence a 
factor that became effective in this fateful decision: the contrary advice of certain 
barons whose lands on the eastern frontier were devastated every year. Although 
Walter does not explicitly name these barons, they were probably Alan of al-Atharib, 
Robert fitzFulk the Leper of Zardana and perhaps also Bonable of Sarmin.
107
 All of 
these towns lay east of Jabal Talat, and the first two were precisely the direct targets 
of Ilghazi’s campaign. According to Walter, it was under the pressure of their lords 
that Roger “decided to cross over with the tents from the suitable place to a useless 
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position.” This is an important point, and suggests the possibility that Roger’s pur-
pose in moving to the new position was to place pressure upon Ilghazi and prevent 
him from capturing those two towns of vital strategic importance. As we shall see, 
this possibility is also corroborated by other evidence provided by Walter. 
The new position Roger chose was the valley of Balat, situated between two 
mountains near the Sarmada pass to the north of al-Atharib,
108
 as also described by 
Ibn al-Adim in his account. Walter states with covert criticism that the Franks left 
Artah and proceeded, “as if braver than lions and more inexorable than tigers,” to 
pitch camp at this fateful place. It was “called Ager Sanguinis (Field of Blood) by the 
populace,” he remarks, “both in reality and in the name.” As a first person witness he 
testifies to the disadvantages of the new location, noting the dearth of food and drink 
which necessitated them to procure these from elsewhere. He also notes that some 
men were sent to fortify the camp outside, which is corroborated by Ibn al-Adim’s 
statement that the Franks had begun to build a castle commanding Tell Afrin. But 
both the new position of the Frankish army and this work of fortification were 
learned by Ilghazi and his companions by the help of spies disguised as bird-sellers. 
Walter argues that upon this they pretended to lay siege to al-Atharib, in order to 
conceal their intention of making a surprise attack on the Franks. According to him, 
another purpose of the Turks in this move was to survey the paths of approach by 
which they could attack the Franks with the greatest convenience for themselves. 
They also intended to inspire fear by displaying their great numbers. 
Walter mentions only al-Atharib in this passage, and following him exclu-
sively on this point, Asbridge accepts that Ilghazi besieged only the castle in ques-
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tion.
109
 On the other hand, we have seen Orderic Vitalis report a Muslim siege of 
Zardana instead. If combined with Ibn al-Adim’s aforementioned assertion that the 
Franks “supposed the Muslims to be besieging al-Atharib and Zardana,” the testimo-
nies of Walter and Orderic might be taken to indicate that both of these towns had 
been placed under siege on the eve of the battle. But it still remains unclear to what 
extent they were serious sieges and to what extent they were undertaken as a cover 
for scouting purposes and to inspire fear, as Walter argues and Ibn al-Adim seems to 
imply. When it is taken into account that Ilghazi’s main goal for the campaign was to 
recover al-Atharib and Zardana, it seems more judicious to believe like Asbridge that 
he was indeed making a serious attempt to capture these castles,
110
 and not simply 
using them as a pretext for other tactical aims. His priority was not to join battle with 
the Antiochene army, therefore, but to capture al-Atharib and Zardana and push back 
the Antiochene frontier beyond Jabal Talat. It was only when he realized that he 
could after all penetrate the valley of Balat that he changed his initial plan and ven-
tured to make a surprise attack on the Antiochene forces.  
As for the latter, we have seen that they had come to Balat precisely to try to 
prevent Ilghazi from capturing al-Atharib and Zardana, upon the urging of the lords 
of these castles. So they must have prepared there to go into attack and raise the 
Turkish sieges, rather than simply ensconce themselves in their supposedly inacces-
sible position. This is corroborated in the first place by a clash that Walter reports to 
have taken place on the day before the battle: the sides involved were the Turkish 
troops around al-Atharib and a group of Franks who had come from the Frankish 
camp and the castle itself to confront them. Walter relates that Robert of Vieux-Pont 
displayed heroic resistance with his companions against the Turks and managed to 
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repulse them from al-Atharib. This is supported by Orderic Vitalis, who as we saw 
noted that Robert was outside the camp at this time. Apparently, as an urgent reme-
dy, Roger had sent a contingent to al-Atharib to help its garrison repulse the besieg-
ers.  
Nevertheless, Roger did not intend to content himself with this immediate 
measure: Walter relates as an eye-witness that in a consultation with his nobles the 
prince proposed to march to al-Atharib and join battle if the enemy came to confront 
them; if not, they would march the next day (29 June) against the Muslim camp it-
self. Roger’s proposal was accepted after some discussion, and it was decided that a 
force of cavalry and infantry would be sent to al-Atharib that night. Next morning 
Mauger of Hauteville would set out with forty knights and dispatch ten of his men as 
scouts to the tower on Tell Afrin. These were to notify Roger by a messenger in case 
the enemy approached al-Atharib again. This reveals still more clearly that Roger 
was determined to put a definite stop to Ilghazi’s plans to besiege and capture al-
Atharib and, if the testimonies of Orderic and Ibn al-Adim are taken into account, 
also Zardana, and that he was fully prepared to venture a pitched battle for this pur-
pose. Further support for this argument is brought by Ibn al-Athir’s aforementioned 
report that the Franks sent message to Ilghazi to say “do not fatigue yourself by 
marching towards us; we shall come to you,” although the chronicler himself be-
lieved that they were only playing “a waiting game.”  
It emerges from all this evidence that pace Ibn al-Athir Roger’s forces had 
not simply taken refuge in what they thought to be an impregnable location, waiting 
for the king to arrive or the Muslims to disperse, but were actively seeking battle to 
save al-Atharib and Zardana before Ilghazi could capture them. In any case they 
                                                                                                                                          
110
 Asbridge himself makes this suggestion for al-Atharib alone. 
382 
 
could not have planned to stay in Balat for long, since unlike Artah it was short of 
food and water. Possibly, they may also have been aware that they could be attacked 
in that position, despite its seeming inaccessibility. Indeed Walter’s report about the 
detachments sent against al-Atharib seems to conflict with the assertion of various 
sources, including Walter himself, that the Franks thought themselves to be in an ab-
solutely inaccessible position at Balat: if they were able to send forces from Balat to 
al-Atharib, they had enough reason to consider the possibility that the Turkish forces 
around that castle could reach them in turn. Under these conditions, Roger could not 
have thought of ensconcing himself in Balat and applying pressure on Ilghazi till the 
latter’s forces dispersed or the king arrived. His intention was probably to halt at Ba-
lat briefly and then to go on to the offensive. But Ilghazi anticipated him by attacking 
early in the morning.  
Such considerations suggest the possibility that Roger had not acted so inju-
diciously as the Christian sources have it: in order to prevent Ilghazi from capturing 
al-Atharib and Zardana he moved from Artah to Balat, as also urged by the lords of 
these castles, and prepared to attack the Turks without further delay. His only other 
choice was to forgo the two strategically important castles in question, which was the 
policy adopted by King Baldwin, as we shall see, during Ilghazi’s later siege of Zar-
dana. Hence if Roger is to be criticized at all, he must be criticized for placing more 
than necessary importance on the preservation of these two castles. But it must not be 
forgotten that giving them up was more difficult for him in view of the pressure of 
their lords, Robert and Alan. In the contrasting case of Baldwin, who would watch 
Ilghazi capture Zardana without lifting a finger, its lord Robert was not in a position 
to apply pressure, having fallen captive at the Battle of Ager Sanguinis. And Alan’s 
castle, al-Atharib, had already been captured by that time. As for the other frontier 
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lords, the all-too-fresh experience of Roger’s disaster must have prevented them 
from insisting too much on the preservation of their lands and castles. 
In any case Ilghazi was quicker to act than Roger, and this brought him the 
victory. Aware of the fact that he could not easily take al-Atharib and Zardana with-
out removing the pressure exerted by the Antiochene army in his close proximity, 
and explicitly informed by the latter that they would advance to join battle, he opted 
for a pre-emptive strike early next morning: it was best to attack the Franks while 
they were still in the disadvantageous position of Balat. 
Roger first received the news of the Muslim attack, Walter states, as he was 
making a reconnaissance at the aforementioned tower of observation early next 
morning. Indeed the author escalates the suspense by reporting the successive arrival 
of messengers, each bringing news more alarming than the previous one. Thus he 
relates that the first messenger who arrived riding at top speed informed Roger that 
there were enemy hordes all over the mountain slopes and valleys, which had seemed 
inaccessible even for wild beasts; they were “approaching quickly from three direc-
tions to wage a threefold war.” This conforms with Ibn al-Athir’s statement that the 
Muslims entered the valley by three routes, making use of their superior knowledge 
of local geography, while the Franks were convinced that nobody could reach them 
because of the apparent difficulty of access. Upon this news Roger ordered his army 
to rally for battle. When a second messenger arrived to report that the Muslims were 
very close, on their side of the Sarmadan district, the army was gathered before the 
portable shrine in the camp, in front of the relic of the Cross, where the prince con-
fessed his “sins” –– which are set out in detail by the other Christian sources, as we 
have seen, but mentioned only fleetingly by his chancellor Walter.  
384 
 
The author states that the third in this series of messengers was the deputy-
steward Alberic, alarming in appearance as well as with the news he brought, since 
he had been “struck by a lance in his face and pierced by an arrow almost in his eye;” 
he informed them about the death of most of the forty knights sent before. The leader 
of these, Mauger of Huteville, was the final messenger. Arriving with a companion 
on “horses stuck with arrows and overpowered by leaden missiles,” he announced 
that the enemy was divided into three parts, trying to destroy the Franks with three-
fold war, and called for urgent consultation. Upon this, Walter relates, the Franks de-
cided to draw up the army with ordered battlelines around the tents and with the in-
fantry in the front line. This way, they claimed, “they could wait for the enemy’s 
barbarism more easily and more safely,” forgetful however of God’s own judgement. 
When suddenly “the flags and standards of the heathens appeared from the 
mountainsides among the olives,” Walter continues, the prince exhorted his soldiers 
to fight “in a successful battle as soldiers of God,” and then instructed a certain Rain-
ald Mazoir to make a flanking or diversionary attack
111
 through the districts of Sar-
mada. Combining the elements of chivalry and just war,
112
 Walter relates that after 
Roger had commanded his battlelines to march in ranks, he exhorted them to “defend 
God’s law” and to “bring down the pride of the evil-doers as befits knights.” In cor-
roboration of Ibn al-Athir’s testimony about the initial check suffered by the Mus-
lims, he states that the battleline of St Peter took the lead from the right, scattering 
the Muslims opposite them, and Geoffrey the Monk similarly routed the detachment 
confronting him, while Guy Fresnel was also attacking with all his might. But the 
Franks failed to carry through the attack with force, losing many as a result from dif-
ferent lines, while “the heathen, with the Lord’s assent,” remustered their forces and 
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went into a violent counter-assault. This is again corroborated by Ibn al-Athir, who 
spoke of the Muslim troops charging in waves and stopping the flight of their com-
rades in the vanguard.  
At this critical moment, Walter states, there took place an event that proved 
decisive for the outcome of the battle. The battleline commanded by Robert of St Lô, 
advancing from the left with the Turcopoles, failed to deliver its strike, being unable 
to withstand the opposition of the enemy, and the Turcopoles went into a headlong 
flight, from which they could not be called back by any means. Moreover, meeting 
the battleline of the prince, as he was riding against the enemy, they got in its way 
and carried away part of it as they scattered. Then, “as one misfortune often follows a 
worse,” says Walter, a whirlwind sprang up from the north and raised dust from the 
ground, which got into the eyes of the soldiers and prevented them temporarily from 
fighting.  
Walter then relates Roger’s death, making clear his belief that the prince fell 
martyr while fighting a “Holy War” and obtained salvation in return.113 By this time 
Roger’s troops “lay cut down and dead on all sides,” he states, but with the few men 
remaining the prince kept up the struggle without retreating, “obeying the command 
of God and the bishop by fighting energetically against the entire military might.”114 
Finally, though, he was struck by a horseman’s sword “through the middle of his 
nose right into his brain,” and “in the presence of the symbol of the Holy Cross he 
gave up his body to the earth and his soul to heaven.” Next to be killed was the priest 
bearing the reliquary of the Cross, and Walter depicts with obvious satisfaction how 
“the heathens,” in greed for the gold and precious objects on the reliquary, fought 
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and killed each other, being sent as a result to “the lower regions, never to return, for 
burning by the fires of hell.” As Asbridge and Edgington point out in the notes to the 
text, Walter does not only offer a miracle of the True Cross here, but also compares 
and contrasts the fate of these Muslims after death with that of Roger.
115
  
After this Walter proceeds to relate that the Muslims made a common charge, 
assaulting the Franks “very fiercely from the four corners of the world.” While “the 
shouts of the heathen swelled again and again and the enemy’s swords prevailed,” he 
says, most of the Franks, “compelled now by divine revenge and with the agreement 
of the highest judge,” were killed, wounded and captured. Walter gives the number 
of regular Frankish troops as seven hundred knights and three thousand foot soldiers, 
with many others who had joined them for payment or plunder. In accordance with 
the other sources, he asserts that the major part of these troops were lost.  
Walter notes that the detachment sent under Rainald Mazoir to make a diver-
sionary or a flank attack through the district of Sarmada had also been routed after 
some initial success, with many being killed: Rainald himself, seriously wounded, 
took refuge with a few of his men in the tower of Sarmada, planning to wait for the 
arrival of King Baldwin if they could. Nevertheless, the weakness of the tower and 
the lack of food compelled him to demand safe conduct from Ilghazi, who granted it 
and additionally gave his ring as a guarantee for Rainald’s release at the end of one 
month. Walter does not reveal whether Ilghazi, “even more astute” than the “cun-
ning” Rainald, kept his word, but a charter dating from 1122 and bearing Rainald’s 
name among the witnesses testifies that he did survive these events. As Asbridge and 
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Edgington suggest, it was probably out of his reluctance to show Ilghazi keeping a 
promise that Walter failed to report Rainald’s release.116        
At this point Walter reproaches some of the nobles who had deserted the 
prince to escape to Antioch, and adds that “they would have preferred the port” to 
abandon the East altogether. He next relates what happened on the battlefield after 
the death of the prince. In parallel with the reports of the Muslim sources, who as-
serted that only ten or twenty Franks were able to survive the battle, Walter sates that 
“the battlefield was so hemmed in and access and paths to the mountains and valleys 
so observed, that not a single person trying to escape was able to get through un-
scathed.” Some of them fought back to the tents, he relates, only to find that these 
had already been “carried off by the hands of the unrighteous.” Walter also notes the 
“martyrdom” of a certain Eutrepios who had attacked the Turkomans plundering the 
chapel-tent as well as the death of a group of Franks who had taken refuge on a hill 
and been surrounded there by the Muslims.       
At this point Walter goes into a lengthy digression, dwelling on “the tortures 
and torments and martyrdoms” of the Frankish prisoners taken captive by Ilghazi’s 
forces, very probably as an eyewitness of the events himself; he depicts both Ilghazi 
and his son Shams al-Din Sulaiman as ruthless and sadistic villains.
117
 Then he sets 
out to relate Ilghazi’s actions after his victory: the emir first checked al-Atharib, but 
saw that it was still defended too strongly to storm. He then proceeded to Artah and 
received the “tower of the bishop” on granting safe conduct to the prelate and his ret-
inue as far as Antioch. In the case of Rainald Mazoir in Sarmada, we have seen Wal-
ter’s reluctance to show Ilghazi keeping his promises. In this case, he could savor 
telling how the emir broke his promise by sending robbers to deprive the clergy of all 
                                                 
116
 Walter the Chancellor, Antiochene Wars, 129, n. 103; 64 and n. 138. 
388 
 
the silver and gold ornaments they were carrying. Although Walter grudgingly ad-
mits that Ilghazi later restored their priestly garments, he asserts that this was only to 
“conceal his own wickedness with them.”  
Walter proceeds to relate that Ilghazi arranged to spend a few days in the 
camp before Artah, so that he could take the rest of the town and then set out to at-
tack Antioch. Thereby he reveals his belief that Ilghazi’s main purpose after his vic-
tory at Balat was to capture Antioch, and he is joined in this by Orderic Vitalis as we 
have seen. The people of Antioch do not seem to have thought differently, as far as it 
emerges from the preparations for defence reported by Orderic and Walter himself. 
Artah was a good place besides to begin the assault upon Antioch, for there was only 
a flat plain between this town and the city, with no other fortified places in between, 
and it also controlled the approach to the Iron Bridge. Nevertheless Ilghazi did not 
attack Antioch in the end, for reasons to be discussed in the next section, and Walter 
seems to have felt the need to explain this situation, just like Ibn al-Adim, Ibn al-
Qalanisi and Usama ibn Munqidh on the Muslim side.
118
  
One of the two explanations Walter hit upon was Ilghazi’s detainment before 
Artah by the clever machinations of its castellan Joseph, probably an Armenian.
119
 
“Fore-armed by wisdom,” and pretending to bow to Ilghazi’s demand of surrender, 
this man reportedly begged him to appoint a certain Sahenas as his proxy until he 
took Antioch. Then all the Frankish castles would capitulate, his amongst them. The 
pretext he put forward for this request was that he feared for the fate of his son, who 
was held as a hostage in Antioch, in case he surrendered the castle.  
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But Ilghazi would have accepted this proposal only if he had really been 
planning to attack Antioch, which was probably not the case as we have already stat-
ed. So Walter’s story needs correction even though it might contain a core of truth. In 
recent years certain Armenian lords in the Jazira had been collaborating with the 
Turks against the Franks.
120
 It may have been the case that after the Frankish debacle 
this Armenian castellan also changed sides and offered his allegiance to Ilghazi, who 
accepted it in order not to lose more time before attacking his main targets, al-
Atharib and Zardana, as he had been joined in the meanwhile by the expected rein-
forcements under Tughtekin and reached a power necessary to tackle those strongly 
garrisoned towns.  
It must be pointed out that this first explanation offered by Walter also finds 
support from Ibn al-Adim: we have seen him accuse Ilghazi of having lost time by 
marching against Artah istead of Antioch, thus enabling the king to reach and enter 
the city.  
The second explanation Walter offers for Ilghazi’s apparent “failure” to take 
Antioch seems like a combination of that of Usama ibn Munqidh about Ilghazi’s 
drunken stupor and that of Ibn al-Qalanisi about the dispersion of his troops in search 
for plunder: Ilghazi was keen on drink, Walter states, and forgetting about Antioch 
“by God’s will,” he dispatched “thousands of soldiers throughout regions far and 
near who returned to him day after day refreshed and laden with spoils both of men 
and of other things.” 
Like Orderic Vitalis, albeit in much more detail, Walter relates the defensive 
measures taken in Antioch against the imminent attack that the inhabitants expected 
now, and not entirely without reason: “Every care, labour, fear, terror or harm to 
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Christendom could happen, now that Antioch was deprived of military service and 
almost the entire military force of Frankish citizens was lost.” As a result, “all came 
down to the clergy” in ensuring the safety of the city. What was worse, the threat did 
not only come from the outside but much more seriously from the inside as well: 
Walter admits with astonishing frankness that the indigenous populace of Antioch, 
“deprived of their goods by force and deviousness of our people… and often over-
come by despair,” could well desire to “return evil for evil” by betraying the city to 
the Muslims.
121
 In order to prevent this, he states, the patriarch, consulting the other 
Latins, took exclusive charge of the city for himself, the clergy and the remaining 
Franks, and forbade the indigenous populace to carry arms or to go out without a 
light at night. He also ordered his tents to be placed by the weakest point in the forti-
fications and all the towers to be garrisoned by monks and clerics, along with lay-
men. 
Somewhat paradoxically, Walter adds that the patriarch prayed “for the safety 
and defence of the Christian people,” since he preferred to “fight with prayers rather 
than weapons,” and yet continuously circuited the walls with “his armed clergy and 
knights, in the manner of warriors,” to comfort and encourage those guarding them. 
Thus the clergy “acted the part of military service wisely and vigorously” alongside 
others, and “with God’s strength” preserved the city until Baldwin could make his 
long-desired appearance to protect it.  
At this point Walter relates that Ilghazi, having heard that the king was hurry-
ing to Antioch in the company of Pons, sent twenty thousand men (obviously an ex-
aggerated number) to intercept them. They were to be “intent on the destruction of 
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Christianity in whatever way they could.”122 Setting out by night towards Latakia, 
these forces divided into three parts, one to intercept the king, one to seize plunder, 
and one to attack the port of St Simeon. We have seen Ibn al-Adim relate how a 
Turkoman raiding party met and routed the Franks near Jabala, compelling the king 
and the count to seek refuge in the mountains. Walter’s version of the events is a lit-
tle different, revealing that it was rather the Provençal rearguard led by Pons who 
were eventually defeated by the Muslims, while, before this, the king had managed 
to ward off those attacking his army.  
Beginning from the latter event, Walter relates that Baldwin met the Turks 
unexpectedly at Mount Hingro, and by a vigorous assault scattered them over moun-
tains. Setting out early next morning, he ordered the count and his Provençals to fol-
low behind and guard his rear. The latter came across a Turkish raiding band and at-
tacked them, but after some initial success they were defeated. While some were de-
stroyed and some scattered in the mountains, the rest could reach the king’s camp 
only by night. After some consideration, Walter states, Baldwin gave up the thought 
of pursuit and decided to go to Antioch instead, so that he could comfort its people, 
collect information, consult the patriarch, and then pursue the enemy.    
Walter also relates in much more detail the attack against Antioch reported by 
Orderic Vitalis. He reveals that this was rather in the character of a foray into its vi-
cinity, undertaken by a Turkoman raiding band, and not a serious attack against its 
battlements as presented by Orderic. He states that the Muslim division of around 
three thousand that had made for the port of St. Simeon suddenly attacked the Frank-
ish forces there and forced the survivors to flee by ship. Having withdrawn through 
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the mountains with their captives and booty, they next appeared not far from Anti-
och, with their banners held high, a sight that raised “an immense clamour” from the 
city. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether these were indeed the troops who had at-
tacked St Simeon, or the second division that had set out for plunder, or a combina-
tion of both. But the fact remains that they were not a part of the main army attacking 
the city under Ilghazi’s command.  
Walter goes on to relate that the clergy, knights and other citizens went out 
against the Turkomans, and sent some men to reconnoitre the numbers and strength 
of the enemy. But these were put to flight, and the Turks pursuing them directly 
charged against the main part of Antiochene troops waiting near the city. They 
forced some into the river and pursued the rest to the bridge before the Gate of Anti-
och, killing thirty-seven in all.
123
 Despite this, the Franks stood their ground on the 
bridge, and drove off the Muslim troops. Joining the rest of their comrades, these 
marched away with the booty they had collected.   
Next thing, Walter reports in exultant terms the arrival of King Baldwin: 
“The renowned king; to all the Christian people he was great in prospect, greater in 
arrival, greatest in the protection he brought.” Idealizing the king as a Christian hero, 
Walter thus introduces the main theme of the rest of his work, that is, how he saved 
Antioch from certain capture.
124
 In the same tenor, he relates how sad the king be-
came upon learning about “the infidels’ tyranny,” and hurried to enter the city, not in 
order to rest, but to pray and receive absolution before he would take on the Mus-
lims. Contrasting Baldwin implicitly with the rash Roger, he notes that the king con-
sulted the patriarch and took his advice. After this, reportedly burning for revenge 
and inspired to chivalry by his kingly status, Baldwin set out in pursuit of the Turks, 
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but returned to Antioch upon learning that they were already far off and riding at 
speed, “as if impelled by fear.” Back in Antioch, Walter states, in concluding his in-
troductory eulogy, Baldwin was elevated by God’s gift to the rank of prince. This 
was only rightful, he observes, as it was by the king’s hand that “divine Providence 
took care to return citizens to the ramparts and the city to the citizens.
125
       
Walter then proceeds to relate the defensive measures taken by Baldwin in 
Antioch, and begins with the one that was apparently the most important and effec-
tive in his view: the king and the rest “amended their behavior and watched over oth-
er good things,” he says, in keeping with the advice of the patriarch and clergy who 
pointed out the necessity of “fighting lawfully with true righteousness on their side” 
in order to defeat the “infidels.” Next, Baldwin quickly assembled troops from re-
gions far and near, arming himself and his men with military equipment “as befits a 
king.”  
Asbridge and Edgington observe that this decision of the king to concentrate 
all the remaining troops at Antioch enabled him to gather the military strength with 
which he could eventually put a stop to Ilghazi’s operations in the Principality.126 But 
in the short run it weakened the defences of Antioch, as the castles around it were 
emptied of their troops and leaders. The Turkish army was reinforced at the same 
time, being joined before Artah by Tughtekin and his forces. So the time seemed fi-
nally ripe for the restoration of Aleppo’s control of the region east of Jabal Talat.127  
When Ilghazi learned that almost all the remaining troops in the Principality 
had left their castles to join the king at Antioch, including the lord and garrison of al-
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Atharib, he abandoned the sieges of Artah and Imm (immediately to the south of Ar-
tah) and marched upon this castle, which was one of his two primary targets from the 
beginning. Walter relates how he intimidated the townspeople into surrender by min-
ing the walls and setting fire to their foundations, as well as by bombarding the walls 
with petraries. The author adopts a critical attitude toward the townspeople, stating 
that they traveled “tearful and shamefaced to the king” after their “unfortunate and 
shameful decision.” Ilghazi, having garrisoned the city in the meanwhile, marched 
next against Zardana, the second of his principal targets.     
Walter notes that at this time the king was still preparing to set out for al-
Atharib, where he hoped to find the Muslim army. This reveals that Baldwin was 
concerned like Roger to defend al-Atharib, though probably not at all costs like that 
prince.
128
 Walter relates how the king, “making no false claim of victory or human 
praise for himself, but entrusting all to God,” prayed that He may “put down and 
overthrow the tyrants and assailants of Christianity from their presumptuous eleva-
tion and from their strength, by which they thought they would conquer.” Thus he 
draws a contrast with Roger’s proud attitude, as well as with the “presumption” of 
the enemy who trusted their greater numbers. 
When Baldwin finally set out for al-Atharib, Walter continues, he came 
across the townspeople who had already surrendered it. So he decided to march in-
stead to Tell Danith, from where he hoped to detect the whereabouts of the Muslim 
army. “Nor did he lack effectiveness,” Walter remarks, for soon after camping at Tell 
Danith the king received the news that the Muslims had besieged Zardana. He also 
learned that they were trying to disrupt the order of his army by continous skirmish-
es. To prevent this, Walter relates, Baldwin drew up his men in regular battle lines 
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before the camp. The Turks, in turn, “full of crafty cunning,” did not retire to their 
own quarters at night but instead remained around the Frankish army, holding their 
horses by the reins.  
In the meantime Ilghazi had been assaulting Zardana day and night with siege 
engines, trying to force it into surrender. But Walter notes like Ibn al-Adim that the 
emir’s army was breaking up into foraging parties. He relates how, on the pretext of 
procuring supplies and necessities, thousands of Turkomans and Arabs spread 
throughout the region for plunder, and set out for home once they had collected as 
much booty as they could. Dubais and other emirs who had accompanied Ilghazi into 
the battle followed suit with their troops.  
Apparently, this was precisely what the king had been expecting, being aware 
of the difficulties of keeping a Turkoman army on the field, especially during a long 
siege. Making no attempt to relieve Zardana, therefore, he kept to his defensible po-
sition at Tell Danith, following a cautious strategy in stark contrast to that of Rog-
er.
129
 But Walter asserts that Ilghazi was just as aware of what awaited his army, so 
strove hard to capture the castle with all his forces. In addition to this pressing situa-
tion and his long-term strategic aim of restoring Aleppan control east of Jabal Talat, 
there was probably yet another reason why Ilghazi was so eager to capture Zardana 
quickly: he must have been concerned that he could be trapped between Baldwin’s 
troops in his immediate vicinity and the defenders of Zardana. It would have been 
too dangerous in the forthcoming battle against the king’s army to have an enemy 
garrison to his rear.
130
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Walter complains that in order to avoid this danger Ilghazi gave deceitful 
promises of safe conduct to the townspeople, contravening the oaths he swore alt-
hough these were binding in Muslim law. Thus he depicts the emir as being ready to 
flout even the laws of his own religion. He relates how, persuaded by their wounds 
and weakness as well as by the apparent good faith of the prince, the townspeople 
assented to the “abominable petition” and “unwittingly placed themselves in the 
hands of butchers instead of escorts”: for when they left the town, the “unholy prince 
happily ordered his armies to put the Christians savagely to death.” Walter relates in 
extolling terms that the king, “second only to the Lord as the lord and defender of 
Christendom,” suffered greatly on learning that they had all been killed in this way, 
but being “comforted by the power of the Holy Cross… prepared himself manfully” 
to fight the Turks on the following morning. 
Significantly, all the elements of Walter’s story about the siege of Zardana, 
the dispersion of Ilghazi’s forces, his haste to press forward the siege, and the massa-
cre of the townspeople display remarkable parallels with the account of Ibn al-Adim. 
But differently from Walter, Ibn al-Adim does not hold Ilghazi responsible for the 
massacre of the people of Zardana, presenting it as the work of Turkomans acting on 
their own.  
Walter goes on to relate that Ilghazi took Zardana and garrisoned it, after 
which he and Tughtekin joined those who had been lying in wait around the Frankish 
army at Tell Danith. Ilghazi’s intention was to make a sudden attack early next morn-
ing, just as he had done with successful results in the previous battle at Ager Sangui-
nis. But the king was not like Roger, and aware of the designs of the enemy, cau-
tiously took all the necessary measures: “God ensured that Baldwin, who had often 
experienced the enemy’s existence and wars,… arranged for the tents to be gathered 
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up and the soldiers to be put on alert,” so that if the enemy launched a surprise attack 
they would find nothing in disorder, “but would discover that by God’s power and 
His sign the Christians thrived in trading blows and destroying the enemy.” Walter 
notes that Baldwin also considered the possibility that he could confront the Muslim 
army en masse, instead of being subjected to a surprise attack, and for that prospect 
undertook preparations to march towards Hab. “Truly only then he welcomed war, 
and it was inevitable,” remarks Walter, stressing that in contrast to Roger Baldwin 
was prepared to join batte only when it became strictly necessary.
131
    
Walter attempts to give a detailed account of the following battle of Tell 
Danith, but the fact that he was a prisoner in Aleppo at this time, having fallen cap-
tive in the Battle of Ager Sanguinis, makes caution advisable in approaching his ver-
sion of the events. Some confusion arises already in his report of the battle order, 
which he says consisted of nine lines in total. Three of these were placed in the van-
guard, with the infantry positioned to their rear, while the royal forces assumed the 
task of protecting them. As Asbridge and Edgington point out, however, it remains 
unclear whether it was the infantry or the royal force that held the rearguard.
132
 The 
right and left wings, on the other hand, were held respectively by the forces of Tripo-
li and the remaining nobles of Antioch.
133
 
In agreement with Michael the Syrian, Walter states that the Muslim army, 
having surrounded the Franks just like at Balat, went on to the attack. Making a loud 
din with drums and trumpets, and showering down arrows and javelins, they tried to 
scatter the Frankish army. Failing to achieve this purpose, the Turks then decided to 
destroy the large Frankish infantry that posed a serious hindrance for them, insofar as 
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it protected the lines in the vanguard. Accordingly they slung their bows on their 
arms, took out their swords, and assaulted the Franks with such impetus that the lat-
ter were scattered. The contingent of Pons, put in entirety to flight, became mixed up 
with that of the king; only the count himself and a few of his committed soldiers 
stood their ground to fight. “The greater part of our infantry” confesses Walter, 
“struck by the Lord’s leave, fell to the enemy’s sword.” This slaughter of the infantry 
is corroborated by the testimonies of Ibn al-Adim and Michael the Syrian. Walter 
indicates that following this event the Turks charged from all sides, which would 
correspond to the charge that Ibn al-Adim reports to have been made by Ilghazi, 
Tughtekin and Toghan Arslan. 
Walter’s account also displays an important parallel with that of Fulcher’s, 
namely the central role he attributes to the “miraculous influence” of the Holy Cross, 
which he says turned the tide of the battle at this critical moment. Reportedly, it was 
the archbishop of Caeserea who was bearing the Cross, without a hauberk and un-
scathed despite having been hit by an arrow. Observing that the “infidels” were pre-
vailing, he reportedly turned the Cross towards them and cursed that they be routed 
by the power of the Cross.  
On a level more congenial to the modern historian, and in line with Michael 
the Syrian, Walter also stresses the role of Baldwin’s personal efforts in turning the 
tide of the battle. “Calling upon the protection and assistance of the Holy Cross,” he 
relates without neglecting the miraculous factor, the king charged at great speed to-
wards the point where the enemy was more numerous, and managed to scatter suc-
cessively their vanguard and rearguard. He also asserts in agreement with the Anon-
ymous that Ilghazi and Tughtekin, put to flight in this way, returned to Aleppo 
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“weaponless and weary,” accompanied by only a few men.134 But we have seen Ibn 
al-Adim reports that the Muslim emirs routed and pursued Baldwin’s troops to Hab. 
Coming back to the battlefield, according to the same source, they then defeated 
Robert fitzFulk and the other Franks who had returned from their attempt to relieve 
Zardana. Accordingly, if Ilghazi and Tughtekin arrived at Aleppo with only a few 
men as Walter and the Anonymous assert, this may have been due to the dispersion 
of their troops in search of plunder rather than to a rout they had suffered. It is also 
notable that Walter does not mention the actions of Robert of Zardana during the bat-
tle, but only records his captivity and death.
135
 
Despite his claims about the king’s rout of the Muslims, however, Walter 
admits that “both sides considered they were both vanquished and victors in that bat-
tle.” Much like Ibn al-Adim, as we have seen before, he attributes this uncertainty to 
the fact that parts of both armies were variously victorious or defeated, and that the 
contrasting news of these events, particularly the exaggerated reports of the defeats, 
arrived at Aleppo, Antioch, Hab and Tripoli with those in flight.
136
 And yet Walter 
insists that the Franks were victorious, basing himself on the fact that ultimately the 
king remained in possession of the battlefield. God granted the victory to King 
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Baldwin, he asserts, “because both the enemy fled and with a few men he even ob-
tained the field of battle freely and absolutely with the triumph of God’s victory.”  
As Asbridge and Edgington point out, however, Walter was well aware that 
there were serious problems with this assertion: one of these was that Ilghazi had 
seized one of the king’s banners, which was just as important a sign of victory at that 
time. The other, more important one was that Baldwin left the field for Hab, as Wal-
ter himself admits, and indeed we have seen Ibn al-Adim assert that most of his forc-
es had to take refuge there under attack from Ilghazi, Tughtekin and Toghan Arslan, 
who pursued them up to that castle. Walter spends considerable effort to explain 
away these facts, presenting that the loss of the royal standard was the consequence 
of a chance skirmish and that the king’s departure for Hab was solely a result of the 
need for provisions, which reportedly arose when the Franks in Hab refused to join 
him on the battlefield.
137
  
About the skirmish in question, Walter relates that this happened when a part 
of the Turkish army came across and attacked a group of Franks returning from the 
previous charge. Their exhausted horses had been entrusted to a groom, who was car-
rying one of the banners of the king. Walter reports that they were all killed or cap-
tured and their horses struck down with arrows, and although he refrains from men-
tioning the banner, it was no doubt taken as well. He then states that the king was 
compelled to proceed to Hab in the evening because of the dearth of provisions, and 
could only return the next morning. For the Franks who had taken refuge in Hab had 
rejected his repeated summons to come and join him on the battlefield, “partly as a 
result of fear and partly because they were overcome by shame.” So Walter seems to 
suggest that Baldwin had expected them to bring the necessary supplies as well, and 
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when they refused to come, he was compelled by the depleted provisions to go to 
Hab himself.  
However, the real cause of the king’s retreat to Hab may have been a little 
different. Asbridge and Edgington suggest that Baldwin could have been compelled 
to seek safety there because of the relative scarcity of his troops who remained on the 
battlefield.
138
 Evidence that supports this suggestion is Ibn al-Adim’s report that the 
forces under Baldwin were compelled to seek refuge in Hab after being defeated and 
pursued by Ilghazi and his allies; significantly, the Aleppan chronicler does not ex-
plicitly mention Baldwin among those who escaped to Hab at this time. It could be 
deduced from here as well that the reason why Baldwin went to Hab was the rout of 
a part of his army, probably the infantry with whom he had shielded the archers and 
cavalry. With the latter, however, he probably led a successful charge against the 
Muslim army after the count of Tripoli’s knights had been driven inwards toward his 
own. While this was interpreted as a victory by the Franks, the remaining royal forc-
es were left exposed and vulnerable against an attack by the Muslims, so it proved 
necessary to seek supplies and security at Hab. This was interpreted in turn by the 
Turkomans as a victory of their own. After the king’s departure Ilghazi and 
Tughtekin returned to the battlefield, where they came across Robert fitzFulk on his 
way back from Zardana, and routed his forces. At this point the Turkomans felt at 
liberty to scatter for plunder, and the emirs themselves returned to Aleppo with a 
small contingent, having by now secured Zardana. The following morning, Baldwin 
returned from Hab with the troops and provisions necessary to reoccupy the battle-
field, and claimed the victory for himself.  
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The whole of the rest of Walter’s account is concerned with the same issue, 
designed to show the king as the triumphant possessor of the battlefield. Walter in-
sists that he “remained on the battlefield long enough to be certain from sure an-
nouncements and sure signs that the infidels had been defeated,” and sent his ring to 
Antioch to “proclaim by this sign the victory of the Holy Cross and announce that the 
king had won the field of battle.” The king is also shown in action as the master of 
the battlefield, ordering the dead and the wounded to be brought to him and sending 
his men to collect the left-over booty he had seen while riding. In a further attempt to 
prove that the result was a victory for the Franks, Walter compares the number of 
Frankish losses with that of the Muslim dead, which he claims to have heard from 
the enemy: “Two or three thousand [Muslims] fell to the swords of the Christians,” 
he asserts, against a hundred horsemen and between five to seven hundred footmen 
lost on the Frankish side.  
Walter’s  account concludes with the celebrations of victory at Antioch, in 
which, he notes with importance, “all unanimously… reformed their behavior and 
way of life.” He declares that Baldwin was received as a victor in the city, after “the 
triumph of Christianity had been regained by the life-giving power of the Holy 
Cross.” Thus some of the main themes of the account are recapitulated at the end: the 
necessity of giving up sinful behavior, which Walter held responsible for the defeat 
suffered at the hand of the “infidels,” and the crucial role of the Holy Cross in what 
he represented as the victory of the Christians. 
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6.3.1.13 William of Tyre  
The account of William of Tyre
139
 is a fairly straigtforward summary of that 
of Walter the Chancellor, with some additions from Fulcher’s account, notably on 
the specific “sins” of Prince Roger which allegedly brought about his defeat.140 Oth-
erwise William follows Walter very closely in this case, with few modifications or 
additions of note, so only these differences will be touched upon here.  
One significant omission is encountered in the passage relating Ilghazi’s cap-
ture of Zardana, where William skips Walter’s report that the emir broke his promise 
of safe conduct to the people of the town and had them all killed. This is representa-
tive of his approach towards Ilghazi in the rest of the account as well, for he is ob-
served to refrain systematically from the derogatory epithets applied to the emir by 
his source Walter. The only apparent exception comes at the beginning of his ac-
count, where William introduces Ilghazi as “a powerful infidel prince, lord of that 
wretched and perfidious race, the Turkomans, and a ruler greatly feared among his 
own people.” Even there, though, the derogatory remarks are directed at the Turko-
mans in general rather than at Ilghazi himself. In keeping with this, William also dis-
cards Walter’s lengthy depiction of the tortures inflicted upon the captives by Ilghazi 
and his son Sulaiman.  
There is yet another notable difference in William’s account. We have seen 
that Walter emphasized the justness of the war and dwelt on the heroic acts of the 
Franks in battle, going so far as to describe the “martyrdom” of a certain Frank who 
attacked the Turks plundering the chapel-tent. In stark contrast to this William adopts 
an astonishingly condemnatory, one would even say humanistic stance toward all 
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war, including an allegedly “just” one like this: when relating the Battle of Tell 
Danith he abruptly drops a passionate remark about what he saw as the fanatical and 
hatred-filled state of mind with which both sides fought, a psychology that rendered 
it theoretically problematic to consider those killed in battle as martyrs:
141
 “Then the 
closely serried ranks met in bitter combat and a hand-to-hand battle with swords en-
sued. With scornful disregard of the laws of humanity, with burning zeal and insatia-
ble hatred, both sides fought as if against wild beasts.”   
Another interesting difference in William’s relation of the Battle of Tell 
Danith is that he discards the emphasis on the critical, miraculous influence of the 
Holy Cross, which had turned the tide of the battle according to his sources Fulcher 
and Walter, and contents himself with the remark: “our strength was in the presence 
of the ever-victorious Cross and in the confession of true faith.” This omission leaves 
the chief role in the final success to the king’s personal efforts and bravery. The dif-
ference in question between William and his earlier twelfth-century sources could be 
attributed perhaps to the gradual development of a more “secular” worldview in 
twelfth century historiography, as a result of which events came to be explained by 
earthly rather than divine causes.
142
   
William also gives some original information about the measures taken in 
Antioch by Baldwin, relating how the king gave the goods of those slain in battle to 
their children or more distant blood relations, and also provided their widows “with 
worthy husbands, of stations equal to their own.” He adds that Baldwin equipped for-
tresses with men, food and arms wherever it seemed necessary. The reason he could 
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undertake these measures was that the clergy and people of Antioch had granted him 
“freehand there just as in the kingdom to institute and remove, and to manage every-
thing according to his own will.” All these stand in remarkable agreement with the 
testimony of Ibn al-Adim who related how Baldwin got hold of the possessions and 
houses of the slain, wed their wives to the survivors, reconstituted the army, and 
made himself the master of Antioch.  
6.3.2 Ilghazi’s “failure” to attack Antioch  
Why didn’t Ilghazi attempt to capture Antioch? Were the contemporary histo-
rians justified in thinking that he could and should have attacked it? Many modern 
historians believe so. Indeed it is interesting from a historiographical point of view 
how the latter reproduce the judgements of their narrative sources without further 
questioning. Echoing the judgement of the majority of the contemporary sources, 
Karl Süssheim states in his article in EI2: “Antioch now lay defenceless at Ilghazi’s 
feet; but he neglected to take the city.”143 William B. Stevenson,144 Aydın Usta,145 
Robert Nicholson
146
 and Imad al-Din Khalil
147
 put forward the same criticism. Fol-
lowing Ibn al-Qalanisi and the corresponding passage in Walter the Chancellor, they 
attribute the reason for Ilghazi’s “failure” to attack Antioch to his mistake of allow-
ing the Turkomans to scatter in search of plunder. Missing the whole point of the ex-
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pedition, besides, Nicholson charges Ilghazi with capturing “the far lesser prizes of 
al-Atharib and Zardana” instead of directly going for Antioch.  
Imad al-Din Khalil, on his part, proceeds to lament Ilghazi’s waste of “this ra-
re opportunity to capture Antioch and thereby destroy one of the four Crusader prin-
cipalities,” pointing out that it managed to survive about two centuries after this. If 
Ilghazi had succeeded in realizing this goal, he asserts without questioning whether 
this was indeed a goal of Ilghazi himself, the course of the struggle between the Mus-
lims and Crusaders would have changed, and the emir “would have occupied a posi-
tion of greater and more firmly established reputation in the history of the Crusades, 
like the one held by Zangi through his capture of Edessa and Saladin through his cap-
ture of Jerusalem.”  
On a similar line, Ali Sevim
148
 asserts that if Ilghazi had concentrated all his 
troops and assaults upon the defenseless city of Antioch, he could have easily cap-
tured it before the king’s arrival, and the situation of the Crusaders would have taken 
a turn for the worse. He even claims that the Franks could have been expelled from 
Syria. But Ilghazi fell to drinking, Sevim states following Usama ibn Munqidh, and 
therefore failed to take full advantage of this victory “that could have brought about 
great and significant consequences for the world of Islam.” Runciman similarly 
draws upon Usama, but combines his explanation with that of Walter the Chancel-
lor.
149
 He asserts that Ilghazi “settled down to so pleasant a series of festivities that 
his health began to suffer,” while raiding bands were sent into the Principality. But 
Antioch was garrisoned in the meantime, he says, and the fruits of victory were 
thrown away by the Muslims.  
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Another scholar combining the explanations of Walter and Usama is Grous-
set,
150
 who recounts how Ilghazi was prevented by Castellan Joseph’s trick from ac-
quiring Artah, the key to Antioch. Being “only an uncouth boor (soudard grossier)… 
satisfied and proud with his victory, massacres and booty,” he states, Ilghazi “began 
to drink, not finding anything better to do than celebrating his success with his Turk-
omans in monstrous orgies.” As a result he fell sick and lost precious time, although 
“Antioch, demoralized by the disaster, emptied of Frankish chivalry, with a very sus-
picious Syrian population, would have been an easy conquest.”  
Nevertheless, Grousset goes further than the previous scholars in coming up 
with an explanation for this attitude of Ilghazi: the emir was “incapable of political 
conceptions” according to him. What the author means by “political conception” 
here seems to be the notion of expelling the Franks from the Near East, which he 
says would have been the aim of a true statesman sent by an organized Muslim pow-
er, like the Seljukids of Persia. He also contrasts “the Turkoman shepherds [who] 
were not made for a sustained war” unfavorably with the regular troops of the Selju-
kid army.  
Clearly, Grousset views the events from a perspective of religius confronta-
tion and what he understands from “political conceptions” are policies determined by 
religious antagonism. If a Muslim ruler was capable of “political conceptions” ac-
cording to this view, he had to wage an unrelenting war against the Franks and seek 
to expel them from the Levant. But Grousset singularly fails to question whether any 
idea of this kind ever occured to the Seljukid sultan or his governors. On the contra-
ry, we have seen that their primary aim was to bring the local Muslim emirs of Syria 
and the Jazira to heel, and not anything like expelling the Franks altogether from the 
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region. It is quite probable in fact that they saw the Franks as an effective counter-
balance against the local emirs, just as Byzantium regarded powerful Muslim rulers 
like Nur al-Din as an effective bulwark against the Franks.  
In the light of these considerations, Grousset’s depiction of Ilghazi as a “sou-
dard grossier” incapable of policial conceptions turns out to be little more than a 
gross caricature: we have seen already that Ilghazi spent this time not in drunken or-
gies, as Usama and Walter hold, but in trying to realize his realistic conception of 
pushing the Antiochene border beyond Jabal Talat. Although his attack on Artah and 
Imm, instead of directly going for al-Atharib and Zardana, seems to belie this at first 
sight, we have seen Walter indicate that he went to al-Atharib first but then turned to 
Artah on seeing that it was still too strongly garrizoned. Asbridge points out in sup-
port that no troops from al-Atharib seem to have fought at Ager Sanguinis, and plau-
sibly suggests that Ilghazi may have decided to wait for Tughtekin to arrive with his 
reinforcements before marching upon these strongly garrisoned fortifications.
151
 Af-
ter he had been joined by Tughtekin and the garrizons of the two castles had gone to 
Antioch on Baldwin’s orders, the time was ripe for attacking the main targets of his 
campaign. Indeed it would have been hardly realistic for a local emir in Ilghazi’s po-
sition to pursue goals like capturing Antioch or expelling the Franks from the Near 
East, as we shall discuss presently.  
Carole Hillenbrand
152
 attributes Ilghazi’s “failure” to capture Antioch partly 
to the indiscipline of Turkoman troops, in line with Ibn al-Qalanisi, and partly to 
Ilghazi’s own outlook, like Grousset. She also stands close to Grousset in criticising 
Ilghazi for his lack of a “master plan,” a plan for systematically fighting against and 
expelling the Franks from their cities, which she accepts to have been possessed by 
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later leaders like Zangi or Nur al-Din. Discussing the first reason, she states that the 
undisciplined Turkomans, refusing to stay on after the Battle of Ager Sanguinis and 
dispersing with their booty, prevented Ilghazi from advancing against Antioch. Thus 
their short-term tactics thwarted any possible long-term strategy that the emir might 
have had. But according to Hillenbrand the real problem lay in the fact that Ilghazi 
himself also lacked such an overall “long-term strategy,” “a master plan” that ex-
tended beyond the campaign at hand. Like all his contemporaries, he was busy shift-
ing his allegiance to meet the demands of the moment. She argues in addition that 
Ilghazi did not possess the “exceptional gifts of imagination, decisiveness and lead-
ership” that she attributes to leaders like Zangi and Nur al-Din. As a consequence of 
such handicaps, Hillenbrand asserts, Ilghazi did not even think of exploiting what she 
calls “a rare opportunity” to capture Antioch.  
Gerhard Väth153 also believes that this was a rare opportunity to capture An-
tioch, which he says “lay prostrate, unprotected.” He argues that in spite of the de-
fense measures taken by the patriarch and the clergy, Ilghazi could still have taken 
the city before the arrival of the king. This is not justified, however, because Baldwin 
had not been called by the patriarch and clergy after the Battle of Ager Sanguinis, as 
Väth assumes, but had set out much earlier than that, having been summoned by 
Roger himself when Ilghazi had first invaded the Principality. Accordingly it would 
take him much less time to reach Antioch with the reinforcements. In fact Baldwin 
probably arrived there in mid- to late July,
154
 which provided Ilghazi with only three 
or four weeks at most. This would have been hardly sufficient to capture Antioch, 
given the strength of its fortifications and citadel. Moreover, as Väth himself points 
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out, the Turkomans grew unwilling after an initial success to get involved in further 
fighting and still less in a siege, a tendency which would not have made Ilghazi’s 
task easier.  
Like Grousset and Hillenbrand, Väth argues that Ilghazi’s own outlook was 
also a factor that contributed to his “failure” to attack Antioch at this opportune mo-
ment. Nevertheless, he assesses the emir’s conditions much more realistically, not 
attempting to condemn him for his lack of a “political conception” or a “master 
plan,” or to compare him unfavorably with other leaders in this regard. He points out 
that Ilghazi would not try too hard in any case to persuade his men to attack Antioch, 
for he was only an emir with a secure lordship in Diyar Bakr. Outside this region he 
had managed to set foot only in Aleppo, and even that with difficulty. It could hardly 
be expected therefore that he would be able to hold on to both Aleppo and Antioch at 
the same time, complete with the territories they commanded. Väth observes that it 
would also have been unthinkable for Ilghazi to solve this problem by giving Antioch 
to some other emir, since the idea of conquering something for Islam and then giving 
it gratuitously to another Muslim emir was as foreign to the Artukid ruler as to those 
before or after him.
155
 
Claude Cahen
156
 does not criticize Ilghazi for having wasted a “golden oppor-
tunity” to capture Antioch, in contrast to the previous scholars, but contents himself 
with the remark that he could have inflicted much greater territorial losses on the 
Principality, the torso of which remained intact in the event. Analyzing the reasons 
for this failure, he similarly indicates the haste of the Turkomans to return home with 
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their booty, which he says made long campaigns impossible and prevented them 
maintaining a foothold in the territory of the Principality. He points out further that 
because the military base of Ilghazi’s Turkomans was in the Jazira, they could not be 
transported en masse to Syria whenever they were needed to defend newly occupied 
territories. On the other hand, Cahen also criticizes Ilghazi himself for what he re-
gards as the emir’s tactical errors. In this connection he points out Ilghazi’s deception 
by Joseph of Artah, like Grousset, and although he admits that al-Atharib and Zarda-
na were appreciable gains, argues like Nicholson that Ilghazi’s preoccupation with 
their siege and capture gave the Franks a respite to get their defences organized.  
Cahen also examines Ilghazi’s own outlook as yet another factor, in parallel 
with Grousset, Hillenbrand and Väth. Like the latter scholar, however, he assumes a 
more empathetic approach towards the emir. He remarks that Ilghazi was content 
with having brought the Franks sufficiently in line and secured the safety of Aleppo, 
which was only a remote dependency for him, and therefore did not aspire to any 
conquests beyond its basin. He observes further that Ilghazi must have been aware of 
the still formidable power of the Franks in their own region, and accordingly did not 
wish to compromise the results he had achieved in inner Syria by an attack on Frank-
ish territory. 
What counted for Ilghazi, then, was to secure the safety of Aleppo, and he 
was neither willing nor able to dedicate his limited resources to any goal beyond that 
task, not least because his main base was located in Diyar Bakr. But within this lim-
ited framework he did have a long-term strategy that extended beyond the immediate 
campaign, as it emerges from his expeditions following the takeover of Aleppo: this 
was based on capturing the key fortresses on the borders with Antioch, and thus 
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pushing back the Frankish line of encirclement that had been tightening on the city. 
For this reason, the charge of strategic short-sightedness brought against Ilghazi can 
hardly be deemed justified.  
Moreover, it is by no means so clear that Antioch was so ripe for capture, 
even though it had been deprived of its ruler and the major part of its military forces. 
Indeed none of the aforementioned scholars seems to have considered the possibility 
that Ilghazi might have weighed up his chances of capturing and holding it, and judi-
ciously given up the idea when he decided that it was not a feasible option.  
In fact, as Asbridge observes rightly, making a concentrated attack upon An-
tioch would not have been realistic in Ilghazi’s situation.157 We have seen that the 
reinforcements from Jerusalem and Tripoli were already on the way, leaving him 
with far less than a month to accomplish the task –– a period that would hardly have 
sufficed to take the city, even though it was poorly garrisoned. As the Franks them-
selves had learned twenty years earlier at their expense, capturing Antioch was not so 
easy at all, even without Ilghazi’s perennial problem of holding the Turkomans on 
the field. The defences of the city were exceptionally strong, to begin with, and even 
if Ilghazi succeeded in capturing the lower city, he would still have to take the well-
fortified citadel on the mountains –– a much harder nut to crack as the Crusaders in 
1098 had discovered. The task was rendered still more difficult by the fact that the 
siege technology of the early twelfth century was still quite backward. In Cahen’s 
words, “neither the Crusaders and their successors, nor the Muslims had a powerful 
means of attacking cities at the beginning of the 12th century, and could not even 
besiege walls of long perimeter.”158  
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In case the Muslim forces were unable for these reasons to capture Antioch 
before the king would arrive, there was the serious danger that they could find them-
selves trapped between the citadel and the enemy reinforcements. And if that hap-
pened there was no guarantee that they would manage to emerge unscathed like the 
Franks on the First Crusade. We have no good reason to assume that Ilghazi was not 
in a position to take all these factors into consideration as he was about to decide 
whether to attack Antioch or not. 
Ilghazi must also have been aware of the considerable difficulties involved in 
holding on to Antioch even if he succeeded in capturing it. As we have seen, neither 
he nor any other emir of his age would have imagined taking a city and giving it to 
another emir for the sake of enlarging the realm of Islam. And left to his own re-
sources Ilghazi could hardly expect to entrench his rule in Antioch in the face of all 
odds and against all the powers that would confront him. In this connection Asbridge 
points out the “extremely fierce resistance” he was certain to meet from a united Lat-
in force in case he attempted to expel the Franks altogether from the Principality.
159
  
But Ilghazi had still worse to fear, namely a Byzantine intervention and per-
haps even a united attack by reconciled Byzantines and Franks. We have seen Hil-
lenbrand compare Ilghazi infavorably with Zangi and Nur al-Din, who she says pos-
sessed the qualities necessary for exploiting the kind of opportunity that now pre-
sented itself for capturing Antioch. But it was precisely the same Nur al-Din who, on 
being urged to march against a similarly defenceless, prostrate Antioch after the bat-
tle of Harim in 1164, refused on the grounds of a possible Byzantine intervention, 
and expressed his preference for having the Frankish prince rather than the emperor 
as his neighbor. He also pointed out the difficulty of taking the well-fortified citadel, 
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and contented himself with sending raiding bands into the territory of Antioch, just 
as Ilghazi had done after the Battle of Ager Sanguinis.
160
 There seems no reason to 
assume therefore that the Artukid emir could not have thought on the same lines, es-
pecially as he would be far less capable than Nur al-Din of stopping a possible Byz-
antine onslaught. Orderic’s report about Ilghazi’s concern to release the imperial en-
voy Ravendinus without harm and so to avoid alienating the emperor provides suffi-
cient evidence that he was indeed apprehensive about a possible Byzantine interven-
tion.  
It was also possible that the Byzantines would not be alone in such an assault: 
the dispute over Antioch was a still very hot issue in Ilghazi’s day, constituting a 
bone of contention between the Byzantines and Franks and keeping them divided. If 
this bone of contention was now removed with the capture of Antioch and the two 
enemies united in a common front to recover the city, the chances were little that 
Ilghazi, even with the help of other emirs, could defend the city against their on-
slaught. In such a case, moreover, not only Antioch but the whole of Muslim Syria 
could come under threat. 
For all these reasons, the fact that Ilghazi did not attack Antioch after the Bat-
tle of Ager Sanguinis must be seen as the result of a deliberate choice on the part of 
the Artukid emir, rather than as a “failure” stemming from real or supposed factors 
like the undisciplined nature of his Turkoman troops or his lack of a “political con-
ception” and/or long-term strategy. Discerning that such an attack would not be fea-
sible at all, in view of the difficulties of capturing and holding the city in his hands, 
Ilghazi preferred to adopt a more realistic course of action. What he did, as he had 
intended from the beginning, was to besiege and capture the Frankish outposts that 
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threatened Aleppo from the west, before direct attacks could be made from these 
against the city. Indeed, this pre-emptive strike succeeded in rescuing Aleppo from 
the precarious situation in which it had found itself before the campaign.
161
 
6.3.3 The course of events  
The course of the events related with the Battle of Ager Sanguinis is quite 
free of ambiguity, as most of the sources agree with and complete each other. Having 
collected troops from Diyar Bakr, Ilghazi crossed the Euphrates into Syria with the 
purpose of relieving Aleppo, especially by taking the strongholds of al-Atharib and 
Zardana. He ravaged the Frankish territores near the Euphrates, and then waited for 
Tughtekin at Qinnasrin as they had previously agreed. But the latter failed to show 
up, probably because of a conflict near Jordan with the forces of Jerusalem, and 
Ilghazi’s emirs urged him to go into attack without further delay. Accordingly the 
Artukid proceeded to lay siege to al-Atharib and Zardana, so that he could realize his 
plan of pushing back the Antiochene border beyond the natural barrier of Jabal Talat.  
Upon this Prince Roger, with the urging of the lords of these towns, moved 
from his initial camp at Artah to the nearby valley of Balat. His plan was to attack 
Ilghazi at all costs, without waiting for the king’s reinforcements that were on the 
way, and so to prevent Ilghazi from capturing the two castles of vital strategic im-
portance. But Ilghazi perceived the vulnerability of the Franks in their new position, 
and decided to anticipate them with a pre-emptive strike. Toghan Arslan led the at-
tack launched early next morning, passing from the rear of the Frankish army to de-
scend upon their tents, but he was eventually thrown back by the lines of St Peter and 
Geoffrey the Monk. After this initial check, however, the entire Muslim army made a 
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united attack against the Frankish lines, and charging in waves from all around, near-
ly annihilated them; Prince Roger himself was among the slain.  
Ilghazi did not attack Antioch after his victory, although he had gained a 
foothold in the key position of Artah. This was because of his awareness of a number 
of factors. The first of these was that the reinforcements led by Baldwin were already 
on the way and would probably arrive before he could capture the strongly fortified 
city, even though it was poorly garrisoned. Secondly, his Turkomans were impatient 
and quick to disperse in search of plunder, which made it difficult to keep them on 
the field for a long siege. Finally, even if he did capture the city, it would be very 
hard to hold and defend it, especially if the Byzantines decided to intervene.  
Accordingly Ilghazi proceeded instead to carry out what he had intended 
from the beginning, to capture al-Atharib and Zardana. In this he was also helped by 
the fact that the king eventually assembled all the remaining troops in Antioch, de-
priving the castles of their lords and garrisons. Having in the meanwhile taken Imm 
and placed a deputy in Artah, where he was joined by the necessary reinforcements 
under Tughtekin, the emir first marched against al-Atharib and captured it. Then he 
proceeded to besiege Zardana, but his army began to break into foraging parties and 
the king drew near to Tell Danith, raising the danger that he would be trapped be-
tween the reinforcements and the garrison. Pressing on with the siege despite these 
odds, he managed to capture Zardana as well; it fell just on the day before the second 
battle at Tell Danith. 
 
Because of the conflicting source evidence, it seems more difficult to assess 
the course and especially the outcome of the Battle of Tell Danith. It is not clear 
which side won the battle, or whether it could be called a draw, and modern histori-
417 
 
ans have been divided as well on this point. The Muslim historians Imad al-Din Kha-
lil and Ali Sevim, basing themselves mainly on Ibn al-Adim’s account, argue that it 
was a victory for the  Muslims, who they say routed and followed the Franks up to 
Hab.
162
 Drawing upon Walter the Chancellor’s testimony (in William of Tyre’s 
summarized version), Sevim asserts further that Baldwin put up an effective re-
sistance at Hab against the Turks and could not be defeated completely, but still did 
not dare to pursue them as they withdrew. Sevim is wrong however in locating the 
king’s fight at Hab, for Walter and William, like Michael the Syrian and Fulcher of 
Chartres, state explicitly that it took place on the battlefield at Tell Danith. Basing 
himself on this mistake, Sevim goes on to argue that the king must be counted de-
feated insofar as he remained at Hab and abandoned the battlefield for good, but we 
have seen that he returned there next morning after a temporary stay at that town.   
Most of the European historians, in contrast, assert that the outcome was a 
victory for the Franks, basing themselves on Walter the Chancellor’s account. Thus 
Grousset states that it was only the Provençals and some others who escaped to Hab, 
leaving the king with the remaining troops. This situation, he argues, gave some con-
temporary historians the wrong impression that the two armies had taken to flight in 
face of the other.
163
 Despite Grousset’s assertion, however, it is stated nowhere in 
Walter’s account that it was specifically the Provençals who escaped to Hab; we only 
read that they were thrown back and got mixed with the king’s line. In the same con-
nection Grousset proceeds to contend that the reason why Ibn al-Adim thought the 
Muslims won the battle was, beside the Provençals’ flight, the defeat of Robert fitz-
Fulk on his return from Zardana. But Ibn al-Adim explicitly states that Ilghazi and 
his allies had attacked the king’s forces and put them to flight before that point, pur-
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suing them up to Hab. Taking Walter’s apologetic line of argument for granted, 
moreover, Grousset asserts in an authorative tone: “the fact that the battlefield re-
mained at the hands of the king cannot be contested and decides the question.” Doing 
so, he fails to take notice of Walter’s all-too-obvious efforts to explain away the fact 
that Baldwin abandoned the battlefield for Hab, coming back only in the next morn-
ing.  
Grousset is not justified either when he argues in line with Walter that “de-
spite the various vissicitudes of particular clashes Baldwin was victor, since Ilghazi 
and Tughtekin had retired towards Zardana, Atharib and Aleppo.” We have seen Ibn 
al-Adim testify that the two emirs did return from Hab to the battlefield, where they 
met solely the lord of Zardana and not the king: it was only after defeating Robert 
and his contingent that they retired for good. By the time of their return to the field 
the king had followed his forces to Hab, as confessed by Walter himself, probably 
compelled by the vulnerable position of the troops who had remained on the battle-
field. It was only in the morning, after the departure of Ilghazi and Tughtekin, that 
Baldwin ventured out of Hab to claim the battlefield and proclaim himself the victor.  
Stevenson,
164
 Runciman
165
 and Asbridge,
166
 on yet another side of the dis-
pute, admit that the results were confused and indefinite, but still contend that the 
Franks fared better in the end. Although Stevenson accepts that “both sides sustained 
severe losses” and “part of each army was routed and part victorious,” he insists that 
the “substantial fruits of victory remained with Baldwin.” While Ilghazi retired to 
Aleppo and his allies dispersed, he argues in line with Walter, the king claimed the 
victory by collecting his forces and occupying the field of battle on the following 
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day. But he overlooks that this argument is undermined by the very fact that Baldwin 
was able to remuster his army and return to the battlefield only on the next day, hav-
ing been compelled to abandon it in the meanwhile. As yet more evidence in support 
of Baldwin’s victory, Stevenson points out that soon after the battle, in autumn, the 
king found himself in a position to launch a campaign against the neighboring Mus-
lim strongholds. Nevertheless, this cannot be taken as evidence for the outcome of 
the battle itself, for by that time the Turkomans had long dispersed home, being una-
ble to sustain long campaigns, and Ilghazi had returned to Mardin. 
Runciman’s assessment of the course and outcome of the battle is similar. He 
relates that the Tripolitans suffered a check at the hand of Tughtekin, although they 
kept their ranks, and that Robert of Zardana was captured in an ambush after he had 
charged through the regiment of Hims in an effort to recapture Zardana. “Despite 
these setbacks,” he asserts, “the Frankish centre and left held their ground, and at the 
crucial moment Baldwin was able to charge the enemy with the troops that were still 
fresh,” putting numbers of Turkomans to flight.  
There are a number of rather obvious errors in this analysis. To begin with, 
there is no indication in Walter the Chancellor or the other sources that it was 
Tughtekin who pushed back the Tripolitans and caused them to merge with the 
king’s line. Nor do they state that the Tripolitans kept their ranks notwithstanding 
this check. As for Robert of Zardana, Ibn al-Adim, Runciman’s source for the event, 
reports that he charged through the regiment of Damascus as well as that of Hims, 
and makes clear that his purpose was not to recapture Zardana, of whose fall he was 
as yet unaware, but to raise the Muslim siege. We know from the same source be-
sides that Robert was not taken captive upon falling into an ambush on his way to 
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Zardana, but afterwards when he was routed on returning to the battlefield and fell 
from his horse in flight. 
As for the more important issue of Baldwin’s successful charge, Runciman 
fails to note that the king himself was afterwards compelled to seek refuge at Hab, 
probably because his infantry had fled there before the united charge of Ilghazi, 
Tughtekin and Toghan Arslan as reported by Ibn al-Adim. Again with no direct basis 
in the sources, he proceeds to assert that the bulk of Ilghazi’s army left the battlefield 
in good order, despite the flight of a number of Turkomans before Baldwin’s charge. 
Thanks to this orderly retreat, and to the large train of prisoners, Runciman asserts, 
Ilghazi and Tughtekin “were able to tell the Muslim world that theirs was the victo-
ry.” Nevertheless, the Turkomans may in fact have scattered in search of plunder af-
ter the rout of Robert, compelling Ilghazi and Tughtekin to retire to Aleppo with only 
a small contingent, as the Anonymous and Walter the Chancellor testify.  
We have seen Thomas Asbridge point out the problems with Walter’s repre-
sentation of the result as a Frankish victory. Indicating in addition that most other 
sources depict the battle as inconclusive, and that both sides had suffered heavy loss-
es, he admits that its outcome was not decisive. Nevertheless, he draws attention to 
the fact that the king managed to put an end to Ilghazi’s campaign against the Princi-
pality and repelled the Artukid threat for the rest of the year 1119. On the other hand, 
Zardana and al-Atharib could not be recovered in that year or the next; the former 
was only to be taken in 1121 and the latter in 1123.
167
 Similarly, Cahen admits that 
Baldwin could neither win a true victory, nor recover Zardana or al-Atharib, but un-
derlines his success in stopping the conquests of Ilghazi and thus allowing Antioch 
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precious time to recover from the disaster.
168
 Nonetheless, there remains the fact that 
the Artukid emir had managed to realize his principal aim: capturing al-Atharib and 
Zardana, the two key strategic points that had been his targets from the beginning, 
and thus pushing the Antiochene frontier beyond Jabal Talat.
169
 He had also de-
stroyed the major part of the Antiochene manpower, and together these two 
achievements point to him as the true victor of the entire campaign, whatever the 
precise outcome of the battle of Tell Danith. 
 
Thus the course of the battle of Tell Danith could be reconstructed as follows: 
at the beginning Robert of Zardana, with a large contingent of Franks, defeated the 
forces of Hims and Damascus, while an attack of the remaining Muslim troops threw 
back the forces of Tripoli on the right wing and caused them to get mixed with those 
of the king. After this Ilghazi, Tughtekin and Toghan Arslan, with the forces that re-
mained, made an attack towards the Frankish center under the king himself. The in-
fantry forces sheltering the cavalry and the archers were defeated, but Baldwin stood 
his ground and made a successful counter charge. Nevertheless, the royal forces were 
left in a precarious postion in the middle of the battlefield, now that the infantry had 
taken refuge in Hab, and so he saw it prudent to withdraw there as well.   
At this point Ilghazi and his allies returned from the pursuit to the battlefield, 
now emptied by Balwin and his troops. Here they came across Robert fitzFulk and a 
large group of Franks who had hurried to Zardana to relieve it, but then returned up-
on learning of its fall. In the fight that ensued the Franks were defeated and the sur-
vivors similarly escaped to Hab; Robert himself was captured in flight and later exe-
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cuted. Seeing nothing left to do after this clash, and perhaps also compelled by the 
dispersal of their troops in search of plunder, Ilghazi and Tughtekin returned to 
Aleppo. Next morning the king ventured out of Hab with his men to occupy the bat-
tlefield, whereby he could announce that his was the victory.  
In any case Baldwin had managed to put a stop to Ilghazi’s operations in the 
territory of Antioch, but the latter in turn had succeeded in taking and holding onto 
his principal targets, al-Atharib and Zardana, removing thereby the immediate threat 
against Aleppo. Accordingly Ilghazi must be regarded as the true winner of the con-
frontation in 1119; he had saved Aleppo from almost certain capture. 
6.3.4 The consequences of the campaign  
The most important consequence of the campaign for Antioch was the loss of 
its leader and the major part of its manpower, which relegated it to a secondary rank 
among the Latin states of the East and spelt the end for its predominantly Norman 
character. As Runciman points out, territories might be recovered, but it was not so 
easy to replace the knights and infantry slaughtered in the Battle of Ager Sanguinis 
within a few years.
170
 We have seen Orderic report how Roger’s widow knighted 
squires to replace those lost, while Ibn al-Adim and Walter relate how the king trans-
ferred the possessions of the slain to their heirs and wed their wives to others of 
equal rank in an effort to fill the vacant fiefs and so to reconstitute the Antiochene 
army. This is in itself an evidence for the extent of the loss in manpower, for no such 
measures had had to be undertaken after the Franks’ defeat in the Battle of Harran 
fifteen years before.
171
 Moreover, the Normans slain in the battle were not all re-
placed by other Normans, but their place was filled gradually by knights from middle 
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and eastern France, which eventually reduced the Norman influence in North Syr-
ia.
172
 
Among those killed were also contingents and individuals of note, including 
the battle line of St Peter as well as Robert fitzFulk of Zardana. Of course Prince 
Roger himself was also among the slain, having left no heir, and this created a politi-
cal vacuum in the Principality that necessitated the king to take over its government. 
But Baldwin was able to fulfill this task only imperfectly, since he had to govern the 
Kingdom of Jerusalem as well. As a result, Asbridge points out, the principality was 
deprived of strong and sustained leadership precisely when it was needed most after 
the disaster of Ager Sanguinis. These handicaps in leadership and manpower brought 
about the result that the principality declined considerably in rank among the Latin 
states of the East. Whereas in Tancred’s time it had come second only to the King-
dom of Jerusalem, it now became one of the weakest Latin states, subject to the king 
himself. Once Tancred had raised claims of suzerainty over Edessa –– now it was the 
count of Edessa who led its forces to battle.
173
   
And yet Steven Runciman interprets these developments in a more positive 
light as well. He argues that the Franks were brought by the disaster to realize that 
they had to work as a unit, and therefore readily accepted King Baldwin as an active 
overlord, with the result that the Frankish establishments in Syria were welded to-
gether.
174
 Admittedly, Baldwin’s preoccupation in North Syria also raised the risk of 
internal division in the Kingdom of Jerusalem.
175
 But the risk in question does not 
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seem to have been realized in the event, even when Baldwin remained away for 
about a year after falling captive to Ilghazi’s nephew Belek.176      
In contrast to the loss of manpower and leadership, most of the territorial 
losses suffered by Antioch turned out to be recoverable in the short term, although 
initially they were of considerable extent. Among these were Sarmada, Artah and 
Imm, captured by Ilghazi, and Kafartab, Kafaruma, Sarmin and Ma‘arrat Misrin, tak-
en by the Munqidhithes.
177
 These were all recovered within the next twelve months, 
primarily due to the efforts of King Baldwin, as will be related in the following chap-
ter. But the remaining few losses that could not be restored within a year were key 
strategic locations that became a liability for Antioch: al-Atharib and Zardana to its 
east, annexed to Aleppo, and al-Bara and Ma‘arrat al-Nu‘man to its south, annexed 
to Shaizar.
178
 Nevertheless, as Asbridge points out, the Franks fared better when 
compared with the aftermath of their defeat in the Battle of Harran. The reason for 
this was that the Byzantines did not seize the opportunity to attack the territory of 
Antioch as they had done in 1104 when, capturing Cilicia and Latakia, they had re-
duced the Principality almost down to the city itself.
179
  
Thus even at their full extent the territorial losses suffered by Antioch in 1119 
remained at a modest level in comparison with those in 1104. They were also much 
less than those following the Battle of Inab in 1149, when the prince of Antioch and 
his forces were similarly annihilated by Nur al-Din. According to Cahen, this was 
because as of 1119 the Muslim world was not yet in a position to profit fully from 
such a victory, while the Frankish world was still capable of reacting speedily and 
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forcefully.
180
 Indeed there was no Muslim ruler at this time who was both powerful 
and based in Syria, like Nur al-Din, while the Franks, united under Baldwin’s effec-
tive leadership, could immediately set about the task of recovering their losses. This 
was brought to completion in 1123, when al-Atharib was taken; Zardana had been 
recovered two years before. The very next step of the Franks was to attack Aleppo 
itself, as we shall see in the ninth chapter.   
But despite this speedy recovery, the precarious situation that emerged in the 
immediate aftermath of the debacle must have proved more than sufficient to inspire 
feelings of insecurity and apprehension in the Franks. So much so that they do not 
only seem to have realized the importance of unity, as Runciman indicated, but also 
to have grown doubtful about their chances of maintaining a foothold in the Levant 
without the military support of the West. It was probably for this reason that the af-
termath of the Battle of Ager Sanguinis saw the first Latin appeal from the East to the 
West for military aid against Muslims, namely at the council of Nablus in 1120.
181
  
The Muslims in contrast, and especially the people of Aleppo, must have 
breathed a sigh of relief as the Frankish stranglehold on Aleppo was broken at last, 
even though temporarily, with the capture of al-Atharib and Zardana. Although Run-
ciman states that “the great Artukid campaign fizzled out” without having achieved 
anything material for the Muslims, “except for a few frontier-forts and the easing of 
Frankish pressure on Aleppo,”182 this had been the original aim of the campaign as 
we have seen. Indeed it was no mean achievement, considering that these two castles 
would have enabled the Franks to undertake direct attacks against Aleppo, a mere 
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thirty kilometers away in flat country. Ilghazi’s capture of both prevented this from 
happening and removed, for the time being at least, the threat posed to the security of 
his city.
183
 Stevenson observes rightly that Ilghazi “had good cause to be satisfied 
with the fruits of his first campaign,” since he had “loosened the strong hand from 
the throat of Aleppo” and scored a so far unprecedented victory against the Franks.184 
Indeed the victory considerably increased Ilghazi’s prestige in the Muslim 
world, as is also evident from the comments of Muslim chroniclers and the poems of 
Al-Azimi. Cahen indicates that Ilghazi’s successes drew attention to him and wid-
ened his horizon, causing him to be invited for a campaign against Georgia in the 
distant north.
185
 Imad al-Din Khalil goes further in asserting that Ilghazi, through his 
critical victory in Ager Sanguinis, “rose to leadership in the movement of jihad 
against the Crusaders,” following it with “a series of other victories that created an 
atmosphere of peace, stability and production for the Muslims in North Syria.”186  
If jihad is interpreted in a limited, functional, defensive sense here, as the 
form that the task of averting the encirclement of a Muslim city like Aleppo assumed 
in the eyes of the contemporaries when the aggressors happened to be Christian, 
Khalil may be considered right: apart from Ilghazi there was no other leader at the 
time willing or able to carry out this task. But insofar as the historical “jihad move-
ment” is understood, it is far from certain that Ilghazi had any interest in leading a 
“Counter-Crusade” as such against the Franks. Even though it may be true that in the 
process of defending Aleppo he had to come to blows with the Franks more often 
than any other Muslim emir of the time, and showed himself adventurous enough to 
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comply with the summons against Georgia, these are by no means sufficient to argue 
that he had consciously taken up the leadership of the “jihad movement.” For this 
movement was yet in its infancy at his time, promoted fitfully by a limited circle of 
pietists, and far from the mature state it would reach when it was developed and cul-
tivated systematically during the reigns of Nur al-Din and Saladin.
187
 
And yet Ilghazi seems to have taken pride in his victory against the “infi-
dels,” for he wrote letters to the sultan and the caliph to report his successes. The ca-
liph Al-Mustarshid sent honorary robes in acknowledgement, thanking him for his 
attacks against the Franks.
188
 Runciman claims that he also received the title of “the 
Star of Religion” (Najm al-Din) at this time from the caliph.189 Surprised at this as-
sertion, Gerhard Väth190 and Imad al-Din Khalil191 point out rightly that this is men-
tioned nowhere in the Arabic sources. Very probably, Runciman’s claim is based on 
a simple misunderstanding of the corresponding passage in the French translation of 
Ibn al-Athir’s work contained in the RHC edition. This reads: “Le khalife Mos-
tarched envoie des habits d’honneur à Nedjm al-Din (l’étoile de la religion) Ylga-
zi.”192 Apparently, Runciman read too much meaning into the translation of Ilghazi’s 
name in parantheses, which the French translator chose for some reason to insert at 
this point.
193
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It was not in vain that Ilghazi’s fame and reputation grew with the victory. 
Grousset calls Ager Sanguinis the first true disaster suffered by the Franks, as distinct 
from their previous defeats which had affected only outer districts or failed to inflict 
any serious losses on the Frankish knights. But far more important than Ilghazi’s per-
sonal gain of fame and reputation was the fact that such a great victory against the 
Franks had been scored only by a local emir. Grousset remarks in this connection: 
“What the regular Turkish armies, the armies of the sultan from Kerbogha to Bursuk 
had not been able to obtain was achieved at the first blow by a simple emir of Diyar 
Bakr with his semi-savage Turkomans.”194 Similarly, Hillenbrand points out the in-
teresting paradox that it was of all people a rebellious enemy of the sultan, a Turko-
man chief, who had scored a victory against the Franks that had been denied to the 
previous campaigns launched under the Seljukid aegis.
195
  
Claude Cahen, in turn, focuses on the lesson that this taught the contemporary 
Muslims.
196
 In the frightful years they had been living through, he observes, they had 
despaired of victory, but now it dawned upon them that the situation could be re-
versed after all. What was still better was that for this reversal they did not need a 
new intervention by the sultan’s army, still foreign and unwanted in the region. They 
could count instead on the resolution of a local emir, even a chieftain of the neigh-
boring Turkomans. Indeed Cahen sees the most important and far-reaching conse-
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quence of Ager Sanguinis in this lesson: the success achieved by Ilghazi, together 
with his similarly local allies Tughtekin and Toghan Arslan, encouraged the other 
emirs in the Jazira to renew the attack, and the following years would see the Artukid 
Belek, Aksungur al-Bursuki, and then Zangi on the scene against the Franks.
197
 They 
were to be followed by Nur al-Din and Saladin, immediate neighbors of the Franks in 
Syria and Palestine.    
 
Now that Ilghazi had captured al-Atharib and Zardana, his next effort would 
be directed towards adding Azaz to these and thereby restoring the major part of the 
Antiochene border. He failed in this task however, and suffering many other setbacks 
due to his preoccupations elsewhere, found himself in a struggle to preserve or re-
cover what he had acquired earlier with his victory at Ager Sanguinis.. The next 
chapter examines this sequel. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
196
 Cahen, Syrie du Nord, 286-87. 
197
 The latter two were indeed governors of Mosul, but had shaken off the tutelage of the Seljukid sul-
tan and acted in effect as local emirs like Ilghazi. 
430 
 
CHAPTER 7 
ILGHAZI: DEFENDER OF ALEPPO 
Thomas Asbridge observes that the whole period from 1120 to 1126 passed 
with an unrelenting contest between Antioch and Aleppo over the control of al-
Atharib, Zardana and a part of the Jabal Summaq; to these Azaz might be added as 
well. Largely as a result of the political crises afflicting Aleppo, Baldwin II eventual-
ly succeeded in restoring the eastern boundary of Antioch running from Azaz to al-
Atharib and Zardana, although he was not so succesful in Jabal Summaq, where the 
Muslims continued to hold al-Bara and Ma‘arrat al-Nu‘man.1 It was in this context 
that the rest of Ilghazi’s reign in Aleppo saw the efforts of the Franks to recover the 
places they had lost after Ager Sanguinis and so to restore their access to the east of 
Jabal Talat. Ilghazi, in turn, tried to counter these efforts as well as to capture Azaz, 
but was severely hampered by a number of factors. Among these were the indisci-
pline of his Turkman troops, the divisions in the ranks of his own family, including 
the rebellion of his son and deputy in Aleppo, and especially his defeat in an ill-
judged campaign to Georgia.  
There was yet another obstacle before Ilghazi, a monastery at Sarmada that 
was fortified by the Franks. In the meantime he he had razed the fortifications of 
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Zardana, which was subsequently rebuilt and reoccupied by the Franks. His efforts to 
recover it, as well as to attack the Principality from an easterly direction, were effec-
tively resisted by the Franks from this monastery. It enabled them to threaten the 
Artukid emir in the rear whenever he laid siege to Zardana, and also to exert pressure 
on al-Atharib, which had not surrendered yet. So by the end of his reign Ilghazi 
turned once more against Azaz, at the northern end of the frontier line, after he had 
besieged it unsuccesfully in 1120. As we shall see in the next chapter, Ilghazi’s 
nephew and successor Belek, the emir of Kharput, was to develop this strategy fur-
ther: since the Principality had been secured in the east by the fortified monastery at 
Sarmada, he attacked it instead from its northeast, Azaz, and the southeast, Jabal 
Summaq.  
The purpose of both emirs in these campaigns was to prevent the Franks from 
encircling Aleppo again, rather than to wage a “Holy War” per se against the Franks. 
As we shall discuss in the final sections of this chapter and in the next, however, this 
does not necessarily mean that jihad meant nothing for them. The fact that they 
launched their campaigns to realize well-defined and limited strategic goals to defend 
their own city, Aleppo, need not have prevented them from regarding these conflicts 
as jihad, even if only for their quality of being conflicts in which the adversaries 
happened to be Christian. These discussions will reveal that it is mistaken to try to 
liken jihad to a Crusade, and to call it a “Counter-Crusade” in analogy with the latter. 
It must be understood in its own terms and insofar as what it could have meant to the 
contemporaries.     
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7.1 Continuing hostilities between the Muslims and the Franks  
The months following Ilghazi’s departure for Mardin saw the continuation of 
the hostilities between the Franks and the Muslims. In particular, Baldwin launched a 
campaign to recover the places that had been lost to the Munqidhites of Shaizar. 
Thus Ibn al-Adim reports
2
 that the Franks first undertook an assault against Ma‘arrat 
al-Nu‘man and carried off some people, but were then forced to withdraw by a group 
of Turkomans. Next Baldwin set out from Antioch for Jabal Summaq, to the south of 
Antioch, where the Frankish disaster at Ager Sanguinis had caused the loss of several 
towns to Shaizar. One of these was the castle of Zur, to the west of al-Bara, which 
had been abandoned to the Franks and then retaken after the Battle of Ager Sangui-
nis. After some fighting, Baldwin captured this in September 1119 and allowed the 
garrison to depart freely. Kafar Ruma, on the other hand, had to be taken by force 
and all its defenders were killed. From here Baldwin proceeded to Kafartab, which 
had been burnt and abandoned by the Munqidhites on seeing the Franks approach. 
After repairing the town and installing a garrison in it, the Franks advanced against 
Sarmin and Ma‘arrat Misrin, which capitulated. But Zardana could not be taken, and 
after camping briefly before it, Baldwin returned with his army to Antioch.  
Grousset asserts that the king’s reentry into Antioch was triumphal: “He had 
avenged Roger and the Norman chivalry. He had reconstituted almost entirely the 
territory of the Principality.”3 As the French scholar admits in a footnote, however, 
al-Atharib and Zardana had not been recovered, and since these two castles had con-
stituted the main bone of contention, Baldwin’s failure to capture them must have 
made his reentry into Antioch less “triumphal” than Grousset would have it.  
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Ibn al-Adim notes that the king’s cousin Joscelin had come from his fief in 
the Galilee to join him during the siege of Sarmin, and was appointed as Baldwin’s 
successor in Edessa and Tell Bashir. He now joined in the continuing struggle with 
the Muslims and carried out two incursions into the Butnan valley, with Buza‘a as its 
chief city, following this with an incursion into the Muslim territories on the western 
bank of the Euphrates; there he killed and captured almost a thousand people. He 
next raided Manbij, Naqira and the eastern lands of Aleppo, seizing the horses and 
capturing the men and women he came across. In corroboration of this report the 
Anonymous states that Joscelin, having been called from Tiberias and sent by Bald-
win to rule in Edessa, mustered an army and attacked the camps of the Turkomans, 
taking many prisoners. As a result, he says, the count’s “fame spread abroad in north 
Mesopotamia and fear of him fell on the Turks around.”4  
Ibn al-Adim reports that at this point a group of Turkomans crossed the Eu-
phrates to raid the Frankish territories in Syria. As Gerhard Väth observes, the Frank-
ish debacle at Ager Sanguinis and its sequel must have filled the Turkomans of Diyar 
Bakr with the hope of easy booty in Syria, and led some groups to cross the Euphra-
tes on their own to plunder Frankish territory.
5
 Ibn al-Adim relates that Joscelin ad-
vanced to Ravendan in pursuit of these Turkomans, but was defeated in the fight that 
ensued and lost a number of his men.
6
  
Two possible interpretations exist of this incident: one is that the Turkomans 
were already heading towards Ravendan, probably on their way to the territory of 
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Antioch,
7
 and the other is that they were forced to withdraw in this direction when 
they were repulsed by Joscelin from the territory of Tell Bashir.
8
 Taking into consid-
eration only the second of these, Işın Demirkent rejects it on the grounds that the 
Turkomans could not have retreated towards Ravendan, as it was already Frankish 
territory since 1098. So they would have been expected to retreat towards Muslim 
territory instead.
9
 But Ibn al-Adim does not indicate explicitly that the Turkomans 
were withdrawing or being pushed in this direction by Joscelin; he only states that 
the latter marched to Ravendan in their pursuit. As Väth suggests, therefore, the case 
might rather be that Joscelin attempted to stop their advance toward the territories of 
Antioch and caught up with them at Ravendan on their way to the Principality.
10
 
Ibn al-Adim also notes that around the time of Baldwin’s campaign against 
the Munqidhites in Jabal Summaq the troops of Aleppo kept raiding the Frankish ter-
ritories in their neighborhood, returning victorious and laden with booty from their 
incursions.
11
 Ilghazi had in the meanwhile captured the castle of al-Bira, which 
guarded an important ford on the Euphrates, as Cahen deduces from its recapture by 
                                                 
7
 Väth, Geschichte, 80. 
8
 Claude Cahen, La Syrie du Nord au temps de Croisades et la Principauté Franque d’Antioche (Paris, 
1940), 290-91. 
9
 Işın Demirkent, Urfa Haçlı Kontluğu Tarihi (Vol. 1: İstanbul, 1974, Vol. 2: Ankara, 1994), II, 20-1. 
Based on this objection, Demirkent goes on to argue that Joscelin’s clash with the Turkomans near 
Ravendan as reported by Ibn al-Adim might be the same as his successful attack on a group of Turk-
omans sent by Ilghazi in spring 1120 beyond the Euphrates, a report that she attributes to Matthew. 
The chronicler in question relates that Joscelin collected troops from Kaisun and Behisni, and pursu-
ing the Turkomans, killed a thousand of them. See Armenia and the Crusades, Tenth to Twelfth Cen-
turies: the Chronicle of Matthew of Edessa, translated by Ara Edmond Dostourian (Lanham, New 
York, London, 1993), 225-26 (III.82). Pointing out the subjectivity of contemporary authors with re-
gard to the outcome of clashes, especially smaller ones, Demirkent suggests that the two accounts of 
Ibn al-Adim and Matthew might pertain to one and the same event. This view cannot be accepted, 
however, for it is quite clear in Matthew’s account that the Turkomans attacked by Joscelin in that 
case were not a detachment sent across the Euphrates by Ilghazi who remained in Diyar Bakr, but ra-
ther a group of his troops with whom he had crossed the river. For further discussion of this issue see 
the next section. 
10
 Väth, Geschichte, 80. 
11
 Ibn al-Adim, RHC, Historiens Orientaux III, 623. 
435 
 
the Franks in 1122.
12
 This may have been an attempt to secure Aleppo against possi-
ble attacks from Edessa. 
The Artukids had recovered al-Atharib after the Battle of Ager Sanguinis, and 
it was their turn to attack Antioch from this strong bastion. Ibn al-Adim relates that 
in May 1120 its governor Bulak ibn Ishaq, a companion of Ilghazi,
13
 undertook an 
incursion against the territory of Antioch with a contingent from Aleppo. In the ensu-
ing battle with the forces of Antioch, which took place at a location between Tur-
manin and Tell Aghda, in the territory of Lailun, he was defeated and pursued back 
to al-Atharib.
14
 This raid was probably undertaken as a prelude to Ilghazi’s expedi-
tion that would begin at the end of the same month.  
7.2 Ilghazi’s Syrian campaign in 1120  
In the last section we have seen the Anonymous’s report about Joscelin’s at-
tacks on the Turkomans encamped to the west of the Euphrates, many of whom he 
captured. The companions of these captives took refuge with Ilghazi, the Anonymous 
relates,
15
 and persuaded him to avenge them by attacking Edessa. So he gathered a 
vast army and camped with it near Edessa to devour the crops, cut down the gardens, 
and ravage the land, after which he departed. Michael the Syrian
16
 reveals that Ilgha-
zi’s expedition was larger in scope. After he had mustered an army to invade the ter-
ritory of Edessa and burn the crops, Michael relates, the emir proceeded to enter the 
territory of Antioch, as he found nobody to confront him, and returned to Diyar Bakr 
after taking captives there. Nevertheless, the other sources reveal that what the 
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Anonymous represents as a punitary operation against the lands of Edessa to avenge 
the Turkomans, and Michael as an attack on the same lands, followed by an extem-
porized incursion across the Euphrates upon meeting no resistance, was in fact a ma-
jor campaign against the Principality of Antioch.
17
    
Among these other sources is another indigenous Christian author, Matthew 
of Edessa.
18
 As the only source beside Michael to mention both the Edessene and the 
Antiochene phases of the campaign, he rightly accords the latter the principal place 
in the expedition. He relates that Ilghazi mustered an army supposedly of about 
130,000 and camped before Edessa, covering the entire plain around the city with his 
troops. He remained encamped here for four days, ravaging the whole countryside 
with his army, before departing for the banks of the Euphrates. Crossing the river 
secretly with his army, he captured all the people of both sexes in the region between 
Tell Bashir and Kaisun. Matthew depicts Ilghazi’s depredations here in graphic detail 
and probably with some amount of exaggeration as well: “He mercilessly massacred 
everyone and even had children burnt and roasted with matchless barbarity and in 
incalculable numbers…19 The populations of many villages were put to the sword, 
and both priests and monks perished by fire and the sword.”20  
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To put a stop to these ravages, Matthew continues, Joscelin hurried from 
Ra‘ban to Kaisun and Behisni to collect troops. Pursuing Ilghazi’s army, he caught 
up with it at daybreak and killed a thousand in the ensuing attack. Matthew is the on-
ly source to relate this incident, and it might be referring to a detachment of Turko-
mans in search of plunder rather than to Ilghazi’s entire army. Be that as it may, Mat-
thew interprets Ilghazi’s subsequent advance south to Azaz as a move of retreat due 
to this defeat of the Turkomans. This is hardly plausible, however, as Ilghazi would 
not have thought of moving towards a Frankish castle if he had wanted to avoid Jos-
celin’s further attacks as well as to allow his forces to recover from their defeat. As 
we shall see Ibn al-Adim state, marching to Azaz was in fact what he intended from 
the beginning, with the purpose of capturing this stronghold that constituted the 
northern end of the Antiochene frontier. Thus he would have completed the task he 
had begun with the capture of al-Atharib and Zardana, which made up the middle 
portion of the frontier directly to the west of Aleppo. This reveals that Ilghazi had a 
certain strategy that he tried to realize as systematically as he could: this involved 
recapturing  all the castles that the Franks had seized from Aleppo in an effort to en-
circle and apply pressure on it.  
Just as the Franks had tried to prevent Ilghazi from capturing al-Atharib and 
Zardana in the previous year, they now set out to avert the fall of Azaz. “At this 
point,” Matthew states, “the king of Jerusalem, together with all the Frankish forces, 
reached Azaz in order to give battle to the Turks;” he was joined there by Joscelin. 
But the confrontation did not develop into a battle this time. After the Turkish and 
Frankish forces had stood facing each other for many days without joining battle, 
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Ilghazi departed to go the district of Germian in the territory of Melitene, and the 
Franks returned home, the king to Jerusalem and Joscelin to Edessa. 
 
The longest account of the Syrian phase of the campaign belongs to Ibn al-
Adim. His testimony appears rather different from that of Matthew at first sight, but 
is nevertheless reconcilable with it. He relates that Ilghazi crossed the Euphrates with 
a great assembly of Turkomans on 26 May 1120 and headed for Tell Bashir. In con-
trast to Matthew, who reported the depredations of the Turkish army in this region 
and Joscelin’s retaliatory attack, Ibn al-Adim asserts that Ilghazi stayed there for 
some days without fighting the Franks. This difference can be attributed to the Alep-
pan chronicler’s lack of information about this early phase of the campaign in the 
East, as is also observable from his failure to make any mention of Ilghazi’s attack 
on the territory of Edessa. It has already been indicated that Ibn al-Adim denotes 
Ilghazi’s target explicitly as Azaz. Nevertheless, he notes that Ilghazi did not allow 
any of his Turkomans to ravage the lands of that town. This can mainly be attributed 
to the emir’s determination to prevent his forces from scattering in search of plunder 
and thwarting his effors to capture the town, as had happened so many times before 
and almost foiled his capture of Zardana. The latter experience, indeed, may have 
been precisely the main reason that led Ilghazi to forbid plunder at this stage, a deci-
sion that would shortly prove fateful.  
Ibn al-Adim gives no indications about the movements of the Franks at this 
point, but it can be held in accordance with Matthew’s testimony that they encamped 
opposite Ilghazi’s army to prevent his capture of Azaz, a move that turned out to be 
successful. For after having stated that Ilghazi intended to capture Azaz, the Arab 
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chronicler reports that he set out for Antioch, without indicating why the emir gave 
up his initial aim. In turn, Ibn al-Adim supplies more information than Matthew 
about the events that followed the siege of Azaz, beginning with Ilghazi’s advance 
towards Antioch. The emir’s motivation for this move may have been his desire to 
draw the Franks away from Azaz by ravaging their central lands in Syria, so that he 
could later return to attack it again. Ibn al-Adim relates that Ilghazi halted before An-
tioch for a single day and then turned east and proceeded to al-Ruj, where he stayed 
for some days before moving further east to Qinnasrin. As shall emerge from Ful-
cher’s account, this was probably because the Franks followed him to Antioch and 
compelled him to withdraw eastwards under the threat of being trapped between 
themselves and the garrison of the city. 
Precisely at this critical point, however, Ilghazi’s determination to keep his 
Turkoman army intact by forbidding them plunder cost him dear. “The Turkomans 
were disturbed in heart,” Ibn al-Adim states, “for they had been hoping for a booty 
like that in the previous year, but Ilghazi would not fight against a single castle with 
them, and they could not collect any.” 21 They had other grievances too: the Christian 
captives from the previous year, who had been ransomed and returned to their lands, 
did their utmost now to avenge themselves by attacking the Turkomans wherever 
they encountered them. In keeping with his concern to preserve the army intact, 
Ilghazi had probably forbidden the Turkomans to answer these hit-and-run attacks as 
well. He did not content himself with these prohibitions, moreover, but also took se-
vere disciplinary measures to punish those who transgressed them, some of which 
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view of the fact that he fought aginst Azaz at least, but perhaps it might be taken to mean that Ilghazi 
did not want to deal with minor castles and waste the precious time available for besieging Azaz once 
more. 
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amounted to severe insult: Ibn al-Adim relates how he went to the greatest lengths in 
humiliating a group of Turkomans for something he held against them, even shaving 
and hamstringing them. This proved too much, and almost all of the Turkomans dis-
persed to return home, leaving Ilghazi alone against the Frankish army. Only a small 
number of men remained, and these were scattered over the lands of Aleppo.        
How could Ilghazi, this veteran chieftain of Turkomans, have ignored the fact 
that his troops were nothing like a regular army, that they were only willing to fight 
as long as they could find the booty that constituted a means of living for them? Ibn 
al-Athir offers a picturesque description of their attitude in this regard: 
Ilghazi was not wont to prolong his stay in Frankish territories, because he 
mustered the Turkomans on account of their desire [for booty]: each of them 
would come with a bag in which there was flour and with a sheep, and would 
count the hours for some booty he hurried to receive, after which he would 
return home. And if their stay was prolonged they would disperse, as Ilghazi 
lacked the money to distribute among them.22  
Discussing the possible motives of Ilghazi for this unusual decision, Cahen 
suggests that he might have taken into account his impending annexation of the prov-
ince, which he therefore would not like to be ravaged.
23
 Carole Hillenband similarly 
contends that Ilghazi might have been unwilling to let the Turkomans pillage the 
lands he was soon to acquire.
24
 But it is quite doubtful that Ilghazi could have be-
lieved he was in a position to seize al-Ruj and other places for good when the entire 
armies of Jerusalem and Edessa were present and literally on his heels. Indeed Cahen 
comes closer the mark when he suggests as another possibility that Ilghazi could 
have been fearing a surprise attack of the enemy forces. Hillenbrand on her part 
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makes the additional suggestions that Ilghazi might have wished to ensure that his 
troops would concentrate their energies on fighting, and expected to control them by 
the promise of battle plunder rather than casual pillage. She alternatively states that 
the emir could have grown overconfident in his own abilities as a general after his 
victory at Ager Sanguinis. At any event, Hillenbrand concludes, this episode shows 
that Ilghazi’s control over the Turkomans was slackening during the years 1119-21.  
Nevertheless, it should be asked whether the result would have been any dif-
ferent if Ilghazi had taken a similar step before this time, say five or ten years earlier. 
Indeed there does not seem any sufficient ground to assume that Ilghazi’s hold over 
the Turkomans was slackening in this period. The case was probably rather that they 
had always been quite independent, but for various reasons Ilghazi chose to ignore 
this fact and attempted to tighten his hold on them to an unprecedented degree, treat-
ing the Turkomans almost like a regular army. To put it otherwise, the emir tried to 
establish a far stronger control on the movements of the Turkomans than they would 
ever be willing to accept, since he wanted to mobilize the full energy of his troops for 
capturing Azaz, feared a surprise attack by the nearby Frankish army while his forces 
were scattered for plunder, and perhaps also placed too much trust on the great repu-
tation he had made after Ager Sanguinis.    
Ilghazi found himself in a very precarious situation as a result of these ill-
judged strong-arm tactics applied against the Turkomans. Mentioning the presence of 
the Frankish army for the first time, Ibn al-Adim reports that they were encouraged 
by Ilghazi’s predicament and advanced to Danith. Ilghazi would perhaps have met a 
fate similar to that of Roger in the previous year had it not been for Tughtekin who 
arrived in the nick of time with forces that could match the Franks, three thousand in 
number according to Fulcher’s testimony. Considering the astonishingly timely arri-
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val of the atabek, it can be imagined that Ilghazi had already summoned him to join 
forces at or near Aleppo, perhaps with the aim of attacking Azaz together.  
Ibn al-Adim relates that the two emirs marched against the Franks, who num-
bered a thousand horsemen and a great number of footmen, and surrounded them 
with their forces from all around, so that not a single Frank could get out of the en-
circlement. The enemy refrained from turning back towards Antioch, for fear that 
retreating under these conditions could easily turn into a rout, and marched instead 
towards the town of Ma‘arrat Misrin. They were so closely enveloped during the 
march that hardly a man dared to leave his ranks, and those who did were immediate-
ly killed; the horses that tripped and fell were also abandoned. Thirst was added on 
top of all this, as those who brought fresh water to the thirsting army were driven 
away with blows of cane –– so much so that the Franks were on the brink of ruin as 
they came to camp by Ma‘arrat Misrin. Ibn al-Adim fails to provide further details, 
however, and simply notes that at this point the Turks returned to Aleppo, while the 
Franks returned to Antioch.    
What happened at Ma‘arrat Misrin and why Ilghazi and Tughtekin failed to 
capitalise on the advantage they had gained over the Franks is revealed by Ibn al-
Athir,
25
 who covers only this latter part of the campaign. He relates that the two 
emirs besieged the Franks in Ma‘arrat Misrin26 for a day and a night, but then 
Tughtekin advised Ilghazi to let the Franks go free. For there was the danger that 
desperate fear could incite them to defy death and make a sortie against the Muslims, 
from which they might emerge victorious. Ibn al-Athir notes that most of 
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Tughtekin’s apprehension stemmed from the sore-backed condition of the horses of 
the Turkomans and the excellent state of those of the Franks.
27
 So Ilghazi allowed the 
Franks to depart freely, and they escaped. Ibn al-Athir attributes this act of Ilghazi 
also to his inability to keep the Turkomans on the field, as we have seen above. But 
here the army in question was the army of Damascus rather than his own troops, 
most of whom had already dispersed home.   
It was probably also due to this dispersal of his troops that Ilghazi was com-
pelled to make an extremely disadvantageous treaty with the Franks, although the 
arrival of the Damascene troops had enabled him to save face for the time being. As 
Cahen points out, he was in no position to resist the Franks if they now undertook a 
major campaign against the territory of Aleppo or even the city itself.
28
 On the other 
hand, Grousset attributes the conclusion of this treaty so advantageous for the Franks 
to what he considers as Baldwin’s “magnificent success”: with his “both prudent and 
tenacious tactics,” the French scholar argues, the king remained master of the terrain 
of operations and was “so much the moral victor of this campaign without battle” 
that Ilghazi had to conclude a truce by which he literally “avowed himself to be out 
of fight.”29 This judgement is not entirely out of place, for we have seen that it was 
Baldwin who, with his timely arrival as well as close and tenacious pursuit, prevent-
ed Ilghazi from besieging and capturing Azaz. It was indeed the dispersal of his army 
that actually forced Ilghazi to make the truce, but one reason for his prohibition of 
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plunder, the direct cause of that dispersal, was his fear of being surprised by Bald-
win’s army.   
According to Ibn al-Adim the truce, agreed to last until the end of the year 
514 (May 1121), stipulated the cession of Ma‘arrat al-Nu‘man, Kafartab, Jabala and 
al-Bara, the lands of Jabal Summaq with the tax revenue of Hab, the lands of Lailun 
with the tax revenue of Tell Aghda, and finally the lands in the territory of Azaz with 
the tax revenues of that town.
30
 As Asbridge points out, Aleppo no longer actually 
controlled any of these sites by this time, so the concessions in question could only 
have involved Ilghazi’s final abandonment of claims to them.31 Ilghazi not only 
failed thus to take Azaz and found himself compelled to abandon his claims on it, but 
also became uncertain of his ability to retain al-Atharib and Zardana. Mustering new 
troops from Mardin, therefore, he returned the next month (June 1120) to raze the 
fortifications of Zardana.
32
  
 
The only contemporary Latin account of Ilghazi’s Syrian campaign in 1120 is 
provided by Fulcher of Chartres.
33
 Just as in his account of the second Battle of Tell 
Danith, however, Fulcher focuses much more on the Holy Cross as the centerpiece of 
his narrative than on the precise course of events. Thus a large portion of his account 
is dedicated to the story of a dispute that broke out in Jerusalem when King Baldwin, 
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about to set out north to confront Ilghazi, demanded to take along the holy relic. But 
this story is still valuable insofar as it reveals how seriously even the Franks in Jeru-
salem took Ilghazi’s new campaign, after the experience of Ager Sanguinis, and how 
anxious they were about the results of an engagement that the king considered neces-
sary to drive off Ilghazi.  
Fulcher relates that messengers from Antioch arrived in June 1120 to an-
nounce that the Turks had crossed the Euphrates to molest the Christians in Syria. 
Upon this King Baldwin supplicated the patriarch and the clergy, who included the 
historian himself, to entrust him with the Holy Cross. He asserted that the Turks 
could not be expelled from the territory of Antioch without a hard battle. For such a 
battle, said the king, he and his men had to be fortified by the Holy Cross, without 
which they did not dare to set out for war, since they placed their trust in its protec-
tion and in the Lord’s help rather than in their own power and numbers. On this re-
quest, a hefty dispute broke out between those going to war and those to remain in 
Jerusalem about whether it was right “in such a crisis for Christianity” to carry off 
the Cross to Antioch. The fear of the latter camp, headed by the clergy including Ful-
cher, was that the Church of Jerusalem could be deprived of such a treasure in case 
of defeat: “Alas, what shall we do if God permits us to lose the Cross in battle as the 
Israelites once lost the Ark of the Covenant?” But at last they reluctantly consented, 
Fulcher states, and after a ceremonial procession, Baldwin departed with the Cross.  
There are a number of important conclusions to be derived from the story of 
this dispute. Baldwin’s remarks about the necessity of a hard battle to expel the 
Turks, to begin with, shows how seriously he took Ilghazi’s invasion. Just as he had 
hurried north in the previous year to aid Roger and prevent al-Atharib and Zardana as 
well as Antioch from being captured, now he hurried north again to preserve Anti-
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och, Azaz and other fortified places in the region. And just as before, the king clearly 
expected that he would have to fight another great battle like that at Tell Danith to 
put an end to the threat posed by Ilghazi’s campaign. As for the story of his insist-
ence to take along the Holy Cross, its inclusion in the account is clearly in line with 
Fulcher’s previous stress on the supposed efficacy of the holy relic in bringing victo-
ry to the Franks at Tell Danith. Again as in that case, the story also serves Fulcher to 
illustrate and underline the piety and humility of a king who trusted in the help of 
God and the Cross, rather than in his own power and army.  
But there seems no reasonable ground either to assume that the entire story 
about the dispute has been made up. The piety of Baldwin II is also attested by Wil-
liam of Tyre, who notes that the hands and knees of the king had grown callous as a 
result of continual praying
34
 –– evidence that lends further credibility to Fulcher’s 
story about the king’s insistence on taking along the Holy Cross with him. So Bald-
win’s determination to secure the supposed protection of the holy relic shows once 
again how serious he felt the Artukid threat to be, and how apprehensive he was 
about the results of the forthcoming engagement that he considered necessary. This 
point is equally valid for the insistence of the patriarch and clergy on retaining the 
Cross in Jerusalem, out of fear that it could be seized by the enemy just as “the Isra-
elites [had] once lost the Ark of the Covenant.” Considered together with Fulcher’s 
words “in such a crisis for Christianity,” this attitude on their part reveals that the 
experience of Ager Sanguinis had made a profound impression even on the Franks of 
distant Jerusalem, who consequently viewed any further campaigns of Ilghazi with 
apprehension. Apparently, the chances that their army could be so severely defeated 
that it could even lose the Holy Cross, protected in the center of its ranks, seemed 
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quite serious to them. Indeed a relic of the Cross preserved in Antioch had been simi-
larly lost to the Turks in the Battle of Ager Sanguinis.
35
   
Fulcher’s account of the actual course of events in the North is quite brief and 
rather confused. Indeed it can only be made sense of in the light of the previous three 
accounts. He takes up the narrative at the point where Ilghazi had proceeded from 
Azaz to Antioch: he states that the king and his army went to Antioch, which the 
Turks had surrounded so tightly that the inhabitants hardly dared to go a mile outside 
of it. But we have seen from a comparison of the testimonies of Matthew and Ibn al-
Adim that the king and his army had actually marched first to Azaz, in order to pre-
vent Ilghazi from capturing it. Due to the presence of the Frankish army Ilghazi had 
been unable to pursue the siege of Azaz, and proceeded to Antioch. The Franks must 
have followed on his tracks there, as it emerges from Fulcher’s account. For he states 
that the Turks departed at once on hearing of the king’s approach and retired toward 
the lands of Aleppo which they thought would be safer. This is in accordance with 
Ibn al-Adim’s statement that Ilghazi stayed before Antioch for one day before he 
turned back east and marched via al-Ruj and Qinnasrin towards Aleppo. Fulcher does 
not appear informed about the dispersal of Ilghazi’s troops, but he does note that the 
emir was joined near Aleppo by the forces of Damascus, whose number he donotes 
as three thousand.     
Fulcher does not mention Ibn al-Athir’s story of the Franks’ envelopment by 
the Turks and their march to Ma‘arrat Misrin under difficult conditions. Nor does he 
reveal that here they were besieged by Ilghazi and Tughtekin. He contents himself 
instead with the report that although the king approached the Turks to give battle, 
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and many on both sides fell wounded or killed by arrows, the latter refused to engage 
in a pitched battle. After three days of such inconclusive strife, he says, the Franks 
returned home to Antioch and the Turks to “Persia.” Nevertheless, his version of the 
events is still reconcilable with that of Ibn al-Athir’s, except that the Arab chronicler 
gave the duration of the siege as a day and a night rather than three days. The king 
was probably trying to break through the siege by forcing a pitched battle, but the 
Turks refused it because of the contrary advice of Tughtekin who pointed out that the 
Turkoman horses, in their sorry state, could not have withstood a charge by the still 
fresh animals of the Frankish cavalry. It was also for this reason that the Turks even-
tually let the Franks go, as we have seen, though Fulcher does not reveal this either, 
and even makes it seem as if it were the Franks who departed first. All such omis-
sions in Fulcher’s account are in fact quite understandable: it would have been unde-
sirable for the historian and/or his informants to reveal the embarrassing conditions 
involved in the envelopment and siege of the Frankish army, and the still more em-
barrassing fact that they owed their liberation to their enemies rather than to their 
own efforts.  
  In keeping with the central theme of his narrative, Fulcher concludes the ac-
count by noting how the king sent back the “most glorious Cross” “in fitting honor” 
to Jerusalem, where it was “joyously welcomed back.” The king himself reportedly 
remained in the territory of Antioch to protect its lands.   
 
The course of events that emerges from these considerations is as follows: af-
ter Ilghazi had seized al-Atharib and Zardana in the previous year, which stood at the 
midpoint of the fronter line with Antioch, he moved against Azaz, at the norhern end 
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of this line, in a further effort to break the Frankish encirclement of Aleppo. After a 
short punitary raid on Edessa, undertaken in retaliation against Joscelin’s attacks up-
on the Turkomans in the area, he crossed the Euphrates and ravaged Joscelin’s lands 
beyond the river before moving on to Azaz. Joscelin, on his part, defeated a contin-
gent of Ilghazi’s army and killed around a thousand of them in an effort to put a stop 
to their depradations. Arriving at Azaz, Ilghazi laid siege to the castle, but Baldwin 
reached in time to prevent Ilghazi pursuing the siege, just as he and Roger had tried 
in the previous year to prevent him seizing al-Atharib and Zardana. Realizing that he 
had to abandon the siege, Ilghazi proceeded to Antioch to draw the Franks away 
from Azaz by a movement toward their city. Baldwin followed on his tracks. After 
ravaging the lands near Antioch for a day Ilghazi again set off, not desiring to be 
trapped between the king’s army and the garrison, and turning east, he passed 
through al-Ruj and Qinnasrin; perhaps his intention was to join forces with 
Tughtekin and then return to besiege Azaz again.  
But at this point the prohibition of plunder that Ilghazi had imposed on the 
Turkomans to keep them intact as an effective military force, his harsh disciplinary 
measures against the transgressors, and the hit-and-run attacks of previously released 
Franks caused his aggrieved army to disband and desert him, with only some scat-
tered troops remaining. The timely arrival of Tughtekin and his army saved the emir 
from suffering a disaster, however, and together they surrounded the Frankish army. 
Under their close harrassment the Franks proceeded to Ma‘arrat Misrin, where they 
were besieged for a period between one and three days. But the Turks refused a gen-
eral engagement, despite Baldwin’s willingness to join battle to break through the 
encirclement. At this point Tughtekin advised Ilghazi to let the Franks depart, fearing 
                                                                                                                                          
dershot: Ashgate, 1999), 128 (II.5). 
450 
 
a desparate charge of their cavalry with horses that were in a much better state than 
their own, and so they allowed the enemy to escape.  
The dispersal of Ilghazi’s army, which had left him in a too weak state to re-
sist a possible counter-attack by the Franks, compelled him to conclude a very disad-
vantageous truce with them, abandoning his claims on many towns, lands and reve-
nues. Collecting a new army in Diyar Bakr, he returned to raze the fortifications of 
Zardana, which he belived was no longer defensible. Thus Ilghazi had suffered a 
very great check in his plans to add Azaz to al-Atharib and Zardana and completely 
relieve the Frankish pressure on Aleppo. This was largely the result of his ill-judged 
attempt to treat his Turkoman army like a regular army, of the kind possesed by the 
Great Seljukids. The factors that led him to this mistake were firstly his concern to 
realize his strategic aim of capturing Azaz without seeing his troops disperse in plun-
der, secondly his fear of being subjected to a surprise attack by the Frankish army 
while they were scattered, and lastly his erroneous belief that after his great victory 
of Ager Sanguinis, which had endowed him with a huge reputation, he could treat his 
Turkomans with strong-arm tactics. But the influence of that reputation over the 
Turkomans was far from adequate to let him play the general of a regular army to-
wards them, as the events showed.          
7.3 The Frankish offensive against Aleppo during Ilghazi’s preoccupation 
with the Georgian campaign 
Our most important source for the year following Ilghazi’s Syrian campaign 
is again Ibn al-Adim. He relates in detail the efforts of the Franks to recover the plac-
es they had lost to Aleppo after Ager Sanguinis, taking advantage of Ilghazi’s ab-
sence while he was away in Diyar Bakr and then on a campaign to Georgia during 
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this period.
36
 Some of the events he reports are also found recorded in al-Azimi’s 
short chronicle of Aleppo, and these will be noted in their respective places.     
Ibn al-Adim reports that “the cursed Joscelin" broke the truce with Ilghazi in 
Shawwal 514 (23 December 1120 – 20 January 1121), attacking the town of Naqira 
in the Butnan valley and then Jabal Ahass to the southeast of Aleppo, including its 
chief city Khunasira.
37
 He killed or captured everybody and burnt down everything 
he came upon in these places. The pretext he put forward for this raid was that the 
governor of Manbij had captured a man of his and then refused to comply with his 
written pleas to release the prisoner. He may also have besieged Manbij itself, as Al-
Azimi reports a Frankish siege of Manbij around this time.
38
 
 Ibn al-Adim goes on to relate that Joscelin proceeded after this to ravage the 
entire valley of Butnan, and returning briefly to collect troops, set out again to repeat 
his former depredations. Intending to give his readers an idea about the cruelty of 
these ravages, Ibn al-Adim notes that in his first incursion Joscelin had captured old 
or infirm men and women, stripped off their clothes, and left them naked outdoors in 
the winter cold, which had caused the death of all. He also notes that the governor of 
Aleppo, who was Ilghazi’s son Shams al-Dawla Sulaiman at this time, sent a mes-
sage of complaint to Baldwin, stating that Ilghazi had not left that country emptied of 
troops for any other reason than his loyalty to the truce. But the king replied that he 
did not have any authority over Joscelin, and the latter continued to carry out numer-
ous successive raids. This exchange might be taken to indicate that the truce did not 
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cover the County of Edessa but only the Principality of Antioch. Nevertheless, it is 
also possible that Baldwin used this just as a pretext, and regarded the count’s incur-
sions as better than nothing when he himself was forced to abstain from further raids.  
At this point Ibn al-Adim turns to Mardin to relate how Ilghazi offered hospi-
tality and protection to Dubais ibn Sadaqa al-Asadi, the Arab emir of Hilla, who had 
escaped from the caliph and the sultan to seek refuge with the lord of Ja‘bar and then 
come to Ilghazi’s side. Arriving with a great sum of money and an abundance of 
gifts, he married Ilghazi’s daughter and increased his power by this alliance; he also 
received countless presents from Ilghazi.
39
 But Ibn al-Adim points out that this affair 
proved a distraction for Ilghazi, preventing him from crossing into Syria, so that the 
territory of Aleppo was devastated and the Franks occupied the major part of it. 
However, when it is considered that Ilghazi and Dubais were about to embark on a 
campaign to Georgia in the summer, it emerges that they were in fact busy with the 
preparations for that expedition. This was probably the actual reason why Ilghazi was 
unable to attend to the deteriorating state of affairs in Syria.  
Just about the the time of the expiry of the truce with Baldwin, in May 1121, 
Ilghazi had not flinched from accepting a call for help from Tughril, Sultan 
Mahmud’s brother and governor of Arran, as well as from the inhabitants of Tiflis 
who had come under the attack of David, the king of Georgia. From the beginning of 
the twelfth century the Georgians had been undergoing a period of recovery and re-
conquest that resembled and even benefited from the Frankish expansion that divert-
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ed the energies of the Muslim powers away from the Caucasus. But in this case the 
reverse happened: Ilghazi was distracted from the affairs in Syria by his campaign to 
Georgia, and was unable as a result to support his son in Aleppo against the Franks, 
being obliged to make concessions to buy peace in the west while he was preoccu-
pied in the north. The disastrous defeat he suffered at the hands of David in August 
was also to benefit the Franks.
40
  
Under these considerations Gerhard Väth calls it “incomprehensible” that 
Ilghazi could decide in favor of so distant a campaign  at such a time, when Joscelin 
had invaded the valley of Butnan and the truce with Baldwin had expired.
41
 Carole 
Hillenbrand explains Ilghazi’s decision by the fame and self-confidence he had ac-
quired after Ager Sanguinis, the money and troops brought by Dubais, and the prom-
ise of booty if not new territories in Georgia.
42
 Imad al-Din Khalil, in turn, attributes 
it to what he calls Ilghazi’s “readiness to assume the responsibilty of defending the 
lands of Islam,” which he argues, stemmed from the emir’s awareness that “the ad-
vance of the enemy did not pose a threat for only one state, without the involvement 
of any other, but was rather a common threat for all the neighboring states.”43  
Whether Ilghazi may indeed have regarded himself as the defender of Mus-
lims in a general sense, as Khalil seems to suggest here, will be discussed in the last 
section of this chapter. Here let us address the more limited question of whether 
Ilghazi may have considered the Georgian campaign in the context of the security of 
his own lands in the Jazira. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Ilghazi’s con-
cern that the capture of Aleppo could eventually lead to threatening consequences for 
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his principality in Diyar Bakr must have played an important role in his agreement to 
take over and defend this city. Could he have agreed to the campaign against Georgia 
with a similar consideration? This is not as likely as in the case of Aleppo, if only for 
the simple reason that Georgia was much more distant than North Syria from Ilgha-
zi’s base and accustomed range of operations, and any advance of the Georgians in 
the Caucasus was far less likely than similar advances of the Franks in Syria to pose 
any threat for Ilghazi in his homeland in the Jazira.  
Accordingly, the main pragmatic reason for Ilghazi’s campaign to Georgia 
should rather be sought in the fact that he was still much of a chieftain of roaming 
Turkomans; let us not forget that the range of activities of his father Artuk had been 
even vaster, extending from Asia Minor to Palestine to Bahrain.
44
 Ilghazi was thus 
following on the steps of his father as he marched to Georgia, although unlike him he 
had succeeded in carving out a principality for himself in Diyar Bakr. Rejecting such 
an attractive offer with its promise of ample booty and prestige, so that he could sys-
tematically concentrate his energies on the defense of his “territory” in Syria, might 
still have been an alien idea for Ilghazi, if not for his successors.  
Despite this the Artukid emir tried as best as he could to prevent Aleppo from 
falling into the hands of the Franks and so enabling them to dominate the region, but 
this did not change the fact that the city remained a remote dependency for him. His 
brilliant success in the Battle of Ager Sanguinis and subsequent capture of al-Atharib 
and Zardana may also have inspired Ilghazi with the confidence that he could easily 
recover fom the Franks whatever he might lose to them while preoccupied with the 
Georgia campaign –– although the check he had suffered in the Syrian campaign of 
1120 should have undermined that confidence a bit. As we shall see in the sixth sec-
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tion of this chapter, Ilghazi was to dedicate a large part of his campaign in 1122 to 
attempts at recovering Zardana, which he had razed and abandoned, but which was 
later rebuilt and reoccupied by the Franks. When launching his Georgian campaign 
he may have calculated that he could undertake such operations after his return to 
recover possible losses.      
Although Ibn al-Adim was thus mistaken in pointing out Ilghazi’s preoccupa-
tion with Dubais, rather than the Georgian campaign, as the cause of his failure to 
cross into Syria and defend Aleppo, he was still quite right about the results of this 
neglect: large-scale ravaging and invasion of Aleppan territory by the Franks, who 
were increasingly encouraged upon meeting no resistance from Ilghazi’s part. Josce-
lin, for one, raided Siffin and took captive the Arabs and Turkomans there, as well as 
seizing much of their money, horses and herds as booty. On his way back he attacked 
Buza‘a and burnt down some of its walls before allowing himself to be bought off 
with a certain sum and returning to his lands.
45
 More significant among the Frankish 
attacks at this time, however, were those directed against al-Atharib. This castle had 
become the main bone of contention between Aleppo and Antioch after Zardana had 
been destroyed by Ilghazi.  
Ibn al-Adim reports two Frankish attacks upon al-Atharib made between 
April and June 1121. In the former in Safar (20 April – 18 May) they killed many 
inhabitants and burnt down the lower town, capturing those who had failed to take 
refuge in the citadel. Then in Rabi‘ I (19 May – 17 June), after attacking Nawaz, they 
again marched against al-Atharib and burnt down the houses and crops outside the 
citadel. Al-Azimi similarly reports that the Franks attacked the lower town of al-
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Atharib.
46
 From here there was only a short distance over the plain to Aleppo, which 
next became the butt of Frankish aggression. Baldwin carried out a plundering raid 
against the city, seizing people and horses from the suburbs as well as from inns. In 
addition to some fifty captives, he also took as much livestock as he could. But at 
this point, Ibn al-Adim relates, a small contingent of Aleppan troops made a sortie 
against the Franks and defeated them, also recovering their cattle, and the Franks re-
turned home. Al-Azimi reports in parallel with Ibn al-Adim that the Franks raided 
Aleppo, upon which the troops of the city attacked and defeated them.
47
 
There is some discord in the literature about the precise identity of the Franks 
who carried out the attacks following Joscelin’s raid of Siffin. Neither Ibn al-Adim 
nor Al-Azimi, to begin with, give any indications about the Frankish leader who led 
the attacks on al-Atharib and Nawaz. Röhricht thinks that it was Joscelin,48 but Ni-
cholson points out the absence of any concrete evidence to support this assertion. 
Basing himself on Ibn al-Adim’s immediately following indication of Baldwin as the 
leader of the subsequent raid against Aleppo, he suggests instead that the king might 
have led the previous attacks on al-Atharib and Nawaz as well.
49
 But the problem is 
that we are not even sure whether it was really Baldwin who raided Aleppo. Grousset 
points out that Ibn al-Adim indicates this raid to have taken place sometime around 
May-June at the earliest, whereas Fulcher asserts that Baldwin crossed the Jordan to 
fight Tughtekin in the distant Jawlan (adjacent to Tiberias) on 5 July.
50
 Grousset’s 
suggestion is that the raid in question might have taken place in autumn instead, 
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when Baldwin undertook a campaign against Khunasira.
51
 This is unacceptable how-
ever, for it means that Aleppo did not come under attack in early summer, which 
would render it more difficult to explain why Ilghazi hurried to make such a disad-
vantageous a treaty with the Franks as we shall see.  
Nevertheless, Baldwin’s presence in Jawlan at so near a date as 5 July to the 
months of May and June still stands in need of an explanation, all the more so as he 
was still in Jerusalem while Ilghazi’s son Sulaiman conducted negotiations with Jos-
celin and Geoffrey. Being aware perhaps of the unacceptability of Grousset’s sugges-
tion, but still in search of a solution to this problem, Cahen goes further than 
Röhricht and speaks of “incursions leading up to the gates of Aleppo by Joscelin, 
helped by Geoffrey of Mar‘ash,” although Ibn al-Adim clearly attributes these to 
Baldwin. If it was Joscelin who raided Aleppo, what was the king doing at this time? 
Cahen’s response is that he was in Jawlan fighting against Tughtekin, who attempted 
a diversion there but was defeated precisely at the same time as Joscelin’s raid 
against Aleppo.
52
 Although more plausible than Grousset’s suggestion, Cahen’s solu-
tion still does not quite ring true, since it ignores Ibn al-Adim’s explicit and unequiv-
ocal attribution of the raid to Baldwin without bringing sufficient evidence for doing 
so.     
Thus scholarly opinion seems to be divided between attributing all the attacks 
after Joscelin’s raid of Siffin to Baldwin or to Joscelin. Which is more likely? To 
begin with, Nicholson’s point about Baldwin leading the attacks on al-Atharib and 
Nawaz seems sensible, as long as it can be proved that it was also Baldwin who raid-
ed Aleppo afterwards and not Joscelin. And for the latter point the closeness in date 
between this raid that took place around May-June at the earliest and the campaign to 
                                                 
51
 Grousset, Histoire, I, 578, n. 4. See the next section for the evaluation of this campaign. 
458 
 
Jawlan must be accounted for. This may not be so difficult as it seems at first sight: 
the key lies in Cahen’s suggestion that Tughtekin’s campaign in Jawlan could have 
been an attempt to divert the king. When the Frankish forces under Baldwin pressed 
hard upon al-Atharib and Aleppo, Tughtekin may have attacked Jawlan in order to 
draw them away from North Syria. It is also conceivable that he made this move at 
the bidding of his son-in-law Ilghazi.  
Tughtekin’s attempt must have proved successful and compelled Baldwin to 
hurry south to the Kingdom of Jerusalem –– which would explain the shortness of 
the timespan between his raid of Aleppo and campaign in Jawlan. Another factor that 
would help to explain Baldwin’s speed is that he must have hastened south with a 
small company rather than the army of Jerusalem, since Fulcher states that he mus-
tered the latter upon returning home –– probably it was the forces of Antioch that he 
had commanded in the North. Also significant in this connection is Fulcher’s report 
that Tughtekin gathered up his tents upon Baldwin’s approach and, avoiding battle 
with the king in pursuit, took refuge in his own territories. It shows that Tughtekin’s 
only goal had been to divert Baldwin’s attention from Aleppo: once he had achieved 
it, he withdrew without fighting.  
Thus it appears that it was indeed the king who led all the attacks on al-
Atharib, Nawaz and Aleppo, once the truce of the previous year had expired. This 
result is significant insofar as it shows the active role that Baldwin played in the re-
covery of al-Atharib and other important possessions lost by Antioch in the previous 
year. Still more importantly, it reveals the large share of the king’s activities in forc-
ing Ilghazi once more to accept a very disadvantageous truce. Ilghazi was just about 
to set out for Georgia at this time, and being eager to use the opportunity provided by 
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the temporary relief of Baldwin’s pressure, he hurried to conclude peace before the 
king could return north to resume his attacks on al-Atharib and Aleppo. It was for 
this reason that the emir now instructed his son, the ra’is Makki ibn Qurnass and 
other men to make a truce on whatever terms the Franks desired. His preoccupation 
in Mardin with the preparations of the Georgian campaign had enabled Baldwin and 
Joscelin to carry out successive attacks on Aleppo and its territory, and now, under 
this intense pressure, he was forced to comply with the demands of the enemy.
53
  
The truce concluded by Ilghazi’s deputies in Aleppo stipulated the cession to 
the Franks of Sarmin, the region of al-Jazr (around al-Atharib and Zardana), Jabal 
Lailun and the large plain to the north of the city. The castle of Tell Hiraq, situated in 
the latter region, was also to be demolished, so that neither side would control it any 
longer. The reason for this last term was probably the reluctance of the Muslims to 
see it become a Frankish base when the plain around it was ceded to the Franks. The 
latter would also be unwilling to have a Muslim castle right in their new territory.
54
 
Half of the region around Aleppo was also to be granted to the Franks,
55
 so exactly 
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indeed that the two sides would even share Raha’l-Arabiyya (the Mill of the Arab 
Woman) equally.
56
  
More astonishingly, however, Ilghazi even showed himself ready to surrender 
al-Atharib when the Franks demanded it too, although we have seen that together 
with Zardana it was one of the two most valuable gains and indeed the main targets 
of his campaign in 1119. But Ibn al-Adim reports that the castle remained in Muslim 
possession when the garrison refused to surrender it.
57
 Perhaps the reason for Ilgha-
zi’s consent to give up the fortress was that he was no longer sure of his ability to 
maintain a hold over it, precisely the grounds on which he had razed the fortifications 
of Zardana. Unlike Zardana, however, the castle of al-Atharib still stood erect and 
would have formed a serious threat against Aleppo. So it could well be the case that 
Ilghazi just pretended to comply with the Franks’ demand, in order to conclude the 
truce as soon as possible, but then secretly ordered the garrison of al-Atharib to re-
fuse its surrender. In this way he would be able to preserve this strategically vital and 
practically impregnable stronghold without having to bear the responsibility and 
complications that would have resulted from rejecting the Frankish demand outright. 
Baldwin was in Jerusalem during the negotiations conducted by Joscelin and 
Geoffrey of Mar‘ash.58 He ratified it on returning to Syria, Ibn al-Adim relates, and 
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then began to rebuild and fortify the old ruined monastery near Sarmada. Al-Azimi 
similarly reports that around the time of their raid on Aleppo the Franks rebuilt what 
he calls “the monastery of Atharib.”59 The fortified monastery of Dair Sarmada, now 
also called Hisn al-Dair (the Castle of Monastery), was given to none other than 
Alan, the former lord of al-Atharib.
60
  
The reason why Baldwin undertook this construction work was probably the 
failure of al-Atharib to surrender. From this new stronghold he intended to apply 
pressure on the castle and check any attacks that the Muslims might make from it. As 
it turned out following year, the new fortress would also play an important role in the 
defense of Zardana against Ilghazi’s insistent attacks.61 In this context Thomas As-
bridge stresses the important place that Dair Sarmada gained in the border conflict 
between Antioch and Aleppo, in which the Franks kept trying to recapture al-Atharib 
while they protected Zardana from being taken back by the Muslims. Since Dair 
Sarmada was situated in a valley with only one exit towards the east, they could keep 
a large army at this location without risking a surprise attack from the direction of 
Aleppo. The army in question could be deployed to defend Zardana, or to attack al-
Atharib when the occasion arose.
62
     
The Franks had gained considerable ground against Aleppo even before 
Ilghazi had set out for Georgia, while he was still preoccupied with preparations in 
Mardin. His defeat in that campaign enabled them to gain still further ground, as we 
shall see in the following section.  
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7.4 The Frankish gains from the rebellion of Sulaiman ibn Ilghazi 
Ilghazi not only concluded peace with the Franks to secure his rear during his 
Georgian campaign, but also took measures to ensure the stability of his rule in 
Aleppo. Ibn al-Adim states that he ordered his son and the ra’is to expel Ridwan’s 
troops from Qal‘at Sharif and then to demolish the citadel. The pretext they found for 
expelling the troops without a fight was jihad: bringing them out of Qal‘at Sharif on 
the pretext of raiding the lands of the Franks, they closed the gates of Aleppo in their 
face. Ridwan’s children remained in the city however, and shortly afterwards Ilghazi 
would marry Ridwan’s daughter in a further effort to bolster his rule. On the other 
hand, the destruction of Qal‘at Sharif was also an expedient against the Ismailis of 
Aleppo, who had sent to Ilghazi in Mardin to ask for its grant to themselves. In their 
hands this citadel of strategic importance could have posed a considerable threat to 
Ilghazi’s authority, so ordering its demolition must have seemed the best solution to 
this problem as well.
63
 
Ilghazi must have believed that after these measures he would not have to 
face any challenge to his authority in Aleppo while on campaign, and indeed he 
would stand in dire need of such security after his disastrous defeat in the mountains 
of Georgia (15 August). But that challenge did come, and from the least expected 
quarter: his son Shams al-Din Sulaiman. The story of his revolt against Ilghazi and 
its consequences is again recounted at length by Ibn al-Adim,
64
 while Ibn al-Athir
65
 
and Ibn abi Tayyi (cited by Ibn al-Furat)
66
 also provide independent accounts; Al-
Azimi also touches upon the related events in his usual sparse manner.
67
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Ibn al-Adim offers two alternative reasons for Sulaiman’s revolt. According 
to the first of these, Ilghazi sent a message to his son at Aleppo to demand certain 
things which Sulaiman’s entourage presented in an unfavorable light to him,68 mak-
ing insinuations that compelled him to rebel against his father. Among these men 
were the ra’is Makki ibn Qurnass and the chamberlain Nasir, who was the shihna of 
Aleppo. Ibn abi Tayyi adds that Ilghazi’s nephew, Badr al-Dawla Sulaiman was also 
among the instigators, but this seems to be contradicted by the fact that he was ap-
pointed in his cousin’s place after the suppression of the revolt –– unless Ilghazi was 
unaware of his role in it.
69
 Ibn al-Adim’s version is supported by Ibn al-Athir, who 
asserts that several of Sulaiman’s entourage incited him to revolt.  
What could have been their motivation in pushing Sulaiman to this action? 
Ibn al-Adim reports that Sulaiman went to great lengths after his revolt in oppressing 
the people of Aleppo with exactions, confiscations and other sorts of corruption, and 
we can guess that he was not the only one among his associates to profit thereby; in-
deed the shihna Nasir was to be dismissed by Ilghazi from his post for molesting the 
population. Accordingly it could be surmised from Ibn al-Adim’s account that the 
instigators had received news of Ilghazi’s defeat and decided to take advantage of 
this situation by inciting Sulaiman, a lad of only twenty years, to revolt, so that they 
could exploit the populace to swell their own coffers.   
Another slightly different but perhaps more likely alternative is that they had 
already begun taking advantage of Ilghazi’s prolonged absence for this purpose, and 
when the emir sent a message demanding an immediate stop to such practices, they 
incited Sulaiman to rebel. Fearing punishment and being encouraged by Ilghazi’s 
defeat, they calculated in this way to keep him out of Aleppo and continue their ex-
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actions and confiscations as before. This is indeed supported partially by the testimo-
ny of Ibn aabi Tayyi, who relates that Ilghazi rushed to Aleppo on learning that 
Sulaiman had made himself unpopular in the city by financial exactions. Receiving 
the news, Sulaiman and Ibn Qurnass revolted out of fear. This could again be 
brought in connection with Ibn al-Adim’s testimony: the “certain things” demanded 
by Ilghazi and shown in an unfavorable light to Sulaiman could well have been the 
demand to stop the exactions and confiscations. As for the insinuations of Sulaiman’s 
entourage that reportedly forced him to revolt, these may have been to the effect that 
he could not possibly escape punishment for his abuses unless he revolted against his 
father –– in that case the latter, having been soundly defeated in Georgia, would be 
incapable of returning to Aleppo to chastise and prevent him from further profit.  
On the other hand, Ibn abi Tayyi’s asertion that Sulaiman and the ra’is re-
belled upon Ilghazi’s departure for Aleppo cannot be accepted. As we shall see, Ibn 
al-Adim and Ibn al-Athir state unequivocally that Sulaiman did not get wind of 
Ilghazi’s setting out and speedy march before the latter reached Qal‘at Ja‘bar, and 
then sent envoys to ask for an agreement, instead of revolting.        
But what to make of the alternative version of the events offered by Ibn al-
Adim? According to this, Dubais asked Ilghazi to grant Aleppo to himself while they 
were en route to Georgia. In return he promised to give a hundred thousand dinars to 
collect Turkomans, and to help Ilghazi capture Antioch. Ilghazi agreed to this pro-
posal. After the defeat they suffered at the hands of King David, however, he 
changed his mind. Thinking of a pretext that would enable him to evade his engage-
ment without losing face to Dubais, he sent to Sulaiman, saying: “Pretend that you 
have rebelled against me, so that the agreement between me and Dubais may become 
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null and void.” But Ibn al-Adim asserts that Sulaiman was a feeble-minded character, 
and this caused him to really revolt against his father, supported by the ra’is, the 
shihna and others.  
There seems no good reason to reject this second version out of hand as Ali 
Sevim does, arguing that Ilghazi’s speed in reaching the city and the drastic punish-
ments he meted out to the instigators, as well as his refusal to forgive his son, show 
that the revolt was real and not feigned.
70
 Ibn al-Adim explicitly states however that 
the revolt started as a feigned one but then turned into a real one, which renders Se-
vim’s objection out of place. It is indeed possible that this strange request of Ilghazi 
for a pretended rebellion was what initially put the idea of revolt in the minds of 
Sulaiman and his associates. When this request was followed by orders to stop the 
exploitation of the populace, it took them only a step to turn the feigned revolt into 
an actual one, having been encouraged besides by the wretched condition in which 
Ilghazi and his men had returned to Mardin.    
Hence the revolt may have developed in the following way: taking advantage 
of the prolonged absence of Ilghazi on account of the Georgian campaign, Sulaiman 
and his counsellors, headed by the ra’is Makki ibn Qurnass and the shihna Nasir the 
chamberlain, began to mulct the population of Aleppo by exactions, confiscations 
and other corrupt practices. When Ilghazi heard this, he rightly feared that it could 
cause him to lose control of Aleppo by rendering him highly unpopular at a time 
when he had just been weakened by his defeat in Georgia. Accordingly he sent mes-
sages ordering them to stop the exploitation of the populace.  
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Possibly, by this time Sulaiman and his counselors were already in a state of 
feigned rebellion. This was on the order of Ilghazi himself, who wanted to evade his 
promise to give Aleppo to Dubais in return for the latter’s support in capturing Anti-
och, probably because it exceeded the bounds of his defensive strategy concerning 
Aleppo and perhaps also because he had lost many troops in Georgia. Upon receiv-
ing the emir’s messages that forbade further abuse of the populace, and perhaps also 
included threats of punishment, Sulaiman’s companions began to incite the feeble-
minded lad against his father. In doing so they may have insinuated that if only he 
turned this feigned revolt into a real one, all would escape punishment and continue 
their lucrative business as before. They were also encouraged to act in this way by 
the miserable state in which Ilghazi had returned from Georgia, calculating (errone-
ously, as it turned out) that he would not be able to march upon Aleppo and suppress 
the revolt. Sulaiman was thus persuaded to rebel against his father.       
 
Once he had revolted, Sulaiman began by expelling the Seljukid princes Sul-
tanshah and Ibrahim as well as the other associates of Ridwan, who thereupon went 
to Qal‘at Ja‘bar. In his precarious situation he may have feared an attempt on their 
part to wrest control of the city from him. He also arrested and insulted the chamber-
lains of his father. Not stopping there, Sulaiman made advances toward the Franks as 
possible allies against his father, at least in order to keep him at bay. Ibn al-Adim 
states that the Franks grew covetous upon this, and camping before Zardana, rebuilt 
the castle on behalf of William, the son of its former lord Robert fitzFulk.
71
 Raiding 
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the Tayy and other tribes, they next marched to the gates of Aleppo, where they were 
met by a contingent led by the chamberlain Nasir. The Muslims were defeated and a 
number of them were killed. Ibn al-Adim does not reveal the identity of the Frankish 
prince who led these operations, but considering that the chronicler directly goes on 
to relate Baldwin’s campaign against the castles around Aleppo, it is probable that he 
had been the leader who fortified Zardana and attacked Antioch as well.  
Thus the king had broken the truce in July to take advantage of Ilghazi’s de-
feat and his son’s revolt, and now he proceeded to capture Khunasira, Naqira and al-
Ahass, as well as an unidentified place named Burj Sina. In these places he demol-
ished the castles, enslaved the inhabitants, and burnt and robbed the entire region. 
Since Ibn al-Adim indicates the time of Baldwin’s campaign as Jumada II (16 Au-
gust – 13 September 1121), these events must have taken place between the end of 
August, when the news of Ilghazi’s defeat on 15 August must have reached Syria, 
leading Sulaiman to revolt, and the middle of September.  
Sulaiman realized that he would not be able to ward off Baldwin’s attacks 
which spread devastation and resulted in the fall of castles around Aleppo one after 
another. Accordingly he decided to ask for peace. As Baldwin was camping on his 
way back before Silda’, on the river Quwaik, a certain Atsiz ibn Turk, probably the 
governor of the town, came out to beseech him on Sulaiman’s behalf to make a truce. 
Baldwin agreed only on condition that Sulaiman would surrender al-Atharib to him, 
promising in return to protect and defend him. It is not denoted against whom this 
defence and protection was offered, but it could be nobody else other than Sulaim-
an’s father Ilghazi.  
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Baldwin’s purpose in launching his campaign becomes clear in this light: he 
placed great importance on the recovery of al-Atharib, and seeing Sulaiman’s at-
tempts to ally with the Franks against his own father, he doubled the reward for the 
concession of that castle, so that Sulaiman could be persuaded still more easily: if he 
gave what Baldwin wanted he would not only find a protector in him against Ilghazi, 
as he had desired from the beginning, but would also avoid further attacks that he 
could not hope to resist without his father’s help. So the whole story reveals once 
again the importance of al-Atharib and Zardana for the Franks, which were indispen-
sable if they wanted to close down on Aleppo: Zardana had been rebuilt in the same 
campaign, taking advantage of the opportunity provided by the division in the 
Artukid family, and now Baldwin tried to use the same division to secure al-Atharib, 
which was very hard to take by force. 
But even Sulaiman and his men could not overlook the castle’s vital im-
portance for the security of Aleppo. Ibn al-Adim relates how Atsiz rejected Bald-
win’s demand, pointing out that it was impossible to inaugurate Sulaiman’s reign in 
Aleppo with the surrender of one of its frontier castles.
72
 He offered instead another 
place that the king might desire. Baldwin’s highly interesting response reveals once 
more that his whole efforts, including the fortification of the monastery of Sarmada 
and the rebuilding of Zardana, had been directed systematically toward the purpose 
of recovering al-Atharib: 
The lord of Aleppo is not in a position to preserve al-Atharib, since I have re-
built the castles surrounding it. And I tell you that today it resembles a 
knight’s horse whose front legs have become powerless. The knight has a 
granary full of barley which he feeds to the horse with the hope that it will re-
cover and he will win on its back. But the barley in the granary is depleted, 
the horse ends up powerless, and the expected gain eludes him.  
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Ibn al-Adim relates that Baldwin headed after this to al-Atharib and besieged 
it for three days, before news that arrived that necessitated his departure for Antioch. 
Perhaps the actual reason was his awareness of the difficulty of taking the castle by 
force.
73
 
In the meantime Ilghazi was at the end of his tether in Mardin, having learned 
of Sulaiman’s revolt. Ibn al-Adim relates that he kept receiving letters from Aleppo, 
assuring him that there was no means of defence there to keep him at bay, and so he 
set out in haste for Syria. When Sulaiman heard that Ilghazi had already arrived at 
Qal‘at Ja‘bar, he grew too weak in spirit to defy him. Sending an envoy to his father, 
he adjured him to pardon and behave well towards himself and the others like Ibn 
Qurnass and Nasir who had incited him to revolt. After having sworn the required 
oaths, Ilghazi entered Aleppo on the first of Ramadan (13 November 1121).  
This episode is related somewhat differently by Al-Azimi and Ibn al-Athir. 
The former reports briefly that Ilghazi rushed upon Sulaiman and arrested him. Simi-
larly, the latter asserts that immediately upon learning of his son’s revolt Ilghazi set 
out on a forced march toward Aleppo, and Sulaiman had no inkling of this until he 
was attacked.
74
 However, there seems no good reason to ignore the details provided 
by Ibn al-Adim, and their testimonies could be reconciled: presumably, Ilghazi had 
set out in secret and moved with so great a speed that Sulaiman got wind of his 
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march against the city only when Ilghazi had reached Qal‘at Ja’bar, upon which 
Sulaiman sent him the envoy mentioned by Ibn al-Adim.    
Ilghazi had of course no intention of observing his oaths. Ibn al-Adim relates 
that he first established himself in the citadel and took measures to secure the full 
support of the populace, who had come out of the city to welcome him. Among these 
measures were the remittance of some of the taxes and market dues they paid and the 
dismissal of the shihna, Nasir the chamberlain, who had been molesting them. Ibn al-
Athir indicates that Ilghazi refrained at first from proceeding against Sulaiman him-
self, who had come in person to apologize to him, but set about arresting and punish-
ing his counsellors. Makki ibn Qurnass was blinded and mutilated, dying shortly 
thereafter as a result, and his brother was also tortured and deprived of his posses-
sions; a certain assistant of the ra’is was hamstrung as well. The degree of violence 
applied was partly due to the ingratitude of Makki, Ibn al-Athir points out, whom 
Ilghazi had promoted over the rest of the people of Aleppo and made ra’is.  Follow-
ing this the chamberlain Nasir, previously dismissed from the position of shihna, was 
similarly blinded, mutilated and deprived of his properties. According to Ibn al-Athir 
this man was also guilty of ingratitude, having been adopted and brought up by 
Ilghazi’s father Artuk.  
Now the time for the punishment of Sulaiman had come, once his supporters 
had been deprived of power and rendered harmless. Ibn al-Athir relates how he was 
brought into Ilghazi’s presence while drunk. The latter wanted to have him killed, but 
being held back by paternal affection, spared him. Immediately upon this Sulaiman 
fled to Damascus and Tughtekin sent to intercede for him, but Ilghazi refused to ac-
cept his mediation. Then he replaced his son with his nephew Badr al-Dawla Sulaim-
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an ibn Abd al-Jabbar as the governor of Aleppo, and appointed Salman ibn Abd al-
Razzaq al-Ajlani, a native of Balis, as the new ra’is.  
Beside these punitary measures, Ilghazi also felt necessary after the revolt to 
bolster his legitimacy as the ruler of Aleppo. For this purpose he did not only have 
the children of Ridwan brought back from Qal‘at Ja‘bar, but also married Ridwan’s 
daughter and consummated the marriage in Aleppo. Following this, Ibn al-Adim re-
ports, the emir made a new truce with the Franks, to last for a full year, and gave 
them the lands they had possessed in the days of their former mastery over al-Atharib 
and Zardana. This is rather surprising, however, because the truce concluded in July 
had already stipulated the cession of the region of al-Jazr that surrounded these cas-
tles to the Franks. It could be surmised in view of this situation that the refusal of the 
garrison of al-Atharib to surrender after that truce had also prevented the Franks from 
taking full possession of the lands in question.  
Carole Hillenbrand argues in connection with these events that neither Ilgha-
zi’s “final bid for strong rule in Aleppo” nor the respite he gave to the city through 
his one-year truce with the Franks could change the fact that “it was too late for the 
Artukids to gain a firm foothold in Aleppo.”75 Nevertheless, at this stage of the de-
velopments it would be too early to make such an assertion, which is apparently 
based on a teleological perspective of the events backwards from 1124, the year 
when Timurtash abandoned the city for good. The enthusiastic reception that the 
people of Aleppo accorded to Ilghazi on his return is sufficient evidence that they 
had not altogether rejected Artukid rule. And Belek, Ilghazi’s eventual successor in 
Aleppo, was to gain considerable ground against the Franks before his untimely 
death and succession by the sedate and indifferent Timurtash. 
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However, it remains true that the division caused in the Artukid family by 
Sulaiman’s revolt, which was due in turn to Ilghazi’s prolonged absence from Syria 
and his subsequent defeat in Georgia, cost Aleppo further important losses. The chief 
among these were the Franks’ reconstruction of Zardana and capture of other castles 
in its territory like Khunasira, Naqira and al-Ahass, as well as their actual takeover of 
the region around al-Atharib; the latter was reduced as a result to a Muslim island 
amidst a Frankish sea. Aware of the importance of these losses, and in particular of 
Zardana, Ilghazi set out a few months after the truce, in Muharram 516 (11 March – 
9 April 1122), for Diyar Bakr. His intention was to levy troops for a new campaign 
and return with them to recover Zardana and other places.  
Thus whereas Ilghazi may have been toying on the way to Georgia with Du-
bais’s offer of making a go for Antioch, he was now reduced once more to calculat-
ing how he could push back the Frankish encirclement around Aleppo, just as he had 
been doing in 1119 –– naturally there could be no question of leaving Aleppo to Du-
bais in these new conditions. The extent of the damage that the ill-judged Georgian 
campaign inflicted on Ilghazi’s interests in Syria is only too clear from this contrast 
between the situations before and after it. The only gain of the previous year that re-
mained in his hands was al-Atharib, and in Baldwin’s words it had come to resemble 
“a horse without power in its front legs” after the reconstruction of Zardana and Dair 
Sarmada. 
Before focusing on the next campaign of Ilghazi, we should discuss a curious 
report of Bar Hebraeus that reveals at first sight the emir’s widespread reputation as a 
formidable adversary of the Franks, but may be found to have a further significance 
as well.   
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7.5 A curious report about Ilghazi’s defeat of a Frankish army newly arrived 
from Europe 
Among the events of the year 515/1121-22 Bar Hebraeus reports
76
 that the 
Byzantine emperor (John Comnenus) sent message to Ilghazi, warning him to pre-
pare to fight a great army of Franks sailing towards Syria, and offering to send him 
thirty thousand troops in case he needed reinforcements. Upon this news, Bar He-
braeus relates, Ilghazi set out immediately, captured the Latin ports, and killed many 
of the Franks who had arrived; the survivors returned to Europe. The author takes 
care to underline that this defeat was due to the treachery of the Byzantines.  
The event that could have formed the basis of this report, which has admitted-
ly an “apocryphal flavor” to it as Hillenbrand remarks, cannot be determined with 
clarity. It could perhaps be related to the launching of the Venetian fleet that eventu-
ally assisted in the capture of Tyre, but since that event took place no earlier than 
1124, the Artukid in question should have been Belek, rather than Ilghazi who died 
in 1122. For Belek was making preparations to hasten to the aid of Tripoli when he 
was killed before Manbij, and like Ilghazi had achieved fame as a formidable adver-
sary of the Franks afer his capture of Baldwin and Joscelin.
77
  
An alternative explanation, however, is that this was a minor Crusading ex-
pedition undertaken by a nobleman from Europe in 1121, which went unrecorded in 
most sources because of its relative insignificance. Evidence that supports this possi-
bility is that two exactly contemporary Arab sources, Ibn al-Qalanisi and Al-Azimi, 
do report the arrival of such a Frankish leader from beyond the sea in 514/1120-21, 
almost the same date as that given by Bar Hebraeus. Ibn al-Qalanisi writes that this 
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“count”78 arrived with ships to take possession of most of the fortresses in the re-
gion,
79
 while Al-Azimi relates that the “son of the sister of the king of the Franks” 
came out from the sea and gained mastery over the major part of the towns.”80  
Who could this “son of the sister of the king of the Franks” be? Among 
Baldwin I and II of Jerusalem and Louis VI of France, who seem the most likely 
candidates for Al-Azimi’s “king of Franks,” the only one to have a sister’s son who 
lived across the sea from outremer while having interests there, and who was also of 
an acceptable age to undertake such a voyage, was the latter, Louis VI. His full sister 
Constance, born like him from the marriage of their father Philip I with Bertha of 
Holland, had first become the Countess of Champagne upon her marriage to Hugh of 
Champagne, and then the Princess of Antioch, upon her second marriage with Bo-
hemond I. Louis VI’s sister’s son was thus none other than the future Bohemond II 
of Antioch, born around 1108.  
It is usually accepted that Bohemond II remained in Apulia until 1126, when, 
having come of age, he came to the East to take over the Principality of Antioch as 
his rightful inheritance. Nevertheless, he was already fourteen years old by 1121-22, 
and although this age was perhaps not yet adequate to claim his inheritance, he was 
certainly old enough according to the standards of the time to pay a visit to the East 
with a fleet and undertake some minor Crusading operations like many other noble-
men of the time. In any case, he would have been accompanied on this voyage by 
mature members of his family and entourage.
81
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Further evidence that supports this possibility is the reaction of the Byzantine 
emperor as noted by Bar Hebraeus: if it was indeed Bohemond II who undertook the 
expedition across the sea, we can better understand why the emperor was so con-
cerned to warn Ilghazi against his arrival, and even ready to offer reinforcements: the 
Byzantines had always been staunch enemies of the Normans of Antioch, and in par-
ticular of Bohemond II’s father, Bohemond I. The latter had not only refused to hand 
over Antioch to the Empire after its capture, but had also attacked Byzantine lands in 
the Balkans both before and after the First Crusade. Through contacts with the Greek 
population in Southern Italy, where Bohemond II resided with his mother at Taranto, 
the emperor would also have been able to receive news of the expedition beforehand 
and to warn Ilghazi in time, as he did in the event.  
If it is allowed in this context to attribute any significance to Ibn al-Qalanisi’s 
mention of Bohemond II as “count,” rather than “prince” or something else, it might 
be due to the fact that his mother Constance was the countess of Champagne from 
her first marriage and therefore he had a claim, even if remote, to that title also. This 
might have led some of the Franks in the East to speak of him actually as the 
“count,” especially since he had not yet become the Prince of Antioch.  
All this having been said, the three reports in question still stand in need of 
qualification. Bar Hebraeus’s mention of a “great fleet,” as well as his assertion that 
Ilghazi captured the ports and killed the majority of the Franks who arrived, seem 
rather exaggerated to say the least. Likewise, the assertions of Ibn al-Qalanisi and Ibn 
al-Adim that the Frankish “count” took possession of most of the fortresses in the 
region and gained mastery over the major part of the towns also look hyperbolic. Bo-
hemond’s campaign was very probably only a seasonal operation with a limited 
number of troops and narrow scope, during which Ilghazi might have defeated a part 
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of his army; of course the Artukid emir did not capture any Latin ports. Were it oth-
erwise, the expedition would have been reported in detail by other sources as well, 
notably by Ibn al-Adim. For the same reason, it is not surprising that the only con-
temporary Latin source, Fulcher, fails to mention Bohemond’s short visit; it may 
have appeared a minor or embarrassing event, because of the defeat involved, or giv-
en the distance from Jerusalem, he may not even have got wind of it. Given that 
Baldwin was effectively lord of Antioch at this time, Fulcher may also not have been 
keen to mention this portent of the end of Baldwin’s rule in Antioch.  
It remains to determine the most likely dates for Bohemond’s arrival and so-
journ in Syria. Considering that Ilghazi was in Diyar Bakr and then on the Georgian 
campaign from autumn 1120 to October 1121, but in Syria between the latter date 
and March-April 1122, and that the sailing season began in spring, Bohemond must 
have probably arrived in the early spring of 1122. He must have departed sometime 
before the end of the sailing season in autumn 1122 at the latest, and probably con-
siderably earlier than that, given the failure of important sources like Ibn al-Adim 
and Fulcher to mention him.  
There is also some possibility that the young prince had in fact complied with 
an invitation from Antioch to cross to Syria and take over his inheritance, but losing 
face through his defeat by Ilghazi, was advised to return home within the same year, 
so that he could wait until he had grown mature and competent enough to ward off 
the Turks. In this case, the Arab chroniclers’ reports that he “took possession” and 
“gained mastery” over the towns and fortresses in the region could be taken to imply 
pledges of future loyalty, homage, or perhaps simply admittance to meet to the local 
lords and castellans of the Frankish possessions. In short, it may have been more of a 
tour of the main places in the Principality to show off the future heir. 
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Indeed the Norman historian Orderic Vitalis, who was knowledgeable about 
the affairs of the Principality of Antioch, reports that the men of Antioch “sent mes-
sengers on many occasions to invite the true heir to cross in safety to Syria and re-
ceive the government of his father’s principality, with the approval of his subjects,” 
but “his anxious mother held him back.”82 Although Orderic dates this to the period 
of Baldwin II’s captivity in Belek’s hands, that is 1123-24, Bohemond may have first 
been invited to the East as early as 1122. His mother Constance may have been per-
suaded to let him go on this occasion, and perhaps she grew “anxious” to restrain 
him only after this affair. So it might have been the case that Bohemond had original-
ly come for good to the East, but was compelled by his defeat by Ilghazi to return 
home for another four years. In the absence of further evidence this must of course 
remain a speculation, but is nevertheless worth considering. On the other hand, if 
Bohemond had really come to take possession of his inheritance, Fulcher’s failure to 
mention his visit becomes more problematic. 
If it was really Bohemond II against whom the Byzantine emperor sought for 
allies, it is hardly surprising to see that he hit upon Ilghazi as the best candidate for 
this purpose. Indeed this choice shows that Ilghazi’s renown after Ager Sanguinis as 
the foremost adversary of the Franks and the chief defender of Muslim Syria had 
spread as far as the court of Constantinople. The emperor had grown eager as a result 
to rely on the Artukids as a bulwark against his deadly enemies, the Norman House 
of Hauteville.  
Another point revealed by the emperor’s offer of alliance against the Franks 
is that pace Hillenbrand,
83
 Ilghazi’s reputation had not seriously suffered as a result 
of his disastrous defeat in Georgia. Indeed Hillenbrand herself also concedes this fact 
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elsewhere, and attributes it to the relative remotness of Tiflis.
84
 Georgia was indeed 
too far away from Ilghazi’s power base and normal field of operations in Diyar Bakr 
and North Syria to damage his prestige or properties to any considerable degree, 
apart from the heavy losses suffered by the Turkoman troops. But of Turkomans 
there were still more than enough in Diyar Bakr, as revealed by the following cam-
paigns of Ilghazi and Belek at their head. It is to their campaign in 1122 that we shall 
now turn. 
7.6 Ilghazi and Belek’s Syrian campaign in 1122 
The most important loss for Aleppo during Sulaiman’s revolt had been the 
reoccupation of Zardana by the Franks, and the next campaign that Ilghazi undertook 
in summer 1122 was mainly directed towards this target. How much importance he 
gave to this campaign can also be understood from the fact that he brought along an 
additional body of Turkomans as well as his nephew, Belek ibn Behram ibn Artuk, 
who had a lordship in the region of Khanzit with Harput as its center.
85
 Among the 
Muslim sources of this campaign Ibn al-Adim’s account86 is once more the most de-
tailed one, while Al-Azimi
87
 and Ibn al-Qalanisi
88
 provide much briefer accounts that 
corroborate it on the main lines and will be touched upon in their proper places.     
Ibn al-Adim states that Ilghazi crossed the Euphrates on 17 Rabi‘ II (25 June 
1122), after he had summoned Belek from the lands of Rum (Asia Minor) and was 
joined by many Turkomans in addition to those who regularly accompanied him. 
Skipping over the movements of the Muslim army within the following month, he 
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next reports that they laid siege to Zardana on 20 Jumada I (27 July 1122), and cap-
tured the first line of walls within a few days. By this time William, the lord of Zar-
dana and the son of its former lord Robert fitzFulk had already departed to seek aid, 
having heard that Ilghazi had crossed the Euphrates with the intention of descending 
upon his castle.  
Ibn al-Adim relates how William implored the troops of the garrison to stand 
their ground for fifteen days, while he himself would go to bring help. He swore that 
in case he failed to return within this period, and they had to surrender as a result, he 
would redeem their lives with all that he possessed, and reportedly confirmed it with 
an interesting oath: “Be my witnesses before God that if Ilghazi does not set you free 
unless I become Muslim, I shall go convert to Islam in his presence for your release, 
if he accepts it.” The lengths that William was prepared to go in order to persuade his 
troops to stay and defend the castle, until he could bring reinforcements, reveals once 
more the strategic importance of Zardana for the Franks and by implication for 
Ilghazi. Even if we refuse to take Ibn al-Adim’s report of William’s oath at face val-
ue, it at least shows how important the Aleppans thought the castle to be for their en-
emies, which amounts in effect to the same thing.    
Ibn al-Adim proceeds to relate that William went to seek help from King 
Baldwin, who was at Tripoli at this time because of Count Pons’ refusal to pay alle-
giance, and informed him of Ilghazi’s advance accross the Euphrates towards Zarda-
na. As we shall see presently, however, Fulcher of Chartres asserts that it was in fact 
a certain archbishop from the Principality of Antioch who brought the message to the 
king, while Walter the Chancellor reports that upon the news Joscelin immediately 
set out to rescue Zardana with the forces of Antioch and Edessa. So it would be more 
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plausible to agree in accordance with these Latin sources that William went to Anti-
och rather than Tripoli to seek help, setting out with Joscelin back for Zardana, while 
the archbishop was sent south to summon the king from Tripoli. Whoever it was that 
brought the news to the king, Ibn al-Adim asserts that he refused to believe it: “Since 
we have sworn to him and he has sworn to us,” Baldwin reportedly said, “we have 
not violated the truce and have spared his country during his absence. We are both 
mature, respectable men,
89
 and I do not believe that he would act perfidiously.” The 
only possibility he considered was that Ilghazi had targeted Tripoli or Jerusalem, 
since the truce he had made only covered Antioch and its territory.  
This passage has elicited interesting comments from modern scholars. Run-
ciman, for one, remarks: “Baldwin, when the news was brought to him, refused to 
believe it. He had made a treaty with Ilghazi, and he believed that a gentleman –– the 
Arab chronicler says sheikh –– kept his word. But Ilghazi was no gentleman.”90 
Grousset goes still further, using the story to wax rhapsodic over what he saw as the 
superior moral standards of the Frankish nobility vis-à-vis their Muslim counterparts: 
“A passage of capital importance in that it shows to what extent the Frankish nobility 
established in Syria brought its conception of law and honor to bear on the relations 
with Muslim feudality. But Baldwin II was mistaken in attributing sentiments of 
chivalry to the Turkish chief.”91 Both scholars forget of course that two years later 
Baldwin would not hesitate to break the oaths he had sworn to Ilghazi’s son Timur-
tash for his release, and instead of remaining at peace with Aleppo and fighting Du-
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bais, as he had promised, would immediately lay siege to the city together with the 
Arab emir.
92
  
But Baldwin should not be condemned for his act either: faced with the op-
portunity of capturing Aleppo, when there was a weak ruler in the city and a Muslim 
ally by his side, the king, bearing responsibility as the effective leader of the Latin 
East, simply could not have afforded to bow to the demands of what the modern 
scholars call “chivalry” or “gentlemanship.” Ilghazi’s own breach of the truce in this 
case was similarly based on his desire to take advantage of Pons’s insubordination 
and Baldwin’s absence to recover the strategically vital point of Zardana.93 Like 
Baldwin, as the leader and defender of Aleppo and Muslim Syria, he could not have 
afforded to observe his previous agreement under these conditions.  
Indeed another point of significance entirely missed by these scholars is that 
the Muslim chronicler Ibn al-Adim himself does not appear to have been disturbed in 
the least about attributing such a remark to the king. Whatever its authenticity, this 
remark seems to modern readers to represent the Muslim emir Ilghazi as a perfidious 
breaker of truce, and the Christian king in contrast as a noble man of his word aston-
ished at such kind of behavior. However, the author does not appear to have seen an-
ything strange or dishonorable in Ilghazi’s policy. Indeed Ibn al-Adim may even 
have savored telling an anecdote about how Baldwin was naively caught off guard, 
being aware from the king’s later relations with Timurtash that he was equally ready 
to do something similar when the occasion arose. Probably medieval Arab historians 
were much more aware of the political realities of the age and the problems and re-
sponsibilities faced by contemporary rulers than some of their modern counterparts. 
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Whatever the case, this example shows the importance of considering the stance of 
the sources themselves toward the stories they relate. 
Ibn al-Adim proceeds to tell us that although Baldwin was rather incredulous 
about the news of Ilghazi’s attack, he instructed William to return to Apamea and 
Kafartab and investigate the new developments in the north. When the news arrived 
that Ilghazi had indeed attacked Zardana, Baldwin immediately made peace with 
Pons. Cahen takes this report to mean that Pons yielded and agreed to do homage to 
the king at the news of the Turkish assault.
94
 This is indeed quite probable, consider-
ing the greatness of the threat that the Franks felt was posed against them by Ilgha-
zi’s campaigns. We have previously seen this in their heated discussions about 
whether to take along the Holy Cross or not when going to fight the Artukid emir. 
Pons would not have dared to preoccupy the king’s attentions at this critical stage, 
and risk the opprobrium of having enabled Ilghazi to gain ground against Antioch in 
Baldwin’s absence. The only problem here is Fulcher’s testimony that the count had 
already offered his submission to the king by the time they received the news of 
Ilghazi’s attack. But we shall see that Fulcher had his own reasons for representing 
the events the way he did, and in the light of the foregoing considerations, his testi-
mony on this issue cannot be preferred over that of Ibn al-Adim.    
The king summoned Pons as well as Joscelin to his aid, Ibn al-Adim contin-
ues, and proceeding via Antioch made for Dair Sarmada, where he pitched camp on 
the fourteenth day of the Muslim siege. He states that by the time of Baldwin’s arri-
val at Dair Sarmada Ilghazi’s forces had already breached the first line of walls 
around Zardana, having set up four mangonels against it. When Ilghazi heard of the 
Franks’ advance, however, he moved against them and pitched camp at Nawaz. His 
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intention was to lure them out of the narrow valley in which Dair Sarmada was situ-
ated, into the open plain to the east. When they refused to abandon their position, he 
made for Tell al-Sultan, also known as Funaidiq; by this time, Ibn al-Adim notes, he 
had been joined by Tughtekin.  
Although the forces of Damascus took part in the campaign only after this 
point, the Damascene chronicler Ibn al-Qalanisi covers solely the events up to their 
arrival, basically corroborating Ibn al-Adim. But he also adds an interesting report: 
after Ilghazi had crossed the Euphrates and encountered the Franks without engaging 
in battle, the chronicler states, he destroyed whatever he could lay hands on in their 
territories before retreating towards Tell al-Sultan. This is quite plausible, consider-
ing that the region of al-Jazr around al-Atharib and Zardana had been handed over to 
the Franks by this time. Ilghazi may have devastated these lands in an effort to weak-
en the resistance of Zardana still further, as well as to reduce the Franks’ chances of 
finding food and fodder.      
The contemporary Aleppan author Al-Azimi, on the other hand, offers a 
slightly different version of this initial part of Ilghazi’s campaign before his retreat to 
Tell al-Sultan. According to his testimony, Ilghazi did not retire to Tell al-Sultan af-
ter he had marched to Nawaz to confront the Franks who had advanced against him, 
but returned to the siege of Zardana instead, and marched off to Tell al-Sultan only 
after the Franks moved against him for a second time. But the testimonies of Ibn al-
Qalanisi and Fulcher of Chartres tend to support Ibn al-Adim’s assertion that Ilghazi 
poceeded directly to Tell al-Sultan from Nawaz, and Al-Azimi fails to make clear 
where the Franks had advanced in their two moves against Ilghazi before the latter’s 
withdrawal to Tell al-Sultan. In order for his account to be consistent, they must have 
left Dair Sarmada in one of these two moves, and either marched upon Ilghazi while 
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he was before Zardana, or alternatively retreated from Dair Sarmada and then ad-
vanced back there. But both of these possibilities seem quite unlikely: holding their 
position was both necessary and sufficient for the Franks to hinder Ilghazi’s siege 
operations, and in view of their reluctance to join a pitched battle with the Muslim 
forces, it would hardly have been sensible for them to abandon their safe abode to 
march upon Ilghazi.  
Ibn al-Adim goes on to relate that once Ilghazi had retired towards the east, it 
was the turn of the Franks to advance to Nawaz. From here they attacked the lower 
town of the castle of al-Atharib, which was just as coveted a prize for them as Zarda-
na was for Ilghazi. They burnt down the outer line of walls and the collected grain. 
The governor of the town, Yusuf ibn Mir Khan (Yusuf al-Harami according to Al-
Azimi), was compelled to take refuge in the citadel. Ibn al-Adim states that the 
Franks camped after this at a place named Ibbin, and then proceeded to pitch camp at 
Tell Danith. Ibbin remains unidentified, but in any case Al-Azimi gives the Franks’ 
initial camping place as Zardana instead, which seems much more plausible: here 
they would have replenished its provisions and reinforced its garrison, and perhaps 
also aided in the repair of its walls. The march of the Franks southwards from Dair 
Sarmada to Tell Danith is also significant: they were following a route approximately 
parallel to that of Ilghazi, probably with the aim of keeping his movements under 
control and being ready to resist in case he attempted to strike west and enter the ter-
ritory of Antioch. Indeed Tell Danith was exactly the same location that Baldwin had 
chosen to survey Ilghazi’s movements in the campaigns of 1119 and 1120. But no-
body approached the Franks here, and they returned to Antioch in the belief that 
Ilghazi’s campaign was at an end, that they had succesfully repulsed his attack 
against Zardana.     
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The Franks were quite mistaken however, since almost the same course of 
events was repeated after this point, as Ibn al-Adim and Al-Azimi testify in parallel. 
When the Franks had departed Ilghazi returned to the siege of Zardana and attacked 
its second line of walls this time, killing a number of its garrison. Upon this the 
Franks also returned to their former position below Dair Sarmada. Ilghazi advanced 
to Nawaz again and camped there for three days, in order to provoke the Franks to 
leave the valley and join battle, but once again they refused to emerge from their safe 
position to engage him. Their intention was clearly not to deliver a pitched battle, 
which could prove disastrous for them as it had for Roger and his forces, but simply 
to prevent Ilghazi from conducting his siege of Zardana. In this they were successful. 
Ilghazi was taken ill upon consuming mixed food of excessive quantity, and had to 
set out for Aleppo as his sickness kept worsening. Tugtekin and Belek set out as well 
to return to their lands. Belek was shortly to capture Joscelin and his cousin Galeran 
on his way home, as we shall see in the eighth chapter. As for Ilghazi, although he 
arrived at Aleppo and took up quarters in the citadel to receive treatment, he was not 
entirely cured of his ailment, which was to prove fatal.  
Ilghazi’s bed-ridden state did not prevent him from sending forth a detach-
ment to carry out a plundering raid against Azaz. Ibn al-Adim reports that a thousand 
horsemen with a number of emirs marched to Tubbal, in the territory of Azaz, to 
plunder and gather booty. On their way back, however, they were attacked and rout-
ed by William of Zardana and forty knights, losing a number of their companions in 
the process. The reason why Ilghazi had dispatched this force against Azaz was per-
haps his intention to direct at least some of the following attacks on the north, after 
he had become aware of the difficulties of besieging and capturing Zardana with the 
Frankish army safely positioned to his rear at Dair Sarmada. As Asbridge observes, a 
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kind of stalemate had been reached in the region because of the new line of defence 
between Dair Sarmada and Zardana, with neither side being able to attack al-Atharib 
or Zardana with impunity. Shifting some of his pressure northwards against Azaz, 
already targeted in the campaign of 1120, may have appeared to Ilghazi as an apt 
way to break the stalemate.
95
 Although he was going to be prevented by death from 
continuing this strategy, it was to be successfully taken up and developed by his 
nephew Belek.  
However, this does not necessarily mean that Ilghazi had given up his inten-
tion of capturing Zardana, as Asbridge seems to imply. We shall see Walter the 
Chancellor relate how he declared his intention to return to its siege with an even 
larger army of Turkomans and Arabs. This is understandable given the direct threat 
posed by that castle to the security of Aleppo, which was revealed once more by the 
attack of its lord on the raiders of Azaz.    
 
The only indigenous Christian source to mention Ilghazi’s campaign in 1122 
is Matthew of Edessa,
96
 who provides the least detailed and reliable account among 
those considered so far. He states erroneously that Ilghazi camped at Shaizar, rather 
than at Zardana, and proceeds to relate that the Franks under Baldwin and Joscelin 
(with no mention of Pons) marched forth upon this to pitch camp opposite the Turk-
ish forces. Without any engagement the two sides preserved their respective posi-
tions for the rest of the summer, and then returned home.    
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Among the two Latin accounts of the campaign, those of Fulcher of Char-
tres
97
 and Walter the Chancellor,
98
 Fulcher’s account is the more detailed one and 
corroborates the Muslim accounts on their main lines. But Fulcher also diverges from 
the Muslim sources on certain points, as we have seen to some extent. Thus accord-
ing to his version of the events, Pons had already offered his submission to the king 
and had been reconciled to him through the mediation of certain nobles, when a mes-
senger arrived: this was an archbishop sent by the people of Antioch, bringing an ur-
gent summons of aid against the Turks: these latter had begun devastating the lands 
of the Principality without any Christian leader to resist them.  
What is noteworthy here is that Fulcher does not present the reconciliation of 
the king and the count as the result of the urgent need to join forces against Ilghazi, 
and so take advantage of this opportunity to stress the necessity of uniting against the 
“infidel.” Instead, he prefers to assert that they had already made peace by the time 
they received the news of Ilghazi’s campaign. It has been shown before that Pons 
probably yielded only on the news of Ilghazi’s attack on Zardana, so we must inquire 
the reason why Fulcher might have preferred to represent the matter otherwise. Pos-
sibly, his concern to emphasize the leadership of the king at the expense of other Lat-
in princes had again prevailed in this case: revealing that Pons had agreed to submit 
only in the face of a Muslim attack and then helped Baldwin against it was some-
thing that could have detracted doubly from the particular image of the king that Ful-
cher liked to present. So apparently he preferred to show Baldwin single-handedly 
suppressing the insubordination of Tripoli, and then as the indisputed leader defying 
the Muslim incursion.  
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Fulcher does not seem well informed about the exact details of what hap-
pened in the north, including the Franks’ camping at Dair Sarmada and Ilghazi’s ad-
vance to Nawaz to provoke them into battle. He simply reports that the king arrived 
with three hundred picked knights and four hundred footmen at the place where the 
Turks had gathered to besiege Zardana, upon which the latter betook themselves 
away, not wishing to encounter him. Without mentioning the Franks’ attack on al-
Atharib and descent south to Danith before dispersing home, he states that Baldwin 
returned to Antioch upon the withdrawal of the Turks. His relation of the latter part 
of the campaign is similar, without any mention of Ilghazi’s second advance to Na-
waz to allure the Franks away from Dair Sarmada where they had camped again. He 
simply reports instead that the emir departed upon the advance of the king.  
Apparently unaware of Ilghazi’s illness, Fulcher interestingly tries to explain 
the disbanding of the Muslim troops by reference to his general knowledge about 
their battle tactics, particularly the feigned flight. He relates that the king rode against 
the Turks when they returned to the project of capturing Zardana, but 
these people, who are truly Parthian in battle tactics and equipment and char-
acteristically never remain long in any one place (more quickly than can be 
imagined they turn now their faces and now their backs to those opposing 
them, fleeing unexpectedly in pretense,99 and then quickly returning to attack 
again), did not prepare themselves to fight in a fixed position, but entirely 
avoided an encounter and fled as if they had been defeated.100 
Of course the chronicler fails to take into consideration that the Turkomans did not 
return to fight in this case, but retreated for good.
101
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Fulcher dedicates the rest of his account to a prayer of thanks to the Holy 
Cross for having ensured the safety of the Frankish troops, who he asserts were much 
less numerous than the Turks, only twelve hundred horsemen against their ten thou-
sand. He also relates how the Cross was brought back to Jerusalem, where it was re-
ceived in joy and honourably deposited in its place. But he notes that Baldwin him-
self, with the major part of his army, stopped at Tripoli and turned back to Antioch 
because of an issue that arose there. The issue in question may have been related to 
Ilghazi’s illness, which seemed to offer a good opportunity for retaliation.    
 
Walter the Chancellor telescopes the events still more than Fulcher, collaps-
ing the two parts of the campaign into one. He begins by reporting that Ilghazi re-
turned to besiege Zardana in the month of July, after having gathered as many horse 
and footmen as possible. He reveals that by the time Baldwin advanced to Dair Sar-
mada against the emir, Joscelin had already come there with the forces of Edessa and 
Antioch; he had done so on the patriarch’s advice. According to Walter Joscelin’s 
intention in this move was to raise the siege of Zardana by battle, but this cannot be 
accepted, as we have seen Ibn al-Adim and Al-Azimi testify that the Franks insistent-
ly refused to join battle with Ilghazi despite his two attempts to provoke them. They 
were certainly aware that simply holding their position at Dair Sarmada was suffi-
cient to interrupt the siege, without their having to attack the Muslim forces.    
  Walter proceeds to relate that the king arrived after Joscelin at Dair Sarma-
da, where skirmishing Turkish soldiers came to spy on his tents. Without mentioning 
Ilghazi’s advance to Nawaz and the subsequent developments, he asserts that “the 
enemy’s boldness was subdued by fear” on seeing the Christian forces, and breaking 
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camp at night, they abandoned their efforts to damage Zardana. Ilghazi himself was 
afflicted with some kind of paralytic illness and returned to Aleppo.  
The most interesting part of Walter’s account is its conclusion, where the au-
thor reveals that Ilghazi was determined despite his illness to recover Zardana. 
“Since Ilghazi did not want the castle to be given up,”102 the author asserts, “he pre-
tended he was about to go, and that he would soon bring there a very great horde 
both of Arabs and of Parthians.” However, Walter’s own explanation for Ilghazi’s 
insistence on capturing Zardana is not based on the strategical importance of this 
frontier castle. It is expressed instead in terms of religious confrontation: “Because a 
man of his religion was ardently intent on the destruction of the Christians.” 
 
William of Tyre seems to echo this remark of Walter when, introducing his 
own account,
 103
 he states: “Ilghazi was a determined and unwearied persecutor of the 
Christian faith and name. Like a gnawing worm he was ever seeking whom he might 
injure.” Dating the campaign wrongly to 1121, and telescoping the events even more 
than Walter, he relates that Ilghazi took advantage of the king’s absence to besiege 
some of the Franksh castles. “Always ready to respond,” Baldwin set out upon the 
urgent call for help that reached him and, taking along Joscelin as well as the chief 
men of Antioch, marched in haste against the strong fortress under siege. The Franks 
had expected to join battle immediately upon reaching their destination, William 
notes, but it turned out that “the hand of God had touched Ilghazi with apoplexy.” 
This necessitated the leaders of his army to decline engagement and return to Aleppo 
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with their nearly lifeless lord, who was soon to “breath forth his wretched spirit” and 
“doomed to suffer the eternal fires.”      
 
According to these considerations, the events seem to have developed as fol-
lows: Ilghazi was determined to recover the castle of Zardana, which had brought the 
Antiochene border once again dangerously close to Aleppo, having been refortified 
and reoccupied by the Franks in the previous year. Assembling a great army, there-
fore, he crossed the Euphrates with his nephew Belek and laid siege to Zardana. He 
was also able to take advantage of the absence of King Baldwin, who was busy at the 
time with the insubordination of Pons, the count of Tripoli. In the meantime William 
fitzFulk, the lord of Zardana, had hurried to Antioch to ask for aid. Joscelin, who was 
there at the time, proceeded with the armies of Antioch and Edessa to Dair Sarmada; 
Baldwin also set out from Tripoli, after he had managed to obtain the submission of 
Pons owing to the danger at hand. Together the two princes arrived at Dair Sarmada 
to join Joscelin. By this time it was the fourteenth day of the Muslim siege of Zarda-
na.  
Ilghazi was prevented by the Franks’ arrival from attacking the second line of 
walls, after he had breached the first. So he tried to provoke them into a pitched bat-
tle by advancing to Nawaz. This town was situated in the plain to the east of the val-
ley around Dair Sarmada, where the Franks were encamped. But since the latter had 
nothing to gain and all to lose by battle, and just keeping their position was more 
than enough to hinder Ilghazi’s siege by threatening his rear, they refused to engage. 
Upon this the emir devastated the lands around al-Atharib and Zardana, in an effort 
to weaken the defences of the latter castle as well as to reduce the Franks’ chances of 
finding food and fodder.  
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Ilghazi then withdrew towards Tell al-Sultan to the south of Aleppo, so that 
the enemy would disperse home in the belief that he had given up his efforts to cap-
ture Zardana; he would then be able to return to the siege. Indeed during the cam-
paign of 1120 he had attempted a similar maneuver to capture Azaz, though he had 
been foiled in that case by the disbanding of his Turkomans. Nevertheless, the emir 
was more succesful this time: upon his departure the Franks advanced to Nawaz and 
made a retaliatory attack on al-Atharib. From here they proceeded to Zardana to re-
plenish its provisions and reinforce its garrison. Then they descended south to Tell 
Danith, on a route approximately parallel to that of Ilghazi, so that they could keep 
his movements under surveillance. Finally, they believed that the emir’s campaign 
was at an end and returned home as he had expected.  
The same course of events was repeated after this point: Ilghazi came to be-
siege Zardana once again, the Franks returned to their position by Dair Sarmada to 
prevent him from taking the second line of walls as well, Ilghazi advanced for a sec-
ond time to Nawaz to provoke them into battle, and they again refused to budge. Per-
haps everything would have been repeated for a third time if the emir had not been 
taken ill at this point and compelled to return to Aleppo for treatment.  
Ilghazi’s experiences in this campaign had clearly shown him the difficulties 
involved in capturing Zardana with a Frankish army positioned to his rear at Dair 
Sarmada. Accordingly, he gave signs of shifting at least some of his pressure to the 
northern end of the Antiochene border, against Azaz, dispatching a force to raid its 
territory. This was a resumption of his strategy in the campaign of 1120, which was 
shortly to be taken up and developed by his successor Belek. Nevertheless, Ilghazi 
did not entirely give up his project of recapturing Zardana either, as he expressed his 
intention to return to its siege with a still greater army. Indeed the lord of this castle 
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ambushed and defeated the raiding party he had sent against Azaz, revealing once 
again the persistent threat it posed to the security of Aleppo. But Ilghazi’s death at 
this point prevented him from recovering either Zardana or Azaz. The next section 
will examine the adverse developments that followed the emir’s demise, showing 
how important his protection had been for Aleppo.  
7.7 Ilghazi’s death and the subsequent Frankish raids against Aleppo 
According to Ibn al-Adim’s report, Ilghazi seemed to recover a little in Alep-
po and so went to Mardin. From here he set out for Mayyafariqin, but died on the 
way, at a village near that town, when his illness was aggravated (1 Ramadan 516 – 2 
November 1122).
104
 The news of his death seems to have occasioned great relief 
among his Latin adversaries in Syria. Walter the Chancellor celebrates it in no uncer-
tain terms, and apparently he had little doubt about where the emir was to end up in 
afterlife: 
It happened that on his litter, on which he was carried about on account of his 
rank and his infirmity, his filthy soul issued forth from his anus along with a 
flux of dung from his belly, and it was dragged away by the claws of infernal 
scorpions to tumble into the halls of deepest hell, which are full of dreadful 
fires burning without end, blazing and inextinguishable…105     
For the people of Aleppo, on the other hand, Ilghazi’s death was an agonizing 
experience as the local chronicler Ibn abi Tayyi (cited by Ibn al-Furat) testifies: 
“They closed their doors and were convinced that one disaster would follow another 
upon them, since Ilghazi had put an end to the claims of the Franks on Aleppo and 
curbed their desires for it.”106 The Aleppans were entirely justified in these apprehen-
sions, as Ilghazi’s death had broken the precious link between Aleppo and the Turk-
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omans of Diyar Bakr, the sole guarantee of the city’s security. His possessions were 
divided after his death, with Mayyafariqin going to his son Shams al-Dawla Sulaim-
an and Mardin to his other son Timurtash, while his nephew Badr al-Dawla Sulaiman 
took over Aleppo, where he had been appointed governor the previous year. With 
this new division of the Artukid realm (following the one between the branches of 
Hisn Kaifa and Mardin in 1108), there was left no single authority who could deploy 
the Turkomans of Diyar Bakr to defend Aleppo against Frankish encroachments or to 
carry out counter-attacks against Antioch.  
Indeed already by the end of Ilghazi’s last campaign a great number of Turk-
omans had returned under Belek to the Jazira, and their withdrawal from Syria sped 
up after Ilghazi’s death. As a result, Badr al-Dawla Sulaiman was left bereft of troops 
in Aleppo. Ibn al-Adim reveals that the Franks were not late in taking advantage of 
the helpless situation in which Sulaiman found himself.
107
 Since the Turkoman base 
of Diyar Bakr was controlled by other Artukids, he had to make do with defending 
only the immediate surroundings of Aleppo. As a result, the city was reduced to al-
most the same state in which it had been before Ilghazi’s takeover, a prey to Frankish 
raids proliferating everywhere.
108
 
As the first of these opportunistic raids made upon Ilghazi’s death, Ibn al-
Adim reports an attack on Tell Qubbasin; this was undertaken in October by a group 
of Franks from Tell Bashir. The Muslim garrison of the town was defeated and lost 
ninety men. It is not clear whether it was King Baldwin or only the Franks of the 
County of Edessa –– whose lord Joscelin had just been captured by Belek at Saruj, as 
we shall see in the next chapter –– who made this raid. Nicholson argues that it must 
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have been the king, pointing out the commanding role he played in Antioch and 
Edessa, as well as the absence of the lords of these two principalities. However, 
Grousset opts for the second alternative,
109
 and indeed this seems to have been an 
extemporized attack that the Franks of Tell Bashir made to avenge the capture of 
their count. 
In any case Baldwin himself took to the field before long, and collecting his 
army as well as a number of Armenian troops, carried out a devastating attack 
against the valley of Butnan to the northeast of Aleppo. He exacted the submission of 
the town of al-Bab in this valley, which agreed to pay tribute. Ibn al-Adim reports 
that the king then made for Balis and laid siege to it, beating the walls with mango-
nels, but was less successful there: as the price of peace he demanded an exorbitant 
sum from its lord, Salim ibn Malik, and in response the garrison of the town made a 
sortie with the support of a group of Turkomans and Aleppan horsemen who hap-
pened to be there at the time. Together they inflicted a sound defeat on Baldwin, kill-
ing a number of Frankish notables as well. After this, Ibn al-Adim relates, Baldwin 
returned to the valley of Butnan, although Badr al-Dawla Sulaiman had also ad-
vanced there. He then made for al-Bira and took it by capitulation, bringing its garri-
son under safe conduct to Antioch. This was by no means the last of the Frankish 
raids against the territory of Aleppo, which continued until the end of 1122 according 
to Ibn al-Adim. The Franksh encirclement was once more tightening its grip upon the 
city, blocking all the caravan routes to its east and northeast, and almost reducing it 
to famine.
110
  
Under this intense pressure Badr al-Dawla Sulaiman finally yielded, and to 
buy peace consented to cede the prize that Baldwin had been seeking for so long, 
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“the stake of all these battles” in Grousset’s words,111 al-Atharib. In contrast to 
Ilghazi’s previous cession of this castle in the truce of 1120, the new agreement made 
on 9 April 1123 did not remain on paper, and the town was duly surrendered to the 
Franks. They turned it over to its former lord Alan, who was to hold it for the rest of 
his life, while its former Muslim governor was compensated by Sulaiman with the 
post of the shihna of Aleppo. Thus the last of Ilghazi’s precious gains from the cam-
paign of 1119 was lost by the sixth month after his death, and Aleppo reverted to the 
extremely precarious situation in which it had found itself by the end of 1118.  
In addition to the division of the Artukid realm, this was also due without 
doubt to the skills of the Frankish king who had succeeded in restoring the bounda-
ries of Antioch back to their greatest extent. Thereby he had also become ready for a 
direct attack upon Aleppo, as Roger had once been. In contrast to his rash predeces-
sor, Baldwin did manage to realize this long-prepared assault, as we shall see in the 
ninth chapter. In the same connection Cahen and Grousset draw attention to the pa-
tience and prudence of the king, who had attained this remarkable achievement “with 
a minimum of pitched battles, through a series of strategic marches and unrelenting 
application of economic blockade, and by profiting with remarkable perspicacity 
from the political divisions of the enemy.” 112  
The fact that Baldwin could accomplish this in the absence of the lords of 
Antioch and (after Joscelin’s capture) Edessa is all the more notable; no doubt, it was 
rendered possible by the peace and order prevailing in the Kingdom of Jerusalem. In 
this connection Grousset points out the stability and continuity of the monarchical 
institutions that the Franks had imported from Capetian France. This put them at an 
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advantage vis-à-vis the Turkish principalities, which fragmented according to chance 
partitions of inheritance and revolts within the ruling families.
113
 The minority of 
Bohemond II was also helpful in this regard. The resulting ability of the king to defy 
and defeat the Artukids single-handedly, in turn, enabled the Kingdom of Jerusalem 
to become the de facto head and leader of the outremer, although it had been estab-
lished only after the principalities of Antioch and Edessa, and originally possessed no 
rights of suzerainty over them.
114
 
7.8 A final assessment of Ilghazi’s policies toward the Franks: jihad in a con-
text of shifting alliances and enmities 
Ilghazi’s relations with the Franks have been assessed in contradictory ways 
by scholars. Thus in a section entitled “Ilghazi, the leader of the Holy War,” in his 
monograph on Nur al-Din Mahmud, the French scholar Nikita Elisséeff states: 
“While the [Seljukid] sultan and the atabek of Mosul were disinterested in Holy War, 
an emir took it over and by himself, with his Turkoman troops, pursued the jihad  
against the Franks: Ilghazi of Mardin.”115 Similarly, Imad al-Din Khalil, in his doc-
toral dissertation on the Artukids, calls Ilghazi “a powerful leader, far-sighted in 
military matters, who was able by dint of his personal abilities and the great number 
of the Turkomans he commanded, to lead the movement of jihad  for five years.”116 
On the other hand Carole Hillenbrand, another scholar with a doctoral dissertation on 
this house, seems to put forward a quite different perspective when she remarks: 
“Ilghazi’s relations with the Franks were characterized by flexibility and pragma-
tism… Since the Franks were a significant power group in Northern Syria, Ilghazi 
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inevitably came into conflict with them on occasions, sometimes emerging trium-
phant, sometimes not.” She proceeds to point out that this policy of his also entailed 
collaborating with them against other Muslim powers when his territories were at 
stake.
117
  
In the light of these apparently contrasting approaches, this section seeks to 
understand Ilghazi’s policies in his dealings with the Franks, and addresses the ques-
tion whether it is possible to assert that he pursued “jihad ” against the Franks, or at 
least believed that he was doing so, when all that he did was to act in accordance 
with his own strategic needs and interests, and in conformity with the system of shift-
ing alliances and enmities that prevailed in the fragmented political geography of 
early twelfth-century Syria. It is argued here that it is indeed possible to do this, pro-
vided that we focus on what jihad  may have meant for Ilghazi and his contemporar-
ies, and begin by questioning whether it was for them necessarily a “Counter-
Crusade,” a Holy War involving the subordination of their self-interests in an all-out 
onslaught against the invading “infidel.” 
Yet another distinguished historian interested in Ilghazi’s position within the 
development of the jihad  movement, Emmanuel Sivan, regards him as one of the 
first Muslim leaders who took an interest in the idea of jihad  when he was confront-
ed with Frankish aggression and used it for purposes such as keeping up the morale 
of his troops, consolidating his position as the ruler of Aleppo, and bolstering his 
prestige.
118
 Hillenbrand largely disagrees with this view, pointing out that Ilghazi 
used jihad  propaganda only once, to motivate his troops before his victory at the 
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Battle of Ager Sanguinis. She accepts, along with Sivan, that it worked very well in 
that case, causing the Turkomans to “fight like lions” and enhancing Ilghazi’s own 
reputation. Nevertheless, she contends that Ilghazi, lacking vision and being unaware 
of the “political realities,” failed to build upon this achievement, and consequently 
wasted the rest of his career with minor military operations as well as foolhardy ad-
ventures like his campaign in Georgia.
119
 In the same connection she attributes Ilgha-
zi’s failure to attack Antioch after his victory at Ager Sanguinis to his lack of an 
“overall strategy,” a “master plan,” in contrast to Zangi or Nur al-Din.120  
These are all debatable points however. To begin with, even on the single oc-
casion before Ager Sanguinis, it is not certain either that Ilghazi had recourse to jihad  
propaganda on his own initiative, or it that it really had any effect on his Turkoman 
troops. It was probably upon the suggestion of Ibn al-Khashshab, the leader of the 
pietist pro-jihad circles in Aleppo, that Ilghazi used the theme of jihad during his 
preparations for the campaign.
121
 While collecting Turkoman troops in Diyar Bakr he 
urged them to “carry out the obligation of Holy War” and to “destroy the factions of 
infidelity and error,”122 and then made his emirs and officers swear to “sacrifice their 
lives in jihad”123 –– assuming that these are not the words of Muslim chroniclers who 
grafted their own rhetoric on to arguments of quite another kind actually used, like 
promises of payment and booty. Finally, just before the battle of Ager Sanguinis, Ibn 
al-Khashshab delivered an exhortatory speech on jihad to Ilghazi’s army. Since 
Ilghazi does not seem to have resorted to similar measures in the campaigns that fol-
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lowed, he may have given only indifferent assent to these proposals, without any per-
sonal belief in their efficacy, and rather with the aim of securing the loyalty of the 
pro-jihad circles in Aleppo, headed by Ibn al-Khashshab, to consolidate his position 
as the new ruler of the city. 
Indeed, the assumption of Sivan and Hillenbrand that the jihad propaganda of 
this scholar before the battle had a tangible effect on the fighting fervor and capabili-
ties of the Turkomans, and thus helped Ilghazi to win the day,
124
 is based on the ra-
ther implausible report of a single Arab chronicler, Ibn al-Adim.
125
 It could be ques-
tioned whether the Turkomans could understand an oration delivered in flowery Ara-
bic, or alternatively that Ibn al-Khashshab could wax eloquent in Turkish, in either 
case to a degree sufficient to bring tears to their eyes after they had mocked “this tur-
baned fellow,” as they called him.126 It could also be questioned whether the eventual 
success of the Turkomans was due to the inflaming effect of Ibn al-Khashshab’s 
speech and not simply to their appetite for booty, as evident in their eagerness to en-
gage the enemy before Tughtekin’s troops would come to share in the spoils, or 
again to the extremely disadvantageous position of the Antiochene army.
127
 Ibn al-
Adim notes that during the Frankish siege of Aleppo in 1124 Ibn al-Khashshab made 
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a similar speech to the troops of Aksungur al-Bursuki, and, like Ilghazi, this ruler too 
did not deploy jihad propaganda in his later campaigns.
128
  
It seems more likely therefore that Ilghazi’s “failure” to have recourse to ji-
had propaganda to motivate his troops in his later campaigns was due to his aware-
ness of its negligible efficacy on their fighting spirit. For the same reason, Hillen-
brand’s suggestion that Ilghazi’s resort to jihad propaganda was due to his flagging 
hold over the Turkomans does not seem plausible.
129
 If Ilghazi had resorted to jihad 
propaganda because of the failing loyalty of his troops, he would have been expected 
to continue using it because of his increasing practical need to assert his authority –– 
which was clearly not the case. 
Hillenbrand’s argument that Ilghazi, lacking political vision, wasted the rest 
of his career in minor-scale operations is not convincing either. As Thomas Asbridge 
has demonstrated, Ilghazi’s main purpose in these operations was to push the border 
between Aleppo and Antioch beyond Jabal Talat, and thereby to re-establish the se-
curity of Aleppo. He had a precise and clear strategy in this respect. His “failure” to 
attempt an attack on Antioch after the Battle of Ager Sanguinis also seems to have 
been the product of a well thought-out decision. As is also shown by his hurry to re-
lease the Byzantine envoy to Antioch among the captives,
130
 Ilghazi may have been 
afraid of antagonizing the Byzantines and of removing what had been the chief bone 
of contention between them and the Franks. Such a mistake could have endangered 
Muslim Syria much more seriously than solely the presence of Latins in Antioch. 
Other important factors like the lack of time, the strong resistance he would have to 
face when establishing control over the city and principality, the impregnability of 
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the citadel, and the news that Frankish reinforcements led by the king were on the 
way, may also have contributed to Ilghazi’s decision to refrain from attacking Anti-
och.
131
  
In conformity with such considerations, Ilghazi did not attempt any later at-
tacks on Antioch either. Indeed Hillenbrand states that he had planned such an attack 
in a campaign in 1120, but was prevented from realizing it by the desertion of his 
Turkomans when he forbade them to scatter in search of plunder.
132
 As we saw, 
however, this campaign was in fact primarily directed at the important castle of 
Azaz, north of Aleppo, and Ilghazi’s goal in marching towards Antioch was merely 
to raid its territory in retaliation against the Frankish army which had forced him to 
raise the siege. Another instance Hillenbrand cites for a plan of Ilghazi’s to attack 
Antioch was when, on his way to Georgia, he reportedly agreed to the proposal of his 
ally Dubais ibn Sadaqa that the latter would help him to capture Antioch and receive 
Aleppo in turn. But already on the way home he had given up this idea, perhaps be-
cause it exceeded the bounds of his defensive strategy as lord of Aleppo, and possi-
bly also because of his heavy loss of troops in the defeat in Georgia.
133
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We have seen up to this point that Ilghazi pursued certain limited and well-
defined goals both when he made campaigns to protect the borders of Aleppo, and 
when he avoided attacking the city of Antioch. We observe the same kind of practi-
cal, strategically oriented way of thinking in his previous dealings with the Seljukids 
of Persia and his subsequent consent to taking over Aleppo. As long as the Seljukids 
tried to reestablish their control over the Jazīra and Syria by launching one expedi-
tion after another to the west, Ilghazi either remained in a passive role, merely dis-
patching a small contingent, or actively collaborated with the Franks against them 
like the atabek of Damascus and the former rulers of Aleppo. Of course through this 
policy he contributed to the entrenchment of the Frankish occupation of North Syr-
ia,
134
 but this was a price that had to be paid if he wanted to consolidate his own posi-
tion in the Jazira. Yet, the cessation of Seljukid expeditions after the debacle of the 
last one in 1115 meant that the local emirs including Ilghazi found themselves de-
prived of external support against the Franks, who proceeded to take advantage of 
this situation by gradually encircling Aleppo.  
Hillenbrand considers Ilghazi’s consent to undertake the rule and defense of 
Aleppo in these circumstances as a serious blunder, not much different from his 
foolhardy acceptance of the summons of help against the Georgians.
135
 Nevertheless, 
it was probably not merely out of rash eagerness that Ilghazi agreed to take over 
Aleppo, as is also demonstrated by his hesitant attitude in doing so. Stemming from 
the impoverished state of the city and the consequent difficulty of defending it 
against the Franks, this hesitation even went so far as to make him offer the rule of 
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Aleppo to Tughtekin, his father-in-law.
136
 Neither the atabek of Damascus nor any 
other local emir in the region was in a position to undertake the task however, while 
Ilghazi could use the economic resources and Turkomans of Diyar Bakr for the pur-
pose. In this situation he had hardly any other option than to take over Aleppo, for its 
capture by the Franks might have tilted the power balance of the region in such a 
way as to enable them to threaten his interests even in Diyar Bakr. Once Ilghazi thus 
came to rule Aleppo he did not go beyond what was strictly necessary to avert this 
danger, and only tried to restore its former boundaries with the Principality of Anti-
och. 
 Thus Ilghazi’s policies against the Franks were in strict conformity with his 
strategic needs and interests, and followed restricted goals of practical relevance. Ex-
cept for the Battle of Ager Sanguinis he did not have recourse to jihad propaganda to 
motivate his troops, and in that case he seems to have complied with the wishes of 
Ibn al-Khashshab. But in contrast to Hillenbrand’s contention this does not necessari-
ly mean that Ilghazi’s “failure” to launch a full scale jihad campaign, complete with 
its propaganda and targeting the city of Antioch, resulted from his habit of following 
a short-sighted, opportunistic realpolitik and his concomitant lack of awareness about 
the larger-scale political realities. On the contrary, he seems to have been quite aware 
of these realities, and followed policies in conformity with them. Precisely speaking, 
he was aware that allowing the Franks to take Aleppo could have dangerous conse-
quences for his hold on Diyar Bakr, but he was also aware that capturing Antioch 
could lead to the formation of a common Byzantine-Frankish front against him. As 
Gerhard Väth indicates, he was hardly in a position as a local emir to hold both Syri-
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an cities against the fierce resistance he was sure to meet, and taking Antioch only to 
hand it over gratuitously to another emir in the name of Islam was a thought that 
would not have entered even Nur al-Din’s or Saladin’s mind. 137  
Indeed Hillenbrand seems to look from a teleological perspective backwards 
from the fall of Edessa and Jerusalem when she attributes Ilghazi’s “failure” to attack 
Antioch after Ager Sanguinis to his lack of a “master plan” of the sort she attributes 
to later leaders like Zangi, Nur al-Din and Saladin. What she means by “master 
plan,” in this context seems to be a long-term strategy for a “Counter-Crusade” to 
surround and expel the Franks from the East, based on an “awareness” that the 
Franks were different from other factions struggling for hegemony in the region.
138
 
She gives us to understand that this could well have started with the capture of Anti-
och in Ilghazi’s case if he had he possessed such an awareness.  
However, the fact of the matter is that although compared favorably with 
Ilghazi in this regard, neither Zangi nor Nur al-Din nor Saladin betrayed any similar 
awareness in their actions, as distinct from  propaganda (in the case of Nur al-Din  
Saladin), and nor did they owe the capture of Edessa and Jerusalem to a sustained 
and systematic campaign of “Counter-Crusade.” Zangi advanced upon Edessa and 
took it in extemporized fashion when, on a campaign against the Artuqid lord of Hisn 
Kaifa, he learned that the Count of Edessa had left his city to help him.
139
 Otherwise 
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he spent the major part of his career trying to annex Muslim principalities and partic-
ularly those of the Artukids in Diyar Bakr.
140
 Zangi’s son and successor, Nur al-Din, 
differed little from him in this regard: he dedicated a considerable part of his career 
to fighting Muslims with the aim of territorial aggrandizement, and otherwise rarely 
went beyond what was strictly necessary to protect his borders against the Franks, as 
well as to prevent them from seizing Egypt. When he was urged to conquer a de-
fenseless and prostrate Antioch after his victory at the Battle of Harim in 1164, he 
refused flatly, pointing out the difficulty of capturing the citadel and the danger of 
seeing the city delivered to the Byzantines. He contented himself instead with dis-
patching raiding parties into the territory of Antioch.
141
 To all appearances, his atti-
tude in this respect was little different from that of Ilghazi after the Battle of Ager 
Sanguinis.  
As for Saladin, he was compelled to undertake the campaign that eventually 
resulted in the fall of Jerusalem only when he faced the danger that his jihad  propa-
ganda would lose all its plausibility in Muslim public opinion. For he had spent only 
thirteen months fighting the Franks as against thirty-three fighting Muslims, and kept 
postponing the ambitious large-scale expedition against the Kingdom of Jerusalem 
that he had promised to launch after pacifying the “collaborationist” Muslim emirs 
behind his back.
142
 When he finally launched this expedition, it was by a scarcely to 
be expected stroke of luck that he was able to capture Jerusalem, for owing to the 
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erroneous strategy of the Frankish king, he found the opportunity to catch the Frank-
ish army in an extremely disadvantageous position and annihilate it. Under normal 
conditions, in contrast, both armies would have kept facing each other for a couple of 
months and then dispersed, as on so many occasions before.
143
 It was even stated by 
Al-Qadi al-Fadil, a scholar from Saladin’s close retinue, that his decision to leave the 
Muslims alone and launch this attack against the Franks was only the result of a vow 
that the qādī had exacted from him in the previous year, during a heavy illness.144 
The sustained warfare of Saladin and Nur al-Din against fellow-Muslims is indeed of 
significance in a comparative perspective with Ilghazi’s time, as we shall see at the 
end. 
When the case stood like this even for Zangi, Nur al-Din and Saladin, Ilghazi 
had absolutely no reason to launch a fully-fledged “Counter-Crusade” to expel the 
Franks from Antioch or elsewhere, trying as he was to survive in the extremely 
fragmented political geography of the region. Indeed he had been collaborating with 
the Franks against the Seljukids until only a few years earlier, and he must have 
known that if the Seljukids resumed their efforts to bring him to heel, he would need 
to do so again. What chiefly concerned Ilghazi was thus not a struggle with the 
Franks per se, but rather a perilous dance in a context of shifting alliances and enmi-
ties where he was surrounded by all kinds of rivals and threats. His policy was to 
prevent the remote dependency of Aleppo from being captured by the Franks without 
spending too much energy and resources on it, and in the meanwhile to preserve and 
expand his territories as best as he could. He indulged besides in occasional adven-
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tures that promised both prestige and booty, as in the case of the campaign to Geor-
gia. He was little different from other local emirs of his age in this respect.  
If this was so, is it possible to conclude with scholars like Sivan, Hillenbrand 
and Asbridge
145
 that Ilghazi was not really concerned with jihad  except perhaps for 
practical, provisional purposes, like the consolidation of his position in Aleppo or the 
motivation of his troops? Not necessarily. Although Ilghazi quickly abandoned the 
use of jihad  propaganda to motivate his troops, probably because of its apparent use-
lessness, there is evidence suggesting that he may still have regarded and represented 
himself as a mujahid,
146
 or at least responded positively to being seen and shown in 
this guise by his contemporaries. This is revealed by the letters he sent to the sultan 
and the caliph to report his victory at Ager Sanguinis and the honorary robes he re-
ceived from the latter in thanks for his attacks on the Franks; by the eulogizing po-
ems of jihad  composed in Aleppo to celebrate the same victory; by his acceptance of 
the summons of aid against the Christians of Georgia; and finally by his positive re-
sponse to the Byzantine emperor’s choice of himself as an ally against the Crusader 
force coming from Europe. These last two reactions of Ilghazi also demonstrate his 
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appreciation of being widely considered as the chief Muslim adversary of the 
Franks.
147
 
The reason why the scholars in question assume the position they do, despite 
the evidence at hand, probably lies in their conception of contemporary jihad. What 
they seem to understand from jihad is an ideologically motivated struggle against the 
“infidels” to keep them away from Muslim territory, quite separate from the daily 
pursuit of strategic needs and interests incumbent on contemporary emirs. They do 
not deny in theory that religious motives can exist side by side with others, like ex-
pansionism, political and military imperatives, xenophobia, fear of attacks from the 
West or of economic losses, appetite for booty, the quest of personal prestige and 
bravura etc., and concede that it would be vain to try to pinpoint an action stemming 
purely from the idea of jihad, or again to isolate the influence of this factor from oth-
ers.
148
 In practice, however, they still appear to distinguish religious motives sharply 
from the others, assuming that the presence of the latter should imply some degree of 
deficiency in the former. Because Ilghazi accepted payment from the Aleppans when 
he took over the city, and had allied with the Franks before that, for example, Sivan 
concludes that he was not quite imbued with the zeal of a “champion of the faith,” 
though he later discovered that jihad propaganda could be advantageous for his per-
sonal interests.
149
 The religiosity of the contemporary actors is also called into ques-
tion in this connection: Hillenbrand asserts that the religious commitment of Ilghazi 
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and his Turkomans was “only superficial” and “pragmatic,” drawing attention to his 
drinking orgies which were excessive even by the standards of that time.
150
  
In analogy with what Cemal Kafadar points out in respect of Ottoman ghāzīs 
however, it is not right to look for “straw men relentlessly fighting for their lofty, un-
tarnished ideals” in Ilghazi and his contemporaries, and to conclude that they had 
little to do with jihad  when, being historical entities, they naturally fail to have 
measured up to this ideal. Similarly, it is more judicious to allow them to have been 
champions of what they understood from Islam, rather than to pass judgment upon 
the degree and nature of their religious commitment according to the criteria of the 
urban Muslim establishment.
151
 At any rate the problem of religious or personal mo-
tivation cannot be solved easily, not least because it is a moot point if such a sharp 
line between religious motive and personal interest was drawn by the contemporaries 
themselves. As Richards points out for the case of Saladin, “the question of motives, 
possibly irrelevant in the last resort, cannot be satisfactorily answered. Ambition and 
a consciousness of personal worth and fitness for a task are not incompatible with a 
high moral purpose.”152   
Misled by the unhappy designation “Counter-Crusade” moreover, some 
scholars like Michael Köhler commit the additional mistake of trying to see a mirror 
image of the Crusade in jihad  and seek similar features in it, such as being a primari-
ly ideological undertaking with the coalition of many different princes, as well as 
with the initiative and support of the sultan. Failing to find these elements in a specif-
ic case, they reject its existence on that occasion. Thus Köhler rightly refuses to ac-
cept that the warfare Ilghazi conducted against the Franks was a Counter-Crusade. 
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One reason he puts forward for this is that the emir acted independently, without the 
legitimization of the sultan and the participation of Seljukid contingents or other 
emirs save Tughtekin and Dubais. Another reason is that he only pursued practical 
goals, such as capturing the castles around Aleppo to secure the city for himself and 
prevent the Franks growing too powerful in the region.
153
 But asserting that the war-
fare Ilghazi conducted against the Franks was not a “Counter-Crusade” is not the 
same as showing that it was not jihad.
154
 
We do not have any good reasons to assume that the recipes of jihad extract-
ed from idealistic, ahistorical definitions or from attempts to assimilate it to the Cru-
sade –– and then used to decide whether the dealings of Ilghazi and other emirs with 
the Franks could be called jihad or not –– had any validity in the eyes of the contem-
poraries. Even if subordinating one’s interests to an all-out onslaught against the “in-
fidels” on Muslim territory was something that could have been demanded by the 
pietist pro-jihad circles of the time, it was not something that Ilghazi or other emirs 
could have afforded. We have evidence besides revealing that the view of the pro-
jihad ulama in Aleppo at the time was not so very different from that of local rulers. 
Their propaganda and level of activity first rose when the Frankish threat to the city 
increased around 1119, then declined when the threat decreased temporarily after 
Ager Sanguinis, leaving in its place the Sunnite-Shi‘ite tension in the city, and finally 
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rose again with the reemergence of the threat at the time of Timurtash and Aksungur 
al-Bursuki.
155
 Moreover it is also possible, considering the important role of these 
circles and particularly their leader Ibn al-Khashshab in the rule of the city, that the 
Artuqid emir may have adopted the strategy of establishing control over Azaz, al-
Atharib and Zardana on their demand or at least in collaboration with them.
156
  
In short, even in the eyes of the pro-jihad ulama of the time, jihad was some-
thing closely connected with the strategic conjuncture and the interests of their city –
– and even of their own faction. For it is also possible to argue that leading the jihad 
movement in the city may have accorded the Shi‘ite faction an advantage over their 
Sunnite rivals. Let us remember that after Ilghazi’s death the Sunnite ulama support-
ed his nephew and successor in the city, Badr al-Dawla Sulaiman, who was highly 
inefficient against the Franks and even surrendered the vitally important castle of al-
Atharib to them, but still founded the first Sunnite madrasa of Aleppo. At the same 
time, they stringently opposed his other nephew, Belek, who had won fame for his 
exploits against the Franks and was backed by the Shi‘ites, who eventually helped 
him to enter and get hold of the city.
157
 For this reason it makes little sense to claim 
that what Ilghazi and other emirs did when they confronted the Franks was not jihad , 
or that they did not regard what they themselves were doing as jihad, just because 
their policies against the Franks were determined by such strategic needs and inter-
ests.      
It is both possible and necessary therefore to make a more realistic and flexi-
ble definition of jihad that comes closer to what Ilghazi and his contemporaries may 
have made of it. According to this, jihad was the form that warfare in the area as-
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sumed in the eyes of contemporaries when the adversaries who challenged one's 
claims to certain properties and strategic interests in a particular case happened to be 
the Franks rather than any other Muslim power, as was just as often the case. For 
Ilghazi specifically, it was the form assumed by the task of taking the necessary stra-
tegic measures to protect a city of his, in this case Aleppo, insofar as those who tried 
to wrest it away from him were no longer the Seljukids but the Franks. Indeed it is in 
this limited, practical sense that Elisséeff and Khalil, quoted at the beginning of this 
discussion, seem to understand jihad when they assert that Ilghazi was the leader of 
the “jihad  movement” or “Holy War” following his takeover of Aleppo. It was “be-
cause of his concern to defend the province of Aleppo and his desire to hold the 
Franks at bay” that he undertook campaigns against the Franks, the former re-
marks,
158
 while the latter states that he ensured “an atmosphere of peace, stability and 
production for the Muslims in North Syria” by his victories against the Franks.159 
On the other hand, it is hardly possible to count Ilghazi among the first lead-
ers of the historical “jihad movement” that was developed and systematically culti-
vated on the ideological plane during the reigns of Nur al-Din and Saladin.
160
 We 
have seen that Ilghazi paid only limited attention to jihad propaganda, and although 
he had to confront the Franks frequently while defending Aleppo, neither he nor the 
pietist circles in the city seem to have seriously entertained the idea of using Aleppo 
as the base for a systematic campaign to expel the Franks from Antioch and else-
where, in the way Nur al-Din and Saladin spoke of expelling them from Jerusalem 
and the Holy Lands. These later leaders were indeed different from Ilghazi in this 
respect, but the difference in question diminishes when it comes down to their actual 
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course of action. We have already seen how Saladin was finally compelled to launch 
an ambitious offensive against the Kingdom of Jerusalem only under the pressure of 
his own propaganda, and otherwise followed a practical course of action directed at 
the defense and enlargement of his territories and the pursuit of his strategic interests. 
Like Ilghazi he regarded and presented his warfare as jihad when the adversaries who 
obstructed his way happened to be the Franks, but in his case the enemies turned out 
much more frequently to be Muslims.  
And indeed it is on this last point that another difference of these leaders from 
Ilghazi emerges: they regarded and presented their warfare as jihad even when they 
confronted other Muslim rulers as rivals in the struggle for properties and strategic 
interests. Their warfare of territorial aggrandizement against other Muslim rulers like 
Qilij Arslan II of Rum, they argued, was a necessary step to grow stronger against 
the Franks, as well as to get rid of those unreliable emirs who stabbed them in the 
back by collaborating with the “infidel.”161 Ilghazi, in contrast, considered and pre-
sented his warfare as jihad only when the adversary facing him in a particular case 
happened to be Christian, as is shown by his letters to the caliph and the sultan after 
his victory at Ager Sanguinis, as well as by the eulogizing poems written to celebrate 
this occasion. One reason for this difference may have lain in the incomparably supe-
rior prestige, power and resources that Nur al-Din and Saladin drew upon in compar-
ison with Ilghazi, sufficient to annex whole Muslim principalities to their domain and 
then to have the caliph confirm and legitimize these “conquests.”162 Accordingly 
they could afford to consider and present their warfare as jihad also when certain ri-
vals they confronted during the pursuit of their strategic goals and interests happened 
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to be Muslims. Their power and prestige were such as to render this both possible 
and useful, unlike in the case of Ilghazi and most other emirs of his age. Neverthe-
less, we shall see in the next chapter that Ilghazi’s successor Belek went some way 
towards being a precursor of Nur al-Din and Saladin in this respect. 
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CHAPTER 8 
BELEK: ILGHAZI’S SUCCESSOR AS DEFENDER OF ALEPPO 
We have seen in the last chapter that Ilghazi had taken along his nephew Bel-
ek on his last expedition against the Principality of Antioch. This was not a coinci-
dence, for Belek would prove his true heir and continue his policy of protecting An-
tioch against the Franks, who had set out again to encircle the city after Ilghazi’s 
death. Nevertheless, Belek would adopt the method of attacking the northern and 
southern ends of the Antiochene border, represented by Azaz and Jabal Summaq re-
spectively, rather than attacking Zardana and also al-Atharib after it was lost. Taking 
these last two had become extremely difficult after the fortification of the monastery 
of Dair Sarmada, as Ilghazi had discovered in that last campaign. So before his death  
he had anticipated Belek’s policy by sending a raiding force against Azaz. Beside his 
attacks on Azaz and Jabal Summaq, Belek also contributed to the defence of Aleppo 
most spectacularly by his capture of King Baldwin and Count Joscelin, who had al-
most completed the re-encirclement of Aleppo and were about to attack the city it-
self. Although their capture did not seriously compromise the safety of the Latin 
East, due to the robust administrative structure of the Crusader states, it did inflict a 
serious blow on the Franks’ long-term plan of taking Aleppo. The present chapter 
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will trace these events and assess Belek’s policies toward the Franks as well as to-
ward jihad.  
8.1  Belek’s enslavement of the Armenians of Gargar and his evasion of Josce-
lin 
Belek’s first encounter with the Franks after Mawdud’s expedition in 1110 
took place shortly before he accompanied Ilghazi on the latter’s last campaign to Syr-
ia. The reason was the incursions made by the Armenians of Gargar into his territo-
ries, especially Hanzit; they were acting under the protection of Count Joscelin. The 
most detailed information about the raids, Belek’s response, and Joscelin’s subse-
quent reaction is given by Michael the Syrian,
1
 who is cited with little change by Bar 
Hebraeus.
2
 Another Syriac source, the Anonymous chronicle, also mentions in pass-
ing an associated event.
3
 Accordingly we shall mainly follow Michael the Syrian 
here, indicating the additional information and remarks of the other two where neces-
sary.     
Michael the Syrian states at the beginning of his account that Belek was 
feared by all the emirs at this time. Despite this, he says, the troops of the Armenian 
lord of Gargar kept devastating his lands by carrying out numerous raids. According 
to Bar Hebraeus their targets were the city of Kharput and the territory around 
Babula and Melitene, including the region of Hanzit. Michael relates that Belek, in 
an effort to end these incursions, proposed to send every year a thousand loads of 
wheat to Michael of Gargar; he also agreed to cede three villages in his territory. In 
return the Armenian chief repeatedly swore to prevent his people making such at-
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tacks against Belek’s lands, but none of these promises were fulfilled. What caused 
Belek finally to lose his patience was a plundering expedition undertaken by “Mi-
chael’s looters,” as Michael the Syrian calls them. This raid took place on the very 
night following the day when the yearly tribute of wheat was sent to Gargar. Being 
full of confidence now that the wheat had been dispatched, these looters burnt down 
two villages in Hanzit, plundered many others, and killed the unsuspecting Turks 
camping nearby. Michael states that the emir was furious on hearing this, and 
planned to pursue the Armenians to their destruction.      
Thus in the winter of 1121-22 Belek set out to catch the inhabitants of Gargar 
unawares, while they trusted that the mountains were covered with snow. As a fur-
ther strategem he pretended to move away from them after crossing the frozen Eu-
phrates, and followed a roundabout route over the mountain of Qaryuna. Here he 
opened a way through the thick snow by releasing thousands of unharnessed horses. 
Finally, he crossed the mountain of Gargar at night and descended upon their country 
(1 January 1122). Michael states that Gargar “could not escape from the hands of the 
Turks” as Belek carried off the inhabitants, their animals, and everything else he 
came upon, leaving it deserted. Despite this, the chronicler notes, he showed himself 
“compassionate toward the people,” not executing or even enslaving a single one of 
them. On the contrary, he allowed them to keep their animals and other possessions, 
and settled them in Hanzit, where they were given villages. In return he demanded 
them to swear that they would not return to Gargar, and threatened those who would 
do so with enslavement.  
By this deportation of the Armenian peasants and the following mild treat-
ment he accorded them, Belek must have hoped to strike two birds with one stone: to 
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get rid of the plunderers who came in from Gargar, and perhaps more importantly, to 
populate his own lands with settled Christian peasants who would cultivate it and so 
increase his revenue in agricultural goods. Indeed the deportation and resettlement of 
indigenous Christian peasants seems to have been a frequent practice of Turkish 
chiefs in this period, for the Turkomans did not normally take an interest in leading a 
settled life based on agriculture, although this constituted the chief source of income 
for contemporary rulers. The relative scarcity of the settled population, which had 
thinned down during the upheaveals associated with the Turkish incursions, rendered 
the Christian peasants still more valuable in this respect. Accordingly, Turkish chiefs 
were eager to attract and keep them through such mild treatment. They refrained 
from enslaving the peasants, allowing them to keep their animals and possessions, 
and also did not place any pressure upon them to change their religion. Nor did they 
allow any of their Turkomans to dispossess them of anything they owned, which 
would cause the agricultural produce and therefore their revenues to decline.
4
   
  However, Belek himself was disappointed in this case, as a number of the 
Armenians did flee and return to their own lands in Gargar. So Michael relates that 
he launched a new expedition a year later, and this time enslaved all those he found 
in Gargar, as well as burning down the villages, vines, and olive orchards. The 
Franks intervened at this point, with Joscelin marching from Edessa against Belek. 
But the latter fled to the mountains, and the Franks, failing to catch up with him, re-
turned to Edessa. Then Belek returned home as well. Michael of Gargar was unable 
to stop further Turkish incursions, and found himself compelled in the following year 
(1123) to offer his castle to the Franks. The latter accepted the offer and installed a 
garrison there, while Michael received another place in compensation. The Anony-
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mous Syriac indicates his new possession as Duluk. In this connection Cahen points 
out that the threat Belek posed against the right bank of the Euphrates contributed to 
the voluntary or forced replacement of the Armenian lords by Frankish garrisons in 
this period.
5
  
8.2  Belek’s capture of Baldwin and Joscelin, their seizure of Kharput and its 
recapture   
King Baldwin’s takeover of Gargar was what eventually led to his capture by 
Belek, as he went to raise the emir’s siege of that castle in spring 1123. By that time 
Belek had long since taken hold of Joscelin of Edessa and Galeran of al-Bira, having 
captured them in the previous autumn. Although the imprisonment of these princes 
did not endanger the existence of their states at all, it still prevented the Franks from 
attacking Aleppo and also bestowed on Belek a prestige equalling that of Ilghazi af-
ter the Battle of Ager Sanguinis. It is to this subject that we shall now turn.    
8.2.1  The perspectives of the sources  
8.2.1.1  Ibn al-Athir  
Ibn al-Athir’s rather brief account6 of Belek’s capture of the Frankish chiefs 
and their subsequent, unsuccessful revolt in Kharput is of mixed value. Although in 
the case of the capture of Joscelin and Galeran it finds corroboration from Matthew 
of Edessa, it is less accurate about how Baldwin was captured, making it seem like 
the result of a regular pitched battle rather than an ambush. The chronicler’s relation 
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of the revolt in Kharput, as well as its suppression, also seems wanting in accuracy 
when compared with the other sources.   
Ibn al-Athir begins by asserting that Belek marched to Edessa and put it un-
der siege, but achieving no success, withdrew. On his way back a Turkoman came to 
warn him that Joscelin had assembled the Franks to set up an ambush against him. 
However, no other source mentions a siege of Edessa, including the contemporary 
Matthew of Edessa, who would have known best if such a siege had indeed taken 
place. Accordingly Ibn al-Athir’s testimony on this point must be rejected.7    
By this time Belek had only four hundred troops left with him, Ibn al-Athir 
notes, the rest having been dispersed. Nevertheless, he took up a suitable position 
and prepared to give battle. “By God’s grace to the Muslims,” Ibn al-Athir remarks, 
the advancing Franks got stuck in the ground which had soaked up water and turned 
to mud. As their horses sank in this mud, they were unable to move quickly under the 
weight of arms and horsemen.
8
 Seizing this opportunity, Belek’s troops showered 
them with arrows, and “not one of them escaped” as the chronicler asserts. Joscelin 
was among the captives, together with his cousin Galeran and several other distin-
guished knights. Ibn al-Athir gives the interesting detail that Belek had Joscelin sewn 
into a camel’s skin, in order to make him surrender Edessa, but the count refused, 
offering instead a rich ransom including large sums of money and many prisoners. 
Turning down this proposal, however, Belek took Joscelin and his companions to 
Kharput, where they were imprisoned.      
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Next thing, Ibn al-Athir reports that Kharput was conquered by the Franks in 
May 1123. Explaining the cause of this event, he turns back to relate how Belek had 
captured King Baldwin following his earlier capture of Joscelin and Galeran. He re-
ports that Belek laid siege to the castle of Gargar, and upon learning this Baldwin set 
out with his troops, fearing that the Artukid could grow too powerful if he captured 
the castle. When Belek heard of the king’s approach he moved to confront him, and 
in the ensuing battle the Franks were defeated, with Baldwin being taken prisoner 
along with a number of leading Frankish knights (Safar 517/April 1123). These were 
imprisoned in Kharput, along with Joscelin and others previously captured.   
Ibn al-Athir relates the rest of the story briefly. While Belek was away next 
month to capture Harran, he states, the Franks deployed a strategem to win over 
some of the garrison, and emerging thereby from prison, seized the citadel. Thus in 
contrast to the Christian sources, who all speak of a rescue operation carried out by a 
group of Armenians from outside the castle, the Arab chronicler attributes the Frank-
ish capture of the citadel to betrayal by certain members of the garrison. Probably 
confusing Baldwin with Joscelin, he reports erroneously that the king took a camel at 
night and made off to his own lands.
9
 When the news reached Belek, Ibn al-Athir 
relates, the emir returned to besiege his fort, and, placing great pressure on the 
Franks inside, recovered it. After installing a garrison there, he left again.    
                                                 
9
 For ittakhadha al-laila jamalan wa maḍā ilā bilādihi in Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil fī’l-Ta’rikh, 13 vols. 
(Beirut, 1965-1967), X, 614, instead of “rode off under cover of darkness and made his way to his 
own lands,” as in the English translation. The translator has treated the word al-laila in the sentence as 
an object of the verb ittakhadha, which gives the literal meaning “took the night as a camel;” this has 
been interpreted in the way we see in the translation. See Chronicle, 247, n. 5. But al-laila seems to 
have been used rather as an adverb of time in this context.  
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8.2.1.2  Ibn al-Adim  
Ibn al-Adim’s account10 is again brief about how the Frankish leaders were 
captured and their temporary seizure of Kharput, but he provides very detailed in-
formation about Joscelin’s depredations around Aleppo after Belek’s recapture of 
Kharput. These amounted to a veritable war of religion, with the destruction of tombs 
and mausoleums, and the Aleppan authorities headed by Ibn al-Khashshab responded 
in kind by ordering the conversion of almost all churches in Aleppo to mosques.  
Ibn al-Adim supplies much less detail than Ibn al-Athir about how Joscelin 
and Galeran were captured by Belek. He contents himself with noting that in Sep-
tember 1122 Belek defeated the “cursed Joscelin and Galeran” in the neighborhood 
of Saruj. In addition to these two leaders and sixty other knights among the captives, 
Ibn al-Adim mentions a certain nephew of Tancred, who he says had been captured 
by Ilghazi in a battle at Lailun and redeemed himself at the price of a thousand di-
nars. He notes in parallel with Ibn al-Athir that Belek demanded Joscelin and Galer-
an surrender the castles in their possession, and reports the interesting answer they 
gave in refusal: “We and the castles are like camels and saddle. When [a camel] in a 
caravan is slaughtered, his saddle is transferred to another; what was in our hands has 
now passed to the hands of others.” Upon this Belek took them to his country.    
The response of Joscelin and Galeran is an interesting indication of the ro-
bustness and continuity of the administrative structure of the Frankish states, which 
ensured that their existence did not come under serious threat after the capture of 
their leaders. Indeed it was the Franks of Joscelin’s castle of Tell Bashir who carried 
out the raids against the Butnan valley following Ilghazi’s death,11 while Joscelin 
was languishing in a pit in Kharput. Of course this offensive in the count’s absence 
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 Kamal al-Din Ibn al-Adim, Zubdat al-Halab fi Tarikh Halab, RHC, Historiens Orientaux III, 633-
40. 
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was also made possible by the excessively weak state of Aleppo, which resulted from 
the division of the Artukid possessions after Ilghazi’s death. But the fact that the 
Franks could not undertake anything more than these raids, that there was no serious 
attempt until 1124 to capture Aleppo itself, was due without doubt to Joscelin’s im-
prisonment, followed seven months later by that of Baldwin. As Nicholson remarks, 
“The military advantages and opportunities presented to the Franks by the illness of 
their formidable adversary, Ilghazi, were presently negated by the capture of the 
Frankish hammer, Joscelin.”12 Similarly, Demirkent indicates that Joscelin’s capture 
was a great blow for the Franks as it altered the power balance between the Franks 
and Turks in the north in favor of the latter.
13
  
This was mainly on account of the increased burden upon the remaining 
princes. Because Baldwin was compelled to undertake the defence and administra-
tion of Jerusalem, Antioch and Edessa he was too preoccupied with this crushing 
workload to complete the encirclement of Aleppo and attack it before he himself was 
captured.
14
 The same difficulty was equally valid for Joscelin after he escaped from 
Kharput while Baldwin remained in prison. Indeed it was no coincidence that once 
the king was released and both rulers were free, the first thing they undertook was 
the siege of Aleppo. Asbridge’s observation in this context is quite justified: although 
the resources of Antioch had been dedicated from 1121 onwards to reestablishing the 
eastern border between al-Atharib and Zardana and surrounding Aleppo once again, 
an actual attack on the city was stalled by the imprisonment of Joscelin and Bald-
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of the Crusades, 3 vols. (Harmondsworth, 1965), II, 162; René Grousset, Histoire des Croisades et du 
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win.
15
 And it is here that the real importance of Belek’s accomplishment lies: 
through his capture of the Frankish princes he proved to be a still more effective de-
fender of Aleppo than Ilghazi, and this even before he took hold of the city in June 
1123.    
Like Ibn al-Athir, Ibn al-Adim relates Baldwin’s capture in summary fashion 
and gives the impression that it was the result of a pitched battle between entire ar-
mies, rather than an ambush of Baldwin and his retinue. He reports that on 19 Safar 
(11 April) Baldwin advanced against Belek, who was besieging the Castle of Gargar, 
and the two met at Urush (today Turush), near the bridge of Sanja. In the ensuing 
clash Belek defeated and captured Baldwin, killed most of his soldiers and officers, 
and plundered his tents. The chronicler notes that a week after this Belek captured 
Gargar, despite the numerical inferiority of his forces, but he fails to mention the fact 
that the emir had Baldwin tortured before the town to obtain this result. He reports in 
concluding this part that Belek placed Baldwin in Kharput beside Joscelin and Galer-
an. 
Ibn al-Adim relates the seizure of Kharput by the imprisoned Franks through 
the mouth of a messenger who arrived on 12 Jumada II (7 August 1123) to report it 
to Belek. Like Ibn al-Athir, he does not mention the Armenians coming from outside, 
but asserts that the rescuers were a group from the garrison of the citadel who had 
collaborated with the captives to set them free. The released prisoners had then at-
tacked and captured the citadel, and seized all of Belek’s riches stored there.  
Ibn al-Adim also relates an interesting exchange that took place at this point 
between Joscelin and Baldwin, showing the latter in a rather unfavorable light. Re-
portedly, Joscelin urged the other Franks to run off as soon as possible, contenting 
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themselves with as much as they would be able to carry away. They had been saved 
from the brink of destruction, he said, and therefore it would not be proper to expect 
more. But Baldwin thought otherwise, being eager to keep the castle and all the rich-
es in it. Accordingly the Franks decided that Joscelin would go out alone, and refrain 
from changing his clothes, eating meat or drinking wine until he would come back 
with reinforcements to Kharput. The chronicler fails to mention the fact that the cas-
tle had been surrounded in the meanwhile by the Turks living around it, as we shall 
see other sources report.  
Ibn al-Adim notes that by this time Belek had captured al-Bara and was be-
sieging Kafartab, where the bishop-lord of the former town had taken refuge after 
escaping from captivity. On receiving the news, he relates, Belek set out immediately 
and reached Kharput with a forced march, taking it by force on 23 Rajab (16 Sep-
tember 1123). This is only partially correct, for as we shall see in the accounts of the 
Christian sources that the Franks themselves surrendered the castle when a tower was 
undermined and collapsed after their initial refusal to deliver it. In conformity with 
his earlier assertion that the captives had collaborated with certain members of the 
garrison, Ibn al-Adim notes that Belek executed all of his men in the citadel “who 
had shown themselves ungrateful for his favor.” Killing all the Franks as well, except 
for Baldwin, his nephew and Galeran, Belek took the three captives to Harran, where 
they were imprisoned again.  
Joscelin had reached Tell Bashir when he learned of these events, having in 
the meanwhile collected reinforcements from Jerusalem. Ibn al-Adim relates at 
length the retaliatory incursions he carried out against Aleppo and its territory, and 
gives to understand that there was a strong element of religious hostility in these at-
tacks –– which gave rise to similar feelings and actions on the part of the Aleppans. 
 527 
According to his report Joscelin first marched with the Frankish army into the valley 
of Butnan, attacking and burning Buza‘a, al-Bab and other towns situated there. Then 
advancing against Aleppo from the north, he profaned the mausoleums (mashāʾid) 
and devastated the gardens on that side of the city, also defeating a group of Alep-
pans and killing or capturing twenty of them. Moving next to pitch camp to the west, 
he proceeded to destroy the mausoleums and gardens lying to the south of the city. 
Not content with this, he desecrated a mausoleum called Mashshad al-Dakka, and 
finding nothing inside to steal, set fire to it. The Aleppans, for their part, undertook a 
number of sorties against the Franks, with losses suffered on both sides. Subsequent-
ly Joscelin moved his camp to Su‘da, but the Franks of Jerusalem parted from him to 
return home. Their abandoned camp revealed that they had robbed the Muslim dead 
in the graves.   
Ibn al-Adim relates that in retaliation for this display of religious hostility, the 
qadi Ibn al-Khashshab, supported by the authorities (Belek himself was away in 
Kharput), ordered the churches in Aleppo to be converted into mosques. For this 
purpose their chancels were destroyed, doors were replaced, and mihrābs built in 
their southern walls. Except for two churches still extant in Ibn al-Adim’s time, all 
the other churches including the cathedral church itself were converted in this way to 
mosques.  
Ibn al-Adim notes that Joscelin undertook a last incursion into the Butnan 
valley before he returned home to Tell Bashir, and attacked Naqira and al-Ahass as 
well. In addition to spreading devastation as much as he could, killing and capturing 
people as well as taking their animals, he also seized more than five hundred of the 
Aleppans’ horses, which were in al-Gharib at this time. Another three hundred of 
these horses were taken by Alan of al-Atharib, who advanced to al-Hanuta and Hilli-
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fa after Joscelin’s return, and also got hold of a caravan carrying grain from Shaizar. 
All these horses had belonged to the troops of Aleppo, Ibn al-Adim indicates, and as 
a result only fifty horsemen remained in the city who actually had mounts. These lat-
ter made repeated sorties together with some bandits, but although they took prison-
ers time and again, they were unable to put an end to the Frankish incursions.   
Ibn al-Adim concludes his account with the report of a new incursion Joscelin 
conducted, this time across the Euphrates into Shabakhtan, where he attacked the 
Turkomans and Kurds, capturing and killing them and seizing more than ten thou-
sand sheep and horses. Proceeding next to attack al-Jabbul and its environs, the count 
seized many beasts of burden and then passed on to Dair Hafir. Here he not only suf-
focated by smoke the inhabitants who had taken refuge in the caves, but also opened 
the graves and robbed the dead of their shrouds. For now this was the last display of 
religious hostility on Joscelin’s part, but such acts were to be repeated during the 
siege of Aleppo a year later.    
8.2.1.3  Ibn al-Qalanisi 
Ibn al-Qalanisi’s account of the capture of the Frankish leaders as well as 
their escape and seizure of Kharput
16
 is quite summary, adding little that is new to 
the testimonies of the previous two Muslim sources. This is rather disappointing, 
given his contemporaneity to the events, but the reason might be the relative distance 
of Damascus from the scene of the events. A point where he diverges from the previ-
ous sources is that he shows Belek as the sole aggressor at the time of Joscelin and 
Galeran’s capture, omitting to mention the fact that the latter themselves were pursu-
ing the Turks. When relating Baldwin’s capture, on the other hand, he follows the 
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other Muslim sources in representing this as the result of a pitched battle rather than 
an ambush.   
About the capture of Joscelin and Galeran, Ibn al-Qalanisi reports briefly that 
Belek advanced with his army against the Franks of Edessa in Rajab 516 (September 
1122). Attacking them successfully at Saruj, he took captive their commander Josce-
lin and the latter’s cousin Galeran. His report of the king’s capture is similarly brief, 
and also somewhat confused in geography, as he assumes Gargar to be situated in the 
territory of Aleppo.
17
 He relates that King Baldwin marched with his army towards 
the province of Aleppo to attack Belek, who was at the time besieging the castle of 
Gargar. As if describing a pitched battle, he states that the emir advanced towards the 
king in turn, and the latter was defeated in the engagement of their armies near the 
bridge.
18
 Having fallen captive with some of his leading knights, the king was con-
fined in a pit
19
 in the castle of Kharput, together with Joscelin and other Frankish 
leaders.       
Ibn al-Qalanisi’s relation of the escape of the Franks in Kharput is not only 
summary, but also riddled with a lacuna in the manuscript. The captives “had devised 
a strategem among themselves and fled…,” begins the report, and after the lacuna, 
continues: “…King Baldwin, and he escaped, and they could not capture him.” With 
the help of the other Muslim sources, this passage could be reconstructed to indicate 
that the prisoners had devised a strategem among themselves to escape from the pris-
on, and then Joscelin, arriving at an agreement with King Baldwin, fled from the cas-
tle, with the Turks being unable to catch him. No help to the captives seems to be 
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mentioned (as indicated by the expression “among themselves”), neither by Armeni-
ans from outside nor from the garrison in the citadel. Ibn al-Qalanisi notes that it was 
on the same day that the bishop of al-Bara escaped from Belek’s hands. Within the 
same month, he reports in conclusion, Belek marched with his army to Kharput and 
besieged its citadel until he recovered it from the Franks, installing a new garrison 
before he left.   
8.2.1.4  Al-Azimi  
Al Azimi’s brief reports on the associated events in his abridged chronicle, 
when brought together, amount to a basic narrative of the capture and revolt of the 
Frankish chiefs.
20
 The chronicler first notes that Belek attacked the Franks near Saruj 
and captured Joscelin and Galeran; like Ibn al-Qalanisi, he omits the latters’ pursuit 
of Belek before that point. Similarly telescoping the events, he next reports that Bel-
ek besieged the castle of Gargar, defeated the Franks near Sanja and captured King 
Baldwin, imprisoning him with Joscelin in a pit at Kharput.  
Without mentioning any collaboration of the captives with Armenians or the 
garrison, Al-Azimi then indicates that they rose in revolt and rescued Baldwin; he 
notes that this happened on the same night as the escape of the bishop of al-Bara 
from Belek’s hands. Following this, he says, Joscelin left the castle in disguise on 28 
July and mustered troops.
21
 When the news reached Belek, he hurried to Kharput and 
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captured the castle after a siege. The chronicler states wrongly that Belek returned 
the captives to the pit in Kharput, whereas we know from Ibn al-Adim that they were 
taken to Harran.  
Al-Azimi reports next that Joscelin marched at the head of the Franks head-
ing for Kharput and passed by the outskirts of Aleppo, but returned in disappoint-
ment on learning of the recovery of Kharput by Belek. About the ensuing fight 
around Aleppo, he only reports a certain episode in which the Franks attacked the 
oustskirts of Burj al-Jisr, but because the Turks had blockaded the river fords, lost 
many by drowning . The chronicler also notes that the churches in Aleppo were con-
verted to mosques on the orders of Ibn al-Khashshab.   
8.2.1.5  Matthew of Edessa  
On the whole, the indigenous Christian sources offer much fuller accounts 
about the events than the Muslim sources, probably because they were much closer 
the scene of events in the north. Matthew of Edessa,
22
 in particular, was not only an 
exact contemporary of the events, but also lived in the County of Edessa, and could 
even have found the chance to listen to the story from the participants themselves. 
His Armenian background may also have made him familiar with the details of the 
rescue operation, for he reports this to have been undertaken by Armenians from Be-
hisni. These factors render his testimony particularly important.   
In contrast to the Muslim sources, Matthew does not mention any attack that 
Belek made against Edessa. According to his version, when the sick Ilghazi returned 
to Aleppo and Belek, “a brave and vigorous warrior,” set out home for Hanzit, Josce-
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lin and Galeran began to pursue him with a hundred horsemen. They caught up with 
the emir at the village of Tap’t’il (perhaps the same place as Urush/Turush in Ibn al-
Adim’s account), where he was encamped with eight hundred horsemen in an area 
surrounded by marshes. “Being mindless and foolhardy,” the Franks attacked the 
Turks despite their position, and as a result were bogged down in the marshy area. 
Seeing this Belek went on to the offensive, pursuing the Franks and wounding all 
their horses.  
This story accords remarkably well with the version of Ibn al-Athir, who re-
lated how the Franks got stuck in the mud as they tried to reach Belek’s forces and 
were mowed down by arrows. The only difference is that Matthew gives the number 
of Belek’s forces as eight hundred rather than four hundred, but this might be the 
product of an effort on his part to exaggerate the numerical superiority of the Turks. 
He goes on to relate that Joscelin and Galeran were taken captive and thrown into 
prison at Kharput, while twenty-five other Franks were imprisoned at Balu; he indi-
cates the date of the event as 13 September. Matthew also reveals the Edessenes’ 
state of mind at this time, writing: “Thus great sorrow fell upon all the Christian 
faithful, and they were all horror-struck and in a state of fear and trembling.” 
The chronicler makes a digression at this point to note that before dying 
Ilghazi had entrusted all his territories to Belek, who had thus come to rule over a 
large number of territories. We know that this is not true, since Ilghazi’s possessions 
were distributed among his sons and nephews. Nevertheless, it shows the extent to 
which Belek was widely perceived to be his uncle’s true heir: this was due without 
doubt to his continuance of Ilghazi’s recent struggles against the Franks.  
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In relating Baldwin’s capture, Matthew does not speak of Belek’s siege of 
Gargar as what led the king to advance against him. He asserts instead that Baldwin’s 
aim was to avenge Joscelin and Galeran by making war on the emir. Grousset and 
Nicholson seem to base themselves on this report when they assert that the purpose 
of the king in moving towards Gargar was to rescue Joscelin and Galeran or to obtain 
their release.
23
 But Matthew states that the king’s motive was “to avenge” rather than 
“to rescue” Joscelin and Galeran, and indeed it is hard to see how Baldwin could 
have hoped to rescue the count and Galeran by attacking Belek before Gargar. The 
most he could have hoped to accomplish in that respect was to capture some of Bel-
ek’s distinguished men and exchange them with the Frankish prisoners, but this was 
not something that he could have counted upon beforehand. In any case, the motive 
of revenge suggested by Matthew must have paled beside the king’s concern to pre-
vent Belek from acquiring Gargar and becoming a still more formidable power in the 
region, as observed by Ibn al-Athir.    
Matthew relates that Belek was carrying out raids on the border areas of 
Ra‘ban when Baldwin reached that fortress at the head of his forces; the two armies 
were as yet unaware of each other’s presence. By the time the king crossed the 
bridge of Sanja with a small detachment, however, Belek had noticed the Franks’ 
presence and lain in ambush with his entire army. Having pitched camp at Shen-
crig,
24
 Baldwin was about to go falcon hunting when Belek made a surprise attack 
and got hold of him together with his sister’s son. This nephew of Baldwin may have 
been Mannasses of Hierges, the son of his sister Hodiena, as Demirkent suggests, or 
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a brother of Mannasses, as Runciman prefers to assume.
25
 Matthew does not reveal 
that Belek had the king tortured before Gargar, as reported by the Anonymous Syri-
ac, but simply states that Baldwin handed over this castle to Belek when he was tak-
en by the emir to its gates. The king and his nephew were then brought to Kharput 
and thrown into the same “deep dungeon” in which Joscelin and Galeran were im-
prisoned.      
Whereas the Muslim chroniclers attribute the release of the prisoners in 
Kharput to the collaboration of a part of the garrison, Matthew and all the other 
Christian sources attribute it to a rescue operation undertaken by a group of Armeni-
ans from Behisni or Edessa, though they differ as to whether this was a voluntary act 
on their part or they were rather commissioned by others to do it. They all relate the 
story with apparent relish, and dedicate to this failed attempt a far greater place than 
its importance would seem to warrant in the eyes of a modern historian.
26
 Neverthe-
less, contemporary chroniclers were of course not modern historians, and judged the 
importance of a story according to the contribution it could make to the value of their 
work as a “serious entertainment.”27 For this reason we shall examine their accounts 
of this failed rescue attempt at some length as well, in order to see the ways in which 
they treated this story that was so attractive to them with its promise of ample sus-
pense and excitement as well as the examples of loyalty and self-sacrifice it offered. 
Of course it also provided them, and especially Matthew, with an opportunity to 
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show the Armenians in an active role, and not simply as victims at the mercy of the 
course of wars between the Franks and the Turks, as was generally the case.     
Matthew introduces his version of the story with the following words: “In this 
same year, five months later, an amazing event occurred, which later turned out to be 
a disastrous misfortune.” He relates that fifteen men in the fortress of Behisni had got 
together to plan “a very courageous feat,” whereby “they were to accomplish a deed 
to be remembered forever.” Leaving Behisni for the impregnable castle of Kharput, 
they observed that its guards were few and negligent. They approached the gates 
looking wretched and pretending to be quarreling plaintiffs, and in this way they 
were able to get one of them inside the citadel. With his help they succeeded in forc-
ing an entry, and reaching the gates of the prison, killed the guards there. Shutting 
the gates behind them, and with loud cries, they next made for the cell of the citadel
28
 
where the captives were imprisoned, and “very joyfully” released Baldwin, Joscelin 
and others. Matthew adds that some of the inhabitants of the area had entered the 
prison as well to aid in the escape of the prisoners. The captives then went out, and 
seizing the citadel, became masters of Belek’s entire household.29  
Whereas the Anonymous, Michael the Syrian and Fulcher of Chartres state 
that the Turkish forces in the region, on hearing of the event, invested the castle even 
before Belek’s arrival, Matthew asserts that the Turks fled to another region. Never-
theless, this seems unlikely in view of the detailed testimony of these sources about 
how Joscelin slipped with difficulty through the besiegers, and Matthew himself 
states that one night the count departed “in secret.” He goes on to relate that Joscelin 
                                                 
28
 This is from the French translation of Matthew’s work in RHC, Historiens Arméniens I, 134 
(III.86). The English translation reads “dungeon” in contrast, but the translator notes that the actual 
word in the edition he used is “fortress.” See Matthew, Chronicle, 347. 
29
 This is from the French translation in RHC, Historiens Arméniens I, 134 (III.86), whereas the Eng-
lish translation reads “Belek’s entire domain.” But it is hard to imagine how the prisoners could have 
got hold of the emir’s “entire domain” at this stage.   
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proceeded with an infantry escort over Kaisun to Antioch, in order to collect troops 
and return with them to bring succor to the king and others. Thus Matthew seems to 
have been unaware of the fact that Joscelin went as far as Jerusalem.
30
  
When Belek heard the news, Matthew continues, he immediately set out for 
Kharput, and “rushing forth with the rapidity of an eagle,” reached it in fifteen days. 
Laying siege to the fortress, he managed by means of a mangonel and mining opera-
tions to demolish a tower and thus to “strike terror into the hearts of the defenders.”  
As a result, Galeran went in “great fear” to deliver the castle into his hands. Save for 
Baldwin, his nephew, and Galeran, Belek had all the other prisoners, sixty five men 
and eighty “beautiful” women (these may have been Belek’s harem, killed after hav-
ing been left in the hands of the Franks and Armenians, and perhaps collaborated 
with them as we shall see Orderic relate), thrown down from the summit of the for-
tress. Matthew seems unaware that the king and his two companions were taken to 
Harran, since he states that Belek, full of rage, threw them in prison once again. He 
reports in conclusion that Joscelin and Geoffrey of Mar‘ash heard of the event while 
marching to Kharput with reinforcements, and so returned to their territories in dis-
may. The chronicler makes no mention of Joscelin’s retaliatory attacks against Alep-
po and Shabakhtan.  
8.2.1.6  The Anonymous Syriac Chronicle  
The Anonymous Syriac Chronicle offers one of the most detailed accounts of 
the capture and subsequent rescue of the Frankish leaders.
31
 The author’s story of 
                                                 
30
 Matthew was apparently also uninformed about the arrangements of regency in Jerusalem (see the 
analyses of Fulcher’s and William’s accounts below), for he states that by this time Geoffrey the 
Monk, the lord of Mar‘ash, had taken up the command of the Frankish forces as well as the defence of 
all the Frankish territories including Jerusalem, Antioch and Edessa against the Turks. However, 
Geoffrey does seem to have assumed the regency of Antioch and Edessa during the period in which 
both Baldwin and Joscelin were both imprisoned. Matthew introduces Geoffrey as a “brave and 
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how Joscelin and Galeran got caught by Belek is notable for its divergence from the 
other sources, although it is not necessarily more plausible.     
The Anonymous states at the beginning of his account that Joscelin married 
the daughter of Roger of Antioch, who had been killed in the Battle of Ager Sangui-
nis, and received Azaz as her dowry. Going to bring her back to Edessa, he stayed 
the night in al-Bira. However, we know from William of Tyre that this woman, 
named Stephanie, was Roger’s sister rather than daughter; William had met her in 
old age, when she was the abbess of the convent of Holy Mary the Elder in Jerusa-
lem.
32
 Runciman criticizes another aspect of the Anonymous’s testimony, pointing 
out that “there is no mention of her capture and, as Roger endowed his sister, the 
marriage must have taken place before Roger’s death.”33 Demirkent objects to this 
statement, arguing that the Anonymous does not claim that Joscelin took the bride 
immediately upon the marriage to his country, and accordingly the woman may not 
have participated in her husband’s campaign and got captured.  
Neither of these views seems correct. The Anonymous relates the event in a 
way suggesting that she was indeed with Joscelin when he attacked Belek, and his 
testimony is corroborated on this point by Michael the Syrian and Bar Hebraeus. In-
deed we shall see Bar Hebraeus explicitly state that the woman was captured as well 
and taken to Balu. Moreover, this was not an independent campaign against Belek, as 
Demirkent seems to assume, but an extemporized attack Joscelin made while return-
ing from Antioch, after he had assisted Baldwin during Ilghazi and Belek’s campaign 
in Syria. He could well have married Stephanie at the end of that campaign, as he 
                                                                                                                                          
mighty man and a most fervent Christian,” protecting the Frankish territories “with insuperable energy 
and effort,” and “courageously defending them with all the means at his disposal.” 
31
 “Anonymous Syriac Chronicle,” 90-4; Anonymi Auctoris Chronicon, II, 64-70. 
32
 William of Tyre, A History of Deeds Done Beyond the Sea, translated by E. A. Babcock and A. C. 
Krey, 2 vols. (New York, 1943), II, 301 (XIX.4). 
33
 Runciman, Crusades, II, 161, n. 2. 
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was stopping at the city of Antioch before setting out with her for home.
34
 As for 
Runciman’s objection about Stephanie’s endowment, Baldwin, as regent of Antioch, 
surely had the right to give her in marriage as well as to endow her after Roger’s 
death –– unless the marriage and the endowment were agreed earlier, before Ager 
Sanguinis, but took place later.  
While Joscelin was halting at al-Bira, the Anonymous relates, messengers ar-
rived from Mariba, Umqa, and the district of al-Bira itself to report that Turks had 
carried out a raid and captured all those they met. He explains that these were troops 
from the army of Belek who, coming from Aleppo with four thousand horsemen, had 
sent them around to carry out raids in all directions. In the meanwhile he camped at 
the well of Haig, in the territory of Edessa. Hereabouts there was a famous castle, 
situated opposite the district of Ra’s Kaifa. We have seen Ibn al-Adim, Ibn al-
Qalanisi and al-Azimi state that the capture took place near Saruj, and since Ra’s 
Kaifa is situated in the neighborhood of Harran, while Saruj is on the road between 
al-Bira and Harran, the event must be located to the south of Edessa, between Harran 
and Saruj.
35
 Probably the village of Tap’t’il mentioned by Matthew was also around 
here. 
Like Matthew, and in contrast to the Muslim authors, the Anonymous does 
not mention any siege of Edessa undertaken by Belek. But differently from Matthew, 
who asserted that the Franks wanted to catch up with Belek, and from Ibn al-Athir, 
who stated that they intended to ambush him, the Anonymous gives us to understand 
that they were only pursuing the raiders, without knowing that Belek himself was 
camping near with his whole force. He indicates that Galeran was particularly eager 
to pursue the raiders, since it was his own territory that had been ravaged. The Anon-
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 Demirkent, Urfa Haçlı Kontluğu, II, 30. 
35
 Demirkent, Urfa Haçlı Kontluğu, II, 31. 
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ymous seems to be wrong however in asserting that Belek was encamped “with his 
whole force.” Ibn al-Athir states that most of Belek’s forces had scattered, leaving 
him with four hundred men, and Matthew gives the comparable number of eight 
hundred; we have seen the Anonymous himself indicate that Belek had sent away his 
four thousand troops to plunder the Franks’ territories.               
The chronicler goes on to relate that the Franks thought to catch up with these 
raiders in the land of Ra’s Kaifa, and so pursued them from night to midday. They 
had been consumed by thirst, dust, and heat as well as worn down by the fatigues of 
the road by the time they reached Belek’s camp, where they saw a whole army be-
fore them. The Franks themselves were few, the Anonymous notes, and this accords 
with Matthew’s statement that they were a hundred strong against eight hundred 
Turks. Nevertheless, the Anonymous diverges after this point from Matthew as well 
as from Ibn al-Athir, who asserted that the Franks got stuck in mud as they attacked 
the Turks. He states instead that they were unable to go back, despite being seen by 
the Turks, without making clear why. According to his version it was the Turks who 
attacked first, when the Franks went to water their horses, and showered arrows from 
the riverbank on whoever approached the water. Subsequently they surrounded the 
Franks, and having shot many, captured the rest including Joscelin and Galeran.  
The Anonymous’s version of the story does not seem preferable over that of 
Ibn al-Athir and Matthew of Edessa. Even the sole fact that two such independent 
sources from completely different origins agree with each other would favor their 
version. Moreover, the Anonymous’s story seems to lack logical consistency as well. 
It is hard to understand from his account why the Franks did not turn back upon see-
ing the Turkish army, or alternatively did not go into attack, and instead attempted to 
water their horses by the riverbank where the enemy was ranged. And the Anony-
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mous’s statement that the Franks could not turn back would also tend to support the 
other two sources’ assertion that they got stuck in the marshes separating them from 
the Turkish forces. In the light of these considerations, the Anonymous’s version of 
Joscelin and Galeran’s defeat and capture must be rejected.        
When Joscelin and Galeran were captured in this unexpected way and 
brought to Belek, the Anonymous continues, the emir had difficulty believing his 
eyes and “thought it a dream that such princes should in an instant become prison-
ers.” He does not mention Belek’s efforts to make the captives hand over Edessa and 
other places, as reported by Ibn al-Adim and Ibn al-Athir, but states instead that the 
emir took them before the gates of Edessa to persuade its inhabitants to surrender. 
When they refused to do so and abused him, he left the place and imprisoned them in 
Kharput. Like Matthew, the Anonymous touches upon the public aggrievement felt 
in Edessa in face of the news. It reached the city on the eve of the Feast of the Cross, 
he notes, with the result that “there was no procession that year, instead all was 
lamentation.” The chronicler also indicates that King Baldwin came from Antioch to 
Edessa upon hearing this news, and placed there a garrison under Geoffrey the 
Monk, to serve until the captive princes’ fate would become clear. This partly cor-
roborates Matthew’s statement that Geoffrey had taken up the defense of Frankish 
territories during the captivity of their rulers.
36
    
The Anonymous states that Baldwin’s purpose in advancing toward Gargar 
six months later was to bring grain from Kaisun and Samosata to that castle, which 
Belek had begun to harrass along with Kahta and Hisn Mansur.
37
 Thus he diverges 
from the Muslim sources who indicated that the king’s purpose was to attack Belek 
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 See n. 30 above. 
37
 The Anonymous counts Samosata among the places Belek was harrassing, but this seems to conflict 
with his assertion that the king brought in grain from there to Gargar. 
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in order to raise his siege of Gargar, and from Matthew who asserted that it was to 
avenge the capture of Joscelin and Galeran.  
Again, these sources stated that both armies remained unaware of the pres-
ence of each other until the very end, but the Anonymous gives us to understand that 
Belek soon became aware of the king’s approach, having heard that he was at 
Kaisun, and went to the river of Sanja, between Kaisun and Samosata, to meet him. 
Like Matthew, he indicates that what took place there was not a pitched battle, but 
rather an ambush against the king and his retinue while they were detached from the 
main army. But whereas Matthew had reported the king to be on a falcon hunt, the 
Anonymous relates that he was marching ahead of his army with a few attendants, 
having crossed the bridge of Sanja. The rest of the cavalry, marching unhurriedly and 
without precaution, had not even reached the river. At this moment, says the Anon-
ymous, Belek’s troops in ambush suddenly “sprang on [the king] like twilight wolves 
from all sides, armed, equipped, howling for booty,” and captured him along with his 
nephew and many others, while just as many were killed. The chronicler states in 
parallel with Matthew that Belek took the king before Gargar to make him surrender 
the castle, and reveals that he had recourse to torture for this purpose. Installing a 
garrison in Gargar, Belek then took the king and the other captives to Kharput. where 
they were imprisoned by Joscelin and Galeran.  
Interestingly, the Anonymous reports that after Belek had placed Joscelin in 
prison and was about to leave Kharput he had told him: “I shall bring the king to you, 
God willing.” And now, about six months later, Baldwin indeed joined Joscelin and 
Galeran in prison. If true, and not simply a bit of hindsight on the part of the author, 
this anecdote would show Belek’s degree of self-confidence in his struggle against 
the Franks. Perhaps it might also serve as evidence that Belek had adopted it as a part 
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of his strategy to try and capture these princes, as a way of barring the tide of Frank-
ish aggression following Ilghazi’s death.                
At this point the Anonymous makes a short digression to praise the peace and 
security brought to the lands of Gargar by Belek’s rule, stating that the region was 
freed from the thiefs and brigands who had been robbing the poor. He also draws at-
tention to the care Belek took to ensure the safety of local Christians against the har-
rassment of his Turkomans, impaling any who would take the smallest bit from a 
poorman, and even prohibiting any verbal abuse against them. The rationale for this 
policy of Belek toward the indigenous Christians under his rule has already been dis-
cused in the previous section.    
In contrast to Matthew, who presented the rescue operation undertaken by the 
Armenian group from Behisni as an initiative of their own, the Anonymous asserts 
that they concocted this plot with Geoffrey the Monk and Baldwin’s queen Morphia, 
who was an Armenian herself. The involvement of Morphia in the plot is indeed also 
corroborated by Orderic Vitalis, as we shall see. Whereas Matthew stated that the 
group consisted of fifteen men who went to the castle like quarreling plaintiffs, the 
Anonymous indicates that they were twenty, disguised as poor peasants, with ten of 
them carrying grapes, fruit, and fowls. He relates that these latter ten went to the cas-
tle as if they wanted to complain of their governor, saying that he was oppressing 
them and doing them wrong; the others had stayed back to join them when the work 
began. Hearing their purpose in coming, the porter at the upper gate of the citadel 
instructed them to wait between the gates while the governor of the castle was in-
formed. There was a banquet going on inside, with wine taking its effect on the gov-
ernor and his officers, and all guards except for two or three at the gate were watch-
ing the banquet. Taking advantage of this situation, while the porter was away, the 
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Armenians seized the swords hanging between the gates, killed the guards, called 
their companions waiting outside and, closing the gates of the citadel, rushed on the 
diners to slaughter them all. This version of how the Armenians penetrated the castle 
is quite different from that of Matthew, apart from the element of pretended com-
plaint common to both, and the circumstantial details provided by the Anonymous 
render it more plausible.  
The Anonymous proceeds to relate that the Armenians released the prisoners 
and gained mastery over the citadel. Like Matthew, he notes that many of the Arme-
nians of the town who were able to enter the citadel joined them as well. But whereas 
Matthew stated that the Turks in the vicinity fled to other regions upon hearing the 
news, the Anonymous asserts that they “came night and day from all sides and in-
vested the castle closely, so that none could go in or out.” This latter version seems 
more acceptable as it is also corroborated by Michael the Syrian and Fulcher of 
Chartres. As we shall see, the latter adds the detail that Joscelin sent back a compan-
ion with his ring to inform Baldwin that he had managed to slip through the besieg-
ers. The Anonymous himself reports that on the night of the seizing of the castle Jos-
celin left on foot with two or three companions, and succeeded in breaking through 
the surrounding ring of enemies; “God willed that he could escape” remarks the 
chronicler. He also mentions an oath Joscelin swore to the king, similar to that re-
ported by Ibn al-Adim, to the effect that he would not rest till he had brought back an 
army from Jerusalem to relieve them. When the count reached that city via Kaisun, 
Tell-Bashir and Antioch, the Anonymous reports, all rejoiced about the imminent 
liberation of Baldwin and Galeran, as well as the riches to be captured from the great 
wealth hoarded at Kharput. That the riches stored in Kharput made a strong impres-
sion on the Franks is also revealed by Orderic Vitalis’ half-legendary account as well 
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as by Ibn al-Athir’s report that Baldwin, greedy to seize all the wealth in the castle, 
refused Joscelin’s offer to escape carrying all they could.               
But Belek set out at once upon learning what had happened at “his strong 
fort, the capital of his kingdom, the treasury of his wealth,” the Anonymous says, and 
reached it in only four days, ten days after the fall of the citadel. This period is still 
shorter than the fifteen days indicated by Matthew, but does not seem plausible given 
the fact that the messenger bearing the news had only reached Belek’s camp ten days 
after the event, on 7 August. The Anonymous relates that Belek, trying to take the 
castle before the arrival of the Frankish reinforcements, set up great engines that bat-
tered the walls non-stop, but he fails to mention the mining operations reported by 
Matthew and other sources. He states that Belek finally made a breach in the wall by 
this means, but being unwilling to take the citadel by force and cause it by damage to 
lose its defensive capacity, offered safe conduct to those inside. When they still re-
fused to surrender, the great tower over the water supply was razed to the ground, 
depriving the besieged of their last hope. Accordingly Galeran came in person to re-
quest what they had rejected before. This suggests that the besieged may have been 
rendererd desparate when the castle’s water supply was blocked by the debris accu-
mulated on it.  
The Anonymous goes on to relate that Belek gave his word of honor to spare 
the lives of those inside, and the castle was surrendered on 16 September 1123. 
Without comment, he then reports how Belek contravened his promise of safe con-
duct and punished the Armenians from Behisni by torturing and flaying them alive. 
But it could also be that Galeran had requested the safe conduct only for behalf of 
himself, the king and a few other Franks. The Anonymous indicates in any case that 
Baldwin and Galeran as well as some of their companions were returned unharmed 
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to where they had been imprisoned. He was apparently unaware that they were taken 
to Harran.           
In the meanwhile, the Anonymous notes, Joscelin was on his way to Kharput 
with the reinforcements he had gathered from Jerusalem. Passing by Aleppo, he 
camped for three days on the hill of Jawshan opposite its west gate, and exacted trib-
ute from the townsfolk. According to the chronicler, it was at this point that he 
learned of Belek’s recovery of Kharput. However, it does not make sense that Josce-
lin should have delayed for three days outside Aleppo when he was hurrying to reach 
Kharput before Belek. Accordingly, it seems more plausible to accept with Ibn al-
Adim that he turned back from Tell Bashir towards Aleppo on receiving the news. 
This might also serve to explain his sacrilegious depredations around the city, proba-
bly calculated to hit the Aleppans on a particularly sensitive spot to exact retaliation. 
The Anonymous mentions these depredations briefly, revealing that beside the mau-
soleums and gardens, reported by Ibn al-Adim, he also destroyed two mosques on the 
hill of Jawshan, one built for Ridwan and the other called Dakka.
38
 This additional 
information also clarifies why Ibn al-Khashshab ordered almost all of the churches in 
Aleppo to be converted into mosques, as we have seen Ibn al-Adim relate. According 
to the Anonymous, the qadi told the Christians of the city to rebuild these two 
mosques, but the church treasurers objected. Their grounds were that this would set a 
precedent for the use of church funds to finance the reconstruction of any other 
mosque to be destroyed in the future. 
The Anonymous’s report of what happened next reveals that the conversion 
of the churches into mosques was not carried out in orderly fashion by the authori-
ties, which is the impression given by Ibn al-Adim’s testimony, but was in fact the 
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 This last must have been at the same place as the mausoleum that the count opened to rob and then 
burnt down according to Ibn al-Adim. 
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product of popular fervour, with thousands of Muslims volunteering for the task. 
This fact shows that the Franks’ targeting of mosques and mausoleums in a spirit of 
religious antagonism also caused the jihad fervour in Aleppo to pass beyond the cir-
cle of the learned and spread to the populace. The Anonymous relates that on Ibn al-
Khashshab’s orders, given significantly on a Friday, these Muslims rushed with axes 
and spades to the great church of St Jacob, broke the pulpit and the angels of the al-
tar, defaced the pictures, made a mihrāb in the south wall of the sanctuary, and pray-
ing there, turned it into a mosque. The same happened with the Greek church of the 
Theotokos and that of the Nestorians. The zeal of the populace did not stop there, the 
Anonymous says, and they proceeded to sack the churches and cells of the two bish-
ops in the city, one of them a Jacobite and the other a Melkite. The former fled upon 
this to Qal‘at Ja‘bar, and the latter to Antioch.      
8.2.1.7  Michael the Syrian 
Although Michael the Syrian’s account39 generally resembles that of the 
Anonymous, it diverges from the latter source as well as from the others considered 
so far on some critical points. Thus Michael states in parallel with the Anonymous 
that Joscelin was taking his bride, Roger’s daughter to Edessa, and notes that this 
was his second wife after the first had died. But whereas the latter stated that the 
count and Galeran began to pursue Turkish raiders and eventually confronted Belek, 
he asserts that the emir set up ambushes for Joscelin on the way and captured him. In 
contrast to all the other sources, Michael states that Joscelin was sent to Balu on his 
capture, but this might be a confusion stemming from the fact that twenty five com-
panions of Joscelin and Galeran were indeed sent to Balu as Matthew reports.  
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 Michael the Syrian, Chronique, 210-11. 
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At this point Michael provides valuable evidence that the capture of Joscelin 
endowed Belek with great prestige among the Turkomans, and caused them to flock 
to him in order to raid Frankish territories: “He sent [Joscelin] to Balu; and Belek 
obtained a great fame amongst the Turks. Tribes united around him, and they entered 
the lands of the Franks again.”40 Thus the Artukids’ confrontations with the Franks 
neighboring them seems to have increased their power through the Turkomans’ at-
traction to the prestige the Artukids gained thereby, as well as by the promise of boo-
ty. This is not so unlike the way in which the later Ottoman beylik in western Anato-
lia could grow in power thanks to its convenient position on the Byzantine frontier, 
which enabled it to draw new recruits from the freely roaming Turkomans who were 
eager to share in the prestige and booty to accrue from raids into ”infidel” territory.41 
But in the case of the Artukids, their attractiveness to the Turkomans diminished af-
ter they gave up Aleppo and after the subsequent collapse of the County of Edessa, 
events that ended their contiguity with the Franks. This was an important reason for 
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the decline of their former power and independence, as we shall discuss more at 
length in section 9.3.   
Under attack from the Turkomans who had flocked to Belek, Michael of Gar-
gar was compelled to hand over his fortress to Baldwin, who compenstated him with 
Duluk and installed a Frankish garrison in Gargar. After this, Michael relates, the 
king reassembled his army and came to drive the Turks from the territory of Hisn 
Mansur and Kaisun. All this accords with the Anonymous’s report that Belek’s 
troops were harrassing Gargar, Hisn Mansur and Kaisun, but Michael seems to tele-
scope the events and makes it appear as if Baldwin marched immediately upon tak-
ing over Gargar, without returning to Antioch. Relating the king’s capture, the chron-
icler fails to mention the fact that he had been separated from the main army. He 
simply states that Belek’s troops ambushed the Franks who were camping near the 
river Sanja, and massacring Baldwin’s companions, got hold of his person. Michael 
reports Belek’s capture of Gargar as well, but reveals that before this he had laid 
siege to Hisn Mansur and taken it by capitulation. Despite this, he remarks, “the cruel 
Turks took the people captive and burnt the city and the region.” As Demirkent 
points out, this is indeed plausible given that Hisn Mansur was on the road from 
Saruj to Gargar and much closer to the former town, near which Baldwin had been 
captured.
42
 Concluding this episode, Michael indicates that Baldwin was imprisoned 
with Joscelin and other Franks in a ditch in Kharput. 
After Baldwin’s capture, Michael notes, the Egyptians wanted to take ad-
vantage of the fact that he was in prison and his country without a master, and so 
ventured to capture Jerusalem and other places by sending forces over land and sea. 
Nevertheless, both of these forces were defeated, and Michael attributes this to the 
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aid of God. According to him it was “God and not man who annihilated” the great 
Egyptian land army as it was crushed before the people of Jerusalem, and he adds 
with importance that the latter had practised a week of fasting and prayer before the 
battle. He similarly attributes the timely arrival of the Venetian fleet to God’s dispo-
sition, and asserts that “God gave the victory to the Franks” in the ensuing battle at 
sea. After this, Michael notes, the strengthened Venetians even laid siege to Tyre to-
gether with the army of Jerusalem. The idea that God assisted the Franks against the 
opportunistic Egyptian attacks made in Baldwin’s absence is also found in the ac-
count of Fulcher, who expatiates at length on the theme of God as the true king of 
Jerusalem.  
About the seizure of Kharput by the prisoners, Michael presents a different 
version from those so far examined. According to this, the Armenians who rescued 
the prisoners were employed at the time to do some kind of work within the fortress, 
and it is not indicated that they had come from Behisni. These workers reportedly 
observed that the citadel was well-fortified, with only a few soldiers around, so they 
assembled near the gate on the pretext of complaining about their salary. Seizing the 
swords deposed there, they rushed forward to kill the guards at the gate, after which 
they ran to release Baldwin, Joscelin and the other captives. They then killed the 
Muslims and captured the citadel. However, Michael’s version does not seem plausi-
ble as it begs the question why the Armenians had to begin by killing the guards at 
the gate if they were already admitted inside as workers.  
Michael relates like the Anonymous that the Muslims in the town assembled 
after the seizure of the citadel to attack the Christians. Despite this Joscelin managed 
by means of a trick to go out at night with an Armenian companion. He had sworn to 
Baldwin to return with an army to defend the castle, if they could, or to take him 
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away if otherwise. Following his departure Belek arrived to batter the walls with four 
mangonels, and upon their collapse the Franks came out. After the emir had tortured 
the prisoners and massacred seventy of them, Michael reports in conclusion, he re-
turned in haste with Baldwin, Galeran and the king’s nephew, being in a hurry to 
ravage all the Frankish territories.  
8.2.1.8  Bar Hebraeus  
Bar Hebraeus’s account about Belek’s capture of Baldwin, Joscelin and Ga-
leran
43
 is rather confused. Although the author generally follows Michael the Syrian, 
he tells the events as though it was only Joscelin’s bride who got caught in Belek’s 
ambush as the count was taking her from Antioch to Edessa. The woman was sent to 
Balu, Bar Hebraeus asserts, while Joscelin himself was captured only the next year, 
after Belek had ambushed the king in his camp by the river Sanja. Upon Baldwin’s 
capture, he relates, Joscelin and Galeran prepared to meet the Turks for the entire 
summer of 1123, but in the battle that followed they were defeated by Belek and sent 
to Kharput to join the king in prison. Considering that Bar Hebraeus’s version and 
chronology are contradicted by all the other sources, they must be rejected.  
The rest of Bar Hebraeus’s account, comprising the revolt in Kharput and its 
suppression, is almost identical with that of Michael the Syrian. The only difference 
is that he fails to mention the oath Joscelin swore to the king before his departure, 
promising to return with an army to defend the castle or alternatively to take away 
the king, according to their strength vis-à-vis the Turks. Instead he cites the first part 
of this promise out of its context to assert that Joscelin sought out the Frankish army 
in order to defend the castle and take full control of it in the king’s name. He also 
asserts wrongly that Belek made for Manbij after suppressing the revolt, taking along 
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Baldwin and Galeran, although the emir would not go there before the following 
spring.    
8.2.1.9  Fulcher of Chartres  
In his account
44
 Fulcher relates the capture of Baldwin, Joscelin and Galeran 
very briefly, but dwells at great length on the revolt in Kharput, handling it in con-
formity with the contemporary view of history as “serious entertainment.” In this 
connection he underlines the moral implications of the reduction of kings and counts 
to humble captivity. He also stresses the negligible effect of Baldwin’s capture on the 
ability of his kingdom to defend itself against Egyptian attacks, and points to God as 
the true king and defender of Jerusalem.      
The only information Fulcher gives about the capture of Joscelin and Galeran 
is that Belek, “striving with cunning and by means of an ambush, intercepted 
them.”45 While Joscelin was taken prisoner along with Galeran, a hundred of his men 
were killed. Fulcher reports Baldwin’s capture even more briefly, indicating that 
Belek also got hold of the king while the latter “had not expected this and was not 
prepared.” He adds that “nothing could have been more joyful to the pagans or more 
horrible to the Christians.” In an assembly at Acre, he notes, Eustace of Caeserea and 
Sidon was chosen as regent by the patriarch and other notables until Baldwin’s fate 
should become clear. Eustace was to die on 15 June and be replaced by William of 
Bures, lord of Tiberias.  
Fulcher then proceeds to relate the attack of the Egyptian land and sea forces 
on Ascalon, eager to take advantage of the king’s captivity. After having related how 
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these were defeated with the help of the Venetian fleet, he asserts like Michael the 
Syrian that God had helped the Franks in the king’s absence, but he dwells on this 
theme at much greater length and with rhetorical flourish, representing God as the 
veritable king of Jerusalem:  
Oh how good and glorious for men always to have God as their helper! Oh 
how “blessed are the people whose Lord is God” [Psalm 32:12]. For the pa-
gans said, “let us go and utterly destroy the Christian people and erase the 
memory of them from the earth. For they do not now have a king; the mem-
bers are without a head.” They spoke truly, for they did not believe that we 
had God for our king. We had lost Baldwin, but we had adopted God as King 
of all. We invoked Him in our necessity and through him we miraculously 
triumphed. Perhaps he was no king whom we had lost by accident, but He 
who recently won the victory is not only King in Jerusalem but over all the 
Earth. Truly we must confess that we have had in reality a King in battle, and 
have now and shall have, since in our undertakings we shall prefer Him to all 
others. For He is present always, present to all who call upon Him in truth. 
[Psalm 144:18] For He saw us in our humility afflicted greatly, and merciful-
ly considering our humility He freed us. [Psalm 114:6] Here he fought for us, 
and here he brought our enemies to naught… 
As in the case of Joscelin, Baldwin’s capture caused little disorganization in 
his state. Just as the Franks of Edessa had carried out incursions against the Butnan 
valley in Joscelin’s absence, those of Jerusalem warded off the two-pronged Egyp-
tian attack on Ascalon with Venetian help. Not content with this, they proceeded to 
besiege Tyre with the help of the Venetian fleet, and obtained its surrender at the end 
of a year.
46
 Nor was administrative life in Antioch and Edessa disrupted, although the 
king had been ruling them as well and was indeed “the centrepiece of the whole 
Frankish fabric” as Runciman puts it.47 With three out of four states deprived of a 
head (the exception being Pons of Tripoli), it was indeed a remarkable situation that 
the fabric in question remained intact. Whereas Fulcher attributes this to God’s lead-
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ership of the Franks, modern historians have more practically attributed it to the so-
lidity of the political and military structure of the Franks,
48
 the entrenchment of 
Frankish domination and the idea of monarchy,
49
 and finally the administrative abil-
ity of Baldwin and his predecessor
50
 that had made these possible.        
It is only after this point that the main body of Fulcher’s narrative begins, and 
it was probably a conscious choice on his part to touch upon the capture of Baldwin 
and Joscelin very briefly, while relating their revolt at length. Otherwise it cannot be 
imagined that the chronicler could draw upon so much information about the events 
after the revolt, but hardly any about those before it. We have seen Fulcher’s tenden-
cy to skip over the Franks’ defeats but to dwell at length on their successes also in his 
extremely brief report of the Battle of Ager Sanguinis and lengthy description of the 
subsequent Battle of Tell Danith. For the present case, nevertheless, Fulcher had yet 
another motive in doing so, an apologetic one: he states that the story of how Bald-
win and others escaped from Belek’s prison “by God’s mercy” is rather long, but 
“blessed with divine intervention and adorned with miracles.” Relating it at length 
after the report of the victory against the Egyptians would serve to show, through the 
divine interventions and miraculous events involved, that God was firmly behind the 
Franks in the Levant, both the people and their leaders. The victory against the Egyp-
tians had shown that God supported those Latin subjects who had been deprived of 
their princes, and the story of the escape would now demonstrate that He was behind 
the captured princes as well.  
According to Fulcher the rescue operation in Kharput was neither an initiative 
on the part of the Armenians of Behisni, nor a plot that these concocted in collabora-
tion with Geoffrey the Monk and the queen of Jerusalem, but a plan made by the cap-
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tives themselves in prison. These latter not only sought aid through messengers sent 
to friends in various localities, but also tried to conspire with the Armenians living 
around, so that in case they received aid from outside, these Armenians would not 
desist from helping them as well.
51
  
After an agreement confirmed by gifts, promises and mutual oaths, Fulcher 
relates, fifty agents from Edessa were sent “very craftily” to Kharput for this matter. 
Disguised as humble pedlars, they managed to reach as far as the doors of the citadel. 
Here the commander of the guard was carelessly playing chess with a collaborator of 
the Franks, and approaching him on the prextext of complaining about an injury done 
to them, they slew him with daggers. As they seized the lances found there and 
“without hesitation smote and slew manfully,” a great clamor and tumult arose, with 
the Turks hurrying to the scene, nearly a hundred of them, only to be cut down like 
their commander. The king and his companions were immediately released from 
prison and, with some of them still in chains, ascended to the top of the citadel to 
raise the “standard of the Christians.” When this happened, Fulcher states exultingly, 
“the truth of the matter was made manifest.” He also notes that in the citadel there 
was a wife of Belek, dearer to him than the others he had.
52
 This might be the basis 
of a legendary story found in Orderic’s account about how Belek’s three wives sup-
ported and advised the Franks.    
Before passing on to the story of Joscelin’s escape, Fulcher pauses to note 
that one night Belek had dreamed that the count was tearing out his eyes. When he 
reported this dream to his “priests” to learn its interpretation, they warned him that 
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something like this would indeed happen to him if he ever fell into Joscelin’s hands. 
Upon this, Fulcher relates, Belek sent some of his men to Kharput to kill Joscelin and 
ensure that this would never happen, but “thanks be to God” Joscelin had already es-
caped by this time. No doubt, the story of this dream was meant to prepare the 
ground for Fulcher’s story of Belek’s last battle with Joscelin, which erroneously 
shows the emir being defeated and killed. As we shall see, a similar dream is men-
tioned by Orderic Vitalis, along with a likewise fictitious report on Belek’s manner 
of death.       
Fulcher states like most of the other Christian sources that the castle was sur-
rounded by the Turks immediately after the revolt, blocking all exit and entry. Under 
these conditions, he relates, the king and his men took counsel about the way to save 
themselves. In accordance with their decision, Joscelin stole away from the castle at 
night with three servants. Placing his life in danger, and “with fear as well as bold-
ness,” he slipped through the besiegers in the moonlight, and in order to assure the 
king of his safety, sent him his ring with one of the servants. Fleeing and hiding, 
marching mostly by night, the count reached the Euphrates, Fulcher notes, his shoes 
were so worn out as to leave him almost bare footed. As he did not know how to 
swim and there were no boats around, he crossed the river on inflated wine-skins, 
supported by his companions on each side. Exhausted, starving, thirsty, and out of 
breath, with nobody around to help him and his companions, Joscelin sent one of the 
servants to find a peasant and buy bread. Then he dropped off to sleep under a tree, 
not forgetting to camouflage himself with brambles and brush.              
Fulcher proceeds to relate that the servant indeed found an Armenian peasant 
and brought him to Joscelin, but the man happened to recognize the count despite the 
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latter’s protestations to the contrary. Finally Joscelin relented, however, and related 
the story of his captivity and escape. He begged the peasant not to betray him but in-
stead to lead him in safety to Tell Bashir, and promised him money as well as new 
properties in his domain. The peasant replied that he would help Joscelin without 
taking anything in return, because the count had once kindly allowed him to eat 
bread with him and now he wanted to return this kindness. At this point Fulcher ap-
parently intended his readers to draw the moral that the great should treat even the 
humblest of their subjects kindly, considering that they might one day become so 
lowly as to require their help. We shall see that he touches upon this theme in two 
further instances  in his account.  
The humble peasant even wanted to feast the count with a pig, Fulcher con-
tinues, but the latter rejected this in order not to arouse suspicion amongst the poor-
man’s neighbors. In accordance with the agreement they made, the Armenian went to 
bring back all he had, his wife, little daughter and two brothers, as well as a small ass 
and two oxen, entrusting himself to Joscelin whom he called “a man prudent and 
most wise.” Reporting that the count mounted the peasant’s little ass, Fulcher cannot 
help observing that in former days he had been accustomed to ride the finest mule. 
He notes that Joscelin carried the baby girl to appear as if he were her father and thus 
to camouflage himself better. For some time, however, he was concerned about the 
crying and screaming of the baby, considering whether it would be safer to proceed 
alone. But he was unwilling to upset the peasant, and so endured the situation until 
Tell Bashir. Upon the count’s arrival there, Fulcher states with a melodramatic flour-
ish, “we cannot doubt with what great joy all rejoiced, what tears flowed for very 
joy, and what sighs there were.” The peasant was also remunerated without delay for 
his kindness, receiving two yokes of oxen in place of his existing one.          
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Fulcher goes on to relate how Joscelin proceeded from Tell Bashir to Antioch 
and then to Jerusalem, where he thanked God and made an offering of his two fetters 
on Mount Calvary, “in memory of his captivity and the glory of his liberation.” In-
terestingly, Fulcher indicates that one of these chains was made of silver. If true, this 
could be an evidence for the honorary treatment accorded to captives of high rank by 
Belek and possibly other Muslim emirs. After this, Fulcher reports, Joscelin hurried 
with the army of Jerusalem and the Holy Cross to the aid of Baldwin and others in 
Kharput. Before proceeding further, he returns to the morals to be derived from such 
cases of the great toppled from their position, and drives home the point:  
Blessed be the universal God who so regulates His will and His power that 
when He wishes He casts down the mighty from on high and raises the lowly 
from the dust. So in the morning Baldwin ruled as king; in the evening, how-
ever, he served as slave. No less happened to Joscelin. It is quite clear that 
nothing in this world is certain, nothing stable and nothing agreeable for long. 
Consequently it is not good to sigh for terrestrial goods, but it is better to 
keep the heart always turned toward God. Let us not put our trust in worldly 
goods lest we lose eternal life. 
Fulcher goes on to relate that the army of Jerusalem joined with the troops of 
Tripoli and Antioch in the latter city and proceeded to Tell Bashir. When they arrived 
there, however, they learned that the king had been captured again and imprisoned in 
Harran.
53
 Upon this they turned around to Aleppo, Fulcher reports in parallel with 
Ibn al-Adim and the Anonymous Syriac, and “desiring to gain something for them-
selves,” devastated and destroyed everything outside the walls. They also warded off 
a sortie made from inside. At this point the troops of Jerusalem decided to return 
home, suffering a shortage of food and having nothing left to accomplish. Fulcher 
reports a raid that they carried out on their way against the Muslims east of the Jor-
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dan. He also notes that Joscelin stayed behind in the territory of Antioch, and we 
have already seen Ibn al-Adim relate the raids he made against Aleppo and Shabakh-
tan.    
Returning to the events at Kharput, Fulcher relates that Belek hurried to this 
castle upon learning what had happened. At first he tried peaceful methods, promis-
ing to grant the king hostages and safe conduct to Edessa or Antioch if he would 
hand over the castle. When this offer was refused, he reportedly went wild with rage 
and threatened to storm the castle to exact vengeance from Baldwin and the others. 
Accordingly he ordered mining operations to be conducted on the rock underlying 
the castle. When the props supporting the mine were set to fire, the nearest tower col-
lapsed with a loud crash.  
As the flames flared up amongst the debris, Fulcher states deploringly, the 
king was terrified by the unexpected event and chilled by his disappointment and de-
jection, with the result that both he and his men “lost their courage along with their 
judgment.” In this state of mind, Fulcher writes in a somewhat sardonic tone, they 
surrendered as suppliants to Belek’s mercy, “expecting nothing more than punish-
ment according to their deserts.” He reports that Belek spared the lives of Baldwin, 
his nephew and Galeran, but took vengeance on the Armenians who had aided them 
by hanging, flaying, or cutting them in two. The king and his companions were then 
taken to Harran. Fulcher’s testimony about Belek’s method of capturing the castle 
and the punishments he meted out to the Armenians is confirmed by Matthew’s ver-
sion.        
Fulcher concludes his account with the interesting proviso that on account of 
the event’s distance from Jerusalem, he had experienced difficulty in acquiring cer-
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tain information about it. Despite this, the chronicler assures his readers, he had set 
down what others had told him as exactly as possible.    
8.2.1.10 William of Tyre  
William of Tyre mostly follows Fulcher of Chartres in his account, but does 
not seem wholly dependent on him. Apparently he could draw upon other sources as 
well, and some of these may have been the descendants of the actors involved in the 
event, notably Baldwin II and Joscelin I.   
Whereas Fulcher had given short shrift to the capture of Joscelin and Galeran, 
William skips it altogether and begins directly with the story of how Baldwin came 
to be captured. He relates that the people of Antioch sought help from the king 
against Belek, “a magnificient and powerful Turkish prince,” who was harassing the 
region with frequent incursions. At this point Willliam reveals that Belek had cap-
tured Joscelin and Galeran by a surprise attack, and explains that it was this event 
that had rendered him so confident in his raids. Upon Baldwin’s arrival in the north, 
he continues, Belek lessened his activity and avoided a direct confrontation with him. 
The historian attributes this to the emir’s knowledge of the difficulty of defeating the 
king, who was renowned for his success in battles. Despite this, he notes, Belek fol-
lowed the king at a distance with his light-armed horsemen, being on the lookout for 
an opportunity to injure his troops. Apparently William was unaware of the fact that 
Belek was besieging Gargar at the time, and tells the story as if he had been follow-
ing Baldwin from the start.        
Due to this lack of information William also fails to report that the king’s mo-
tive in marching towards the Jazira was to raise the siege of Gargar, as the Muslim 
sources state, or to bring corn supplies in aid to it, as the Anonymous indicates. Nor 
does he claim like Matthew of Edessa that Baldwin intended to avenge Joscelin and 
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Galeran. William’s explanation is rather that the king wanted to put the defences of 
the County of Edessa in order and thus to assist its people who were deprived of a 
leader. He relates that Baldwin first took care of the cis-Euphratian part of the Coun-
ty where he examined the conditions, ensuring that the fortresses were well defended 
and adequately provided with arms and provisions. Then the king crossed into Meso-
potamia for the same task, but while he was on the way one night, accompanied by 
his private following, all sleepy and marching incautiously, they were suddenly at-
tacked by Belek. William explains that the emir had received intelligence of their 
march and laid an ambush. In this way he was able to take advantage of the unpre-
pared condition of Baldwin’s escort, and as they fled in different directions, carried 
off the king.  
This version of the events cannot be accepted, however, since William seems 
to be confusing the campaign in which Baldwin fell captive with the trip he made 
seven months earlier, after Joscelin’s capture, to put the defences of Edessa in or-
der.
54
 Cahen seems to have been misled by William on this point when he states that 
the king, after he had established Geoffrey the Monk in Edessa as his lieutenant, 
marched to drive off the Turkish raiders on the plateau north of the Euphrates, but 
was captured just after crossing the Sanja river.
55
 William notes that Baldwin was 
imprisoned along with Joscelin and Galeran in Kharput, and reports like Fulcher that 
Eustace Garnier was elected regent in Acre “until the dayspring from on High should 
visit the king and restore him to liberty.”   
William diverges from the previous sources in reporting more than one ver-
sion of how the captives in Kharput were rescued by the Armenians, without directly 
committing himself to one of them. Thus he first relates an account reminiscent of 
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Matthew’s version that certain Armenians, upon hearing that the “great chiefs of the 
Christian faith were being held in captivity,” courageously resolved on their own to 
attempt a rescue and made a plan for that purpose. However, William also reports in 
a way reminiscent of Fulcher’s account that it was Joscelin who summoned them 
from his prison, promising a very liberal reward to induce them to undertake this 
dangerous task. William does not indicate whether the Armenians’ hometown was 
Edessa or Behisni, but like Fulcher gives their number as fifty. He also cites Fulcher 
in stating that according to one version these men gained admittance into the fortress 
as merchants selling cheap wares.  
Nevertheless, William also presents another version of how the Armenians 
managed to penetrate the castle. According to this they went to the castle disguised 
as monks, in tears but with daggers hidden under their robes, as if to complain to the 
governor about the treatment they had received at the hands of certain individuals. 
Upon being granted entry to the castle, they cut down all who opposed them and re-
leased Baldwin and Joscelin. The Turks living around hurried to besiege the citadel 
until Belek’s arrival, William relates citing Fulcher, but Joscelin managed to set out 
with three companions to bring aid, as the king had decided, and sent back his ring 
with the third companion to report his success in eluding the enemy.             
Unlike Fulcher, William does not continue with the story of Joscelin’s escape 
at this point, but proceeds to relate how Belek recovered Kharput. He cites Fulcher’s 
tale about Belek dreaming that Joscelin blinded him and sending men to execute the 
count, and uses this episode to explain how the emir got wind of the events; he re-
lates that the men he dispatched to cut off Joscelin’s head approached the citadel on-
ly to see that it had been taken by the captives. Thereupon they returned with speed 
to report this to Belek, who summoned his troops from all around and hurried to 
 562 
blockade the citadel. William follows Fulcher for the rest of the story, relating that 
Belek offered Baldwin and his companions safe conduct to Edessa if they peacefully 
surrendered the castle. But this was rejected by the king who trusted in the strength 
of the citadel, bolstered further by the captives. The enraged Belek then set the sap-
pers to undermine the cretaceous hill under the citadel, and when fire was set to the 
tunnel props, one of the towers collapsed. Immediately upon this the king made an 
unconditional surrender, for fear that the entire edifice might come down.  
Citing Fulcher, William indicates that Baldwin, his nephew, and Galeran 
were granted their life, but the “valiant and faithful Armenians” who had helped 
them were given over to torture. In addition to the tortures mentioned by Fulcher, he 
also states that some were buried alive and some used as targets for archery practice. 
“Though they suffered torture in this world,” the historian remarks, “these men had a 
sure hope of immortal life; though they were tried in a few things, yet, from another 
point of view, their reward was great.”       
William follows Fulcher also in the account of Joscelin’s march, albeit only 
in a shortened form and without the episode about the Armenian peasant who helped 
the count. Marching in constant fear and with great caution, he relates, Joscelin 
crossed the Euphrates on inflated wine-skins, and despite hunger, thirst and weari-
ness, finally reached Tell Bashir “by the mercy of God.” Proceeding via Antioch to 
Jerusalem, he begged the patriarch and the princes to send relief without delay. Upon 
his entreaties “the people of the entire kingdom assembled as one man,” William 
says, and taking along the Holy Cross as well as the reinforcemens, they marched to 
Tell Bashir. Here they learned about Belek’s recovery of Kharput. In order to have 
accomplished something before returning home, they decided to attack the city of 
Aleppo on their way. After defeating the populace who made a sortie against them, 
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they stayed four days before the city despite the further efforts of the defenders. Wil-
liam ends his account with Fulcher’s report of the foray that the returning troops of 
Jerusalem made into Muslim territory across the river Jordan.              
8.2.1.11 Orderic Vitalis  
Orderic Vitalis’ account56 smacks strongly of legend, and is quite confused in 
chronology and otherwise. And yet it is interesting for the impressions of Belek and 
his world that it conveys from distant Normandy, where Orderic was writing.      
It is interesting to observe at the beginning of Orderic’s account that he 
knows Ilghazi to have been the shihna of Baghdad, even though he confuses him 
with Belek. He also seems aware of the marriage of Ilghazi and then Belek with 
Ridwan’s daughter, though he falsely states that it was through this marriage that 
Belek received his “kingdom” of Aleppo.57 His next statement that the emir “waged 
fierce war against the Christians for a long time” is also applicable to both Ilghazi 
and Belek, perhaps more to the former given the indication “for a long time.”     
With considerable chronological confusion, Orderic makes it appear as if 
Belek’s siege of Manbij on the eve of his death had begun before his capture of the 
Frankish leaders. He also arouses the impression that all the princes were captured 
around the same time. According to his version, “this old warrior” was besieging 
Manbij and “taking pride in the losses of Christians” when he learnt that Baldwin, 
Joscelin and others were coming to Edessa to celebrate the Easter festival there. So 
he withdrew quietly from the siege with forty thousand men, and first captured Jos-
celin and Galeran on the advance guard. Then he hid in a thick wood “like a wolf” to 
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ambush the unsuspecting king at the bridge in that location. After the king was taken 
prisoner with thirty-five nights, Orderic relates, Belek dispatched his troops like 
“raging tigers” to slaughter the chaplains and unarmed men who had preceded the 
king and his escort. He points out as significant that these were all “butchered like 
sheep on Holy Saturday.” Again with chronological confusion, he asserts that Belek, 
“overjoyed at his great fortune,” took the captives first to Harran and then to 
Kharput. The fine and very well fortified tower found here, he informs his readers, 
was “one of the most famous citadels anywhere of those that make the glory of ty-
rants.”    
Orderic indicates that the Frankish prisoners stayed in Kharput for a year, and 
counts among them, alongside Baldwin, Joscelin and Galeran, also Pons, vicomte of 
Gavarret; the young knight Gervase of Dol; Guy the Breton, son of Count Alan; and 
thirty-two other knights. These latter, especially Gervase of Dol and Guy the Breton 
are probably based on real figures whose stories later got embroidered in literature 
and acquired a legendary character. Claude Cahen indicates that episodes involving 
them in Orderic’s work bear a close resemblance to those in the chansons des chétifs, 
having probably been garnered by the historian from the jongleurs he personally 
met.
58
 Orderic also notes that the Franks encountered forty Armenian and Jacobite 
prisoners captured previously and brought to Kharput.  
Again with chronological confusion, Orderic states that Belek assembled a 
great army after this and went to besiege Zardana. This is no doubt a reflection of the 
campaign that Ilghazi had made in 1122 against that castle, taking along Belek with 
him. Nevertheless, Orderic’s relation of the episode is still interesting for its perpec-
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tive of religious confrontation. He asserts that Belek believed the Christians to be 
leaderless, and so hurried to attack them, but his long siege of the town proved un-
fruitful as “the mighty Lord of Hosts strengthened the Christian garrisons.”  
As for the prisoners back in Kharput, Orderic has apparently lots of things to 
relate about them, albeit mostly of a legendary character. Before leaving Kharput 
Belek entrusted them to three hundred and fifty knights, he asserts, and ordered these 
latter to starve the king into surrendering the castles in his hands. The other Franks 
save Joscelin were assigned to perform daily tasks under guard, like carrying water, 
and since they obeyed the commands given and cheerfully carried out their duties, 
the “pagan guards” treated them kindly and fed them well, as one would do with 
good beasts of burden. The guards also treated the carefully watched king and count 
with respect, Orderic states, since Baldwin gave meals to all three hundred and fifty 
of them, as well as other prisoners, with the desire to purchase their goodwill. In turn 
the guards disobeyed Belek, who had ordered the king to be allowed food only on 
Sundays and Thursdays, and secretly feasted Baldwin on the other days as well. Or-
deric also notes the interesting but rather doubtful detail that the emir of Qal‘at Ja‘bar 
(Salim ibn Malik), who was reportedly the uncle of a wife of Belek’s, assisted Bald-
win by sending him a hundred bezants every week.      
So much for the relatively positive portrayal of the “pagan guards” in Or-
deric’s narrative. It was out of cunning calculation that the “heathens” often regarded 
the Christians with favor, Orderic stresses again, and utters a curse: “may their dog’s 
faith perish eternally!” He relates how, during their festivals, they had twice picked 
up a Christian knight by lot, and binding him to a stake, made sport of the hapless 
man by shooting arrows at him. This episode might in fact be related with the pun-
ishments Belek meted out to the Franks and Armenians after his recovery of 
 566 
Kharput, since their use as targets for archery practice is mentioned by William 
among these punishments. Whatever the case, Orderic uses this episode as a conven-
ient transition from his almost idyllic depiction of the prisoners’ life to the relation of 
their uprising, and puts it forward as the reason why they finally decided to revolt: 
stricken with grief upon seeing their companions perish in this way, the captives had 
supposedly “resolved that it was far nobler to die than to live wretchedly.”  
According to Orderic’s dubious version of the revolt, the captives thus finally 
renewed their courage, and after making the guards drunk on one Sunday, following 
a royal banquet, they killed them all with the aid of the Jacobite and Armenian pris-
oners, gaining mastery of the entire citadel. Not content with this, and contrary to all 
the other sources, Orderic adds that they next burst out into the lower city, slaughter-
ing “many thousands of pagans” and taking their goods as booty (although the actual 
habitants of Kharput were mostly Armenians). In this way, he claims, the captives 
were able to hold the castle for eight months before they dispatched Joscelin and 
Geoffrey le Grele (this might be the same person as Geoffrey the Monk, given that 
“grele” meant pock-marked and Geoffrey the Monk himself was a leper) to seek help 
from ”all Christendom.” In this connection Robert Nicholson questions whether Jos-
celin was indeed accompanied by Geoffrey le Grele, arguing that the danger of their 
being noticed by the enemy would have been increased.
59
 But we have seen the other 
Latin sources state unequivocally that Joscelin was accompanied by three others on 
his escape, one of whom later returned to report the count’s safety to the king.   
Another element in Orderic’s version that seems to have a basis of truth is his 
report that the queen of Jerusalem, an Armenian by birth, sent “a thousand trustwor-
thy Armenians in Turkish clothes with Turkish weapons” to help her husband. Enter-
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ing the citadel upon reaching Kharput, these proved to be of great help to the Franks 
“because of their knowledge of the language and cunning ways of the Turks.” Evi-
dently the number of the Armenians is grossly exaggerated, and Orderic does not re-
veal that it was these men rather than the captives who took the initiative in the res-
cue operation and killed the guards, but still he seems to corroborate the Anony-
mous’s report that Baldwin’s queen played an active role (together with Geoffrey the 
Monk ) in the dispatch of the Armenians on this mission.            
Orderic is the only source beside Fulcher to relate Joscelin’s encounter with a 
peasant while on his way to bring help. In his version, nevertheless, this is a Turk 
rather than an Armenian, traveling from Mesopotamia to Syria with his wife sitting 
on a little ass. On recognizing Joscelin, despite the latter’s denial, he reportedly told 
the count that he had been a servant in his house for a few years, being delighted to 
wait upon even the humblest of his dependants. Although he had eventually returned 
among his countrymen he was now on his way back to join the Christians, for his 
kinsfolk were “infidels” and he had been living more happily among the Christians 
than among them. This particular twist that Orderic gives to the story reveals once 
again the perspective of religious confrontation evident in his account of the seizure 
of the citadel. Presently we shall see him attribute a similar willingness to convert to 
Belek’s wives in Kharput.  
Orderic proceeds to relate how the Turkish peasant confessed that he had 
long been distressed by the misfortunes of Joscelin and his men, and was now willing 
to guide him to Antioch. The count and his “barbarian” companion cheerfully 
changed clothes upon this, and took turns in carrying the man’s six-year-old daughter 
as he led the way. Although Orderic asserts on the one hand that they were not rec-
ognized while passing through cities and castles, he also states paradoxically that the 
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count spoke to all they met on the journey and noble Christians followed him like 
humble slaves, “praying silently to the lord of hosts for the safety of the whole par-
ty.” This is no doubt another effort on the part of Orderic to emphasize Christian sol-
idarity, just like his report about how the indigenous Christian captives in Kharput 
had joined forces with the Franks to kill the guards. Upon arriving home, he states, 
Joscelin had the peasant baptized with his whole family, enriched them with great 
possessions, and betrothed the little girl with great honor to a Christian knight. Thus 
in Orderic’s romantic version Joscelin’s saving angel was rewarded with much more 
than the mundane gift of two yokes of oxen reported by Fulcher.      
Returning to Kharput to relate Belek’s recovery of the castle, Orderic indulg-
es in even more legendary material than so far in the account. We have seen Fulcher 
mention the presence of Belek’s dearest wife in the citadel of Kharput. Orderic raises 
this number to three, one of whom he says was “Fatima, the daughter of Ali the king 
of Medes,” who was the most beautiful and influential; the second was Ridwan’s 
daughter; and the third was the daughter of the emir of Qal‘at Ja‘bar (or his niece, 
according to Orderic’s previous indication about the emir’s relationship with Belek). 
It was reportedly Ridwan’s daughter who notified Belek of the revolt by means of a 
letter she sent attached to the neck of a dove. At the time, Orderic notes wrongly, the 
emir was besieging Zardana with a hundred thousand troops. Being alarmed on re-
ceiving the letter, he raised the siege at once and hurried back to Kharput, summon-
ing additional forces from far and wide to invest it for eight months.  
Orderic remarks that Baldwin and his men put up a noble defence against 
Belek’s siege, and were encouraged by the abundant riches and goods stored in the 
castle to stand their ground until Joscelin’s return. In a way that would seem congru-
ent with Ibn al-Athir’s assertion that the king rejected Joscelin’s proposal to leave the 
 569 
castle because of his greed for the wealth hoarded there, and also with the Anony-
mous’s report that the Franks in Jerusalem and elsewhere rejoiced over the wealth to 
be captured from Belek’s base, Orderic states that immense treasures were kept in 
great halls and chambers at the citadel: “heaps of gold and silver and precious stones, 
purple and silk, and an abundance of all riches.” Beside this, he indicates, an ingen-
iously designed underground canal supplied plentiful water for all needs, and there 
were enough bread, wine and meat stored to “feed a thousand knights for ten years.”  
Orderic relates that Belek was alarmed under these conditions and repeatedly 
entreated the king to release his wives. Interestingly the historian had no doubts that 
the emir shared the notions of courtly culture, only just budding at that time in Latin 
Europe, about the respect owed to the fair sex by honorable knights. “What a dis-
graceful crime to treat noble ladies with cruelty and oppress them shamefully!” he 
has Belek exclaim. “Why do you shackle queens of royal blood as if they were 
thieves or traitors? Your acts are a disgrace to your race and will be a shameful blot 
on your religion to the end of time.” He reportedly promised to withdraw for a year, 
until Joscelin would arrive, if his wives were restored to him.  
The king and his men were at a loss about how to respond to this proposal, 
Orderic relates, when Belek’s most beautiful and influential wife Fatima spoke up. 
She implored them not to pay heed to her husband’s false promises and informed 
them that the emir was in fact afraid that his wives’ relatives, lords of “the greater 
part of the lands of the East,” would fight to death with him should the Franks kill 
the women when he attacked them. Pointing out in addition the impregnability of the 
castle and the abundance of the arms and provisions stored in it, she warned the 
Franks to guard against the “deadly intrigues of [their] deceitful enemy” and to wait 
until the arrival of reinforcements. Like her husband, Fatima is also represented as 
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quite knowledgeable about the culture of chivalry in the making in contemporary Eu-
rope: Orderic shows her calling on the Franks to remember the “marvellous deeds of 
the heroic lords” chanted every day by their jongleurs, and to “fight bravely in Frank-
ish fashion… for fear that a shameful song should be sung about [them] in every 
land.”  
Passing to a different register, Orderic then relates how Fatima declared her 
willingness to “receive the heavenly sacraments of the Christians” if they could man-
age to escape safely with the Franks, being heartily joined in this by the other two 
wives. She reportedly asserted that they were “more willing to endure this imprison-
ment than to take part with idolaters in the worship of demons,” while they wel-
comed the Franks’ “kind customs” and “wished well to [their] faith and religion.” 
Thus, after Joscelin’s one-time Turkish servant, Orderic represents Belek’s wives as 
willing to embrace the Christian religion too. Whereas Fulcher used the whole story 
to press home the need of the great to keep in mind that they could be humbled one 
day, Orderic uses it as an opportunity to vindicate Christian faith through the mouth 
of “infidels.” He states that the encouragement provided by the words of these “alien 
women” profited the Christians, emboldening them to hold on to the citadel for many 
more days.   
Nevertheless, the historian states with a covertly critical tone that King Bald-
win was finally worn down, and yielding to Belek’s requests, returned his wives 
against their wish. The five knights who escorted them, including Guy the Breton 
and Gervase of Dol, were reportedly taken prisoner by the “tyrant… false Belek,” 
who gave them to the aforementioned “Ali, king of the Medes.” Sent by the latter to 
the caliph, who turned them over to the sultan, they received their freedom along 
with many rich gifts, and remained by the sultan for another three and a half years, 
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being honored greatly, before they returned to Antioch in the fourth year. At this 
point the historian offers a digression of highly legendary quality about the marvels 
and riches that the captives saw in the East and the admiration they attracted there, 
notably from the “daughters of kings.” Nevertheless, Orderic’s statement that David 
II of Georgia and Thoros of Armenia offered safe conduct to the captives on their 
way back to Antioch suggests that the princes in question may indeed have played a 
role in their ransoming, and so this story about the captivity of a number of knights at 
the hands of the Great Seljukids may have a grain of truth to it.
60
  
Upon their arrival in Antioch, Orderic continues, the captives learned that 
King Baldwin had again fallen into Belek’s hands, and his companions had been 
butchered. He goes on to relate how this had come to take place: when, after eight 
months, Joscelin set out with a great army for Kharput, having sent for aid to the 
Byzantine emperor John Comnenus as well as to the Greeks and Armenians living 
around, Belek had already laid siege to the castle and was entreating the king to sur-
render. He repeatedly promised to him on oath that he would be free to go wherever 
he chose and take whatever he asked for. Going over to explicit criticism this time, 
Orderic states that the king, “exhausted by the long imprisonment and too ready to 
trust the treacherous infidel, surrendered the tower to the scandal of the Christians 
and delight of the pagans.“  
When the captives emerged from the castle, Orderic continues, Belek ordered 
four teeth of the king to be drawn out, after which he was thrown into a dungeon to 
endure still worse hardships for another four years. He asserts that Galeran was also 
mutilated, with his left eye put out and the veins of his right arm cut off to prevent 
him from using a lance ever again. Orderic indicates that Galeran died after this op-
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eration, although we know from Michael the Syrian that he was actually executed by 
Timurtash two years later.
61
 He adds that Belek ordered the other knights, along with 
the forty Jacobites and Armenians, to be beheaded as well, and offers a prayer on 
their behalf: “May they live with Christ whose faith they confessed, and whom they 
served as long as they lived!” 
Orderic relates in conclusion that Joscelin received the news of the event on 
his way to Kharput, and stopped to break into loud lamentations with the entire 
Christian army. “The news of the calamity,” he says, “spread all over the world, 
causing Christians to mourn and pagans to rejoice.” Without mentioning the Franks’ 
depredations around Aleppo, he notes that a council was held after which the Frank-
ish army disbanded and each went about his own business.      
Considered overall, what is particularly notable in Orderic’s account is the 
sharp perspective of religious confrontation, with Belek being portrayed as a treach-
erous “infidel” waging fierce war against Christians, and with Muslims, including 
Belek’s wives, shown eager to embrace Christianity. 
8.2.2  The course of events  
In the light of these considerations, the following course of events seems 
plausible: while Belek was returning from the Syrian campaign after Ilghazi’s illness, 
he sent off the major part of his four thousand troops to plunder in the County of 
Edessa, particularly around al-Bira, while he himself remained with four or eight 
hundred troops near Saruj. Joscelin and Galeran were also on their way home, Josce-
lin having taken along Roger of Antioch’s sister as his second bride. When the two 
princes heard of the raids, and perhaps also of Belek’s presence thereabouts, Galeran 
urged Joscelin to pursue the Turks, since his lordship at al-Bira was the butt of ag-
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gression. Doing so, they reached the place where Belek was encamped with his re-
maining troops at a spot surrounded by marshes. When the Franks got stuck in the 
mud the Turks showered them with arrows, and Joscelin as well as Galeran were tak-
en captive (13 September 1122). Belek tried to exploit this hardly expected stroke of 
luck by pressing them to surrender Edessa and other places, but they refused and 
were imprisoned in a pit at his central base, Kharput. The other Franks taken captive, 
twenty-five knights in all, were taken to Balu, possibly along with Joscelin’s new 
wife. Upon this Baldwin came from Antioch to Edessa to put the defences of the 
County in order, installing there a garrison under the lord of Mar‘ash, Geoffrey the 
Monk, who was to act as regent for Joscelin.  
The king returned to the region about seven months later, when Belek rav-
aged the lands of Kahta and Hisn Mansur and laid siege to Gargar. The latter had 
been handed over by its Armenian lord to Baldwin, on account of the relentless dep-
redations carried out by Belek’s Turkomans. Not wishing to see Belek grow more 
powerful, Baldwin hurried north to raise the siege as well as to stop the ravages. 
Probably hearing of the king’s approach, Belek abandoned the siege for the time be-
ing and set out to confront him. The two armies came near each other around the 
bridge of Sanja, without being aware of each other’s presence at first. But the Turks 
eventually noticed the Franks and lay in ambush. Attacking the king as he was sepa-
rated from the main army with a small detachment, either because he had crossed the 
bridge in the vanguard, or perhaps because he had gone on a hunt after pitching 
camp, they caught him at Turush (18 April 1123). Belek had more success taking 
advantage of this opportunity than in the previous case, and received the surrender of 
Gargar on having Baldwin tortured in front of its walls; he had already received the 
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surrender of Hisn Mansur before this. Then the king and his nephew (probably Ma-
nasses de Hierges) were imprisoned in Kharput together with Joscelin and Galeran.  
After Baldwin’s capture Geoffrey of Mar‘ash assumed the regency of Anti-
och as well, while in the kingdom of Jerusalem regency was first given to Eustace of 
Garnier, lord of Caeserea and Sidon, and upon to his death to William Bures, lord of 
Tiberias. An opportunistic attack made by the Egyptians against Ascalon (May 
1123), in order to take advantage of Baldwin’s absence, was successfully warded off 
with the help of the Venetian fleet.   
Evidently, the capture of Joscelin and Baldwin did not jeopardize the three 
Frankish states that were deprived of a head, largely thanks to their solid political and 
military structure consolidated by Baldwin I and II. But it was still an important 
event insofar as it prevented the Franks from completing the encirclement of Aleppo 
and attacking it directly. Baldwin was hampered in his efforts to realize this plan by 
the increased administrative burden he had to shoulder after Joscelin’s capture, and 
Joscelin saw himself in a similar situation after his escape from Kharput. That Belek 
effectively acted as a good defender of Aleppo through his capture of these formida-
ble enemies is evident from the fact that the release of the king after his death was 
immediately followed by an ambitious siege of Aleppo that brought it to the brink of 
being taken. Belek also acquired great prestige among the Turkomans with this ac-
complishment, and they came to join him from all around to partake in his incursions 
against the Franks. This reveals one of the ways in which the Artukids profited from 
their contiguity with the Franks, when their contacts with Antioch and Edessa were 
at a maximum.     
In the months following Baldwin’s capture a plot was hatched to rescue the 
prisoners in Kharput, with varying degrees of contribution by Joscelin and other cap-
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tives, Baldwin’s Armenian queen Morphia, Geoffrey the Monk, and the Armenian 
troops in the nearby castle of Behisni. At a time when Belek was conveniently away 
in Syria with his troops, between fifteen and fifty men went from Behisni to Kharput, 
disguised according to different versions as monks/peasants desiring to complain of a 
certain injury inflicted on them, as sellers of wares, or as quarreling plaintiffs, and 
succeeded in penetrating the citadel by killing the guards at the gate. Their task was 
perhaps eased by the drunken state of the governor and the rest of the garrison who 
were holding a banquet. The prisoners were released and took hold of the citadel, be-
ing assisted in this by local Armenians from the lower city who joined them at this 
stage.  
But the Turks in the city and its environs immediately sent a messenger to no-
tify Belek, who was besieging Kafartab at the time, and hurried in masses to invest 
the castle closely. Either because of the quickness of this blockade, or their desire to 
weaken Belek by holding on to his headquarters and treasury as long as possible, if 
not for good, Baldwin and the other Franks did not attempt to flee. Instead they sent 
off Joscelin on the first night (28 July 1123) to collect reinforcements from Antioch 
and Jerusalem, so that he could return to garrison the castle, if possible, or at least 
take them away in safety. Slipping through the ranks of besiegers with a few com-
panions, and assisted by an Armenian peasant whom he met on his way, Joscelin 
managed to reach Tell Bashir and proceeded via Antioch to Jerusalem.  
Belek acted with remarkable speed, however, covering the distance between 
Kafartab and Kharput within a fortnight. His offer to grant safe conduct in return for 
the surrender of the castle was rejected by the king, who hoped to defend the appar-
ently impregnable citadel until Joscelin would arrive with reinforcements. It turned 
out to be not so impregnable as he had imagined, however, since the underlying rock 
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could be undermined, and consequently the tower on the water supply collapsed. 
Growing afraid that it would be followed by other sections of the walls, and probably 
also because the water supply was cut off by the debris, Baldwin sent Galeran to sur-
render the castle (16 September 1123). Only these two princes and Baldwin’s neph-
ew were left alive by the outraged Belek, who took them to a prison in Harran, while 
the rest were killed with various tortures.  
Joscelin and Geoffrey the Monk received the news only when they had 
reached Tell Bashir with the troops of Jerusalem and Antioch. In retaliation, and also 
to put the already assembled army to some use at least, they turned around to Aleppo 
and raided its territory for four days, also repelling a sortie made by the Aleppans. 
Some degree of religious animosity was displayed by the count in these raids, with 
the destruction of two mosques as well as mausoleums and tombs. Joscelin continued 
the depredations around Aleppo and in the Butnan valley even after the departure of 
the army of Jerusalem, and carried these ravages across the Euphrates, into Shabakh-
tan as well. One reaction of the Aleppans against his attacks was to make repeated 
sorties, although most of their horses assembled in al-Gharib were driven off by Jos-
celin and Alan of al-Atharib.  
The success of these sorties remained very limited, but the destruction of 
mosques and mausoleums also gave rise to a spirit of jihad among the populace, car-
rying it beyond the narrow circle of pietists who had so far promoted it: the qadi Ibn 
al-Khashshab demanded the Jacobite and Melkite churches in Aleppo finance the 
reconstruction of the destroyed mosques, but this was rejected in order not to create a 
precedent. When he took the retaliatory step of ordering the church buildings to be 
converted into mosques, thousands of volunteers showed up with with axes and 
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spades to carry out the order. The Jacobite and Melkite bishops also found them-
selves compelled to flee from the city. 
8.3  Belek’s takeover of Aleppo and other conquests in the meanwhile 
As we saw in the last chapter, the eastern frontier of the Principality of Anti-
och had finally been restored to its former extent through Badr al-Dawla Sulaiman’s 
cession of al-Atharib in April 1123. Perhaps the next step might have been a direct 
attack on Aleppo itself, even though the power balance in the north had shifted in 
favor of the Turks after Joscelin’s capture. But this possibility was nullified too 
when, just at this point, Baldwin himself was caught and sent to prison to join the 
count. Thus, at a time when Aleppo was still ruled by the highly inefficient Badr al-
Dawla Sulaiman, who was moreover deprived of the resources of Diyar Bakr that 
had been used by Ilghazi, Belek contributed greatly in effect to its defense against the 
Frankish offensive.  
Under these conditions it is not surprising that the first thing Belek undertook 
after the capture of the Frankish princes was first to seize Harran, which was a key 
strategic point for the communications between the Jazira and Aleppo, and then to 
take hold of Aleppo itself. The reason why he chose to do so, instead of directly at-
tacking the Franks, was both because he must have felt that he deserved better to rule 
Aleppo than his inefficient cousin, thanks to his already great services and ability to 
bring Turkomans from Diyar Bakr, and most importantly because it was only by ac-
tually holding the city that he could hope to provide it with the effective and steady 
support it needed against Frankish encroachments. As we shall see, this was exactly 
how Belek himself presented his purpose to the notables of Aleppo: not to annex it 
for self-aggrandizement, but to ward off the Franks from it. This statement does not 
necessarily need to be viewed with cynicism. Just as in the case of Ilghazi, Belek’s 
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strategy was strictly limited to the defense of Aleppo, without either making it his 
main center or using it as a base to try and expel the Franks from Antioch and else-
where. 
In this respect the criticism of some scholars that Belek did not adequately 
take advantage of his capture of the Latin princes and concomitant prestige to deliver 
the “death-blow” to the Franks seems hardly more justified than the criticism they 
direct at Ilghazi for having failed to attack Antioch after his victory at Ager Sangui-
nis. The most succinct example of this approach comes from Runciman who writes: 
“The emir Belek had conquered a vast prestige; but he used it, not to deliver a death-
blow against the Franks, but to establish himself in Aleppo.”62 Işın Demirkent simi-
larly remarks that Belek won a great success on behalf of the world of Islam and at-
tained to “inextinguishable fame” with his capture of the king, but then he could not 
take advantage of this superior position to deliver the death-blow to the Franks. Since 
the emir concentrated all his attention on seizing Aleppo, she says, his fight against 
them remained at an inadequate level.
63
 Coşkun Alptekin expresses the same view in 
his encyclopaedia article on Belek.
64
  
Such criticisms do not seem acceptable. We have seen in the previous section 
that the robust political and military structure of the Frankish principalities ensured 
that they remained intact and powerful even after being deprived of their original rul-
ers. Accordingly they were far from lying prostrate, waiting helplessly for the final 
“death-blow” to be delivered, as these scholars seem to assume. This is also demon-
strated by the raids that the Franks of Tell Bashir made against Aleppo upon Josce-
lin’s capture, or again by the siege of Tyre undertaken during Baldwin’s captivity. 
Belek himself must also have been aware that the strength of the Crusader states en-
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dured even after his capture of their leaders –– all the more so as he had not de-
stroyed an important Frankish army like his uncle Ilghazi. 
For the same reason, Demirkent and Alptekin are also unjustified when they 
assert that Belek’s aim after capturing Aleppo was to undertake an all-out offensive 
against the Franks, having bolstered his power in the meanwhile with his new city. 
Imad al-Din Khalil expresses a similar view when he states that Belek’s purpose in 
taking Aleppo was to use it as a base in Syria to achieve solid results in his jihad 
against the Crusaders, just as Ilghazi had managed to score many victories against 
them following his takeover of Aleppo.
65
 Belek’s aim, like that of Ilghazi, was not to 
make war on the Franks and score victories against them per se, but to defend Alep-
po against their encirclement and thus to ensure that they would not grow too power-
ful by capturing this strategically vital center. Getting hold of Aleppo itself was of 
course an indispensable step in this direction.   
     Once Belek took over Aleppo, therefore, he dedicated his efforts to the 
limited goal of pushing back the frontiers with Antioch, just as Ilghazi had done. But 
he adopted a different strategy than the one generally followed by his uncle: As-
bridge draws attention to the fact that throughout the period from June 1123 to May 
1124, when Belek ruled Aleppo, he “significantly made no attack to recapture either 
al-Atharib or Zardana.”66 These two castles lay to the west of Aleppo, and constitut-
ed the middle portion of its boundary with Antioch, which extended from Azaz in the 
north to the region of Jabal Summaq in the south. Apart from the unsuccesful cam-
paign of 1120 and a later raiding attack against Azaz, Ilghazi had mostly fought 
around al-Atharib and Zardana, variously capturing, defending, or trying to recapture 
them. But Belek began by attacking the southern end of the boundary line in ques-
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tion, first recapturing al-Bara, which had been taken by the Franks after Ilghazi’s 
death, and then besieging Kafartab: both of these castles lay in Jabal Summaq.  
This strategic choice of Belek was probably based on the same reason as that 
which had prompted Ilghazi to dispatch raiders against Azaz following his unsuc-
cessful attempt to recapture Zardana: both this fortress and al-Atharib, after its recap-
ture by the Franks, were effectively protected against sieges by the recently fortified 
monastery at Sarmada, as an army stationed there could threaten the besiegers from a 
safe position. Accordingly Belek’s next attempt to push back the Antiochene frontier 
bypassed these castles and targeted its other, northern end: Azaz. His offensive 
against that castle will be the subject of the next section.   
   
The Muslim sources provide the major part of our information on Belek’s 
movements after his capture and imprisonment of the king. Among these Ibn al-
Athir
67
 attributes the emir’s advance against Aleppo to his dismay at the surrender of 
al-Atharib by Badr al-Dawla Sulaiman. Fearing the Franks, who had been making 
many raids in Aleppan territory, and not being strong enough to deal with them, Badr 
al-Dawla had finally yielded this important castle to stop their attacks. Ibn al-Athir 
admits that the truce improved the situation of the populace in and around Aleppo, as 
provisions could be imported once again, but he points out that the significant loss of 
al-Atharib could only be recovered at the time of Imad al-Din Zangi. Upon this loss, 
he relates, Belek realized that his cousin was incapable of defending Aleppo, and 
therefore grew still more eager to get hold of the city. Accordingly he marched upon 
Aleppo in June 1123, after having taken Harran in the previous month to secure safe 
communications between Syria and his base in the Jazira. He closely encircled Alep-
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po, Ibn al-Athir relates, blocking supplies and burning the crops, and finally Badr al-
Dawla Sulaiman surrendered the city on terms on 1 Jumada I [27 June 1123]. Ibn al-
Athir notes in conclusion that Belek married Ridwan’s daughter and ruled the city 
until he was killed.     
 
The Aleppan historian Ibn abi Tayyi (cited by Ibn al-Furat) gives more de-
tailed information about the strategies that Belek had followed to get hold of Alep-
po.
68
 One of these was to place pressure on the citizens by a blockade and the terror 
of seeing men, women and children from the environs brought before the walls to be 
tortured and killed in their sight. As this method did not prove sufficient, however, 
Belek also established contact with the leading men in the city, assuring them that he 
did not want to take over Aleppo for self-aggrandizement, but only in order to ward 
off the Franks: “My aim concerning Aleppo is not the possession of it,” he is said to 
have affirmed; “I rather desire to drive the Franks away from it. And I swear to you 
that if I enter Aleppo, the only important thing for me will be to confront the Franks 
and disperse them.” Pace Väth, Belek does not seem to have meant by this statement 
that he intended to use Aleppo as a base to destroy the Franks by a general, all-out 
offensive.
69
 He rather declared his intention to defend Aleppo more effectively 
against their encroachments. This is corroborated by the policy that the emir fol-
lowed after his takeover of the city, as we shall see in this and the next section.  
If Ibn abi Tayyi is to be lent credence, being the sole source to report this, 
Belek finally obtained the surrender of Aleppo by an interesting strategem: he en-
tered the city disguised as a merchant of lambs, and in addition to examining the de-
fense works, started an intrigue with Ibn al-Khashshab and his friends. Thanks to 
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them a gate was secretly opened for his troops, and Sulaiman capitulated. Ibn abi 
Tayyi notes that the individual who opened the gate was a certain Ibn al-Khallal, who 
had acted with the silent collusion of Ibn al-Khashshab.   
 
Ibn al-Adim
70
 also seems to have been aware of Belek’s collaboration with 
agents from inside, but prefers to dwell on the pressure he applied on the city by 
blockade and depredations rather than on this other aspect of his strategy. He relates 
that Belek first camped to the south of the city. From here the emir proceeded to 
Banqusa and thence to Nairab and Jabrin, where he burnt down the crops and drove 
off the beasts of burden. A detachment of his troops made for Hadhadin, and when 
one of these was killed by a peasant upon seizing a goat, Belek ordered the villagers 
to be suffocated by smoke in the cave where they had taken refuge, a hundred and 
fifty people in all. The same fate befell the refugees in the caves of Tell Ubbud and 
Ta‘jin. Ibn al-Adim adds that Belek’s men also captured the women of Ufr Tannur as 
well as their children, selling some of them and enslaving the rest, while Belek him-
self drove off three hundred horses and livestock belonging to the people of Aleppo. 
As he burnt down the crops, moreover, prices in the city rose to great heights.  
Ibn al-Adim states that the city was finally handed over to Belek on Jumada I 
517 (26 June 1123), and gives the names of the men who did this as Muqallid ibn 
Saqwiq and Mufarrij ibn Fadl. That this was not a regular surrender but a betrayal of 
the city by collaborators from inside is revealed by the chronicler’s report of what 
followed. He relates that Belek’s rallying cry was raised from many directions in the 
city, while the emir forced open the Gate of Antioch and a breach was made in the 
walls to the west of the Gate of the Jew.  
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This account differs from that of Ibn abi Tayyi as regards the identity of the 
men who betrayed the city to Belek as well as the exact manner of his entry. But a 
comparison of the two reveals that Belek’s collaborators in the city raised his rallying 
cry from inside and his troops were allowed in through one gate or another. Whatev-
er the exact identity of the man or men who actively helped Belek from inside, they 
were in any case the members of the Shi‘ite faction in the city, the associates of Ibn 
al-Khashshab. The Sunnites in contrast were strongly attached to Badr al-Dawla 
Sulaiman, who had founded the first Sunnite madrasa in Aleppo, and they had been 
largely responsible for the staunch defense that Belek met in his attempts to take hold 
of the city.
71
 One reason why the Shi‘ites assisted Belek under these conditions may 
have been their wish to gain the upper hand over their Sunnite rivals, who had se-
cured the support of the present ruler, by replacing him with another more favorable 
toward themselves. Another motive of theirs may have been to acquire for the city a 
more efficient defender against the Franks than the “sluggish” Badr al-Dawla.72  
Nevertheless, this latter motive apparently played only a secondary role be-
side inter-confessional rivalry, as is revealed by the fact that the Shi‘ites later in-
trigued to shake off Belek’s overlordship while he was away in Kharput to deal with 
the revolt there. On his return, as a result, the Artukid took measures against them 
and expelled their leader Ibn al-Khashshab as well as the Ismailis in the city.
73
 The 
reason behind this volte-face on the part of the Shi‘ites of Aleppo was perhaps the 
failure of their expectations that Belek would follow a thoroughly pro-Shi‘ite policy 
in return for their assistance in his takeover. Apparently, the effective protection that 
Belek offered against the Franks was eminently dispensable for either the Sunnites or 
the Shi‘ites in their struggle to gain the ascendancy in the city. This fact also quali-
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fies the observation of Cahen and others that the prestige Belek gained from his cap-
ture of the king and count allowed him to seize Aleppo and Harran from his Artukid 
rivals.
74
 
Under these conditions, Belek’s initial promise to the notables of Aleppo that 
he wanted to take over the city to defend it against the Franks and not to possess it 
for himself, if sincere at all, proved self defeating: as long as he did not actually hold 
the reins of power in the city, there was always the danger that he could be replaced 
by another who happened to be more favorable toward one faction or another. Thus 
Belek’s expulsion of the qadi Ibn al-Khashshab along with Abu’l-Fadail ibn Badi‘, 
and his appointment of a native of Harran as ra’is of Aleppo, also meant an aban-
donment of his promise not to alter the existing power structure.
75
 Nevertheless, this 
was not Belek’s first attempt to secure full control of the city. Ibn al-Adim informs 
us that immediately after Badr al-Dawla’s departure from the citadel and Belek’s oc-
cupation of it on 4 Jumada I (29 June), he had undertaken measures to consolidate 
his rule in the city, sending off Sultanshah ibn Ridwan to Harran “because of his fear 
of him.” 
On the other hand, Belek did keep his promise to ward off the Franks from 
Aleppo. Once the emir had established himself in the city, Ibn al-Adim relates, he set 
out without delay for the region of Jabal Summaq, where he first attacked al-Bara. 
The lord of this town, captured by the Franks after Ilghazi’s death, was a bishop, 
perhaps Peter of Narbonne.
76
 Grousset suggests that this might have been the reason 
why Belek targeted that town first, expecting it to be less well-guarded for being 
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ruled by a clergyman rather than a warlord.
77
 However, this expectation seems ques-
tionable in light of the consideration that the lord of Mar‘ash, Geoffrey, was a former 
monk, and was none the less warlike for that. Väth asserts in turn that the lord of al-
Bara had become notorious for his particularly cruel handling of the Muslim popula-
tion, though he fails to indicate the source of this information, and adds that Kafartab 
was also more strongly fortified.
78
 However, the actual reason might simply have 
been the fact that al-Bara lay to the north of Kafartab and therefore became the first 
target of Belek as he advanced south from Aleppo.  
After Belek had captured al-Bara, Ibn al-Adim continues, he took the bishop 
prisoner and placed him under guard. As he proceeded to Kafartab, however, the 
man escaped by taking advantage of the guard’s negligence and took refuge in the 
same castle. Asbridge suggests that he may also have organized the defence of 
Kafartab.
79
 Ibn al-Adim states that Belek was determined to besiege the town until he 
recaptured the bishop, but then news arrived of the revolt of the prisoners at Kharput. 
What happened afterwards has been examined in the previous section.  
 
Another local chronicler of Aleppo, Al-Azimi,
80
 adds nothing new to the ac-
counts so far. He reports amongst the events of 517/1123-24 that Badr al-Dawla 
Sulaiman, who had taken over the citadel of Aleppo in the previous year, handed 
over the castle of al-Atharib to the Franks and made peace with them. He notes Bel-
ek’s capture of Harran in Rabi‘ I of this year (28 April – 27 May 1123). His next re-
port about the events concerned is that Belek besieged Aleppo and captured it in Ju-
mada I (26 June – 25 July). Taking the citadel from Sulaiman, he established himself 
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in it. Immediately after this, Al-Azimi states, Belek proceeded to camp at Ain al-
Sailam, probably on his way to Jabal Summaq. He reports that the emir attacked the 
castle of al-Bara, captured its bishop, and advanced on Kafartab. 
 
The account of the contemporary Damascene chronicler Ibn al-Qalanisi is 
similarly brief.
81
 Reporting the peace agreement that stipulated the cession of al-
Atharib, he praises its results: “Friendly relations were maintained on this footing, 
the provinces prospered on both sides, and the roads became safe for travellers be-
tween the districts of the two parties.” Indeed it is a marked attitude of Ibn al-
Qalanisi’s to approve of the establishment of peaceful relations between Muslims 
and Franks, on account of the prosperity and security it would bring to the common 
folk, even when it entailed serious compromises –– which is somewhat paradoxical, 
given the author’s generally confrontational religious approach. Ibn al-Athir may 
have been citing this passage as he noted how the Aleppans’ state improved as a re-
sult of the truce. But this positive evaluation was nullified in his case by the immedi-
ately following report that Belek was dismayed at the news and realized Badr al-
Dawla Suaiman’s inability to defend the city. Nothing of the sort in Ibn al-Qalanisi’s 
own account: he only reports further among the events of the year that Belek had de-
scended upon Aleppo, and burning the crops as well as blockading the city, received 
its surrender from Sulaiman. He notes that by this time the emir had already got hold 
of Harran, taking it in May.  
Ibn al-Qalanisi’s chronology diverges considerably from that of Ibn al-Adim 
as regards the capture of al-Bara and its bishop. Whereas the latter dated it to July, 
soon after Belek’s takeover of Aleppo, Ibn al-Qalanisi dates it to the first ten days of 
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Rabi‘ I (28 April – 7 May). Since we know for certain that Belek’s siege of Kafartab 
took place just before the revolt in Kharput, at the end of July, this would put a three 
months between his capture of al-Bara and the siege of Kafartab. When the proximi-
ty of al-Bara and Kafartab (at a distance of around 25 km) is added to this calcula-
tion, Ibn al-Adim’s chronology seems to be the more plausible of the two: it would 
have been more natural for Belek to attack one fortress in Jabal Summaq and then to 
proceed to the other. Moreover, the fact that the bishop was able to take refuge in 
Kafartab before Belek laid siege to it also suggests that he was still under guard with 
Belek’s troops and had not yet been taken elsewhere to be imprisoned –– which 
would probably have been the case if he had been captured three months earlier.
82
 
This point of chronology is not without significance: if Ibn al-Adim’s chronology is 
indeed correct, it reveals that following his takeover of Aleppo Belek launched a sys-
tematic offensive against the fortifications in Jabal Summaq. We have seen that these 
constituted the southern end of the boundary line with Antioch. 
 
The Syriac sources add some information to what the Muslim sources testify, 
though it is rather confused and dubious at places.
83
 According to the Anonymous,
84
 
after Belek had imprisoned the king and was marching from Kharput towards Harran 
and Aleppo, he stopped by Edessa for a while to ravage its territory. The Anonymous 
also claims that Belek laid siege to Edessa, but this must be viewed with doubt given 
the lack of corroboration by the other sources: at most a short blockade or harrass-
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ment may have taken place.
85
 Belek may have aimed by these moves to intimidate 
the Franks of Edessa into passivity while he would be preoccupied with taking Har-
ran and Aleppo. In reporting Belek’s takeover of these towns the Anonymous con-
tents himself with stating that these were peacefully handed over to him.  
Neither the Anonymous nor Michael the Syrian
86
 touch upon Belek’s attacks 
on al-Bara and Kafartab, but both authors testify that he advanced upon Tell Bashir. 
Michael even makes the obviously false assertion that he captured that town. If cor-
rect, this attack may only have been a brief incursion that Belek made after his re-
covery of Kharput, perhaps to avenge Joscelin’s depredations around Aleppo and in 
Shabakhtan. In addition to this, the Anonymous asserts that Belek advanced against 
Duluk and Azaz as well, capturing, plundering and “sweeping away the villages like 
a torrent.” We shall examine Belek’s offensive against Azaz, which took place in in 
early 1124, in the following section. Duluk may have come under attack at that time 
too. The Anonymous ends his account by reporting Belek’s capture of Hisn Mansur, 
which had taken place soon after his surprise of Baldwin at Sanja; he also notes the 
emir’s seizure of some lands from Akhlat. “For a year,” he remarks in conclusion, 
Belek “perpetrated great crimes in Frankish territory.” Michael the Syrian, on his 
part, asserts that in addition to Tell Bashir Belek took three other castles as well from 
the Turks or Franks. This probably refers to the emir’s takeover of Harran and Alep-
po and his capture of al-Bara.  
 
Belek’s offensive in Jabal Summaq was cut short by the news of the revolt in 
Kharput, but after suppressing it he did not return there. Instead he launched an am-
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bitious undertaking in coalition against the northern end of the Antiochene frontier, 
Azaz. We shall now turn to examine this campaign. 
8.4 Belek’s offensive against Azaz 
 Ibn al-Adim
87
 relates that in the latter half of January 1124 Belek mustered 
his troops and joined forces with Tughtekin, who had arrived at the head of his forc-
es, as well as with the troops of Aksungur al-Bursuki.
88
 Together the allies went to 
lay siege to Azaz, and managed to open breaches in the walls, so much so that it be-
came an easy matter to storm it. Assembling at this point, the Franks sought to drive 
away the Muslims. In the ensuing battle the latter were routed and scattered, with 
some of them being killed and others captured. Before returning to Aleppo, Ibn al-
Adim notes, Belek refortified the castle of Na‘ura in Naqira as well as the castle of 
Maghara on the bank of the Euphrates. Al-Azimi also records that around this time 
Belek restored the ruined castles in Syria.
89
  
Ibn al-Qalanisi relates the campaign against Azaz in much the same way as 
Ibn al-Adim,
90
 and indeed certain turns of phrase used in common by the two authors 
reveal that he served as a source for the Aleppan author. However, Ibn al-Qalanisi 
fails to count Belek among the participants. Another difference between their ac-
counts is that whereas Ibn al-Adim does not make it clear whether Aksungur person-
ally took part in the campaign, or only sent a detachment to join the allies, Ibn al-
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Qalanisi indicates him unequivocally as a participant. Ibn al-Qalanisi’s chronology 
seems erroneous as well, since he indicates that Tughtekin returned to Damascus in 
Jumada I 517 (27 June – 26 July 1123), which would place the campaign in late June 
–– early July  1123. Nevertheless, we know that at this time Belek was still preoccu-
pied with his campaigns against Aleppo and Jabal Summaq. Accordingly, as in the 
case of Belek’s capture of al-Bara (see the previous section), Ibn al-Adim’s chronol-
ogy must be preferred over that of Ibn al-Qalanisi. It emerges from the Aleppan 
chronicler’s testimony that the campaign took place sometime between 15 January 
1124, when Belek ordered the expulsion of the Ismailis from Aleppo, and 11 Febru-
ary, when he married Ridwan’s daughter.  
 Ibn al-Adim notes that following his marriage, in the month of Muharram 
(18 February – 18 March 1124), Belek transferred Baldwin and the other Frankish 
captives from Harran to a prison in the citadel of Aleppo. The reason for this may 
have been his wish to avoid another incident like that in Kharput. The fall of Harran 
as the result of a new revolt would have severed the communications between Alep-
po and his base in the Jazira, and produced disastrous consequences for the city. He 
may also have suspected that the governor of Harran, Barakat ibn Abi’l-Fahm, would 
collude with the Franks to release the captives, for Al-Azimi reports that he had the 
governor arrested at this time.
91
 On the other hand, Robert Nicholson attributes this 
measure of Belek to Joscelin’s repeated attacks against Aleppan territory. As a result 
of this constant pressure, he argues, Belek took the precautionary step of transferring 
the princes from the more vulnerable Harran to the bastion of Aleppo.
92
 So the rea-
son for the measure was perhaps Belek’s fear that Joscelin would collaborate with 
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the governor and the captives in Harran to stage another revolt, and then rush to sup-
port the rebels with his own forces.   
Ibn al-Adim proceeds to report that in the month of Safar (19 March – 16 
April) a detachment of Belek’s troops advanced against the district of Azaz. This at-
tack seems to have been rather in the character of a raid, perhaps undertaken with the 
intention of ravaging the lands around the castle in preparation for a new siege. In-
deed it resembles Ilghazi’s dispatch of a raiding band to that region before his 
death.
93
 In this case, however, the Franks of the town came out to confront the Turks, 
and in the ensuing clash around the nearby village of Mashhala Belek’s troops car-
ried off the day. Ibn al-Adim reports that they killed forty of the Frankish knights and 
footmen and seized their weapons, while the rest took refuge in Azaz. “There was 
not a single one among them,” he asserts, “without wounds in many parts of their 
bodies.”       
 
We have seen in section 8.2 that Joscelin carried out widescale depredations 
around Aleppo, in the Butnan valley and across the Euphrates in Shabakhtan on 
learning of Belek’s recovery of Kharput. He had done this mainly in retaliation, but 
perhaps also because he believed that in their leaderless and vulnerable state, the best 
method of defense for the Franks lay in offense.
94
 On this basis scholars like Cahen, 
Grousset and Nicholson have argued that Belek’s attacks on Azaz were undertaken 
in reaction to Joscelin’s offensive, with the aim of regaining the upper hand in the 
struggle.
95
 Other scholars like Mükrimin Halil Yinanç, Aydın Usta and Coşkun 
Alptekin have contended in turn that this was the beginning of an ambitious cam-
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paign that was undertaken in coalition to capture all the Frankish castles one by one, 
and thus to deliver the “death-blow” to the Crusader states while the king was con-
veniently imprisoned.
96  
It has emerged clearly enough in the previous section that the Frankish prin-
cipalities were far from helplessly awaiting the final “death-blow,” as is evident from 
Joscelin’s offensive and the siege of Tyre, and this fact is enough in itself to under-
mine the latter argument. Against the former it must be pointed out once again that 
the offensive against Azaz was far more than a reaction, an extemporized retaliation 
against Joscelin’s attacks; it was based on an independent initative, and carried out 
according to an overall strategy, that of pushing back the the borderline with Antioch 
at its northern and southern ends. Belek had launched this undertaking with his of-
fensive in the Jabal Summaq, but then broken it off because of the revolt in Kharput. 
With his attack on Azaz, he now tried his hand at the northern flank of the border. 
The fact that Belek mustered such a large army to do so, joining forces with 
Tughtekin and Aksungur, reveals the importance he gave to Azaz for the adequate 
defense of Aleppo.  
Although Azaz was not situated as close to Aleppo as al-Atharib and Zarda-
na, there was nothing but a plain in between, and its siege by the Franks in late 1118 
had been enough to set the Aleppans desparately seeking help from all quarters, in-
cluding Ilghazi himself. Moreover Azaz also lay at a strategical location on the 
communication lines of both sides. It posed a threat for Belek as he approached the 
city from the north on his way from the Jazira, and its capture by the Turks, in turn, 
would have seriously threatened the communications of Antioch, Tell Bashir and 
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Edessa. It was for this reason that Belek attacked that castle with a coalition of forces 
and then sent a detachment against it, perhaps in preparation for a new assault that he 
planned to launch.  
It is not clear why Belek failed to undertake any further attacks against the 
Franks during the three months between the siege of Azaz in late January to early 
February and the raid against the same town in April. It could perhaps be attributed 
to the heavy loss of morale and men that Belek appears to have suffered in the first, 
ambitious undertaking against Azaz. But in any case this rather long hiatus serves to 
prove that Belek’s aim had never been to make an all-out onslaught against the 
Franks and deliver them the “death-blow,” as Yinanç and other Turkish scholars 
have contended. It would have been too much of an anticlimax to return to Aleppo 
after a single defeat and merely dispatch a raiding band three months later if the 
emir’s initial purpose had been so ambitious. Indeed Belek’s next target also shows 
that he did not have a “death-blow” against the Franks in mind: this was Manbij, a 
Muslim castle. 
8.5  Belek’s campaign against Manbij, battle with the Franks and subsequent 
death 
Like Harran, Manbij was situated on the line of communications between 
Belek’s base in Diyar Bakr and the city of Aleppo. This followed a route passing to 
the east and then south of the territories controlled by the County of Edessa, and the 
two towns in question were located on the latter half of the route, Harran to the south 
of Edessa, and Manbij to the further south and west. Accordingly, Manbij’s loyalty 
was essential if Belek wanted to secure the vital link with the Jazira that enabled him 
to defend Aleppo. His attack upon the town was therefore a necessary complement to 
his previous takeover of Harran and the later arrest of its governor suspected of 
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treachery. Indeed Belek may have suspected the emir of Manbij of similar conduct 
when he proceeded to have him arrested, and we shall see that the man’s brother did 
not hesitate to call Joscelin to aid him when the town came under attack.  
8.5.1  The perspectives of the sources  
8.5.1.1  Ibn al-Adim  
As usual, Ibn al-Adim supplies the most detailed information about Belek’s 
siege of Manbij, battle with the Franks and subsequent death. In addition to his 
chronicle Zubdat al-Halab fi Tarikh Halab, this information is also found in his biog-
raphy of the emir of Manbij, Hassan ibn Gumushtekin, in Bughyat al-Talab fi Tarikh 
Halab.
97
 This biography includes two separate accounts of the related events, which 
Ibn al-Adim seems to have used alongside other sources to compose the one in the 
Zubda. Consequently the Bughya provides very little information that is not already 
found in the Zubda, and we shall mainly follow the account in the latter work here, 
noting the different or additional information found in the Bughya when necessary.  
Ibn al-Adim relates that in Safar 518 (19 March – 16 April 1124) Belek 
turned against Hassan ibn Gumushtekin, lord of Manbij, on account of a certain re-
port that he had received about the man.
98
 Accordingly he dispatched a contingent 
against Manbij under the command of his cousin Timurtash. Their mission was to 
request Hassan to join them for a raid against the lands of Tell Bashir, and to arrest 
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him when he went out of the town. Doing so with success, they entered Manbij. But 
Hassan’s brother Isa took refuge in the citadel, and the garrison refused to surrender. 
Ibn al-Adim states in the Zubda that Hassan was consequently punished, being 
stripped and dragged over thorns, and was then imprisoned in Balu. In the Bughya, 
where he cites an account by Marhaf ibn Usama ibn Munqidh, Ibn al-Adim similarly 
relates that Hassan was subjected to various tortures to make him surrender Manbij, 
after which he was sent to Balu. But in that work Ibn al-Adim also relates an alterna-
tive version, according to which Hassan was sent to Kharput and imprisoned in a pit 
there.  
Ibn al-Adim goes on to relate that Isa refused to surrender the citadel, despite 
his brother’s plight, and sent word to Joscelin, promising to deliver Manbij to him if 
he came to raise the siege. He even had Joscelin’s rallying cry raised in the town. Ibn 
al-Adim notes in the Bughya that Belek had also come to join Timurtash by this time. 
Upon Isa’s call for help, Ibn al-Adim continues in the Zubda, Joscelin raised an army 
of more than ten thousand horse- and footmen, making a tour of Jerusalem, Tripoli 
and all the other Frankish lands for this purpose. This does not conform with the tes-
timony of other sources, however, and we shall discuss its veracity further on. Ibn al-
Adim proceeds to relate that Joscelin advanced upon Manbij to repulse Belek, and 
the latter marched to confront him. In the ensuing battle on 18 Rabi‘ I (5 May 1124) 
the Muslims routed the Franks and pursued them until the end of the day, killing and 
capturing many.  
The rest of Ibn al-Adim’s account about how Belek fought in this battle and 
died on the next day is highly interesting, and worthy of quotation at length. He 
states that on the day of the battle with the Franks  
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Belek charged fifty times into their ranks, spreading death amongst them, and 
emerged safe and sound, without receiving any wounds,  although he was 
struck by swords and pierced with lances. Returning to Manbij, he passed the 
night performing the ritual prayers and humbly praying to God Almighty for 
the victory that He had again bestowed through his hands against the Franks. 
At dawn on the the next day, Monday 19 Rabi‘ I (6 May), Ibn al-Adim con-
tinues, Belek had all the captives taken in the battle executed. Then he went towards 
the citadel, with his helmet on and his shield at hand, in order to choose a place to set 
up the mangonel. Ibn al-Adim explains that Belek had resolved to entrust the siege of 
Manbij to Timurtash and then to march to the help of the people of Tyre who were 
besieged by the Franks. He notes that the Franks captured the city at the end of this 
siege, and proceeds to relate how Belek was killed before he could go to its aid: the 
emir was standing before the walls, ordering this and forbidding that, when an arrow 
sent from the citadel, reportedly fired by Isa himself, hit him on the left collarbone. 
He pulled out the arrow, spat on it, and declared: “This is the slaughter of all the 
Muslims!” Immediately thereupon he died. According to a slightly less dramatic re-
port cited by the chronicler, he lived for a few hours more before passing away. Ibn 
al-Adim notes that Belek was carried to Aleppo and buried to the south of Maqām 
Ibrahim while Timurtash got hold of the city and the citadel on 7 May. Ibn al-Athir 
and Al-Azimi reveal that it was also Timurtash who had arranged the transport of 
Belek’s body to Aleppo.  
In the Bughya Ibn al-Adim reports that Belek’s other cousin Dawud of Hisn 
Kaifa, on learning of his death, marched to Balu and captured the castle, after which 
he released Hassan from the prison there. This is taken from the account of Marhaf 
ibn Usama ibn Munqidh and agrees with the version in the Zubda, which stated that 
the emir had been imprisoned in Balu. But according to the second version in the 
Bughya, which reported Hassan to have been imprisoned in Kharput, he was taken 
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out of the pit there upon Belek’s death and returned to Manbij. Since we know 
Kharput to have been taken over by Shams al-Dawla Sulaiman, as Al-Azimi and Mi-
chael the Syrian note, it may have been this Artukid who released Hassan if he had 
indeed been imprisoned in Kharput.  
This whole latter part of Ibn al-Adim’s account, which begins with Belek’s 
exploits in the battle and continues with the dramatized build-up to his death, seems 
to have been consciously designed as a set-piece by the author. It was apparently 
meant to represent Belek as a mujahid par excellence, with his great courage and 
bravura, with his miraculous immunity in battle against the enemy’s weapons, imply-
ing God’s support, and with his profound faith evident among other things in his at-
tribution of his victories to God rather than to his own skills in war. All this is 
crowned by the emir’s dying declaration upon being mortally wounded. In this decla-
ration Belek is shown to feel himself responsible for the security of all Muslims, be-
ing aware of his vital role in defending them against the Franks. It could be pointed 
out with some justification that the whole story seems to reflect a post-Ayyubid sen-
sibility, but still the possibility that Belek actually uttered these last words cannot be 
denied out of hand. As we saw in the case of Ilghazi, the fact that the Artukid emirs 
mostly restricted themselves to defending Aleppo need not have prevented them 
from regarding and showing themselves as mujahids who fought against the Franks 
on behalf of all Muslims.  
Indeed the interest of Ibn al-Adim’s account is not restricted to this latter part, 
and the entire story about Belek’s siege of Manbij and subsequent death amounts to a 
highly ironic and thought-provoking episode. Let us see what we have in it: a Mus-
lim emir who uses the call of jihad and his prestige in fighting the Franks as a ploy to 
capture another Muslim emir and take his town, in order to bolster his control over 
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the area. Then another emir, the brother of the captive, who prefers to turn over the 
town to the Franks rather than cede it to the other Muslim emir, and summons them 
to help him. This latter emir does not flinch from killing the first emir either, when 
he sees him resolved to capture the town. And the first emir, upon receiving his mor-
tal wound, declares solemnly that this is “the slaughter of all Muslims,” despite the 
fact that he had been attacking not a Frankish but a Muslim town, while another 
Muslim town awaited help against the Franks, and also notwithstanding the fact that 
he had attempted to exploit the call of jhad as a trick to capture it.  
The attitude of Isa of Manbij to Belek shows once again that what was most 
important for the local Muslim emirs was not the possession of a town by Muslims at 
large but only by themselves, and that it did not make any difference to them whether 
they would lose it to another Muslim or to a Frank –– indeed they might even prefer 
the latter if feelings of personal hostility and revenge were involved as in this case. 
The story has still more interesting implications for Belek and his attitude towards 
jihad, which will be examined in section 8.6.  
8.5.1.2  Ibn al-Athir  
In his account
99
 Ibn al-Athir seems to have been unaware of Timurtash’s role 
in the siege of Manbij and the arrest of Hassan, as well as of the trick by which the 
emir was captured. He only reports that Belek arrested Emir Hassan al-Ba‘lbakki, 
lord of Manbij, and marched to besiege the town. The citadel held out against Belek 
even after the lower town was captured, he relates, and the Franks advanced against 
the Artukid to drive him away. Ibn al-Athir does not make any mention of Hassan’s 
brother Isa and his summons of Joscelin to aid him, but asserts that the Franks under-
took this move to prevent Belek from growing more powerful with the capture of 
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Manbij. In relating the battle Ibn al-Athir supplies a new detail, stating that Belek left 
a part of his forces by the citadel to blockade it before he marched with the rest to 
join battle. After defeating the Franks and killing a great many Belek returned to the 
siege, the chronicler relates, but he was killed by an arrow as he fought against the 
citadel.  
Ibn al-Athir neither mentions Belek’s preparations to go to the aid of Tyre, 
nor gives any indication about the person who had fired the arrow, contenting him-
self with the statement that the identity of the man remained unknown. Aparently he 
was also unaware of the fact that Hassan had been sent away to Kharput or Balu, 
since he asserts that the emir escaped from confinement as Belek’s army fell into 
confusion and dispersed. As the siege came to an end, he notes that Hassan returned 
to his castle. Ibn al-Athir concludes by reporting that Timurtash got hold of Aleppo 
on 7 May, after he had carried Belek’s dead body and buried it in the outskirts of the 
city.  
8.5.1.3  Al-Azimi  
Al-Azimi’s brief account100 adds almost nothing new to the previous ones. 
The only exception is his report that Belek had seized the castle of al-Muhaddad, 
around eighty kilometers to the southeast of Manbij, before attacking the latter town. 
This may have been similarly necessary for securing the route from the Jazira to 
Aleppo. The chronicler goes on to relate that Belek defeated the Franks led by Josce-
lin and returned victorious to Manbij, but then an arrow fired from the citadel hit and 
killed him. While the army dispersed Timurtash carried the emir’s body to Aleppo to 
bury him and got hold of the city. Al-Azimi reports like Ibn al-Adim in the Bughya 
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that Dawud ibn Sokman seized Balu, but notes in addition that Shams al-Dawla 
Sulaiman took over Kharput and married Belek’s widow.   
8.5.1.4  Matthew of Edessa  
Among the indigenous Christian sources Matthew of Edessa provides the 
most detailed account about the events,
101
 and generally agrees with the Muslim 
sources. Interestingly, the chronicler begins by reporting that Belek mustered troops 
and marched against the Franks, but then states that a few days after arriving in 
Aleppo he went against the –– Muslim –– town of Manbij. The Anonymous, as we 
shall see, similarly begins by reporting that Belek launched a retaliatory campaign 
against the Franks, only to relate thereafter how he attacked Manbij. There is the 
same incongruity in the account of Fulcher, who reports Belek’s siege immediately 
after stating that he had raised his army and allies once more against the Franks. Per-
haps this might be taken as evidence that Belek had originally intended to advance 
directly against the Franks before Tyre, while Timurtash would take Manbij, but see-
ing that the capture of that town did not go as smoothly as he had expected, he went 
to help his cousin first. 
Matthew seems to have been unaware of the initial role of Timurtash and the 
arrest of Hassan of Manbij; he reports straightaway that Belek set up a mangonel 
against the city and pressed forward the siege with continual assaults, upon which the 
emir defending the citadel sent to Joscelin for aid. Corroborating the report of Ibn al-
Adim, he notes that in return for this aid Emir Isa promised to hand over the town to 
Joscelin. He also gives the additional information that Isa sent for aid to Geoffrey of 
Mar‘ash as well, and Joscelin and Geoffrey were joined by Mahuis, the count of Du-
luk, Aintab and Ra‘ban. As Işın Demirkent suggests, this last may have been none 
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other than Michael of Gargar, since we know him to have received Duluk from the 
king in return for Gargar. But then it is difficult to explain why Matthew gives his 
name in a distorted form, as Demirkent points out, since the author must have known 
that Armenian chieftain very well.
102
 As we shall see, the same individual is also 
mentioned under the name of Mahi by the Anonymous. 
We have seen Ibn al-Adim report that Joscelin collected troops from all 
around the Frankish territories, including Jerusalem and Tripoli, but Matthew only 
states that he gathered together the “remnants of the Frankish troops,” probably refer-
ring to those who had not gone to join the main army before Tyre. He also reveals in 
keeping with this statement that the Franks were fewer than Belek’s forces when he 
attacked them near Manbij. 
Relating the battle, Matthew reveals that the Turks suffered a check at the be-
ginning, as one wing of their army was put to flight while the other was annihilated 
by the troops led by Joscelin. What caused the defeat of the Franks according to Mat-
thew was that the Turks eventually surrounded a contingent of the Frankish army, 
including Geoffrey of Mar‘ash and some of Joscelin’s horsemen, and “caused them 
all to die a martyr’s death.” Upon receiving this news Joscelin turned in flight, and 
the Franks were defeated.
103
 After noting that the count took refuge in Tell Bashir the 
next day, Matthew laments the event: “On that day many Frankish noblemen per-
ished, and so it became a disastrous and horrible day for the Christian faithful.” With 
an error of one day, he indicates the day of the battle as 4 May.  
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The chronicler proceeds to relate that Belek returned triumphantly to Manbij 
after this, and ordered an all-out attack to be made against the town. Overjoyed by 
his recent success, he had taken off his coat of mail when he was hit in the back
104
 
and mortally wounded by an arrow shot from the citadel. In contrast to Ibn al-Adim, 
who reported cautiously that this was rumored to have been fired by Isa, Matthew 
asserts unequivocally that it was shot by one of the Arewapasht, those Armenians in 
the region who still held on to their ancient pagan faith centred on the worship of 
sun.
105
 He indicates in addition that Belek summoned Timurtash to his side (which is 
the first mention of this emir in Matthew’s account), and handed over his lands and 
sovereignty to him before dying. Even if this were true, we know that Timurtash’s 
brother Shams al-Dawla Sulaiman got hold of Kharput and his cousin Dawud ibn 
Sokman acquired Balu before Timurtash could get hold of these towns.   
Interestingly, Matthew draws a sharp distinction between the feelings of the 
Franks and the Armenians when reporting how they reacted to the unexpected death 
of Belek: “Belek’s death brought great joy to all the Franks; however, deep sorrow 
and a general feeling of loss fell upon the people inhabiting his lands, for he had 
dealt compassionately with the Armenians under his rule.” We have examined Bel-
ek’s motives for this mild treatment of indigenous Christians in the first section of 
this chapter. What is interesting here, as far as Matthew is concerned, is a different 
point: despite the perspective of religious confrontation evident in his works, pitting 
the Franks and Armenians together against the Muslims, Matthew is less concerned 
with the fact that Belek was the most formidable adversary of the Franks at the time, 
as he gives a final verdict about him, and focuses instead on his treatment of his Ar-
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menian subjects. It is also remarkable that when mentioning Belek Matthew never 
uses pejorative epithets like “bloodthirsty beast,” such as he bestowed on Sokman 
ibn Artuk or Mawdud; he even praises Belek’s courage and military skills, as we 
have seen before. 
8.5.1.5  Michael the Syrian and Bar Hebraeus  
Michael the Syrian offers a shorter account
106
 than Matthew, and although 
like the latter he generally agrees with the Muslim sources, he also diverges from 
them on a number of points. Thus according to him Joscelin was promised tribute 
rather than the town itself. However, the considerable efforts that the count put in to 
assembling an army and attacking Belek would suggest that he had been promised 
more than simply tribute. Unlike as was the case with the populace, it would normal-
ly make little difference to the emir whether he lost it to Belek or Joscelin, and in this 
case he would have exacted vengeance from Belek by delivering it to the Franks. He 
may even have expected to rule the town as the count’s deputy. 
Michael states that upon Joscelin’s arrival the two sides fought from the 
morning to the evening, and indicates like Matthew that Geoffrey the Monk was 
killed in the battle. Dwelling briefly on the career of “this hero,” as he calls him, Mi-
chael relates that he had left Rome while still a monk and was eventually made 
commander for his exploits in battles around Jerusalem. Baldwin II had then taken 
him along when he came to the north to act as regent of Antioch, and had entrusted 
him with Kaisoun, Rab‘an and Mar‘ash. Returning to the battle, Michael interesting-
ly contents himself with simply stating that it came to an end, without making clear 
which side emerged victorious. In agreement with Ibn al-Adim, he relates that early 
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next morning Belek approached the walls in order to choose a place for the mango-
nels, but at that moment was hit by an arrow fired from top of the wall and died. He 
does not give any indications about the identity of the culprit. Without mentioning 
Timurtash by name, he states that Belek’s troops fled to Aleppo after his death and 
adopted a cousin of his as their leader. In corroboration of Al-Azimi, he also notes 
that a group of Turks returned after this to Kharput, where they adopted Shams al-
Dawla Sulaiman as their new ruler.  
Bar Hebraeus’s account107 is mainly a summary of that of Michael’s. Howev-
er, he states wrongly that Belek advanced to Manbij immediately after his recovery 
of Kharput, taking along Baldwin and Galeran. He also notes that the Seljuqid prince 
of Melitene (Tughril Arslan ibn Kilij Arslan I), who had been Belek’s protégé, took 
over Masara and Gargar after the emir’s death.   
8.5.1.6  The Anonymous Syriac  
The Anonymous Syriac
108
 diverges from the previous sources in claiming 
that Belek was defeated in the battle with Joscelin’s forces. He also wrongly attrib-
utes Belek’s attack upon Manbij to Joscelin’s depredations around Aleppo a few 
months earlier. When the emir heard of these movements, the chronicler relates, he 
hastily gathered his troops, and camping near Manbij, set about ravaging its territory. 
Without mentioning the events associated with Hassan’s arrest and Isa’s call for help 
from the Franks, he reports that Joscelin collected troops upon this move of Belek, 
and taking along Geoffrey the Monk, another Geoffrey and Mahi,
109
 confronted the 
emir near Manbij. In contrast to all other previous sources, the Anonymous asserts 
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that in the ensuing battle Belek was defeated and many of his soldiers perished. This 
is perhaps a result of his knowledge of the initial setback suffered by the Turks, re-
ported by Matthew, and his lack of information about the rest of the course of the 
battle. The Latin sources also declare the outcome to have been a Frankish victory, 
but the reason for this is quite different in their case, as we shall see. 
The Anonymous proceeds to relate that Belek went back to Manbij to punish 
the citizens for not helping him. Apparently he was unaware of Isa’s collaboration 
with the Franks, and had also failed to question how Belek could have returned to 
Manbij with the victorious Frankish army at his back. Belek was attacking the town 
violently, the Anonymous relates, when he was hit by an arrow shot from the wall 
and died. The chronicler does not make any suggestions about who had fired it. He 
concludes by noting that the emir was taken upon his death to Aleppo and buried 
outside the city by his family.         
8.5.1.7  Fulcher of Chartres  
We have seen Matthew indicate that Belek’s death brought great joy to the 
Franks. This joy is indeed fully reflected in the Latin sources: they do not only show 
Belek defeated by Joscelin, like the Anonymous, but also have the emir killed by the 
Franks in the same battle, with only too evident satisfaction. This state of affairs re-
veals that Belek’s campaigns against the Franks, and especially his capture of Bald-
win and Joscelin followed by his speedy recovery of Kharput, had made a considera-
ble impression on the Franks, arousing the need to know that they had avenged these 
wrongs. Apparently it was to this need that the Latin historians, as well as their 
sources who had participated in the battle, catered.      
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Thus the major part of Fulcher’s account110 is clearly of fictitious character, 
and this must have been due to the false information he received from Joscelin’s 
squire, who had come from the north to tell those in Jerusalem what they would have 
liked to hear. Already the way Fulcher begins his account reveals that the Franks’ 
grievances against Belek had become wearisome: “While we were laboring outside 
Tyre, carefully preparing siege engines,” he remarks, “Belek did not cease to raise111 
his army  and allies against us.” Apparently unaware of Timurtash’s role, he states 
that at the beginning of May the emir came from Aleppo to Manbij, and gives the 
number of his forces as five thousand horsemen and seven thousand footmen. Ful-
cher seems to have possessed some information that the emir of Manbij was lured 
outside and captured through a trick. But confusing the events and giving a more 
dramatic appearance to Hassan’s capture, he relates that upon the refusal of the emir 
to surrender the town, Belek summoned him to a meeting outside the walls and then 
treacherously beheaded him.  
Unaware of the call for aid directed from Manbij to the Franks, Fulcher re-
ports that Belek’s siege did not escape the notice of Joscelin, who hurried there from 
Antioch with the troops of the city. He adds that the number of Christians was very 
small, and despite this Joscelin was not afraid to advance against the “multitude of 
infidels.”112 This conflicts with Ibn al-Adim’s assertion that Joscelin collected more 
than ten thousand troops from Tripoli, Jerusalem and other places. Instead, it agrees 
with Matthew’s testimony that the count had collected the leftover troops who had 
not gone to Tyre and the Franks were consequently fewer than the Muslims. At any 
rate Fulcher would certainly have known if Joscelin had come to Jerusalem where 
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the author was residing at this time.
113
 On the other hand, Joscelin’s men were prob-
ably not so few as Fulcher claims either, since we know from Matthew and William 
of Tyre that he had collected troops from the County of Edessa as well.       
Fulcher’s description of the battle does seem to give some support to Mat-
thew’s testimony that the Turks suffered setbacks on both wings, as he reports that 
they were repulsed three times “with the help of God,” and nevertheless boldly re-
turned to the fight each time. Otherwise it is entirely fictitious, however, since the 
author relates that Belek was mortally wounded in this melée and turned aside in a 
dying condition, whereupon his men took to flight. “Indeed many were able to flee, 
but they were not able at all to escape,”114 Fulcher remarks with satisfaction, and 
claims that against three thousand horsemen slain on their side, the Franks only lost 
thirty knights and sixty footmen.    
Fulcher proceeds with his tale to relate that Belek’s corpse was sought and 
detected among the Turkish dead on Joscelin’s orders. His head was reportedly 
brought back to the count, who dispatched it to Antioch, Tyre and Jerusalem with his 
squire, so that he would announce and describe the story as a participant in “this 
memorable battle.” Fulcher notes that the news brought by the squire was so wel-
come for the army besieging Tyre that the Count of Tripoli raised him to the rank of 
knighthood. The reason why the Franks before Tyre rejoiced so much was probably 
their awareness of Belek’s intention to come to the aid of the city. The news was re-
ceived with great joy in Jerusalem too, as revealed by Fulcher’s celebration: “And 
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we all praised and blessed God, since that fiercest of dragons, who had oppressed 
and ruined Christianity for a long time, was strangled.”115  
Not content with all this, Fulcher points out with satisfaction that Belek’s 
dream, in which the emir had seen his eyes torn out by Joscelin, was fulfilled in this 
way. The fact that Belek’s supposed death, as reported by the messenger, had oc-
curred in a somewhat more more mundane fashion than in the dream does not seem 
to have diluted Fulcher’s merriment. At any rate he makes up for this slight incon-
gruence by pointing out that Joscelin had indeed torn out Belek’s eyes, since he had 
had his head and members completely removed.
116
 He concludes his account with an 
exulting couplet: 
Belek neither saw, nor heard, nor spoke, nor sat, nor walked, 
Nor was there a place for him in the sky, the earth, or waters. 
No doubt, in addition to the pleasure felt at the removal of the final obstacle 
before the capture of Tyre, these remarks also reflect in a more general sense the fear 
and hatred in which Belek was held even in distant Jerusalem, feelings that probably 
stemmed in particular from his capture of the king and the other Frankish princes. As 
for the fictitious report that Fulcher and other Franks in Jerusalem had received about 
the outcome of the battle and the manner of Belek’s death, this was due probably to 
deliberate disinformation coming from the north. It could even have been supported 
by the “evidence” of a hefty-looking head chosen from among the Turkish slain to 
present convincingly as Belek’s head. It might be surmised that shortly after the bat-
                                                 
115
 For “Et laudavimus et benediximus omnes Dominum, quia suffocatus est ille drace saevissimus, 
qui Christianismum diu tribulaverat et pessundederat,” RHC, Historiens Occidentaux III, 438, instead 
of “And we all praised and blessed God because Belek, the raging dragon who had oppressed and 
trampled upon Christianity, was suffocated at last,” as in the English translation. 
116
 “Because in a dream he saw his own eyes torn out by Joscelin. Indeed Joscelin tore them out root 
and branch, for he completely removed his head and members,” for “Videbat enim in visu a Joscelino 
sibi oculos erui. Vere penitus eruit, quoniam caput et membra illi penitus abtulit,” RHC, Historiens 
Occidentaux III, 439, instead of “For in a dream he saw his own eyes put out by Joscelin. In truth Jos-
celin utterly destroyed Belek since he deprived him of head and members,” as in the English transla-
tion. 
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tle the Franks in the north heard of Belek’s death and the dispersion of his army, and 
desiring to use it as an opportunity to cover up their defeat, Joscelin sent his squire to 
spread this brazenly false story. An equally spurious tale about Galeran slaying Belek 
reached Orderic in Normandy, as we shall see, so all the Frankish participants in the 
battle seem to have collaborated spontaneously to present the events in a more self-
flattering way than the facts allowed. 
8.5.1.8  William of Tyre  
The account of William of Tyre
117
 is based on that of Fulcher’s, though  not 
without some modifications. Beside the usual analyses and attempts at explanation 
that he usually adds to his source material, William lays special emphasis on the en-
couragement that Belek’s death gave to the Franks before Tyre. This is evident right 
from the title he chooses for the account: “Belek is slain at Hierapolis [Manbij]. The 
news causes great joy in the Christian army, and the siege of the city is pressed on 
with even more vigor.”      
William begins his account by informing his readers that during the siege of 
Tyre Belek, “the powerful Turkish satrap in whose chains the lord king was still 
held,” was besieging Manbij. He repeats Fulcher’s story about Belek beheading the 
lord of Manbij, but in a way that brings to the fore what he wishes to represent as the 
emir’s cruel deceitfulness, in contrast to the victim’s honest simplicity. As Belek 
“summoned the governor of the city with conciliatory but crafty words,” he recounts, 
the latter, “a simple and credulous man, trusted Belek and at once repaired to his 
presence,” only to be beheaded promptly on the emir’s orders. When relating how 
Joscelin learned of the siege and mustering troops hurried north, William also tries to 
explain why he did so. Even though the historian was no more aware than his source 
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Fulcher of the summons for help that came from Manbij, he still discerned the reason 
why the count had reacted so promptly to the attack on this “city in his own neigh-
borhood”: his fear that “in case the former ruler got expelled, a tougher opponent 
would be established there against him.”118  
Whereas Fulcher stated that Joscelin made for Manbij with the men of Anti-
och, William asserts that he assembled troops from his own domains as well, and this 
is corroborated by Matthew and the Anonymous who mentioned the presence of 
Geoffrey of Mar‘ash as well as the lord of Duluk, Ra‘ban and Aintab among the 
count’s companions. Again in contrast to Fulcher, who noted that the number of 
Christians was very few, William asserts that it was a “large force.” Keeping in mind 
that Fulcher does not mention Joscelin’s arrival in Jerusalem, the final verdict on this 
issue must be the following: the count indeed mustered a sizeable force, though 
probably not equal to that of Belek, by gathering those troops in the Principality of 
Antioch and the County of Edessa who had not marched to Tyre. In addition to these 
he also joined forces with Geoffrey of Mar‘ash and the Armenian lord of Duluk, 
Ra‘ban and Aintab.119  
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William proceeds to relate like Fulcher that Joscelin rushed to confront Belek 
and made a sudden attack on his troops, routing and putting them to flight. However, 
the historian was apparently disturbed by the incongruence we have seen in Fulcher’s 
account about the fulfillment of Belek’s dream. In an effort to bring the actual course 
of events a little nearer the content of that dream, he states that it was in fact Joscelin 
who both killed Belek and cut off his head, having encountered him in the melée 
without knowing who he was. Content with his new version of the story, William 
explains: “This was clearly the fulfillment of Belek’s dream. For he who cuts off a 
man’s head and puts an end to both his sight and his life may be said with truth to 
have torn out his eyes.”  
 William also tries to analyse the reason why Joscelin allegedly sent around 
Belek’s head without delay, and interprets this as a deliberate move on the count’s 
part to encourage the army before Tyre through the news of “such a great success.” 
“As Joscelin was a most cautious man who lacked nothing in experience,” the histo-
rian remarks, “he immediately sent Belek’s head with a certain young man, so that it 
would cause our men to rejoice about his good fortune and victory.”120 Joscelin was 
not wrong in his calculations, William gives us to understand, and relates at length 
how the Franks before Tyre
121
 jubilated at the news: “On his arrival the youth122 re-
joiced the hearts of all and raised the happiness of the Christians to the highest 
                                                                                                                                          
united the troops of all the Frankish lands, including those of Jerusalem, and showing that despite this 
he suffered a sound defeat in Belek’s hands. 
120
 For “Statimque sicut vir circumspectissimus erat, et cui nihil ad plenam deerat experientiam, ei-
usdem principis caput, ut nostros de sua prosperitate exhilerasceret et victoria, per quemdam adoles-
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point.” He explains that because of the importance of the mission and his respect for 
Joscelin, the count of Tripoli raised the messenger to knighthood.  
Nevertheless, it is worthy of attention that in citing this passage on the 
Franks’ joy at Belek’s death, William discards Fulcher’s likening of the emir to a 
fierce dragon who was finally strangled after he had oppressed Christianity for a long 
time. Instead, he states that on hearing the news they “raised their hands to heaven 
and began to praise, bless and glorify God who ‘is terrible in His doing toward the 
children of men.’” It is hard to understand the reason for his alteration, but we have 
seen William adopt a similar attitude against those passages in his sources that deni-
grated Ilghazi. This may have been a reflection of his relatively tolerant attitude, as 
suggested before, or perhaps simply a result of the fact that for William writing in the 
1170s and 1180s, these Muslim figures from more than half a century earlier had lost 
too much of their actuality to be made the butt of personal attacks.  
With the wider perspective provided by hindsight as well as by better histori-
anship, William prefers to focus instead on the contrasting effects that the news of 
Belek’s death exerted on the besiegers and the defenders of Tyre: “Then, indeed, 
were our troops fired with more ardent enthusiasm. As if they had recovered their 
strength and found courage once again, they undertook the work they had begun with 
greater fervor, and through frequent attacks denied all respite to those besieged.”123 
By this time, William notes, the latter were already on the point of starvation, and 
“since no hope of aid supported them now, they began to relax their efforts some-
what.” 
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crebrisque congressionibus omnem obsessis negant requiem” in William of Tyre, RHC Historiens 
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8.5.1.9  Orderic Vitalis  
The account of Orderic Vitalis
124
 contains many fictitious elements like those 
of Fulcher and William, although it is independent of them. It also reflects the same 
rejoicing at the emir’s death, combined with the sharp perspective of religious con-
frontation found in this author’s work. We have seen that Orderic showed Belek be-
sieging Manbij already before his capture of Baldwin and Joscelin. After he had re-
captured the king in Kharput and everything had fallen out according to his wishes, 
Orderic continues, the Artukid brought together all the emirs in the “pagan world” 
and returned to the siege of Manbij. At this time, the historian notes, Joscelin and 
other Christians continued to resist the emir bravely in every part of Syria and Pales-
tine, “seeming to forget their king.” Welcoming the news of the siege for this reason, 
they assembled eagerly to fight Belek and his forces. Orderic is the sole source to 
indicate the location of the battle explicitly, stating that it was fought in the wide 
plain between between Manbij and Tell Khalid. He remarks that many Muslim emirs 
fought alongside Belek, “struggling with all their forces to destroy the Christians.”            
Like Fulcher and William, Orderic shows Belek being killed in the battle. 
This reveals once again that the Frankish participants tried to take advantage of Bel-
ek’s death to cover their loss of face, spreading stories –– as far as Normandy in this 
case –– about how they had killed the emir and defeated the Turks on the battlefield. 
In Orderic’s version, however, this honor is accorded not to Joscelin but to Geoffrey 
of Mar‘ash, who himself was killed in the battle. The story also allows us a glimpse 
into Orderic’s extremely limited information about the Muslim faith. Apparently, the 
historian supposed it to be a combination of magic and astrology. He relates how 
Belek’s sister, “a very experienced sorceress,” had seen in the stars that Geoffrey and 
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Belek would kill each other on the same day, and so entreated him with tears to take 
precautions. In order to avert this fate, Orderic says, Belek offered Geoffrey two ass-
es of gold in return for his withdrawal from the battle, but  
the pious count scorned the tyrant’s gifts as so much dirt, and professed his 
willingness to sacrifice himself gladly in the faith of God. Avenging the 
blood of many saints, he killed Belek; he himself perished gloriously, fighting 
resolutely for Christ. His standard was found on Belek’s body; and by Bel-
ek’s death a heavy and dreaded yoke was lifted from the necks of the Chris-
tians.  
The rest of the account is in the same tone as this quotation, one long rhetori-
cal flight celebrating the Christians’ triumph and expressing their joy at having been 
rescued from Belek’s yoke. It is interesting that this author in distant Normandy told 
the event with far greater vehemence and sharper language than his contemporary 
Fulcher in Jerusalem. Perhaps this was a reflection of the attitude of his sources, the 
Normans of Antioch; differently from Fulcher, these had suffered the consequences 
of Belek’s victories at first hand. Exaggerating numbers grossly, Orderic claims that 
owing to God’s help a mere nine hundred Christians fought and defeated no less than 
three hundred thousand pagans, with only seventeen of them lost against the thirteen 
thousand slain on the enemy’s side. He represents Belek as a scourge of God, who 
used him to punish his people for their sins, and attributes the Franks’ supposed vic-
tory to His softening rather than to their own strength:  
The almighty Emmanuel, son of a pure virgin, blessed his Israelites with 
strength, and caused them to rejoice by overcoming the enemy whom he had 
used as a hammer or as a rod of his anger to punish the guilty, and allowed 
them a period of calm and prosperity after the storms of tribulation. 
As a result, Orderic concludes, “the horns of the Gentiles were broken” with 
God’s thunder, “and the Christians lifted up their heads and rendered praise to the 
unconquered Lord of hosts.” 
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8.5.2  The course of events  
The following account of Belek’s siege of Manbij and subsequent death 
emerges from the consideration of the sources: by the end of April 1124 Belek was in 
preparations to bring aid to Tyre, which was under Frankish siege since January. In 
the meanwhile he sent his cousin Timurtash with a detachment to Manbij in order to 
arrest its emir Hassan al-Ba‘lbakki. This town was situated on the lines of communi-
cation between Aleppo and Belek’s base in Diyar Bakr, and its loyalty was indispen-
sable for the safe transfer of the troops and other resources necessary to defend 
Aleppo, or to aid Tyre. In this respect it was similar to Harran, the emir of which 
Belek had arrested on the suspicion of collaborating with Joscelin and the Franks im-
prisoned there. Probably suspecting Hassan of similar collusion with the Franks, Bel-
ek ordered Timurtash to summon him outside to join a raid to Tell-Bashir, and then 
to get hold of his person and his town.  
Hassan and the lower city were indeed captured in this way, but his brother 
Isa ascended the citadel and refused to surrender notwithstanding the tortures inflict-
ed upon Hassan in his sight. Instead he sent for aid to Joscelin, with the promise of 
delivering the town to him. While Hassan was sent to be imprisoned in Balu or per-
haps Kharput, Belek came to join Timurtash upon the emergence of this issue. Josce-
lin was staying at Antioch at this time, and went immediately into action. He was ea-
ger to get hold of this castle in his region, and concerned to prevent Belek from con-
solidating his hold on the area by taking it and securing his communications with Di-
yar Bakr. Collecting troops from the Principality of Antioch and the County of Edes-
sa, and being joined by Geoffrey of Mar‘ash as well as by the Armenian lord of Du-
luk, Aintab and Ra‘ban, he advanced against Belek’s forces to raise the siege.  
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The ensuing battle took place on 5 May, on the plain near Manbij. At first the 
Franks gained the upper hand, putting one wing of Belek’s army to flight and de-
stroying the other. But the Turkish center held firm, and surrounding a sizeable de-
tachment of Frankish cavalry, slaughtered most of them; Geoffrey of Mar‘ash was 
among the slain. Upon this the rest of the Frankish army turned in flight, and Joscelin 
took refuge in Tell Bashir. The next day Belek prepared to entrust the conduct of the 
siege to Timurtash and then to advance against the Franks before Tyre. As he was 
choosing a place to set up the mangonel, however, he was killed by an arrow fired 
from the citadel, possibly by Isa himself or perhaps by an Armenian sun-worshipper. 
Belek’s army disbanded upon his death. Timurtash carried Belek’s body to Aleppo 
and got hold of the city, while Shams al-Dawla Sulaiman took over Kharput and 
Dawud ibn Sokman seized Balu. Released by one of the latter two, Hassan returned 
to Manbij.  
As Claude Cahen points out,
125
 Belek’s death and the division of his posses-
sions among the other Artukids severed the vital link between Aleppo and the Jazira 
once more as had happened earlier for a time after Ilghazi’s death, and this time it 
could not be established during the period of Artukid rule in the city. None of the 
successors of Ilghazi and Belek possessed the prestige and the ability of unifying 
leadership that had enabled them to draw upon the assistance and troops of the other 
emirs in the family.
126
 As a result, although Timurtash held both Aleppo and Mardin 
and it seemed as if the link in question could be maintained under his rule, he found 
himself deprived of the forces needed to defend Aleppo. He was unwilling at any rate 
to continue the policy of his father and cousin, because of various reasons including 
his natural disposition. With Timurtash’s consequent withdrawal to Mardin Aleppo 
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found itself abandoned once more to its fate, being deprived of the troops and re-
sources of Diyar Bakr. The city was to suffer the grave consequences of this situation 
before the end of the year.  
In the meanwhile the Franks around Tyre and elsewhere jubilated at Belek’s 
death, all the more so as Joscelin and other Franks in his company had spread the sto-
ry that this was their own feat accomplished in a victorious battle. Indeed from their 
own perspective the Franks were more than justified in rejoicing, as Belek’s unex-
pected death not only rescued them from a formidable adversary in both Syria and 
Mesopotamia, but by thwarting his planned advance against the besiegers of Tyre, 
also sealed the fate of that city. For this was to remain the last such attempt after the 
failure of previous efforts to obtain aid or a diversion from Tughtekin and the Fati-
mids. While the last hope of the besieged was thus destroyed, the Franks pressed the 
siege with more vigor, and capturing the city a few months later, took possession of 
the whole Syrio-Lebanese littoral –– a great strategic gain that would perhaps have 
been impossible were it not for Belek’s untimely death.127  
8.6  Belek’s approach to jihad 
In his encyclopaedia article on Belek, Mükrimin Halil Yinanç remarks that he 
was one of the “bravest heroes” to have emerged from the ranks of Turks and Mus-
lims, one who passed his entire life in waging jihad against the Crusaders. For this 
reason, he states, the emir’s death proved to be a great mishap for the Muslims, caus-
ing the Crusaders to recover from their recent defeats.
128 
Even though other students 
of the subject do not sound so rhapsodic, they agree that Belek was a formidable foe 
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of the Franks, who united the Muslims in jihad and became, in Cahen’s words, “one 
of the first leaders of the Muslim revival against the Crusaders.”129  
Admitting that Belek was still basically a Turkoman chief, Cahen attributes 
this leadership to what he calls his “striking personality.” Placing similar emphasis 
on Belek’s personality, Runciman asserts that among all the Turkish leaders who had 
confronted the Crusaders, Belek had displayed “the greatest energy and wisdom,” 
and was therefore justified in declaring that his own death was “the slaughter of all 
Muslims.”130 Approving Belek’s last words from a different point of view, Grousset 
asserts that by the time of his death “this energetic Turk had begun to build… the 
unity of Islam against the Franks,” and with more success than Ilghazi owing to his 
“better sense of government.”131 Aydın Usta brings the two points of view together, 
stating that Belek pursued a wiser policy against the Franks than his uncles Sokman 
and Ilghazi, for whereas they had failed to take full advantage of their victories in the 
battles of Harran and Ager Sanguinis Belek, following his capture of the Frankish 
leaders, had united “the forces of the entire Muslim world” in order to deliver them 
the death-blow.
132
 
Most of these judgements seem questionable. To begin with, there were nu-
merous and sometimes rather long time gaps between Belek’s campaigns against the 
Franks, and this qualifies the claims that he had spent his entire time waging jihad as 
an energetic leader. From his capture of Joscelin in September 1122 to his siege of 
Gargar and depredations in the area, which resulted in the capture of Baldwin in 
April 1123, there passed around six or seven months without any major undertaking 
against the Franks. Again, after Belek had captured the king and seized Hisn Mansur 
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and Gargar, he dedicated his efforts to taking over Harran and Aleppo, and did not 
march against the Franks until his campaign to Jabal Summaq some three months 
later, in July. After he had recovered Kharput in September 1123 he similarly did not 
undertake any new attempts against the Franks until his campaign against Azaz in 
January 1124. Following his defeat in that battle he again entered a period of inac-
tivity, still recovering perhaps from his loss of men and morale, and it took him an-
other three months before he sent a detachment against the same town in April 1124. 
Despite the success of this attack, he did not undertake a new campaign against 
Azaz. Instead he began preparations to go to the aid of Tyre, but marched to Manbij 
instead when his cousin Timurtash was unable to capture it on his behalf.   
Moreover, Belek’s purpose in these campaigns was not to deliver the “death-
blow” to the Latin principalities, for these were far from a state of weakness that 
would suggest such a course of action. He rather aimed to defend his home territory 
against the Franks and Armenians in the Jazira and at the same time to protect Alep-
po by pushing back the Antiochene borderline that extended from Azaz to Jabal 
Summaq. It was also mainly for this purpose that Belek undertook the ambitious 
campaign against Azaz in which he joined forces with Tughtekin and Aksungur. His 
alliance with these two Muslim leaders for a single campaign can hardly be taken as 
evidence that he had set out to unite the “entire Muslim world” in order to inflict a 
final defeat on the Franks. This is also revealed by the fact that the campaign had no 
sequel except for a raiding party that he sent against Azaz some three months later. 
Significantly, Belek turned after this to attack a Muslim town, Manbij.  
Indeed when this last campaign of the emir is considered in connection with 
his previous capture of Aleppo and Harran, the lands of Akhlat and the castle of Mu-
haddad, the “Muslim unity” he is said to have been striving at assumes a rather 
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ominuous tone reminiscent of the propaganda of Saladin and Nur al-Din. The content 
of that propaganda has been accepted by some modern scholars as well.
133
 Similarly, 
Imad al-Din Khalil fails to address the full implications of his following apt observa-
tion: “Belek’s concern to impose his will on some of the Muslim strongholds and to 
annex them to his principality prevented him from establishing his authority over the 
major part of North Syria, and also spared the Crusaders greater defeats at his 
hands.” Instead he ventures to attribute this policy to the emir’s desire to confront the 
Franks with a united Muslim principality with abundant resources.
134
     
At this point Belek’s own approach to jihad propaganda deserves a closer 
look. Emmanuel Sivan, who dwells on Ilghazi at length in his study of the rise of the 
jihad movement, contents himself in this case with noting that Belek, like his prede-
cessor in Aleppo, Badr al-Dawla Sulaiman, scarcely made use of jihad propagan-
da.
135
 But, Carole Hillenbrand points out in contrast that Belek’s tomb inscription 
constitutes “a key piece of evidence in any discussion of the evolution of the concept 
of jihad in Syria in the early Crusading period.” This is all the more so, she notes, as 
it is one of the few inscriptions about jihad that has survived from the period 1099-
1146, when out of the entire Muslim world such inscriptions were only found in Syr-
ia.
136
  
The text of this elaborate insciption, preserved today in the Museum of Da-
mascus, has been reconstitued by Jean Sauvaget.
137
 It reads as follows: 
“Their Lord giveth them good tidings of mercy from Him, and acceptance, 
and gardens where enduring pleasure will be theirs.” (Qur’an IX, 21) 
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In the name of God, the Clement, the Merciful ––“Think not of those who are 
slain in the way of Allah as dead. Nay, they are living. With their Lord they 
have provision.” (Qur’an III, 163)  
The martyr, the emir in need of the mercy of his Lord, Nur al-Daw[la Belek 
ibn Ba]hram ibn Artuk, the pride of religion, the sun of emirs, the sword of 
those who fight the Holy War, the leader of the armies of the Muslims, the 
defender of the Imam, the arrow of kings, the vanquisher of the infidels and 
polytheists, has been called to God. He has found martyrdom –– may God be 
pleased with him, illuminate his grave and show him mercy –– in the month 
of Rabi‘ I, 518.”     
By these series of resonant titles, Hillenbrand observes, the inscription extolls 
Belek as a Muslim leader in the fight against the unbelievers, displaying in this way a 
clear concern of the emir with jihad against the Franks. She adds that the Qur’anic 
verses quoted represent Belek as a jihad warrior martyred in the way of God, with 
Paradise as his reward, while the emir is also directly called a “martyr” in the text. 
Based on this evidence, she suggests that Belek “might have inspired a Muslim re-
sponse to the Franks much earlier” if he had lived. This evaluation of Belek is quite 
different from Hillenbrand’s approach to Ilghazi, who she says had only briefly 
picked up and then dropped jihad propaganda, and failed to use the opportunity of-
fered by his victory at Ager Sanguinis to launch an ambitious offensive against the 
Franks. She attributes this to Ilghazi’s lack of awareness about the Franks’ difference 
from other groups contending for power in Syria.    
These views of Hillenbrand concerning Ilghazi have been criticized in the fi-
nal section of the previous chapter, which offers a general evaluation of that emir’s 
policies toward the Franks as well as of his approach to jihad. In the light of the dis-
cussions there, it emerges that Hillenbrand tends to overestimate Belek’s difference 
from Ilghazi in this respect. As in the case of his uncle, what Belek essentially under-
took to do against the Franks was to try and prevent them from capturing Aleppo and 
tilting the balance of power in Syria and the Jazira in their own favor, all the while as 
he treated the city as a remote dependency. Accordingly he restricted himself like 
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Ilghazi to the task of pushing back the borderline between Aleppo and the Principali-
ty. However, he focused his attacks on the northern and southern ends of this border-
line, Azaz
138
 and the castles in Jabal Summaq, because of the difficulty of recovering 
Zardana and al-Atharib after Baldwin had fortified the monastery of Dair Sarmada. 
Again like Ilghazi, Belek does not seem to have made any plans for attacking and 
taking Antioch or any other Frankish center, being aware of the enduring power of 
the Franks in their own domains despite the setbacks they had lately suffered at 
Artukid hands.  
Just as in Ilghazi’s case, this strategy directed at limited and well-defined 
goals did not prevent Belek from regarding and presenting himself as a mujahid. 
Ilghazi had acquired his reputation as the foremost adversary of the Franks after his 
victory at Ager Sanguinis, and we have seen how he acknowledged this renown. Bel-
ek had a similar reputation established after his capture of Frankish leaders of such 
stature as the King of Jerusalem and the Count of Edessa, and likewise he seems to 
have welcomed it.
139
 Corresponding to Ilghazi’s letters to the sultan and the caliph as 
well as to the celebratory poems of jihad written in his honor, we have in Belek’s 
case the aforementioned inscription on his tombstone. And like the way Ilghazi had 
answered the call from Tiflis for aid and the offer of alliance made by the Byzantine 
emperor against Bohemond II, Belek responded positively to the call from Tyre for 
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 Precisely speaking, Azaz was a possession of the County of Edessa since autumn 1122, when Jos-
celin had received it as the dowry of his new bride. But geographically it stood on the northern end of 
the borderline between the territory of Aleppo and the Principality of Antioch. 
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 Belek’s perception of himself as a mujahid against the Franks apparently did not render him a reli-
gious fanatic, as is evident from an interesting anecdote reported by the contemporary author Gerard 
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Belek was seized by wrath upon this, but the monk declared that even if a spear were put through his 
body he would not give up telling the truth. Nevertheless, Belek eventually let him to get away with-
out any harm. Benjamin Kedar, “Gerard of Nazareth, a Neglected Twelfth-Centuy Writer in the Latin 
East: a Contribution to the Intellectual and Monastic History of the Crusader states,” Dumbarton Oaks 
Papers, 37 (1983), 67. 
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aid as it was besieged by the Franks and Venetians –– even though he was prevented 
by his untimely death from actually helping it.  
Belek’s decision to go to the aid of Tyre was moreover no foolhardy venture 
as had been the case with Ilghazi’s campaign to aid Tiflis, a city completely outside 
the Artukids’ sphere of influence. In this respect Michael Köhler is not justified 
when he argues that this move of Belek’s showed him ready to fight the Franks out 
of his sphere of influence, and therefore constituted an exception to the general poli-
cy of the local emirs, as these latter only aimed to preserve their independence as 
well as to avert any critical shift in the power balance of the region.
140
 Belek had 
good reason to fear that the capture of Tyre by the Franks could have serious effects 
on the balance of power in Syria, as it would furnish them with additional troops and 
resources, including those to arrive from Europe at their new port. Among other re-
sults, it would also enable them to increase their pressure on Aleppo.
141
 For this rea-
son, Belek’s response to the summons from Tyre is better regarded in the same class 
as his and Ilghazi’s takeover of Aleppo, namely as a part of the strategy of prevent-
ing the Franks from growing too powerful in Syria by defending key strategic points 
against them. Tyre was just another such strategic location, since its fall to the Franks 
would have completed their conquest of the entire Syrian littoral –– as it did in the 
event. 
While Hillenbrand thus overestimates the difference between Ilghazi and 
Belek as regards their general approach to jihad, she fails to take notice of a remark-
able irony in the inscription, one that might point to an important difference between 
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 Michael Köhler, Allianzen und Verträge zwischen fränkischen und islamischen Herrschern im 
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 Indeed Ibn al-Athir attributes the eventual Frankish siege of Aleppo to the boost of morale and self-
confidence provided by their capture of Tyre (8 July 1124), which he says inspired them with the am-
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the two in this respect: although Belek is extolled as a martyr in the text, he had in 
fact been killed while fighting against a Muslim rather than a Frankish town, and 
quite possibly by the arrow of the Muslim emir he was besieging in the citadel. This 
irony is also evident in Belek’s exclamation that his death was in fact “the slaughter 
of all Muslims,” as if he had been mortally wounded while fighting against the 
Franks.  
Admittedly, Belek and those who composed his tombstone inscription (per-
haps drawing on the emir’s suggestions as well) had some apparently solid reasons to 
speak and write as though he had been martyred in jihad.
142
 One of these was that the 
emir defending the citadel had not flinched from summoning the Franks to aid him 
against Belek, and he had been compelled to fight a formidable battle with the Chris-
tians for this reason. Another was that Manbij, like Harran and the castle of Muhad-
dad, was of strategic importance for the security of the route over which he brought 
the troops and resources necessary to defend Aleppo against the Franks, or to march 
to the relief of Tyre. For the only way to march safely from Kharput to Aleppo was 
to follow a roundabout route to avoid the territories controlled by the Franks of Edes-
sa, passing to the east and south of them. The three towns and castles in question lay 
                                                                                                                                          
bition of gaining mastery over entire Syria. Ibn al-Athir, El-Kâmil fi’t-Tarih, X, 492 and Chronicle, 
253-54 (518: 1124-1125). 
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 Of course Belek’s dying declaration, which seems to support the point of view evident in the in-
scription, may have been placed in his mouth posthumously by common rumor circulating among 
these pietist circles. Therefore it might be reflecting how he appeared to them in hindsight, rather than 
how he saw himself. This is all the more so as Aleppo was besieged by the Franks soon after Belek’s 
death, and found itself confronted with the greatest danger and hardships it had met since the arrival of 
the Franks in the region (see the next chapter for the story of this siege). It could receive no help either 
from Belek’s successor Timurtash, who, being both unwilling and unable to fight the Franks, had al-
ready withdrawn to Mardin. Add to this the heightened jihad fervor in the city caused by the danger 
and the sacrilegeus acts of the Franks, and there was more than enough reason for the citizens of 
Aleppo to believe that the death of Belek had been “the slaughter of all Muslims.” Showing Belek 
himself expressing this idea just before his death would help constitute a memorable image that em-
bodied their longing for his reign. It must be confessed that this possibility cannot be fully excluded. 
Nevertheless, the perspective evident in Belek’s dying declaration as well as in the inscription on his 
tombstone is also observable in the ground he presented to the notables of Aleppo as he tried to take 
the city: his willingness to drive the Franks away from it. Due to its less suspicion-provoking context, 
this statement can be attributed to Belek with more confidence, whatever his own degree of sincerity 
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on this route of approach to Aleppo, and their loyalty was extremely important to 
Belek for this reason.  
In these circumstances, and especially before he set out to help Tyre, Belek 
must have deemed it necessary to secure the loyalty of Manbij after he had taken the 
other two, so that he would be safe against any attempts on Joscelin’s part to block 
that route. Such a blockade would have had disastrous consequences for the proper 
defence of Aleppo. The task was all the more urgent as Manbij’s emir Hassan was 
suspected of being in collusion with the Franks, just like the governor of Harran 
whom Belek had previously arrested. This suspicion seems to be corroborated by the 
speedy summons for aid sent by Hassan’s brother to Joscelin, a fact suggesting that 
the brothers had already been in contact with the count.  
Indeed the reason why Belek ventured to take over Aleppo itself, as far as he 
asserted it during his siege of the city, was also his desire to ensure that it was 
properly defended against the Franks. He would be able to carry out this task much 
better than his weak and inefficient cousin who had recently given away the strategi-
cally vital stronghold of al-Atharib.  
In all these cases, nevertheless, the emirs that Belek wanted to dispossess 
seem uncannily similar to the types familiar from the propaganda employed by Nur 
al-Din and Saladin to justify their attacks on other Muslims: one of these was the 
treacherous Muslim collaborator with the Franks whom the mujahid had to overcome 
before he could confidently advance against the “infidels” themselves. Another was 
the inefficient and timorous emir who, because of his inability to wage jihad, forfeit-
ed his right to these towns and lands that the mujahid could use and defend better 
against the Franks.  
                                                                                                                                          
might have been. In turn it bolsters the possibility that the similar point of view observable in the dec-
laration and the tombstone inscription represented Belek’s own way of thinking as well. 
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Furthermore, the steps Belek used to get hold of these towns or the measures 
he took after he had obtained them bear a strong resemblance to the cases in which 
jihad was instrumentalized by Zangi and his successors. The way he used an invita-
tion to jihad and his reputation in fighting the Franks to attempt to trap the emir of 
Manbij and take his town is exactly the same as the method Zangi would use in 1130 
to capture Tughtekin’s grandson Savinj ibn Buri and seize his town, Hama.143 He 
used his reputation for jihad similarly when he assured the notables of Aleppo that he 
wanted to take over its government only to ward off the Franks and not in order to 
possess it, but then banished them and proceeded to assume full power in the city.
144
   
When considered together with the immediate context of his dying words and 
tombstone inscription, Belek’s efforts to take possession of Muslim towns, and the 
grounds and methods he used in the process, reveal an interesting similarity between 
him and later leaders like Zangi, Nur al-Din and Saladin. These latter regarded and 
presented their attacks against other Muslim emirs as a necessary part of jihad, and in 
the process did not flinch from instrumentalizing jihad either. Belek resembled them 
and differed from Ilghazi in that he could consider his warfare against other Muslims 
as part of jihad, and sometimes used his reputation in Holy War to make acquisitions 
at the expense of other Muslim emirs. These techniques cannot be detected in Ilgha-
zi’s career.   
Nevertheless, Belek was also different from these later leaders. Firstly, his 
ventures against Muslim towns and territories were comparatively few, and apart 
from the capture of the lands of Akhlat, they seem to have been restricted to taking 
Aleppo and the three towns situated on its communicaton lines with Diyar Bakr. It 
should also be noted that among these three towns Harran and probably Muhaddad 
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surrendered of their own accord, without putting up any resistance. This difference of 
Belek from Zangi, Nur al-Din and Saladin could perhaps be attributed to the fact that 
being a local emir with limited powers, he was less capable of annexing other Mus-
lim principalities.  
But then these limited powers do not seem to have prevented Belek from at-
tacking the Franks: indeed a second difference of his from the later leaders is that the 
campaigns he made against the Franks or Armenians far exceeded those against 
Muslims, notwithstanding the fact that they were sometimes separated by several 
months of inactivity. Apart from his capture of the Frankish leaders and recovery of 
Kharput, Belek took Gargar, Hisn Mansur and al-Bara, carried out depredations 
around Kahta and Kaisun, as well as brief raids against Tell-Bashir and Edessa, un-
successfully besieged Kafartab and Azaz, and sent a detachment against the latter 
town. There was also the expedition he planned against the besiegers of Tyre, though 
he was prevented from realizing it by his death. From other Muslims, in comparison, 
he captured Aleppo and the lands of Akhlat, in addition to attacking Manbij, and 
took over Harran and possibly Muhaddad peacefully. This second difference between 
Belek and the later leaders could be attributed to the fact that in Aleppo and even at 
his home base in Diyar Bakr he found himself in a more vulnerable position against 
the Franks, having to fight them frequently as a result: they were surrounding Aleppo 
once again, and the Armenians under their protectorate kept attacking his territories 
in Hanzit and elsewhere.  
Whatever the reasons for these differences of Belek from the Zangids and 
Saladin, the fact remains that he dedicated a considerable amount of effort to defend-
ing his city Aleppo against the Franks, just like his uncle. This state of affairs sug-
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 Admittedly, though, he had reason to believe that they had intrigued against him in his absence. 
See section 8.3. 
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gests that the justification he offered for his bid for the city was not merely a cynical 
pretext to get hold of it. Of course this does not mean that Belek was acting selflessly 
and idealistically as he took Aleppo to defend it against the Franks: just like Ilghazi 
at the time of his takeover of Aleppo, he was trying to avert its fall to the Franks, a 
development that could have momentous consequences for the power balance in the 
region and threaten the possessions and interests of the whole Artukid family in the 
Jazira. It is also a fact that the other Muslim towns Belek took or attempted to take 
were not only few, some of them yielding without resistance, but all had a common 
characteristic, their importance for securing the vital link between Aleppo and the 
Jazira. Therefore Belek’s motive in attacking these towns was again to protect his 
possessions and interests against the threat posed by his powerful Frankish neigh-
bors.  
For this reason, instead of contenting ourselves with a cynical view of Bel-
ek’s consideration of his warfare against Muslims as part of jihad, we may attempt a 
further reformulation of the contemporary (early twelfth-century) understanding of 
jihad to grasp how come he may have seen it in this light. We have already seen that 
Ilghazi and Belek regarded their warfare as jihad when the rival they had to confont 
in their efforts to defend and augment their possesions and strategic interests hap-
pened to be the Franks. Now Belek seems to have gone a step further and regarded 
his warfare as jihad also when he had to dispossess a Muslim adversary in order to 
defend those possessions and interests better against a Frankish rival. Or, to put it in 
other words, he apparently considered his warfare as jihad also when he had to dis-
possess a Muslim adversary in order to better defend his possessions and interests 
against another rival, and when this latter rival happened to be the Franks. 
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The case was different in respect of Nur al-Din and Saladin, as in their time 
there had developed a fully-fledged jihad ideology based on the professed aim of ex-
pelling the Franks from the Near East and taking all their centers –– which was hard-
ly the case in Belek’s time. It was due to this ideological magnification and sanctifi-
cation of their goal in warfare against the Franks, which seemingly carried it beyond 
the defense of their personal possessions and interests against rivals Muslim or 
Frank, that they could regard their relatively much more frequent warfare against 
Muslims still as a part of jihad. The fully developed jihad ideology, with its grandi-
ose aim lingering over the horizon and seeming to require an infinite amount of re-
sources, was what allowed them to take their expansionist policy against other Mus-
lims far beyond their actual warfare against the Franks. Potentially it justified even 
the conquest of the entire Muslim world before a single arrow would be loosed at the 
“infidels.”  
Indeed it is here that the final reason for the difference between these leaders 
and Belek lies, intellectual in nature but perhaps the most important: their purely ide-
ological understanding of jihad, as against the practical understanding of Belek and 
his contemporaries in the early twelfth century. Paradoxically, the ideological magni-
fication of their goal in warfare against the Franks, which gave it an idealistic, self-
less appearance, resulted in the decrease of their confrontations with the Franks and 
the increase of those with Muslims, turning the latter into a veritable onslaught of 
territorial self-aggrandizement at the expense of other Muslims.     
 
Summarizing all these considerations, it can be stated that Belek’s approach 
to jihad resembled that of Ilghazi in its general lines: when he had to confront the 
Franks in the limited framework of protecting his possessions and strategic interests, 
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including the preservation of the balance of power in the region, he regarded and pre-
sented this as jihad, and enjoying the prestige he derived from his successes against 
the Franks, considered himself as the protector of Muslims in a general sense. But we 
have evidence that he may have differed from his uncle in that he regarded and pre-
sented his clashes with other Muslims as jihad too, insofar as the conquest of certain 
Muslim towns rendered it easier and safer for him to defend his possessions and stra-
tegic interests against Frankish neighbors. In this respect he partly resembled later 
leaders like Zangi, Nur al-Din and Saladin, who counted their warfare against other 
Muslims as a part of jihad.  
But Belek also differed from these leaders in two respects. The first was that 
almost all of his few campaigns against Muslims were restricted to taking Aleppo 
and a few towns on its lines of communication with the Jazira. This can arguably be 
be attributed to his limited means as a local emir to pursue a truly expansionist policy 
on Muslim ground. Nevertheless, his second difference from the later leaders was 
that he clashed much more frequently with the Franks than with the Muslims, which 
might be due in turn to his more vulnerable position against the Franks in Syria and 
even the Jazira. But the intellectual and perhaps chief reason for this difference lay in 
their ideological as against Belek’s practical understanding of jihad: since the goal 
they professed to pursue, the hallowed, grandiose goal of expelling the Franks alto-
gether from the Near East, went far beyond the personal aim of defending their pos-
sessions and interests against Frankish rivals, no amount of resources could be 
deemed sufficient for it. Accordingly, they could justify to themselves even the con-
quest of the whole of entire Muslim Syria and Mesopotamia, not to mention Egypt, 
before venturing a serious move against the Franks.    
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With Belek’s death the Artukid period of confrontation with the Franks over 
Aleppo came to an end, since his cousin Timurtash was to adopt a much different 
method for dealing with them, as we shall see in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 9 
ALEPPO ABANDONED: TIMURTASH’S WITHDRAWAL TO 
DIYAR BAKR AND ITS AFTERMATH 
9.1 Timurtash’s release of Baldwin and abandonment of Aleppo 
The Franks did not delay in taking advantage of Belek’s death; only a few 
days later Joscelin’s deputy in Edessa launched a raid into the region of Shabakhtan. 
Nevertheless, he was confronted and defeated by Timurtash’s commander Umar al-
Khass. Ibn al-Adim relates how Umar collected three hundred men and pursued the 
Franks, catching up with them near Marj-Aqsas. In the ensuing fight Joscelin’s depu-
ty and most of his men were killed, and their heads as well as the booty collected 
were sent to Aleppo.
1
 In the meantime Michael, the former Armenian lord of Gargar, 
recovered both this castle and Babula by exploiting the conflict between Belek’s pro-
tégé Tughril Arslan of Melitene, who had taken hold of Gargar and Masara, and 
Shams al-Dawla Sulaiman, who wanted to seize it from him.
2
 Belek’s demise and the 
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consequent divisions among the Artukids soon led to more momentous results, bring-
ing Aleppo to the brink of capture and leading to its loss by the family. It all began 
when Timurtash decided to release King Baldwin in return for a ransom, a promise 
of alliance, and substantial territorial concessions. 
9.1.1 The perspectives of the sources 
9.1.1.1 Ibn al-Adim  
Ibn al-Adim offers the most detailed account about Timurtash’s agreement 
with the king and the subsequent loss of Aleppo. The chronicler seems to have main-
ly drawn upon the various disparate and sometimes conflicting reports in his biog-
raphies of Aksungur al-Bursuki
3
 and Dubais ibn Sadaqa
4
 in Bughyat al-Talab fi Ta-
rikh Halab to form the coherent and more concise account in Zubdat al-Halab fi 
Tarikh Halab.
5
 Despite this, the latter also contains some original information that is 
not found in the Bughya, such as the clash of Timurtash and Dubais at Marj-Dabik.  
The first part of the account in the Zubda, up to the siege of Aleppo and the 
Franks’ depredations, is mainly based on the long chronicle of the contemporary au-
thor Al-Azimi, which is no longer extant but quoted at length in the biography of 
Dubais. The latter half of this account, beginning with the dispatch of Ibn al-Adim’s 
great-grandfather and other envoys to seek aid from Mardin and Mosul, and ending 
with Aksungur’s relief of the city, is based on the information that Ibn al-Adim had 
heard from his father and grandfather and set down in his biography of Aksungur al-
Bursuki. On the other hand, Ibn al-Adim seems to have excluded from the Zubda the 
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information in these two biographies that does not issue from the two sources in 
question, Al-Azimi and his own family. This information excluded from the Zubda, 
for which Ibn al-Adim indicates no source in the biographies themselves unlike his 
usual practice in the Bughya, contains many chronological confusions as well as 
some serious errors like attributing the rulership of Mardin to Shams al-Dawla 
Sulaiman instead of Timurtash. In the following, therefore, we shall mainly follow 
the chronicler’s account in the Zubda, noting where appropriate different or addition-
al information of significance found in the Bughya.    
Ibn al-Adim criticizes Timurtash’s ruling skills immediately at the beginning 
of his account of the emir’s reign in Aleppo. “When Timurtash got hold of Aleppo,” 
he states, “youthfulness and play distracted him from setting to work with diligence 
and seeing to the affairs of the city. As a result, the situation deteriorated and the 
power of the Muslims in Aleppo was reduced.” On 10 Jumada I (24 June 1124), he 
reports, Timurtash arrived at an agreement with King Baldwin, who committed him-
self to return Azaz, al-Atharib, Zardana, al-Jazr and Kafartab to Aleppo. Baldwin al-
so promised to pay a ransom of eighty thousand dinars, of which twenty was to be 
paid in advance. In an additional term Baldwin accepted under oath that he would 
ally with Timurtash against Dubais ibn Sadaqa and work for the latter’s ruin.  
Ibn al-Adim explains that Dubais, the lord of Hilla, after he had been attacked 
and defeated by the caliph Mustarshid, had arrived in Syria to seek refuge by the side 
of Salim Ibn Malik, the lord of Ja’bar. In search of a new base for himself, he had 
established correspondance with a group of Aleppans, requesting them to deliver the 
city to himself in return for a certain sum of money.
6
 This was discovered by the 
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ra’is of the city, Fadail ibn Sa‘id ibn Badi‘, and communicated to Timurtash, who 
had Dubais’s collaborators placed under arrest and tortured; some were hung, some 
had their properties confiscated, and others were burnt. In the Bughya Ibn al-Adim 
reveals that Dubais was encamped before Manbij at this time, having pitched camp 
there on Wednesday 16 Jumada II 518 (30 July 1124). According to that source, 
however, it was the ra’is who executed and banished the culprits, rather than Timur-
tash himself.
 7
 This event shows that Timurtash was indeed justified in his apprehen-
sions about Dubais’s intentions, and these fears may have been one of the primary 
reasons why he chose to conclude the agreement with Baldwin.  
Ibn al-Adim states that the lord of Shaizar, Emir Abu’l-Asakir Sultan ibn 
Munqidh, acted as mediator in the negotiations, sending his sons and nephews to 
Aleppo to stand as hostages for Baldwin. Before the king went to Shaizar he was led 
to the presence of Timurtash, who ate and drank with him and gave him in gift a roy-
al tunic, a cap of gold, and ornamented slippers, along with the prize horse that had 
been taken from him on the day of his capture. Ibn al-Adim gives the date of Bald-
win’s travel to Shaizar as Wednesday 4 Jumada I (18 June 1124), about one week 
before the conclusion of the agreement, so a part of the negotiations seems to have 
been conducted while Baldwin was already at Shaizar. He waited here until the 
twelve hostages including his own daughter, Joscelin’s son and the children of other 
Frankish notables were brought to stand as surety that he would abide by the terms of 
the agreement. He also paid the twenty thousand dinars that he had agreed to pay in 
advance, and was released on Friday 17 of Rajab (29 August).  
                                                                                                                                          
made friends with Baldwin and Joscelin at the Castle of Ja‘bar. Accordingly it would have been in-
consistent for Ibn al-Adim to report that Dubais tried to secure Baldwin’s release and at the same time 
that he made friends with the king at Ja‘bar. In the Zubda, this episode of alliance at Ja‘bar is correctly 
moved to the point after Baldwin’s release. Ibn al-Adim, Bughyat al-Talab fi Tarikh Halab, 228 and 
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But as soon as Baldwin was released from Shaziar, Ibn al-Adim reports with 
a curse, he betrayed the agreement. Sending a message to Timurtash, he informed the 
emir that Patriarch Bernard had inquired about the terms of the agreement and or-
dered him to repudiate the clause about the delivery of Azaz; “Should you find your-
self guilty on this account let that guilt be mine,” he had said. The king apologized in 
conclusion that the Christians could not disagree with the patriarch, and therefore he 
was incapable of opposing him on this issue. 
Işın Demirkent and Michael Köhler have questioned this report of Ibn al-
Adim, suggesting that King Baldwin may not have been responsible in fact for a 
breach of the agreement with Timurtash. Demirkent points out that Azaz belonged to 
Joscelin of Edessa at this time, having come into his hands as the dowry of Roger of 
Antioch’s sister, and was therefore not at the disposal of Baldwin as Antioch’s lord. 
She states that there would have been no problem if it had been Joscelin, rather than 
the patriarch, who had objected to the delivery of the castle, because Azaz would 
soon become the bone of contention in a violent struggle between Joscelin and Bo-
hemond II. Even if the patriarch had indeed brought forward such an argument, she 
observes, he ought to have done so for al-Atharib, Zardana and Kafartab as well, 
which definitely belonged to Antioch. Moreover, although the patriarch is shown as 
objecting to the delivery of Azaz only, the king did not surrender any of the other 
castles either. Based on these seeming contradictions, and on Fulcher’s failure to 
mention the terms in question as well as the patriarch’s objection, Demirkent rejects 
this part of Ibn al-Adim’s account.8  
                                                                                                                                          
7
 Ibn al-Adim, Bughyat al-Talab fi Tarikh Halab, 232-33 and Buğyetü't-taleb fi Tarihi Haleb, 145, in 
“Dubais ibn Sadaqa.” 
8
 Işın Demirkent, Urfa Haçlı Kontluğu Tarihi, 2 vols. (Vol. 1: İstanbul, 1974; Vol. 2: Ankara, 1994), 
II, 56-7. 
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Demirkent seems to belabor the issue of Azaz, however. At a time when An-
tioch had no ruler of its own, and the regent Baldwin was still in captivity, such me-
ticulous distinctions of property between Antioch and Edessa were unlikely to be 
made, though this would become an issue after Bohemond II’s arrival. Moreover, the 
patriarch’s religious authority to dissolve the king and other Franks from their oaths 
to Muslims was general, and not restricted to the territory of Antioch. After learning 
the term about the surrender of Azaz, Patriarch Bernard may have desired to hear no 
more of the rest and delivered Baldwin from his obligation to surrender any of them. 
This may have been reflected in Ibn al-Adim’s account as if he had objected only to 
the delivery of Azaz. As for Fulcher, we shall see that he had his own reasons to sup-
press the embarrassing details about the agreement and the king’s breach of it. 
Michael Köhler objects to Ibn al-Adim’s story from a different point of view. 
He asserts that Baldwin could not be easily charged with deceiving Timurtash, given 
the uncertainty of whether he had a right to surrender the possessions of Antioch in 
his function as regent. At least for the delivery of Azaz, he suggests, the king may 
have needed the consent of the patriarch and the princely court.
9
 Nevertheless, Imad 
al-Din Khalil points out rightly that Baldwin could have coped with such formalities 
in one way or another, given his position as de facto master of Antioch.
10
 It is hard to 
imagine at any rate that the king was ready on his part to deliver the castles and undo 
all the work of the recent years, but was only prevented from doing so by the con-
straint of the patriarch and nobles in Antioch. Even if the latter had brought no objec-
tions, Baldwin would still have been unwilling to give away Azaz or any of the other 
castles in question, considering their importance for both the defence of the eastern 
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 Michael Köhler, Allianzen und Verträge zwischen fränkischen und islamischen Herrschern im Vor-
deren Orient. Eine Studie über das zwischenstaatliche Zusammenleben vom 12. bis ins 13. Jahrhun-
dert (Berlin, 1991), 145-46. 
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frontier of the Principality and the long-run plan of encircling, if possible taking 
Aleppo.
11 For all these reasons, it seems more plausible to accept with Khalil that the 
objection of the patriarch was hardly more than a pretext, a strategem that Baldwin 
used to justify his breach of the agreement.
 
 
Ibn al-Adim goes on to relate that messengers kept going back and forth be-
tween Timurtash and the Franks, without any result being reached, while Baldwin 
and Joscelin developed intimate relations with Dubais through the intermediacy of 
Salim ibn Malik. In the previous chapter we have seen Orderic Vitalis claim that the 
lord of Ja‘bar had regularly sent money to Baldwin while the latter was held as pris-
oner in Kharput. Evidently, the emir regarded his connection with the Franks as a 
sort of security against the Artukid family. Thanks to him an agreement was con-
cluded between Dubais and the Franks, stipulating that Aleppo would belong to Du-
bais while the citizens as well as their money and chattels would belong to the 
Franks; the latter would also receive certain lands in the territory of Aleppo. After 
this, Ibn al-Adim reports, Dubais advanced toward Marj-Dabik and defeated Timur-
tash who had come out against him. The latter thus learned of the Franks’ betrayal 
and alliance with Dubais, and set out for Mardin on 25 Rajab (6 September 1124) to 
collect troops as well as to seek help from his brother Shams al-Din Sulaiman, the 
lord of Mayyafariqin. The Aleppan chronicler Ibn abi-Tayyi (cited by Ibn al-Furat)
12
 
testifies that he also desired to keep under watch his brother’s movements in the Jazi-
ra, ensuring that the latter would not try to occupy his territories. 
                                                 
11
 See Thomas Asbridge, The Creation of the Principality of Antioch, 1098-1130 (Woodbridge, 2000), 
84-5. The next section includes a more detailed discussion of this point. 
12
 Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh al-Duwal wa’l-Muluk, II, f.85b-6a, cited in Khalil, Al-Imarat al-Artuqiyya, 281, 
n. 4. 
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In Aksungur’s biography in the Bughya, Ibn al-Adim offers a different ver-
sion of the events.
13
 Indicating Shams al-Dawla Sulaiman wrongly as the lord of 
Mardin, he states that Timurtash went upon his brother’s death to take over that city 
and the other places attached to it. He asserts that it was upon learning of the emir’s 
departure that Baldwin broke the agreement. But in fact Timurtash went to Mardin 
on 6 September, after the king had renounced the agreement on his release (29 Au-
gust), and according to Ibn al-Azraq Sulaiman died only on Wednesday 6 Ramadan 
(16 October).
14
 The latter historian also gives the date of Timurtash’s takeover of 
Mayyafariqin as Shawwal 518 (10 November – 8 December 1124), and adds that he 
thus outstripped Dawud ibn Sokman who was preparing to set out for the same town 
at that time.
15
  
Ibn al-Adim’s account in Aksungur’s biography also differs as to the parties 
and terms of the agreement over Aleppo that was concluded with the Franks. He 
states that besides Dubais there was also Ibrahim ibn Ridwan on the Muslim side, 
whereas the Franks were represented by King Baldwin himself. They agreed that the 
territory of Aleppo would belong to the Muslims, the city would be given to Ibrahim 
on account of his deceased father’s possession of it, and the money and chattels 
would go to the Franks. Considering that the Zubda mentions Sultanshah ibn Ridwan 
among the besiegers of Aleppo, it is quite possible that either this prince or his broth-
er Ibrahim, or perhaps both of them, participated in the agreement. As Ali Sevim ob-
serves,
16
 the city would still belong to Dubais in fact, while the presence of a Selju-
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 Ibn al-Adim, Bughyat al-Talab fi Tarikh Halab, 205 and Buğyetü't-taleb fi Tarihi Haleb, 127, in 
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kid prince was calculated to provide a modicum of legitimacy to the Arab emir’s 
claims on Aleppo as well as to his collaboration with the Franks to secure it.    
Ibn al-Adim notes that in the meantime the negotiations between Timurtash 
and Baldwin still dragged on, with the hostages from the Munqidh family remaining 
at Aleppo and those from amongst the Franks at Shaizar. Finally, on 18 Shaban (29 
September), the messengers returned with the news that the truce had been broken 
and the king had advanced to Artah to attack Aleppo. From Artah he proceeded to 
camp by the river Quwaik and devastated the region. Then he marched off again and 
arrived before Aleppo on 6 October, pitching camp to the west of the city. He was 
joined before long by Joscelin and Dubais, who had set out from Tell Bashir and 
wasted the valley of Butnan on their way to Aleppo. Ibn al-Adim notes that Joscelin 
camped to the north of the city, over the road to Azaz and the areas adjacent to it. 
Dubais pitched camp to his east, along with Sultanshsah ibn Ridwan; they were 
joined here by Isa, the son of Salim ibn Malik. Still further to their east was the camp 
of Yaghi Siyan ibn Abd al-Jabbar ibn Artuk, lord of Balis, who had fallen out with 
Timurtash.
17
 Ibn al-Adim notes that the tents of the allies amounted to three hundred 
in all, two hundred of which belonged to the Franks and the remaining hundred to the 
Muslims.   
Some scholars have wanted to see in this collaboration of the Franks and 
Muslims an alliance against the Turks
18
 or the Artukids
19
 per se. This does not seem 
to be true, for the allies included Sultanshah (and perhaps also Ibrahim) ibn Ridwan, 
Tughril Arslan ibn Kilij Arslan and Yaghi Siyan ibn Abd al-Jabbar, all of whom 
were Turkish and the latter also an Artukid. So it would be more correct to regard 
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 Köhler, Allianzen und Verträge, 148. 
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this as an alliance that the local emirs and the Franks effected against a formidable 
power based outside Syria, not unlike the similar cases in the first half of the 1110s. 
Let us remember that before this point the emirs of Harran and Manbij had shown 
themselves ready to collaborate with the Franks against Belek, and also the emir of 
Qal‘at Ja‘bar was in collusion with them. Apparently, they regarded the Franks as a 
guarantee of their independence vis-à-vis the Artukids. If Tughtekin did not join the 
alliance, differently from the first half of the 1110s, the reason for this must be 
sought in his long history of collaboration with Ilghazi and Belek; he had wed his 
daughter to the former as well. He may also have felt more secure in Damascus from 
Artukid domination, either because of distance or trust in his own strength or both. 
Ibn al-Adim reports at this point that the Franks destroyed a great number of 
mausoleums, opened the graves of the Muslim dead, and even, digging out their cof-
fins, took them to their tents to use them as chests for food. Robbing the corpses of 
their shrouds, they attached ropes to their feet, and dragging them before the walls, 
they exclaimed “Here is your prophet Muhammad!” and “Here is your Ali!”20 Not 
content with these acts, Ibn al-Adim relates, they took a copy of the Qur’an from one 
of the mausoleums outside Aleppo, and said: “Muslims, see your book!” One of 
them bore a hole in it, and tying it with two ropes, made a crupper for his nag. The 
nag kept dropping dung on the book, and every time the man saw the dung on it, he 
clapped his hands and laughed in wonder and amusement. Each time they seized a 
Muslim, the chronicler tells, the Franks cut off his hands and testicles, after which 
they sent him back to the Muslims. The latter did the same to those they captured, 
                                                 
20
 Another point of interest in this passage is that the Franks seem to have been quite knowledgeable 
about the Muslim religion: if Ibn al-Adim was not projecting his own knowledge to the Franks, they 
knew that Muhammad and Ali were not worshipped as Gods by the Muslims, and that the first was 
regarded as a prophet. Their specific mention of Ali would also suggest that they had some elementary 
knowledge about the tenets of Shi‘ism as well. Of course this is not surprising, given the presence of a 
numerous Shi‘ite population in Aleppo and the rest of Northern Syria in this period. 
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and sometimes they hanged them. Ibn al-Adim’s main purpose in stressing these 
atrocities, which were probably of the sporadic kind perpetrated in most conflicts at 
the time, must have been to show Dubais in a particularly bad light by pointing out 
what kind of “infidels” he had allied with.     
Ibn al-Adim notes that the besieged did not remain passive during this time, 
but made frequent sorties as raiding bands to intercept the enemy troops or even to 
carry them off from their camp; they were able to kill or capture many in this way. 
From the top of the walls they kept crying out to Dubais: “O Dubais! O Nuhais!” ex-
pressing that they saw him as the bringer of bad luck and disaster.
21
 Indeed Ibn al-
Adim’s own consideration of Dubais was not much different, as it emerges from his 
comments in the emir’s biography. It is worth quoting in full the passage where he 
vehemently objects to the praise that another author had bestowed upon Dubais:  
The reports I cite are the words of Abu Sa‘d al-Sam‘ani. Perhaps the news 
about how Dubais allied with the Franks to besiege Aleppo and offered the 
lives and properties of Muslims to the enemies of religion… has not reached 
him. If he had learned this condemnable and ignominious act which would 
not have been committed by anybody with sincere faith –– if Dubais ever 
made the confession of Islamic faith, paying lip service, this would only be 
on account of a despicable idea or an evil design –– he would not have said 
for him: “Perhaps no Bedouin Arab will be born after him who will be his 
match,” or again “the glory of his house was sealed with him.”  
And all this despite Dubais knew very well that Baldwin –– Timurtash had 
released him from his imprisonment since his capture by Belek ibn Artuk, 
and made peace with him on condition that he would not attack himself –– 
had broken the truce with Timurtash and the Muslims, failing to observe the 
terms agreed with him under oath. So Dubais must have known that if the 
king took control of Aleppo now, he would probably not remain loyal to him 
either on what they had agreed about the possession of the city. I swear by 
my life that Dubais has virtually blotted out the honor and glory of his father 
Sadaqa as well as his excellent qualities that are beyond doubt, and similarly 
effaced the celebrated exploits and famous feats of his ancestors that have 
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been overshadowed by this vile and abominable act recorded and reported by 
historians.22              
Of course not all contemporaries of Dubais regarded him from the angle of 
the Aleppans, including Ibn al-Adim himself, as his alliance with Sultanshah ibn 
Ridwan, Salim ibn Malik and the Artukid Yaghi Siyan makes clear.  
Ibn al-Adim notes that peace negotiations were in progress at this time be-
tween the Aleppans and the Franks, but before long the besieged found themselves to 
be in very dire straits. Aleppo was governed in Timurtash’s absence by the qadi Ibn 
al-Khashshab, the leader of the pietist pro-jihad circles. He saw to the defense of the 
city, as well as to the expenditure of money and the distribution of grain, and also 
served as the ra’is. Emmanuel Sivan states that in his double capacity as chief com-
mander and director of the pietists, the qadi launched an energetic campaign of jihad 
propaganda. According to Sivan, this represented the first time that the jihad move-
ment became the “driving force” of a veritable war against the “infidels,” quickly 
winning over the spirits of the populace. He attributes this development both to the 
desparate situation of the city, whose inhabitants were almost its sole defenders, and 
to the sacrilegous acts of the Franks.
23
 Nevertheless, there is little to show that this 
occasion represented anything new, that jihad here was anything more than the form 
in which the Aleppans perceived their struggle against the Frankish aggressors, albeit 
in particularly lurid colours because of the desperate situation and, possibly, the sac-
rileges involved. There seems no ground to support Sivan’s assumption that jihad 
propaganda had become an independent “driving force,” inciting the Aleppans to 
fight the Franks as best as they could: they had hardly any other option in fact, as the 
earlier Christian massacres in cities captured must have shown.  
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Ibn al-Adim relates that besides Ibn al-Khashshab there were also present in 
the city Badr al-Dawla Sulaiman ibn Ilghazi and the shihna Umar al-Khass, who 
commanded an army of only five hundred horsemen. The three administrators re-
solved to send the chronicler’s own great-grandfather, Abu Ghanim Muhammad ibn 
Hibat Allah ibn Abi Jarrada (who was the qadi of Aleppo at the time), the naqīb al-
ashrāf Zuhra and Abu abd Allah ibn Jilli to Mardin in order to ask Timurtash to 
come to their aid. But Ibn al-Adim states that the emir was preoccupied at the time 
with the capture of Mayyafariqin and the other possessions of his brother Shams al-
Dawla Sulaiman, who had died in Ramadan (October), and was therefore distracted 
from attending to the state of affairs in Aleppo. More dubiously, he adds that Timur-
tash was distracted from the affair also by the negotiations he was conducting with 
Aksungur al-Bursuki, lord of Mosul, in order to reach an agreement about attacking 
the Franks together and driving them away from Aleppo.
24
 So although the envoys 
kept urging Timurtash to set out for Aleppo, he delayed them with promises that re-
mained unfulfilled. 
Ibn al-Adim relates this episode with more detail in his biography of Aksun-
gur, basing himself on the testimony of his great-grandfather Abu Ghanim: he had 
heard the story related by his father and uncle, grandsons of the envoy.
25
 Reportedly, 
Timurtash promised to come to the city’s aid when the qadi and the other two envoys 
told him how the people of Aleppo had been brought to the end of their tether. But he 
began putting them off day after day as they urged him to fulfill his promise. Finally, 
he cut them short: “Stop talking about the Franks; if they capture Aleppo, I shall re-
turn and take it back from them.” “Don’t do such a thing,” the envoys begged, “don’t 
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deliver the Muslims to the enemies of religion!” Timurtash asked in turn how he 
could manage to confront the Franks at that time. Ibn al-Adim’s great-grandfather 
replied: “Who are they that you should be unable to prevail against them? We are the 
people of Aleppo, no less; if you come to join us, we should prove an adequate sup-
port for you against the Franks.”      
But Ibn al-Adim reveals in the Zubda that the Aleppans had been reduced to 
such an extremity by this time that they were forced to eat cats, dogs and carrion, 
having run short of all the provisions in their stores. The famine brought along an 
epidemic, and before long they were jumping from their sickbeds to repel Frankish 
attacks, after which they would fall back on to the beds and continue to groan with 
pain as before. All this was described in a letter sent by the envoy Abu Ghanim’s son 
(Ibn al-Adim’s grandfather) from Aleppo to the envoys at Mardin, but it fell into the 
hands of Timurtash. “See these folks who played the tough men to me!” he reported-
ly exclaimed. “And they assure me that if I go to Aleppo, its populace will prove an 
adequate support for me against the Franks. They deceive me so that I may go there 
with a small number of troops, although their weakness has reduced them to this 
wretched state.” After this he ordered the envoys to be entrusted to guardians and 
held under arrest. The reason why Timurtash took such a step, according to Abu 
Ghanim’s remark cited  in the Bughya, was the emir’s fear that the envoys could 
leave his side and go to another emir to seek help.
26
  
In the same work Ibn al-Adim offers an explanation for the reluctance of Ti-
murtash and most other emirs to come to the aid of Aleppo: 
At that time emirs showed little interest in Aleppo because of its contiguity 
with the Franks, its ruined state, and the low amount of its revenues, although 
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whoever ruled it would need a sizeable treasure, sufficient revenues, and the 
resources necessary for funding the army.27 
The only alternative under these conditions seemed to be the atabek of Mo-
sul, Aksungur al-Bursuki, and accordingly the envoys devised a strategem for escap-
ing from the prison and fleeing there to request help from him. Outwitting their 
guardians, who had fallen asleep, they left Mardin in flight, and proceeded via Dara 
to Mosul.
28
 But on arriving they learned that Aksungur was gravely ill and extremely 
weakened. Ibn al-Adim notes that the news of the atabek’s situation also reached 
Dubais, who had it celebrated to the sound of cheers, applauses and drums in his 
camp. That Aksungur was indeed Aleppo’s only hope at this time can be deduced 
from Ibn al-Adim’s report that the Aleppans nearly died of fear when one of Du-
bais’s associates cried: “The man whose assistance you hoped for is dead!” 
Back in Mosul, Ibn al-Adim continues, the envoys finally gained admittance 
to Aksungur’s presence. When they informed him about the sorry state of Aleppo, he 
committed himself by a vow to God to come to its aid if health was granted him. 
“Scarcely three days had passed after this when fever left Aksungur,” Ibn al-Adim’s 
great-grandfather told him, implying divine intervention. Köhler argues that besides 
the religious motive of fulfilling his vow, Aksungur may have been impelled to ac-
tion also by his duty as governor for the sultan to fight the latter’s sworn enemy Du-
bais, as well as by his desire to extend his lordship to Aleppo and inflict harm on his 
Artukid rival.
29
 Nevertheless, the most important reason for Aksungur’s venture to 
save Aleppo must have been the same as why Ilghazi had previously agreed to take 
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over the city: his concern to avert the dangerous consequences involved in a radical 
shift in the power balance of the region.  
Ibn al-Adim goes on to relate that Aksungur marched to Aleppo via Rahba, 
where he summoned Tughtekin and Kir Khan to join him, and reached the city on 29 
January 1125. Upon his approach the Franks and Dubais broke off the siege and 
withdrew toward Mount Jawshan, but fled from that hill too when Aksungur ad-
vanced toward them. The latter pursued them at a rather leisurely pace, until they had 
been driven far enough from the city, and then ordered his forces to turn back. Ibn al-
Adim notes that at this point Ibn al-Khashshab urged Aksungur to continue the pur-
suit and attack the Franks, given that they were in a state of rout and surrounded by 
the Turkish troops. Aksungur refused this proposal on the grounds that they would 
have no safeguard to fall back on if the Franks turned round and defeated them, and 
it would be far better therefore to return to the city and restore its strength before 
launching a serious offensive against the enemy. After taking over Aleppo, Ibn al-
Adim concludes, “he saw to the interests of the city, increased its power, abolished 
oppression and market dues, provided for universal justice, and treated them with 
perfect goodwill.” 
9.1.1.2 Al-Azimi  
It has already been indicated that the first part of Ibn al-Adim’s account in the 
Zubda is mainly based on the account of Al-Azimi found in his long chronicle, which 
is no longer extant. The same author’s short chronicle also contains a brief account of 
the events, although it does not contribute anything new.
30
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In this account Al-Azimi relates that Timurtash released Baldwin in return for 
ransom and an agreement, and handed him over to the Munqidhites, who acted as 
mediators. As soon as Baldwin was set free he broke the truce and besieged Aleppo 
with Dubais and Sultanshah ibn Ridwan. Timurtash was absent during the protracted 
siege, being distracted from the affairs of Aleppo by his efforts to take over the pos-
sessions of his recently deceased brother, Shams al-Dawla Sulaiman. Finally it was 
Aksungur who set out to bring succor to Aleppo, after recovering from his illness, 
and on his arrival the Franks departed from the city. Al-Azimi adds that he was re-
turning at the time from Damascus to Aleppo, and joined Aksungur’s troops on the 
way. As in his account of Ilghazi’s victory at Ager Sanguinis, he cites a verse from a 
qasida he had written to celebrate the occasion and to praise Aksungur: “You have 
defended the frontier cities against his oppression.”  
9.1.1.3 Ibn al-Athir  
Ibn al-Athir does not mention Timurtash’s release of Baldwin or his agree-
ment with the king, and offers a completely different reason for his departure for 
Mardin. He asserts that Timurtash entrusted Aleppo to a deputy after taking it and 
returned to Mardin, “because he saw that Syria was a frequent battle-ground with the 
Franks and he was a man who loved the calm and the easy life.”31  
Parallel to this remark of Ibn al-Athir is an interesting anecdote in his History 
of the Atabeks of Mosul about an exchange that took place between Timurtash and 
Zangi, who reportedly rebuked the former for his love of comfort and reluctance to 
fight the Franks. According to the anecdote, Zangi learned that a group of peasants 
from the lands of Mosul had departed to settle in the territory of Mardin, and sending 
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a message to Timurtash, demanded that he return them. Timurtash rejected to do so 
on the grounds that he himself treated the peasants well, levying from them only a 
tenth of their produce, and added that the peasants would not have abandoned Zangi 
if had treated them similarly. Zangi replied with the following words: 
If you took only a share of one-hundredth that would still be too much for 
you, because you are occupied with your pleasure in the citadel of Mardin. 
But if I were to take two-thirds that would still be too little for me, on account 
of my preoccupation with attacking my enemies and with jihad. Were it not 
for me, even drinking a cup of water in Mardin would feel as if it took longer 
than would be safe for you, and the Franks would have captured the city.32 
It should be noted that Cahen questions the vast difference between the tax 
rates in Mardin and Mosul that is implied by this exchange, and points out that the 
taxes recorded in inscriptions in what had been Timurtash’s territories are the same 
as those that obtained everywhere else.
33
 Evidently, this calls into question the verac-
ity of Ibn al-Athir’s report as a whole. However, against this argument Imad al-Din 
Khalil points out the enormous costs involved in the war with Franks, and states that 
in the reign of Timurtash, who did not interest himself in war with the Franks, tax 
rates may indeed have been lower than those in the territory of Zangi, or for that mat-
ter in the Artukid territories themselves at the time of Ilghazi and Belek.
34
  
Ibn al-Athir offers a quite different account from that of Ibn al-Adim about 
how Aleppo was lost by Timurtash.
35
 Without touching upon Baldwin’s release, he 
attributes the Frankish siege of Aleppo to the bolstering of their ambition and morale 
after their recent capture of Tyre (8 July 1124), which he says convinced them that 
they could take the whole of Syria. He notes that these ambitions were fed still fur-
ther by Dubais ibn Sadaqa, who urged them to attack Aleppo and assured them that 
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most of its inhabitants, being Shi‘ites like himself, would easily surrender the city 
when they saw him. He promised to serve them in Aleppo as an obedient deputy if 
they supported him, and made many other promises as well.  
Probably basing himself on this passage, and pointing out the previous at-
tempt of Dubais to capture Aleppo, Ali Sevim insists that it was Dubais and not 
Baldwin who persuaded the other side to besiege Aleppo.
36
 But it appears that nei-
ther side of the alliance needed much persuading, and each had their own motives for 
the siege: Dubais coveted Aleppo as a replacement for his former power base Hilla, 
of which he had been deprived by the caliph, while Baldwin desired to crown the 
long-time efforts of encircling Aleppo with its capture. The Franks had already be-
gun working in this direction at the time of Baldwin’s accession, and would probably 
have attacked the city sooner or later, with or without Dubais’s help, however im-
portant it may have been in this critical conjuncture.   
But Ibn al-Athir’s story is still valuable insofar as it shows how Dubais ap-
proached the Franks and what grounds he put forward to have them admit himself as 
an ally. Earlier, in the case of Badr al-Dawla Sulaiman and Belek in Aleppo, we have 
seen that a leader’s efficiency in fighting the Franks was less important for the Sun-
nite and Shi‘ite factions in the city than his support for their own sect, and Dubais 
seems to have relied on this fact. Nevertheless, the following developments would 
show that Dubais had gone too far in his reliance on this religious schism: the 
Shi‘ites were far from being ready to betray Aleppo to the Franks backing him. In-
deed it was none other than Ibn al-Khashshab himself, the most prominent leader of 
the Shi‘ites, who assumed the task of organizing the defences of the city.   
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Ibn al-Athir proceeds to relate that the Franks laid siege to Aleppo and pre-
pared themselves for a long stay, building houses against heat and the cold, as they 
had resolved not to leave before capturing the city. On seeing this the defenders’ mo-
rale was shattered, and they became convinced that they were doomed, all the more 
so as “the weakness and incompetence of their lord Timurtash became clear to 
them;” they had also run short of food.37 Seeking a way of escape from the end in 
sight, they realized that there was only Aksungur al-Bursuki to whom they could turn 
to for help.  
Without mentioning the Aleppans’ request of help from Timurtash, Ibn al-
Athir reports that they thus sent to Mosul and asked Aksungur to come to their aid, 
promising to surrender the city to him. While on his way to Aleppo, Aksungur sent to 
ask for the surrender of the citadel to his men, so that he could take refuge there with 
his troops in case of defeat; otherwise, he warned, not one of them would survive and 
Aleppo would fall to the enemy along with other places. This was accepted and the 
citadel was delivered to Aksungur’s deputies, who must have somehow leaked into 
the city, after which he continued his march to Aleppo. Probably an important motive 
of Aksungur’s in taking this step was to guarantee that the city would remain in his 
hands after he had raised the siege.  
When Aksungur came in sight of the city, Ibn al-Athir continues, the Franks 
began to withdraw and the emir contented himself with watching them. Whereas we 
have seen Ibn al-Adim report that Ibn al-Khashshab urged Aksungur to attack the 
retreating Franks, Ibn al-Athir states that it was his vanguard who wanted to charge 
the enemy. The ground he says Aksungur put forward in rejecting this idea is similar 
to that reported by Ibn al-Adim. For the moment, Aksungur said, it was enough for 
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them to have spared the city from the Franks’ evil purposes, and the best course was 
to attack them only after the affairs of Aleppo had been put to right and its provisions 
and finances had been restored. Once the Franks had retired the populace of Aleppo 
went out with joy to welcome Aksungur, Ibn al-Athir states in conclusion, and the 
emir stayed there until he had settled its affairs.  
9.1.1.4 Ibn al-Qalanisi  
In his account that also served as a source for Ibn al-Athir,
38
 Ibn al-Qalanisi 
fails to mention Timurtash and his release of King Baldwin. He reports directly that 
the Franks assembled from their provinces to besiege Aleppo, and relates how the 
siege was prolonged until the provisions in the city were depleted and the citizens 
came to the brink of destruction. He also fails to mention the mission to Mardin, and 
instead reports that the Aleppans wrote to Aksungur in Mosul to inform him of their 
sorry situation and beg him to “deliver them from the hands of the infidels.” Aksun-
gur was reportedly much distressed at this, and making preparations to set out for 
their assistance, reached Aleppo in January 1125. On his aproach, the chronicler re-
lates, the Franks “fled in panic and withdrew in defeat” before the great might of Ak-
sungur’s army, with the Muslim vanguard pursuing and capturing some of them, and 
did not stop till they had reached Antioch.  
Evaluating the whole incident, Ibn al-Qalanisi draws attention to the fact that 
the Franks, being determined to persist with the siege, had even built houses and huts 
to protect them against the heat and cold. Despite this, he remarks thankfully, “God 
Most High — to Him be the praise — showed mercy upon the people of Aleppo and 
delivered them from disaster and snatched them from the coils of destruction.” “By 
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this noble action,” he adds, “Aksungur al-Bursuki acquired great merit and renown.” 
He concludes by reporting how the emir set the affairs of Aleppo in order and “made 
every effort to defend the city and keep the enemy at a distance from it.”  
9.1.1.5 Matthew of Edessa  
Matthew of Edessa offers the most detailed account among the indigenous 
Christian sources.
39 He reveals that Joscelin and Baldwin’s queen Morphia took part 
in the negotiations with Timurtash, and notes that “this was the second time that 
Baldwin was freed from captivity through Joscelin’s efforts.”40 He reports that Josce-
lin and Morphia made an agreement with Timurtash to ransom the king, and handed 
over to him Baldwin’s daughter, Joscelin’s son and fifteen other persons. This makes 
seventeen hostages in all, five more than the number indicated by Ibn al-Adim. It 
should be noted further that Matthew fails to mention Abu’l Asakir Sultan ibn Mun-
qidh’s role as intermediary of the lord of Shaizar, who had in fact received the Frank-
ish hostages. Matthew also indicates the sum promised as a hundred thousand pieces, 
instead of the eighty thousand reported by the Arab chronicler. He reports that Bald-
win was released in September and arrived at Antioch to the joy of the Christian 
faithful, but his nephew and Galeran remained in Timurtash’s “clutches” and were 
eventually put to death.  
 
 
Matthew proceeds to relate how Baldwin and Joscelin gathered all the Frank-
ish troops and marched against Aleppo. He notes that Dubais joined Joscelin with his 
troops, after the two had made an alliance of peace and friendship. This is corrobo-
rated by Ibn al-Adim’s report that the two leaders in question arrived before Aleppo 
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separately from King Baldwin, having set out together from Tell Bashir. So perhaps 
it had been only Joscelin who established a connection with Dubais and the lord of 
Ja‘bar, and not he and Baldwin together as we have seen Ibn al-Adim report in his 
account. Joscelin may even have travelled in person to Ja‘bar, since, in the French 
translation of Matthew’s chronicle, differently from the English version, it is stated 
that Joscelin went to see Dubais and the latter joined him with his troops after their 
agreement.
41
 Matthew also reveals that Tughril Arslan of Melitene came in the com-
pany of Joscelin and Dubais. What he expected from this alliance was probably to 
secure some support for protecting his domain against Shams al-Dawla Sulaiman and 
other dangerous rivals who threatened it on all sides.
42
  
Matthew goes on to relate that the imposing force thus assembled against 
Aleppo put the city in dire straits through continual assaults and famine, until the 
townspeople sent an urgent call of help to Aksungur in Mosul. Assembling a large 
number of troops, the latter arrived before Aleppo to drive away the Franks, who 
thereupon returned home without having suffered any losses. Matthew indicates the 
duration of the siege wrongly as six rather than four months. He reveals in conclu-
sion that Dubais, in retiring, carried out some raiding in the territory of Mosul and 
other lands of Aksungur.      
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9.1.1.6 The Anonymous Syriac  
The account of the Anonymous Syriac
43
 seems to have been suffered some 
sort of mutilation, for under the heading “The release of Baldwin and the death of 
Galeran” he relates the assassination of Aksungur in 1126, without touching upon the 
events in question. But he still provides some interesting details in the following sec-
tion about the course and the ending of the siege. 
The Anonymous mentions the count of Tripoli among the Frankish leaders in 
the siege, which is corroborated by the Latin sources, but on the Muslim side he only 
mentions Dubais; he claims that the emir came to Antioch and submitted to the 
Franks. However, given that Dubais and Joscelin had proceeded to Aleppo together 
from Tell Bashir, it seems unlikely that the Arab emir ever came to Antioch. Like 
Matthew, the Anonymous also exaggerates the duration of the siege, indicating it as 
nine months instead of the actual four. He notes in parallel with Ibn al-Adim that be-
cause of the resulting famine the Aleppans were reduced to eating unclean animals.  
The Anonymous fails to mention the Aleppans’ call for help from Timurtash 
and Aksungur. He only reports that by the time they had come to the point of surren-
der, they received a message stating that Aksungur, the “governor of Assyria,” had 
come to help them. He reveals that at this point Dubais requested the Franks to pro-
vide him with an army, so that he could try and prevent Aksungur from crossing the 
Euphrates (at Ja‘bar probably) until they would be able to capture the city. “But the 
Franks were obstinate and would not take his advice,” laments the Anonymous. 
Probably the actual reason why they rejected the proposal was their fear that if Ak-
sungur succeeded in defeating Dubais’s contingent and crossing the Euphrates, the 
rest of their forces would not stand any chance of resisting the Muslim army.  
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As a result of this decision, the Anonymous continues, Aksungur crossed the 
Euphrates without meeting any resistance, and boldly entered the town at night. Next 
morning the citizens emerged with him from the gates and attacked the Franks, who 
withdrew to pitch camp on the hill of Jawshan. Ten days later they set out for Anti-
och, while Aksungur pursued them till al-Atharib, cutting down stragglers and plun-
dering the baggage. After this, the Anonymous concludes, he returned to Aleppo 
“with great joy.”  
This version of the raise of the siege diverges from most other accounts, ac-
cording to which the besiegers retired on the approach of Aksungur and not after his 
arrival. But it is supported by the testimonies of Ibn abi-Tayyi (cited by Ibn al-Furat) 
and the twelfth-century chronicle Bustan al-Jami‘.44 These sources state that Aksun-
gur arrived at night, and fought and defeated the Franks in the next morning. They 
add that the latter had suffered from a flood of the River Quwaik on the previous day, 
losing many tents, chattels and men. As we shall see presently, they partially agree 
with Fulcher on this issue.        
9.1.1.7 Michael the Syrian and Bar Hebraeus  
The other two Syriac sources, Michael the Syrian and Bar Hebraeus, content 
themselves with noting that the ransom money fixed for Baldwin was a hundred 
thousand dinars, which supports Matthew’s figure against the eighty thousand given 
by Ibn al-Adim.
45
 Bar Hebraeus makes a mistake however in stating that this ransom 
was agreed to secure the release of Baldwin’s nephew as well. We have already seen 
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Matthew report that Baldwin’s nephew as well as Galeran remained in Timurtash’s 
hands and were later executed on his orders.  
Michael the Syrian gives more details about this execution, revealing that 
Timurtash had acted under pressure in ordering it.
46
 He relates that the emir was ac-
tually reluctant to execute Galeran and Baldwin’s nephew, and it was Aksungur who 
compelled him to take this step, threatening to ravage his territories if he refused. 
Complying with this demand, Timurtash had them put to death, but repented his ac-
tion when news arrived shortly afterwards that Aksungur had been assassinated by 
the Ismailis.
47
 This is indeed an interesting episode: Aksungur may have been afraid 
that Timurtash would release the two Frankish princes to the Muslims’ detriment, as 
he had done before with Baldwin. Timurtash, on his part, may have been expecting 
to use the captives to recover at least a part of his losses resulting from the king’s 
failure to pay the full ransom. 
9.1.1.8 Fulcher of Chartres  
In his account
48
 Fulcher of Chartres seems to have been embarrassed by 
Baldwin’s betrayal of his agreement with Timurtash, and therefore sought out excus-
es to explain it away. We shall see that he is followed in this by William of Tyre, 
who drew upon him as a source. Fulcher begins his account by stating that King 
Baldwin was released from captivity “by the favor of almighty God,” and gives the 
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same date as Ibn al-Adim, 29 August. Nevertheless, he states, the king did not depart 
entirely free, for he had had to provide hostages, obliging both them and himself to 
be “uneasy with a hope uncertain and doubtful.”49 Fulcher does not mention any oth-
er terms to which Baldwin had committed himself, including the payment of ransom 
money and the surrender of Azaz and other castles. This may have been because he 
was unaware of these, or more probably because their mention would have made it 
still harder for him to excuse the king’s breach of agreement. 
Fulcher goes on to relate that Baldwin took counsel about how to solve the 
problem of hostages, and then set out for Aleppo; his intention was to force the 
Aleppans through a blockade to release the hostages. But Fulcher adds that the king 
also harbored some hope that he could capture the city as well, since he had learned 
that it was already hard hit by famine. It is noteworthy that the historian omits any 
mention of the fact that Baldwin allied against Aleppo with other Muslims. As in the 
previous case, he may have been unaware of this in distant Jerusalem, but perhaps he 
chose to suppress it because of the embarrasment involved.       
It is mainly on Fulcher’s testimony that Michael Köhler seems to base him-
self when he argues that the Franks did not mean to annex Aleppo to their domains: 
The sources very clearly say that the Franks did not intend to annex Aleppo 
to the Principality of Antioch or to found another Frankish lordship there. The 
purpose of the Franks was restricted to the rescue of the hostages and to cus-
tomary booty-making, leaving aside the surrender of some villages to them. 
The existence of the lordship of Aleppo was to remain untouched. However, 
it was planned to subjugate it to the Crusader states, since Dubais declared 
himself ready to govern Aleppo as the deputy of the Franks… There was no 
word of Baldwin’s establishment of a Frankish garrison in Aleppo.50 
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All this sounds highly inconvincing. It is quite implausible that the enormous 
costs and efforts involved in a full-scale siege operation were undertaken merely for 
the sake of rescuing the hostages and collecting booty. Besides Fulcher confesses 
very clearly that the king intended to get hold of the city if he could, and as we shall 
see, he openly laments at the end of his account that the capture of Tyre was not fol-
lowed by the capture of Aleppo. His testimony on this point must be taken quite seri-
ously, as he was an exact contemporary of the event and also acquainted with the 
king. Moreover, the agreement with Dubais stipulated that the people, money and 
chattels in Aleppo would belong to the Franks, which meant that they were leaving 
Dubais only an empty shell –– and perhaps not even that. For we have seen Ibn al-
Adim indicate in the Bughya that considering Baldwin’s previous breach of the treaty 
with Timurtash, there was a strong degree of probability that he would not leave the 
city to Dubais either.  
Indeed the Franks did not have any more reason to observe their agreement 
with Dubais than in the case of their agreement with Timurtash. We have seen in the 
sixth and seventh chapters that all their efforts since 1118 had been directed at the 
end of encircling and capturing Aleppo, an achievement that would have tilted the 
power balance of the region in their favor, and perhaps even provided them with 
mastery over the whole of North Syria. In these conditions there seems no ground to 
assume with Köhler that the Franks would have desisted from capturing Aleppo if 
the opportunity offered itself. And what better opportunity was there than when they 
were twice as numerous as their Muslim allies, with no other Muslim power in sight 
to intervene? There was little that Dubais could do against the Franks if they decided 
that they wanted to take the enitire city after all, and Köhler’s argument seems far 
from being persuasive. So the prospects for Dubais do not seem to have been very 
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bright in this alliance, but he may have considered that they would at least let him 
have some share in the daily administration and revenues of Aleppo.   
Fulcher proceeds to relate that Baldwin and his troops besieged Aleppo in 
vain for five months. At this point the Turks, “alert as usual,” crossed the Euphrates 
and hastened to relieve Aleppo, for fear that it would soon be captured unless they 
acted quickly. Fulcher gives the number of enemy troops as seven thousand horse-
men, in addition to the four thousand camels carrying their provisions, and indicates 
the same date as Ibn al-Adim for their arrival, 29 January. Like the Anonymous, Ibn 
abi Tayyi and Bustan al-Jami‘ he states that the Muslim army came at night, and 
adds that for this reason they found the Franks unprepared and confounded them. 
Unable to prevail against the enemy, these latter had to abandon the siege. In this 
Fulcher seems to diverge from the majority of the other sources, who assert that the 
besiegers withdrew on learning of Aksungur’s approach. But we have seen Ibn al-
Adim report that the Aleppans plundered the tents left behind by the besiegers, and 
this suggests that some kind of clash may indeed have taken place between Aksun-
gur’s forces and the Franks, whether at night, as Fulcher seems to imply, or in the 
next morning, as the Anonymous, Ibn abi Tayyi and Bustan al-Jami‘ testify.   
Telescoping the development of the events, and omitting the Franks’ initial 
withdrawal to Mount Jawshan, Fulcher relates that they retreated to al-Atharib, to 
which they were pursued by Aksungur’s troops according to the Anonymous. During 
this pursuit, Fulcher reveals, the Turks lost two men while the Franks lost a camp-
follower and six tents. He states that Baldwin and Joscelin finally arrived at Antioch, 
and the troops of Jerusalem and Tripoli returned home, but the Frankish hostages 
remained unredeemed.    
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At the end of his account Fulcher delves into the morals to be derived from 
this failure, which he says was “most vile to say, most dishonorable to know, tedious 
to report, and shameful to hear,” though he had still related it because of his reluc-
tance to depart from the truth. He points out that God had withdrawn his hand from 
the Christians after he had granted them the “powerful and glorious city of Tyre.” He 
seeks the reason for this in their failure to return to God the thanks they owed Him as 
well as to fulfill the promises they had made to Him, doing less when they had more. 
Concluding, he remarks: “Perhaps He has reserved His vineyard for the more faithful 
husbandmen to cultivate who would desire and be able to return from it rich fruit in 
due season.”  
9.1.1.9 William of Tyre  
William of Tyre, as usual, mainly follows Fulcher in his account, though with 
some additional information and slight but interesting modifications and explications 
of his source.
51
 Differently from Fulcher, he does mention the ransom money Bald-
win promised to give, and indicates its sum as a hundred thousand dinars like Mat-
thew and Michael the Syrian, rather than eighty thousand as given by Ibn al-Adim. 
He states that Baldwin was perplexed as to the means by which he could raise the 
ransom and redeem the hostages, and on consulting his men received the advice of 
besieging Aleppo. Like Fulcher, William represents the city as already suffering 
from famine by this time, and adds to this the effects of depopulation. Interestingly, 
however, he diverges from Fulcher in asserting that the only goal of this siege was to 
press the citizens into restoring the hostages or paying the ransom money, and omits 
his source’s statement that the king considered capturing the city too if he could. He 
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also leaves out Fulcher’s concluding lament that God had denied Aleppo to the 
Christians after he had given them Tyre. Taken together, these differences could be 
attributed perhaps to William’s uneasiness at the breach of agreement involved in the 
king’s attack on Aleppo, a fact that he may have learned from other sources.  
William proceeds to relate that in accordance with the advice given to him, 
Baldwin assembled all his cavalry and blockaded Aleppo. He denied the citizens all 
ingress and egress, forcing them to make do with scanty amounts of food. In contrast 
to Fulcher, William was apparently aware of the Aleppans’ call of help from Timur-
tash and Aksungur: he reports that they sent repeated summons of aid to the princes 
of the orient, notably to those beyond the Euphrates, describing their critical situation 
and warning that the city would soon fall without instant aid being brought. Indeed 
this is the only place where William gives away the fact that the real purpose of the 
siege was to capture Aleppo, rather than to solve the problem of hostages and ransom 
money. He states that the Muslim princes were “filled with the solicitude for an al-
lied city” upon hearing the news, and mustering their forces in haste, crossed the Eu-
phrates to relieve Aleppo. He follows Fulcher in giving the number of the horsemen 
as seven thousand, in addition to those in charge of the baggage.  
William again diverges from Fulcher and is closer to the majority of the other 
sources in asserting that the Franks retreated before Aksungur’s arrival at Aleppo, 
preferring to secure their safety rather than to risk a battle with his superior forces. 
Nevertheless, he repeats Fulcher’s mistake in reporting that the Franks directly with-
drew to al-Atharib, whence they proceeded to Antioch and parted ways. He con-
cludes by relating how the king was welcomed in Jerusalem after an absence of 
about two years.  
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9.1.1.10 Orderic Vitalis  
Orderic Vitalis’ account52 mostly consists of legendary material, as is usual 
with his reports about events in the outremer. Interestingly, however, he is the only 
Latin source to mention Timurtash (whom he calls “Ghazi”), although he was writing 
in far-away Normandy; this must be thanks to his sources of information among the 
Normans of Antioch.  
The most interesting part of Orderic’s account is the beginning. Here the au-
thor makes an unfavorable comparison of Timurtash’s rule with that of his predeces-
sor Belek, who receives lavish praise in the process. It must be noted however that 
Orderic seems to attribute the difference between the two emirs more to the limited 
resources of Timurtash than to his personal lack of qualities:  
The emir Ghazi, nephew and heir of Belek king of Aleppo, succeeded him, 
but because of recent changes and the dwindling of his treasures he was una-
ble53 to undertake the great tasks or carry on the difficult enterprises which his 
predecessor, a man of great experience, had begun and which he had been 
shrewd and resourceful enough to support and maintain by force.  
For this reason, Orderic reports, Timurtash released Baldwin from prison in 
return for a ransom and hostages. He gives the fixed sum and the number of hostages 
differently from all other sources, as fifty thousand besants and forty sons of the Je-
rusalemites. He notes that Timurtash also demanded security for the Muslim prison-
ers in Frankish hands.  
Orderic makes no mention of the siege of Aleppo, but offers instead a ficti-
tious account about how the Franks attacked and captured Timurtash in the castle of 
Gis, near Caeserea, where he was supposedly waiting for them to bring the ransom 
money. He states that they released the emir in return for a hundred thousand gold 
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Bezants and the promise of long-term peace with the Christians, but his reign lasted 
only a little while after this. 
9.1.2 The course of events  
The consideration of the sources allows for the following reconstruction of 
the events: after negotiations with Joscelin and Baldwin’s queen, Timurtash released 
King Baldwin in return for an agreement. This stipulated the delivery of Azaz, al-
Atharib, Zardana, al-Jazr and Kafartab and the payment of a sum of eighty or a hun-
dred thousand dinars, twenty thousand to be paid in advance. It also included an alli-
ance against Dubais ibn Sadaqa, who was trying to get hold of Aleppo as a new base 
for himself after he had been forced out of Hilla by the caliph and had sought refuge 
with Salim ibn Malik, the lord of Ja‘bar. But Baldwin had no intention of observing 
the terms of the treaty and undoing the fruits of all his previous efforts for controlling 
the borderline between Antioch and Aleppo, with the ultimate aim of capturing the 
great Muslim city. Accordingly he refused to deliver the castles as well as the rest of 
the ransom money, putting forward as a pretext that the patriarch of Antioch had 
prohibited him to do so.  
The next thing Baldwin did, through the intermediacy of Joscelin and Salim 
ibn Malik, was to cement an alliance with Dubais, the very man against whom he had 
promised to help Timurtash. The Franks and Dubais agreed to besiege Aleppo to-
gether. If they succeeded, the city would belong to Dubais, who promised to act as an 
obedient deputy of the Franks; he had also drawn into the agreement a son of Rid-
wan’s (Sultanshah or Ibrahim) to legitimize this arrangement. The Franks, on their 
part, would receive the people, money and chattels in the city, along with a share 
from its territory. However, they were also in a position to take hold of the entire city 
and its territories if they wished to do so, and given their strength, they could have 
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done this with impunity: it would have sufficed to violate their agreement with Du-
bais, after they had already breached the one with Timurtash. Although Dubais must 
have seen this, he still harbored hopes of gaining some sort of foothold in Aleppo by 
this agreement, even if he would be dependent on the Franks, while the latter ex-
pected to top their long-time efforts to encircle the city by actually taking possession 
of it.  
After the conclusion of the agreement, Dubais attacked and defeated Timur-
tash near Marj-Dabik. Thereupon Timurtash went to Mardin to muster forces from 
Diyar Bakr. He also intended to get help from his brother Shams al-Din Sulaiman of 
Mayyafariqin, as well as to keep the latter under control and prevent him from an-
nexing his territories while he was busy with the defense of Aleppo. Negotiations 
with the Franks continued, but these were little more than a strategem on their part to 
gain time for the siege preparations. Together with their Muslim allies they laid siege 
to Aleppo at the beginning of October, with Baldwin arriving from Antioch and Jos-
celin, Dubais and Ridwan’s son from Tell Bashir. Among the other allies were Pons 
of Tripoli, Salim ibn Malik’s son Isa, Tughril Arslan of Melitene, who wanted to se-
cure allies for protecting his domain under threat, and Yaghi Siyan, the Artukid lord 
of Balis, who had fallen out with Timurtash. This Franko-Muslim coalition against 
the Artukid presence in Syria was not unlike the one that had emerged against the 
Seljukids in 1115, a pan-Syrian alliance against a Muslim power based outside the 
region.   
The Aleppans soon found themselves in great hardship, because of the dearth 
of provisions and resultant sickness, and they had only five hundred horsemen left to 
fight. In Timurtash’s absence the qadi Ibn al-Khashshab had taken up the task of ad-
ministering the city and organizing its defences, and by the help of jihad propaganda 
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he mobilized the desparate populace. The qadi and his companions in government, 
Badr al-Dawla Sulaiman and the shihna Umar al-Khass, sent three notables of the 
city to summon Timurtash from Mardin. But the emir proved unwilling to help, not 
least because he was preoccupied with securing the possessions of his recently de-
ceased brother Sulaiman of Mayyafariqin before their cousin Dawud of Hisn Kaifa 
would be able to do so.
54
 The envoys proceeded from Mardin to Mosul, where their 
only remaining option, Aksungur al-Bursuki, was governor. Indeed Aksungur agreed 
to help them, as he was all too aware of the dangers involved in the fall of Aleppo to 
the Franks.  
Accordingly Aksungur mustered a great army of seven thousand horsemen 
and set out for Aleppo. On the way he sent some of his men ahead to leak into the 
city and take over its citadel, purportedly to have a refuge in case of defeat, but prob-
ably also to ensure his possession of the city. Dubais’s proposal to prevent him from 
crossing the Euphrates until Aleppo would fall was rejected by the Franks, and on  
his arrival at night the besiegers had to abandon their positions; some clash may also 
have taken place between his forces and the Franks in the next morning. They with-
drew to the nearby hill of Jawshan, and then proceeded to al-Atharib, being pursued 
there by Aksungur’s troops. The latter then returned to Aleppo, whereas the Franks 
marched on to Antioch and dispersed home. Aksungur had become the new lord of 
Aleppo.     
9.1.3 The perspective of the Aleppans  
Timurtash had thus turned out to be thoroughly dispensable for the Aleppans, 
once he had failed to bring them succor against the assault of the Franks and their 
allies. As Cahen indicates, it was only on account of the Mesopotamian emirs’ capac-
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ity to protect them from the Franks that the Aleppans had been willing to accept them 
as rulers. Seeking another guardian when Timurtash proved a failure in this regard, 
they hit upon Aksungur al-Bursuki. Aksungur’s reception as the new lord of the city 
thus represented the second time that the Frankish threat against Aleppo had led to its 
annexation by an emir from the Jazira.
55
 Sivan observes similarly that the reign of the 
Artukids in Aleppo began and ended in the same way in 1118 and 1125: it was due in 
both cases to the initiative of Ibn al-Khashshab and the pro-jihad circles in the city 
who offered its rule to an emir from the Jazira, one who they hoped would prove 
more successful than the current weak ruler in warding off the Franks.
56
  
Cahen notes that Aksungur himself had already been rejected before Ilghazi’s 
takeover on the grounds that the Aleppans wanted nobody from the East. But at that 
time his lord, the Seljukid sultan, was still powerful enough to pose the danger of an-
nexation, and moreover Aksungur lacked the adequate financial and military re-
sources to protect Aleppo, being only the lord of Rahba. Now, in contrast, Aksun-
gur’s power had been greatly enhanced with his appointment as the governor of Mo-
sul (1124), while the Seljukids had been much weakened, so that Aksungur’s associ-
ation with the sultan did not render him a threat in the view of the Muslims of Syria. 
On the contrary, through the legitimacy it provided, it made him appear as an ele-
ment of stability. Moreover during his long rule in Rahba, situated on the borders 
between Syria and Jazira, Aksungur had come to be seen as one of the local emirs of 
Syria, participating with Tughtekin in fights against the Franks, and this also pre-
vented him from being regarded as an alien intruder in Aleppo.
57
 
Comparing the power of Aksungur with that of the Artukids, Grousset argues 
that during the period of Artukid rule Aleppo was able to play only an intermittent 
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role in the fight against the Franks, and contrasts this with period following the an-
nexation of the city to Mosul. He contends that this event constituted a beginning for 
the reunion of Muslim territories, which would eventually bring about the demise of 
Frankish Syria.
58
 Nevertheless, this seems to be a much too teleological view of the 
developments. Nur al-Din and Saladin did not have direct access to the troops and 
economic resources of Mosul either, when they fought effectively against the Franks. 
What really counted was the connection established between Aleppo and Diyar Bakr, 
the storehouse of Turkoman troops, and this connection had already come to exist in 
the days of Ilghazi and Belek. Nor did it end after Timurtash’s abandonment of 
Aleppo, pace Hillenbrand.
59
 On the contrary, the Turkomans of Diyar Bakr contin-
ued to play an increasingly important role in the defense of Muslim Syria, being set-
tled by Zangi and Nur al-Din in the border regions with the Franks to tilt the social 
and demographic balance in the Muslims’ favor.60  
9.2 The causes and consequences of Timurtash’s alteration of the Artukid pol-
icy toward the Franks and his withdrawal to Diyar Bakr  
It is time now to address some of the most important questions raised by 
these events: why was Timurtash so willing to make the fateful agreement with the 
Franks, and later so unwilling to rescue Aleppo from their clutches? In what respects 
did his policy toward them differ from that followed by his father and cousin? What 
were his motivations in opting for this change? It will be the task of this section to try 
to answer these questions. After that we shall consider the consequences of Timur-
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tash’s withdrawal to Diyar Bakr and the loss of his possessions in Syria, for it had an 
important bearing on the Artukids’ relations with the Franks. 
There are mainly four motives that historians variously attribute to Timurtash 
for coming to an agreement with Baldwin and releasing him. The first was to acquire 
the strategically important castles to the west of Aleppo, the second was to receive a 
large ransom and set his finances straight, the third was to win an ally against Du-
bais, and the fourth was to secure by this means a peaceful state of affairs in Aleppo 
and Syria, so that he could occupy himself with defending and expanding his home 
territories in Diyar Bakr against the other Artukids. Related with the last was his de-
sire to escape the difficulties and problems he faced in administering the much-
coveted Aleppo as an inexperienced youth.  
Thomas Asbridge emphasizes the first motive, pointing out that the terms for 
the surrender of Azaz and other castles demonstrated the continuing preoccupation of 
both sides with the frontier between Aleppo and Antioch. He observes that Timurtash 
was exacting an extremely high price for releasing Baldwin, as it amounted to the 
loss of the borderline running through Azaz, al-Atharib and Zardana. Since this 
would have been crippling for the Principality, he says, Baldwin was forced by stra-
tegic needs to break the agreement.
61
 Ali Sevim similarly observes that Aleppo 
would have profited greatly from the agreement if it had been put into effect, and 
blames Timurtash’s failure to enforce it on his laxity in military and political af-
fairs.
62 
 
Nevertheless, Runciman and Grousset argue that it was in fact only the ran-
som that really mattered for Timurtash, and point out that even after Baldwin refused 
to return the castles the emir continued to negotiate with him, being eager to secure 
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the unpaid portion of the ransom money.
63
 But this attitude could be attributed just as 
well to Timurtash’s concern at least to prevent Baldwin from allying with Dubais and 
attacking Aleppo. Indeed Cahen stresses that Dubais had already demanded Aleppo 
from the Artukids, in return for the services he had rendered to Ilghazi, in order to 
make it a new base for himself. As an additional factor, he points out Timurtash’s 
desire to keep under watch his brother Sulaiman’s ambitions and then to succeed to 
the latter’s city Mayyafariqin. For it was only by securing the peace in Syria, releas-
ing Baldwin and allying with him against Dubais, that he could hope to dedicate his 
attention to Diyar Bakr.
64 
While this does not seem entirely correct, given that the 
issue of Sulaiman and Mayyafariqin arose in the autumn of 1124, when Timurtash 
had already released Baldwin in June, it was probably true that he wanted to set the 
affairs in order in Aleppo and then turn to deal with what was really important to 
him, his lands in Diyar Bakr.  
Michael Köhler brings all these factors together, stating that Timurtash want-
ed to secure his control of Aleppo through this agreement with Baldwin. Thereby he 
would win an ally against Dubais, bolster the city’s finances with the ransom money, 
and also recover Azaz and other castles from which the Franks controlled the access 
routes to Aleppo and raided its territory. Through these means he hoped to restore the 
power balance with the Franks to such a degree that it would become possible for 
him to withdraw to Diyar Bakr without endangering Aleppo. He would then be able 
to occupy himself with his home territories, as these had suffered after Ilghazi’s and 
Belek’s deaths from the aggression of his Artukid and Seljukid neighbors.65  
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Carole Hillenbrand approaches this intention of Timurtash to secure his con-
trol of Aleppo and then withdraw to Diyar Bakr from a different perspective, point-
ing out the continuous pressure exerted by the conflicting interests of various emirs 
and factions who coveted the city, the most important among them Dubais, Badr al-
Dawla Sulaiman and the Franks. Under this pressure, she observes, Timurtash must 
have soon “felt out of his depth” in Aleppo, all the more so as he was only a lad of 
eighteen at the time, and in charge of a city that was particularly difficult to rule. So 
his hurry to settle the affairs of Aleppo by an agreement with the king and then to 
return to Diyar Bakr also stemmed from his desire to escape these pressures and dif-
ficulties. Hillenbrand notes that negotiation, rather than military confrontation, would 
be Timurtash’s preferred method in the later years as well. But in 1124 he was still 
too inexperienced to negotiate successfully with “such seasoned practitioners of the 
political art as Baldwin.”66  
Even if Timurtash had been more experienced, though, it is highly doubtful 
whether the goals that Ilghazi and Belek had been pursuing for years, with only mod-
est results, could be attained so easily by negotiation. In the light of the foregoing 
considerations, it emerges that Timurtash had expected to hit too many birds with 
one stone by this agreement: through releasing King Baldwin he calculated to win an 
effective Frankish ally against a rival Muslim emir, just as Danishmend, Chakarmish 
and Ibrahim ibn Sokman had done, and at the same time to easily recover the frontier 
line of Azaz, al-Atharib, Zardana and Jabal Summaq, which Ilghazi and Belek had 
struggled for years and with many battles to take from the Franks. On top of this he 
would receive a hefty sum in ransom, and find himself free to leave the problematic 
city of Aleppo in a relatively secure state to deal with his central lands in Diyar Bakr.  
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But dazzled with the thought of how much he could achieve by this one move 
of releasing Baldwin, Timurtash failed to see that the Franks would not so easily give 
up this borderline that they had spent so much effort to establish and reestablish after 
Ager Sanguinis. He could not discern that this time it was different, that Aleppo had 
been the Franks’ target for a long time, and therefore resorting to their aid against a 
Muslim emir who similarly coveted his city was like jumping out of the frying pan 
into the fire.  
Accordingly the agreement only ended up cementing an alliance between 
Timurtash’s two enemies, and the gains promised by his seemingly bright idea dis-
solved like a mirage, leaving him in a very difficult position indeed. The young emir 
was brought to realize his mistake and taste the bitter reality when Baldwin immedi-
ately went back on his promise to deliver the castles, and a few days later Dubais, 
apparently not intimidated at all by his “alliance” with the king, defeated him at 
Marj-Dabiq. As it was too late now to undertake anything, Timurtash sought refuge 
in Mardin. But he still continued the negotiations, hoping to avert a common attack 
by Dubais and the Franks on Aleppo, and perhaps also to recover the rest of the ran-
som money.  
Timurtash’s initial purpose in retiring to Diyar Bakr may have been to collect 
troops and return with them to Aleppo. Perhaps he also planned to win over his 
brother and rival Sulaiman of Mayyafariqin for an alliance against the Franks, and 
thus to divert his designs against the territories of Mardin as well. But his worst fears 
were realized in the meanwhile and the Franks, allying with Dubais and other Mus-
lim emirs, laid siege to Aleppo. About two weeks after this, when Sulaiman died, 
Timurtash had not set out yet to relieve the city, and now the death of his brother ne-
cessitated him to take hold of Mayyafariqin before his cousin, Dawud of Hisn Kaifa. 
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As was the case with all Artukids, the defense and enlargement of his home territo-
ries in Diyar Bakr carried much more weight for Timurtash than the fate of Aleppo, 
which was at best a remote dependency.
67
 If he was to proceed to its aid, moreover, 
he would need the troops and resources of Mayyafariqin as well.  
But even after he had taken hold of Mayyafariqin and returned to Mardin, 
Timurtash kept postponing a march to the aid of Aleppo, despite all the urgings of 
the Aleppan envoys. By this time he seems to have lost hope of being able to relieve 
the city on his own, lacking confidence in his forces and commandership. He was all 
in all an inexperienced youth of eighteen years of age, possessing neither interest in 
nor ability for war. He was also aware that the Aleppans were in a wretched condi-
tion and in no state to help him, having read the letter sent from the city to one of the 
envoys. Getting help from the other emirs did not seem a viable option either. Re-
questing reinforcements from Dawud ibn Sokman, whom he had just deprived of 
Mayyafariqin, was out of question. Ibn al-Adim reports that Timurtash carried on 
negotiations with Aksungur al-Bursuki to join forces with him, but this seems rather 
dubious at first sight: if that had been the case, would he have tried to prevent the 
envoys departing to ask help from other emirs, among whom Aksungur was obvious-
ly the first choice? Wouldn’t he have joined the governor at least as the latter pro-
ceeded south to raise the siege? 
Nevertheless, it is still possible that negotiations were indeed started, but then 
collapsed when Aksungur asked for the citadel of Aleppo to be delivered to him, just 
as he did later to the Aleppans, and Timurtash rejected this on the grounds that he 
could later use it to take full control of the city. In other words, Timurtash may have 
feared that in case he allied with Aksungur, perhaps at the expense of delivering him 
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the citadel, he would be forced to give up Aleppo and return humiliated and empty-
handed to Mardin. The only option that remained for him under these conditions was 
to abandon the city to its fate. 
We do not know whether Timurtash believed in his own words as he assured 
the Aleppan envoys that he would take back Aleppo if the Franks captured it. But the 
fact that he refused to ally with Aksungur and seemed to prefer that the city go to the 
Franks rather than to the lord of Mosul suggests two alternative reasons for his atti-
tude. The first of these is as follows: it has been emphasized in the course of the pre-
sent study that the capture of Aleppo by the Franks would render them far too strong, 
tilting the power balance of the entire region in their favor; as Zangi said later to Ti-
murtash, it would not even be possible for him to peacefully drink a cup of water in 
Mardin. It might be that because of his young age and lack of experience Timurtash 
failed to discern this fact, which had been so well perceived by Ilghazi and Belek that 
they had done their best to defend this remote dependency against the Franks. 
In this connection, Hillenbrand does not seem justified when she argues that 
Timurtash’s abandonment of Aleppo was a logical extension of the policy of Ilghazi, 
who deemed the city unfit to serve as his base.
68
 Regarding Aleppo as an outer de-
pendency that had been taken over to protect it from the Franks was quite different 
from abandoning it altogether to their hands; the second was not a logical extension 
of the first. Hillenbrand goes on to argue that Timurtash’s decision to abandon Alep-
po and pursue his limited territorial ambitions in Diyar Bakr was a sign of his politi-
cal maturity. She contrasts him in this respect with Ilghazi, who she says lacked the 
maturity to concentrate his efforts in a small area, harboring unreal aspirations later 
rejected by his son, and indulged in grandiose military endeavors over an excessively 
                                                 
68
 Hillenbrand, “History of the Jazira,” 143. 
 675 
wide area from Tiflis to Aleppo and Hulwan to Mardin.
69
 Against this it should be 
stressed once again that Ilghazi’s takeover and defense of Aleppo was a strategical 
step that cannot be considered in the same category as his foolhardy adventures in 
Tiflis and elsewhere.  
For this reason Imad al-Din Khalil seems more justified when he argues that 
Timurtash’s abandonment of Aleppo for the sake of expanding his Mesopotamian 
lands and evading any struggle in North Syria point to his political short-sightedness. 
Aleppo was a strategic guarantee that enabled the Artukid to confront the Franks, so 
giving it up meant that he would henceforth be unable to check their ambitions. And 
these ambitions were not as far as he imagined from eventually coming to threaten 
him in Diyar Bakr itself.
70
 When looked at from this perspective, and in reverse to 
Hillenbrand’s argument, Timurtash’s abandonment of Aleppo to the Franks and his 
rejection of an alliance with Aksungur seems to have been precisely due to his lack 
of political insight and maturity, along with other handicaps in manforce, military 
skills and leadership.   
But there is an alternative explanation for this choice of Timurtash as well, 
doing more justice perhaps to his political skills and insight: incapable of relieving 
Aleppo by his own means, and faced with the prospect of seeing it taken by the 
Franks or by Aksungur, he may have considered that in case the lord of Mosul an-
nexed Aleppo he would grow powerful enough to seize his lands in Diyar Bakr as 
well. He might have calculated the likeliness of this to be higher than the prospect 
that the capture of Aleppo would eventually enable the Franks to threaten him in Di-
yar Bakr.  
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If this was indeed the case, Timurtash was not entirely unjustified in his ap-
prehensions. Only ten years ago (and at that time Timurtash was a boy of eight years 
old, sufficiently grown up to be impressed by the events), when Aksungur was the 
governor of Mosul, he had directly targeted the Artukids and attacked Mardin. Ak-
sungur’s consequent defeat and dismissal from the governorship of Mosul, not to be 
restored there until 1124, could hardly have increased his sympathy for this family, 
as Timurtash must have been aware. Furthermore, the commander of the next expe-
dition, Bursuk al-Bursuki, had advanced upon Aleppo to demand its surrender, and 
Timurtash’s father Ilghazi had worked hard with the Franks to prevent this. Later de-
velopments also revealed that Timurtash was justified in his concerns about what 
would happen if Aleppo became attached to Mosul: the Artukids found themselves 
reduced to vassaldom soon after Zangi, the next lord of Mosul, had taken hold of 
Aleppo (1128), and within fifteen years their lands came to the brink of annexation, 
being situated on the route between Mosul and Aleppo. Almost the sole refuge they 
could find at this point turned out to be the County of Edessa, and after the capture of 
its capital they were only saved from being dispossessed by Zangi’s assassination.   
When Timurtash became convinced that he would not be able to relieve 
Aleppo on his own, therefore, he may have opted for the alternative that he believed 
would pose relatively less danger for his interests and even existence in Diyar Bakr: 
the capture of Aleppo by the Franks, rather than its takeover by the lord of Mosul. 
Nevertheless, he was probably mistaken in this belief, for if Aksungur had not been 
able to bring succor to Aleppo and the Franks had captured it, the resulting danger 
would hardly have have been less. Compared with ten years earlier, when the armies 
of the sultan had still some balancing role to play in Syria and the Jazira, the Franks 
were much more powerful and self-confident. They had now reached a position 
 677 
where allowing them to make any more gains was no less dangerous than submitting 
to the Seljukids had been a decade before.  
There is yet another consideration that could have played a role in this deci-
sion of Timurtash, if we are allowed for a moment to assume that he really believed 
his own words as he claimed that he would recover Aleppo in case the Franks took it. 
He may have believed that seizing the city from the Franks would be relatively easier 
than wresting it from Aksungur, even though this was probably yet another mistake 
of calculation based on his underestimation of the power and intentions of the 
Franks. Especially, Aksungur’s nominal position as the representative of the Seljukid 
sultan may have convinced Timurtash that trying to take the city from the Franks 
would be more legitimate and less difficult in that respect than attacking the governor 
of the sultan in Aleppo. But still the chances that the emir was serious as he spoke of 
recovering Aleppo seem rather low.  
Mistaken or not, Timurtash’s abandonment of Aleppo and his apparent pref-
erence that it go to the Franks rather than to the lord of Mosul is revealing of the 
general attitude of the local Muslim emirs. They lacked any notion that a city they 
might lose should at least remain in the hands of Muslims, as they did not view the 
events through the perspective of a Muslim-Christian confrontation. The only thing 
that counted for them was to preserve their possessions, and accordingly they acted 
calculating who posed the less danger for them, regardless of the adversaries’ reli-
gion. Hence they not only failed to make any difference between losing their posses-
sion to a Muslim or a Frankish ruler, but sometimes seemed quite ready to prefer the 
latter on account of such calculations and even personal animosities.  
Thus it becomes clear once again that jihad was not an independent motivat-
ing factor for Timurtash and his contemporaries, but rather the form that warfare 
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with defined strategic goals assumed in their eyes when the rivals they had to face in 
a particular case happened to be Franks. If they believed rightly or wrongly that they 
did not have to confront the “infidel rival” militarily, but could adopt peaceful meth-
ods to preserve their strategic interests and possessions, or if they calculated that it 
would cost themselves less to give up the strategic interests or possessions at stake, 
then there was simply no war against the Franks, and ipso facto no jihad.          
In the light of these considerations, it is possible to conclude that Timurtash 
effected a true volte-face in the Artukid policy followed against the Franks since 
Ilghazi’s takeover of Aleppo, represented by his attempted deal with Baldwin. This 
alteration consisted of a return to the pre-1118 policy of neutrality toward the Franks 
or alliance with them against other Muslim powers, but, paradoxically, it was also 
calculated to attain the goal of the jihad of Ilghazi and Belek, namely to break off the 
Frankish encirclement of Aleppo –– albeit through negotiation rather than war. 
Among the reasons for the dramatic change were Timurtash’s peace-loving nature, as 
also documented by his court historian Ibn al-Azraq, his lack of necessary resources 
after the division of the Artukid possessions, which was aggravated by his inability 
to act as the leader of the family, and his rivalry with the other emirs in the Jazira.  
Whatever its reasons, the new policy was far too ambitious and therefore mis-
fired, resulting in the formation of a pan-Syrian, Franko-Muslim coalition against the 
Artukid presence in Syria, not much different in character from that in 1115 against 
the Seljukids. Even after this point, however, Timurtash stuck to the same policy of 
trying to avert the takeover of Aleppo by the lord of Mosul, which he probably 
thought would be more dangerous for his rule in Diyar Bakr than the Franks’ capture 
of it –– not least because Aksungur had been a long-time enemy of his father and the 
other Artukids. As for the alternative of relieving the city on his own, he had appar-
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ently given up all hope of that due to his lack of confidence in the size of his army 
and in his skills of generalship. For this reason Timurtash chose to remain passive in 
the confrontation between Aksungur and the Franks, but his policy misfired for a 
second time, for the better or the worse for him, and Aleppo passed to the hands of 
the lord of Mosul.  
Coşkun Alptekin argues that Timurtash’s ill-judged abandonment of Aleppo 
caused the Artukids to lose all hope of expanding into Syria, with the result that they 
were reduced to vassal status and confined within a limited area from the end of the 
twelfth to the beginning of the fifteenth century.
71
 However, other scholars consider 
this development in a much more positive light, regarding it as an important step in 
the consolidation of the Artukid principalities and the conversion of the Artukid 
emirs from chiefs of Turkoman bands to settled rulers. Gerhard Väth states that Ti-
murtash’s loss of the territories in Syria had a stabilizing effect on the area under his 
rule, insofar as the borders of his territories came to coincide to a great extent with 
their natural boundaries.
72
 Hillenbrand similarly argues that Timurtash’s retreat to 
Diyar Bakr marked the end of the grandiose Artukid ambitions which had taken 
Artuk and Ilghazi to the farthest corners of the Islamic world. She states that Timur-
tash’s more limited horizons, restricted to the pursuit of territorial ambitions in the 
Jazira, enabled the Artukids to secure a permanent domain in the remote and difficult 
terrain of Diyar Bakr until the fifteenth century. In this sense she considers Timur-
tash’s decision to retreat to Mardin as a realistic and astute move.73  
Nevertheless, all this was not necessarily conditional on abandoning Aleppo 
and less the result of a personal decision based on realism and astuteness than a con-
sequence of the gradual transformation undergone by the Artukid polities: whereas 
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these had been little more than a conglomeration of castles and connecting lands that 
were controlled by a wandering nomadic chieftain, they began to evolve at this time 
into territorial princedoms with relatively well-defined boundaries and a ruler resid-
ing at a fixed center. As Cahen points out, it would not have made much sense for the 
first two generations of Artuk, Sokman and Ilghazi to delimit their possessions, while 
the case was different for their successors.
74
 This is supported by the fact that despite 
his more energetic character Sokman’s son Dawud did not seek to gain possessions 
outside Diyar Bakr either. They represented the first generation of Artukids settled in 
their domains in Diyar Bakr, having succeeded to the generations of wanderers. Ca-
hen observes that it was only from their time onwards that an Artukid state could be 
said to exist.
75
 This was also evident from their assumption of some of the parapher-
nalia of a classical Muslim ruler, like the minting of coins.
76
 Hillenbrand asserts that 
it was also at this time that the Turkomans and the people of the cities first estab-
lished a symbiotic relationship, though real sedenterization took much longer.
77
   
9.3 The end of the Artukids’ contiguity with the Franks –– and the end of 
Artukid power and independence 
After Timurtash thus abandoned Aleppo, and Badr al-Dawla Sulaiman’s last 
bid to rule it was thwarted by Zangi’s takeover of the city,78 the Artukids did not 
have any further relations with the Franks of Antioch. As for the Franks of Edessa, 
they still confronted them from time to time. In 1126 Joscelin raided the lands of 
Amid, where he robbed the Turks and Kurds of the Asuma mountain and plundered 
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all the villages up to the gates of the city. His pretext was that the the troops of Amid 
had participated in an incursion against Edessa while he was staying in Antioch. In 
retaliation Dawud ibn Sokman attacked the count and drove him as far back as Edes-
sa.
79
 In 1133 a certain emir of the Artukid family, called Muhammad Shams al-Hajib 
according to Michael the Syrian, received the region of Shabakhtan from Timurtash. 
He used it as a base to raid continuously the territory of Edessa. But he was eventual-
ly defeated and probably executed by Joscelin, who then set about destroying those 
castles in the region which he would be unable to defend. In this way the count creat-
ed a no man’s land that stood as a buffer zone between his and Timurtash’s lands and 
prevented the Muslims from setting foot in the region until 1144.
80
  
The next confrontation between the Artukids and the Franks took place at the 
time of Emperor John Comnenus’s expedition against Syria, during his siege of Sha-
izar along with the Latin princes. To help Zangi, Dawud ibn Sokman sent his son 
Fakhr al-Din Kara Arslan and a sizeable force across the Euphrates,
81
 while Timur-
tash surrounded Edessa, attacked and captured a caravan that had set out to bring 
there supplies from Samosata, and seized the castle of Kissos.
82
 Together these ac-
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tions may have contributed to the raise of the siege and the emperor’s hasty with-
drawal.
 
 
But the Artukids also collaborated with the Franks of Edessa against Zangi, 
who had defeated their combined forces in a battle in 1130 and then systematically 
set about subjugating them, with the ultimate purpose of annexing their territories.
83
 
Especially the Artukids of Hisn Kaifa were subjected to relentless pressure, being 
deprived of Buhtan, the eastern part of Diyar Bakr, and the territory between Hisn 
Kaifa and Kharput.
84
 In addition, when Fahr al-Din Kara Arslan succeeded his father 
Dawud, Zangi used the claims of Kara Arslan’s elder brother Arslan Toghmish to the 
succession as a pretext for trying to annex his territories.
85
 In the face of this situa-
tion, the Artukids of Hisn Kaifa effected a rapprochement with Joscelin II, the count 
of Edessa. Even though Timurtash had been a vassal of Zangi since 1130, he too may 
have sought an alliance with the count and Hisn Kaifa at this point,
 since Zangi’s 
capture in 1139 of certain castles attached to Mardin had rendered him aware that the 
atabek was no longer prepared to brook any resistance from his part.
86
  
Zangi responded to this alliance between the Franks and Artukids by occupy-
ing the castles in Shabakhtan and the high basin of the river Khabur, in order to cut 
off the routes of communication between them, and proceeded to attack Amid, which 
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was allied with Hisn Kaifa.
87
 Summoned to help by Kara Arslan, who offered the 
castle of Babula in turn, Joscelin II set out to create a diversion. The emir of Harran 
promptly notified Zangi that Edessa had been deprived of its lord and troops, upon 
which the atabek besieged and captured the city.
88
   
In seeking the help of the Franks of Edessa the Artukids had resorted to the 
sole counterweight they could find in the Jazira against Zangi,
89
 but ironically they 
had also brought about its downfall. As a result they were reduced to an extremely 
precarious situation. Indeed Cahen remarks that the capture of Edessa was a disaster 
for both Timurtash and Fakhr al-Din Kara Arslan. Their chances of drawing upon 
Frankish support against Zangi disappeared, and the Artukid territories, especially 
those belonging to Hisn Kaifa, escaped annexation only thanks to the assassination of 
Zangi in 1146.
90
  
Imad al-Din Khalil overlooks this function of Edessa as a counterweight 
against Zangi, focusing exclusively on the benefits that the Artukids would have de-
rived from the removal of their Latin neighbor. He points out that the pressure of the 
County had prevented them from expanding their territories in the western and north-
western parts of the Jazira, and the County’s territories east of the Euphrates, deeply 
penetrating Diyar Bakr, had directly threatened their possessions.
91
 Nevertheless, by 
this time the Artukids were no longer in a position to draw much benefit from the 
elimination of their Frankish rivals, for the fall of Edessa had served further to 
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strengthen their Muslim adversary, while it had destroyed the only power in the re-
gion that could effectively resist him.  
Zangi’s death removed the immediate danger of annexation, and Nur al-Din 
established more friendly relations with the Artukids, not least because he did not 
hold Mosul and therefore did not have to control the territories between that city and 
Aleppo. However, his power still brought about the result that the Artukids gradually 
slid into being his vassals.
92
 When most of the territories of the Zangids were taken 
over by Saladin, who acquired Aleppo in 1183, the Artukids found themselves sub-
jected in turn to him. This was especially true after he had established his domination 
at the heart of Diyar Bakr by installing an Artukid protégé in Amid in 1183 and cap-
turing Mayyafariqin in 1185.
93
 Throughout all this period the Artukids had no Frank-
ish neighbors to fall back on as a counterweight to their vastly superior Muslim 
neighbors occupying the lands of what had been the County of Edessa. Nor did they 
have any opportunity to gain prestige like the latter from their own battles with the 
Franks, which would have provided them with additional Turkoman forces and a le-
gitimate pretext for territorial self-aggrandizement at the expense of other Muslim 
principalities. We have seen that the situation was completely otherwise when, at the 
time of Ilghazi and Belek, they were neighbors not only with the Franks of Edessa, 
but also with those of Antioch. 
The Artukids themselves did receive a fair share from the spoils of the Coun-
ty of Edessa as it was partitioned among Muslim rulers, and also derived some power 
and prestige from these acquisitions. As is evident from the aforementioned devel-
opments, though, whatever they gained in this way would pale beside what they had 
lost through the dissolution of the County. In the partition of its remaining lands be-
                                                 
92
 Väth, Geschichte, 108; Cahen, “Diyar Bakr,” 261; Cahen, “Artukids,” 665. 
93
 Cahen, “Diyar Bakr,” 266; Cahen, Syrie du Nord, 421-22; Cahen, “Artukids,” 665. 
 685 
tween autumn 1149 and summer 1051, which began after Raymond of Antioch’s 
death in the Battle of Inab and accelerated with Nur al-Din’s capture of Joscelin II in 
1150, Fakhr al-Din Kara Arslan of Hisn Kaifa was the emir to act first: he got hold of 
Babula and Kaisun as well as the citadels of Gargar, Kahta and Hisn Mansur on the 
right bank of the Euphrates.
 
Downstream of the same river Timurtash took Samosata, 
al-Bira, Khurus and Kafarsut and installed a deputy in Qal’at al-Rum, where the Ar-
menian catholicos resided.  
These new acquisitions of Timurtash amounted in fact to a new province 
added to Mardin’s lands, even though some time after his death the Artukid governor 
of the more distant al-Bira, Shihab al-Din Muhammad, revolted and declared his al-
legiance to Nur al-Din.
94
 Apparently, it was the modest increase in power and pres-
tige provided by the conquest of this new province that brought Timurtash caliphal 
recognition, in the form of a honorary robe and a manshūr of sovereignty.95 Never-
theless, in the face of the growing power of Nur al-Din and the corresponding subju-
gation of the Artukids, this ascendance proved only short-lived. In 1172 Nur al-Din 
demanded and received from the caliph an entitlement (taqlīd) to Diyar Bakr, among 
other territories, with which the subjection of the Artukids was sealed officially as 
well.
96
   
The partition of the County of Edessa put an end to the Frankish presence in 
the Jazira, so the Artukids’ relations with the Franks were reduced to participating as 
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vassals in Nur al-Din and Saladin’s campaigns against the Crusader states. To cite 
the most important of these occasions, in 1159 they joined Nur al-Din’s army against 
Emperor Manuel and his Frankish allies during their expedition in Syria.
97
 In 1161 
the Artukid Shihab al-Din Muhammad, lord of al-Bira, defeated and captured the 
Prince of Antioch, Reynald of Châtillon, and handed him over to Nur al-Din.98 In 
1163 the same emir rescued Nur al-Din from almost certain capture, when he had 
suffered a surprise Frankish attack at Ra’s al-Ma’ and found himself surrounded by 
them.
99
 The next year Shihab al-Din Muhammad and Fakhr al-Din Kara Arslan per-
sonally took part in Nur al-Din’s victorious campaign against Harim, while Najm al-
Din Alpi of Mardin sent a contingent.
100
 The Artukid emirs also contributed to the 
raids that Nur al-Din carried out in 1167 and 1171 against the Crusader positions 
around Antioch and Tripoli, the first in retaliation against a Frankish attack on the 
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Turkomans and Arabs near Hims, and the second in return for a breach of the truce 
they had committed.
101
  
After the Artukids were subjected to Saladin, Nur al-Din Muhammad of Hisn 
Kaifa, rewarded by the Ayyubid emir with Amid, personally took part in Saladin’s 
campaigns against Baisan in 1183 and Karak in 1184. In the latter campaign Qutb al-
Din Ilghazi of Mardin participated as well.
102
 The Artukids also joined Saladin’s 
forces in the Battle of Hattin, in the subsequent siege of Tyre, in the campaigns of the 
next year against the crusader ports in North Syria, and during the preliminary stage 
of the Frankish siege of Acre in 1189.
103
 Toward the end of the Third Crusade, in 
1192, Qutb al-Din ibn Kara Arslan participated in the siege and conquest of Jaffa.
104
                    
But the Artukids do not seem to have taken part with particular willingness in 
these campaigns, which were not their own as they had been in the days of Sokman, 
Ilghazi and Belek. Thus the Artukids of Hisn Kaifa and Mardin refused to join Sala-
din’s army during the final and most critical stage of the siege of Acre. They put 
forward as excuse their fear of the expansionist policies followed by Saladin’s neph-
ew Taqiy al-Din Umar, who was tarrying at the time in Diyar Bakr. Saladin himself 
would later point this out as one of the major causes of the fall of Acre.
105
 Even when 
the Artukids lacked such an immediate excuse, however, they still showed them-
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selves reluctant to take part in the jihad of Nur al-Din and Saladin, especially during 
the anticlimactic but very hard and protracted campaigns following the Battle of Hat-
tin and the Fall of Jerusalem. Gerhard Väth points out that the compulsory participa-
tion of the Artukids in these campaigns without being able to derive any personal 
gain (that was reserved for the suzerain and his family) weakened them considerably 
because of the huge and continuous expenditures involved. As a result, it was with 
steadily decreasing eagerness and punctuality that they showed up for battle.
106
  
This is only too understandable. As long as the Artukids did not have to con-
front the Franks in order to defend their own strategic interests and possessions, as it 
had proved necessary during the time of Ilghazi and Belek, when their territories 
bordered the Frankish principalities around Antioch and Edessa, jihad did not consti-
tute an independent motivating force for them. At best, it could be an external pres-
sure exerted on the emirs by the pietist-minded ulama who had come under the influ-
ence of the jihad propaganda spreading from Syria. Otherwise they preferred to fight 
their own neighbors, who were now all Muslim, for the sake of defending those pos-
sessions and interests. Such was the case of Fakhr al-Din Kara Arslan, who showed 
himself extremely unwilling to obey Nur al-Din’s summons for the campaign against 
Harim. Ibn al-Athir has preserved  his initial reaction for us, when he was asked what 
he had decided to do. “To stay where I am,” he reportedly answered. “Nur al-Din has 
worn himself out with much fasting and praying, as well as throwing himself and his 
people with him into dangers.” But he changed his mind the very next day, and when 
asked why he had done so, replied: 
Nur al-Din has taken a certain course with me; if I do not aid him, my sub-
jects will rebel against me and take my lands from me, for he has written to 
the local ascetics, pious men and those who have renounced this world, tell-
ing them what the Muslims have met with from the Franks, the killing and 
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captivity they have suffered, and begging the support of their prayers and ask-
ing them to urge the Muslims to take up the struggle. Each one of these men 
has taken his place in public, with his supporters and followers, and is reading 
out Nur al-Din’s letters, while weeping and delivering imprecations and curs-
es against me. I have to go with him.107 
Another reason why Kara Arslan intially showed himself reluctant to join Nur 
al-Din was probably his struggle with his father-in-law, the Danishmendid Yaghi Ba-
san of Sivas, who had prevented him from capturing Amid, ravaged his lands and 
carried off the populace there. As Kara Arslan and Najm al-Din Alpi were about to 
join battle with Yaghi Basan near Sivas, Nur al-Din’s envoy arrived to reconcile 
them, asking: “Is it right that you Muslims fight each other when the Franks are at-
tacking?”108 Kara Arslan’s greater interest in continuing his fight with a fellow Mus-
lim ruler, and the disparaging remarks he made about Nur al-Din’s jihad, are indeed 
highly significant: they reveal how that leader’s struggle with the Franks neighboring 
him in Syria and Palestine appeared to an emir who looked from the secure heart-
lands of Diyar Bakr, so distant now from the Frankish borders, and who had only 
other Muslims to fight for possessions and interests at stake. Of course the outlook of 
the ulama who applied pressure on Kara Arslan was quite different, as they were pro-
foundly influenced by the vigorous jihad propaganda orchestrated by Nur al-Din. 
The prolific Arabic literature on jihad produced around this time in Syria must have 
found a ready audience in the lands of the Artukids, which remained in the sphere of 
Arabic language and culture in contrast to the other Turkish polities in Asia Minor.
109
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When the attitude of the Artukid emirs in the period after the collapse of the 
County of Edessa is considered in this light, it becomes clear that it was out of ques-
tion for Timurtash to have attempted an attack on the far-away kingdom of Jerusa-
lem, as is claimed on the basis of a report by William of Tyre. In this report William 
relates how “certain Turkish satraps surnamed Hieraquin, powerful men of distin-
guished lineage among their own people, assembled a great number of Turks and de-
termined to go to seize Jerusalem as belonging to them by hereditary right.” After 
they had stopped briefly at Damascus to replenish their provisions, without paying 
heed to the warnings of the Damascenes, these reportedly proceeded to Jerusalem, 
but were cut down by the Franks on the road that crossed the rough terrain between 
the city and the river Jordan (23 November 1152).
110
  
Wilken has identified the leader of this Turkoman contingent as Timurtash, 
which is accepted by Röhricht, Stevenson and Runciman.111 Nevertheless, other 
scholars like Grousset, Hillenbrand and Khalil have expressed doubts about the story. 
They rightly point out its absence in other and especially Muslim sources, the vast 
distance of Jerusalem from Artukid territories, and the consequently arduous and 
foolhardy nature of the undertaking. As such it ran directly counter to Timurtash’s 
prudent, lethargic personality as well as to his preference for negotiation rather than 
war.
112
  
All this is true, but a new dimension could be brought into the discussion by 
considering the issue in the light of the contemporary understanding of jihad. As we 
have seen, when the local emirs, finding the Franks as neighbors and rivals, had to 
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confront them for a particular interest or possession at stake, this was jihad for them. 
It would hardly have crossed their mind by 1152 to conceive of it as something that 
necessitated them to put aside their interests and leave their lands to attack a distant 
country, one they could never hope to keep for long. Although such an idealistic 
move would seem to be endorsed by the jihad ideology and propaganda developed 
under Nur al-Din and Saladin in the latter half of the twelfth century, the actual atti-
tude of those leaders was not much different in fact from that of their predecessors. 
Despite the unrelenting, vigorous jihad propaganda that Saladin sponsored, for ex-
ample, he had reached almost the end of his career when he dared to launch a great 
campaign against the Kingdom of Jerusalem, the one that ended with Hattin, and he 
gathered a vast army from the whole of Syria and the Jazira before venturing such a 
move. Moreover, in contrast to the Artukids in 1152, he stood to make lasting acqui-
sitions in case of victory.    
So the only possibility that remains is that William’s story concerns a minor 
raid carried out by a group of independently acting Turkoman nomads on the move. 
Indeed, based on the similarity between “Hieroquin” and the name of the Turkoman 
group called Yaruqiyya, and also on the fact that William mentions it as the common 
name of a group of emirs rather than a single individual, the following suggestion 
could be made in line with Grousset:
113
 the campaign in question was a rather insig-
nificant raid made into the Kingdom of Jerusalem by a group of the Yaruqiyya Turk-
omans, who had been previously transferred from Diyar Bakr into Syria by Zangi 
and Nur al-Din.
114
 William’s report about their claim to Jerusalem as their ancestral 
heritage might be explained by their previous presence there, during the Artukid rule 
of the city, or perhaps more plausibly attributed to the possibility that they were mov-
                                                 
113
 Grousset, Histoire, II, 347-48. 
 692 
ing under the leadership of some minor, landless member or members of the Artukid 
family. The insignificance of the event would also explain its lack of mention by oth-
er sources, including the contemporary Damascene author Ibn al-Qalanisi.
115
  
We have seen that with the end of the Artukids’ contiguity with the Franks, 
following the dissolution of the County of Edessa, their direct, independent contacts 
with the Franks ceased. But this also meant the end of their former power and inde-
pendence, as they completely lost the chance of protecting these by a “diplomatic 
dance” between the Franks and the great Muslim powers trying to dominate the re-
gion, as Ilghazi had done and even his successors had partially managed to do at the 
time of Zangi. They were also unable now to derive prestige from fighting the Franks 
in their own domain and on their own account, rather than on someone else’s, and to 
use this prestige like Belek to attract Turkoman forces and dispossess their Muslim 
neighbors. Indeed the fact that the Artukids’ power and independence went into de-
cline after the end of their relations with the Franks of Antioch, and quickly dimin-
ished to naught after the collapse of the County of Edessa, with the result that they 
became vassals of Nur al-Din and Saladin, is quite telling and ironic, and certainly no 
mere coincidence. Their power and independence decreased in parallel with the de-
cline of their free and direct relations with the Franks, and the concurrent end of 
these brings this study to a conclusion.  
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Thus the present study, which started with the Artukids’ new contiguity with 
the Franks of Edessa, and developed with their becoming neighbors of the Franks of 
Antioch as well, comes to a conclusion with the end of their contiguity first with the 
Principality of Antioch and then the County of Edessa. These events also represent 
the turning points in their fortunes, the first coinciding with the start of their ascent to 
power in Diyar Bakr, the second with the beginning of their strongest period, the 
third with their relegation to an inferior status vis-à-vis Zangi, and the last with the 
start of their final decline into the vassaldom under the Zangids and Ayyubids.   
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CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSION 
At the beginning of this study, it was pointed out that rather than comparing 
bits of evidence from the sources, the method adopted here was a close reading of the 
existing accounts of an event, considering each as a whole, with its individual stand-
point, distortions, legendary elements and all, and to compare these close readings 
with each other. What are the general observations that have emerged from this pro-
cedure, regarding the outlook of medieval chroniclers from diverse backgrounds? 
And how do the Artukids seem to have fared in the eyes of chroniclers of different 
ethnic and religious origins? To begin with the first question, it has become clear in 
the course of this study that all the contemporary historians treated their accounts, of 
momentous events especially, as set-pieces intended to illustrate certain moral points. 
Chief among these was the need to preserve or restore unity against the opposite reli-
gious camp, and most chroniclers busied themselves with showing how their patron 
contributed to this unity while his rivals undermined it by collaboration with the en-
emy. And in those cases where their own patron (or his ancestor for that matter) had 
collaborated with the other side, the same chroniclers usually did their best to cover 
this up. Thus there was a marked spirit of religious animosity and confrontation in 
both the Latin sources, indigenous Christian authors and Arab chroniclers, who all 
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seem to have taken for granted that there were two religious blocks confronting each 
other in the region, locked in a constant struggle. Accordingly they dedicated a large 
place in their narratives to the role played in battles and sieges by the assistance of 
God or Muslim or Christian saints and by religious elements and symbols like the 
Muslim ritual prayers or the Holy Cross, and dwelt at length on the insults perpetrat-
ed against religious values by the opposite side on such occasions. Paradoxically, 
however, this did not prevent them from openly welcoming the peace and prosperity 
brought about by truces, nor from praising the rulers on the opposite side when these 
acted benevolently (even for their own benefit) toward the Muslims/Christians under 
their rule.  
When we turn to the second question in this respect and examine the chroni-
clers’ attitude toward the Artukid rulers in the first half of the twelfth century, Sok-
man and Ilghazi evidently do not fare well in the eyes of Christian authors. They do 
not hesitate in calling the first a bloodthirsty beast and portraying the second as a de-
termined persecutor of Christianity as well as a sadistic trooper who enjoyed roasting 
babies or torturing Frankish captives of war. Belek is judged somewhat better, espe-
cially by the indigenous Christians, because of his mild treatment of the populous 
Armenians living under his rule. As for the Latin authors, although they openly gloat 
over Belek’s death and call him a fierce dragon oppressing Christianity, they still 
acknowledge what they see as his shrewdness and resourcefulness. Timurtash, no 
wonder, does not receive much attention from the Latin chroniclers, and his court 
historian, as an exception to the general attitude of Muslim chroniclers, does not 
seem interested in past or present battles with the Franks either. From the point of 
view of Muslim authors, on the other hand, Ilghazi fares relatively the worst despite 
his success in Ager Sanguinis, because of his supposed failure to take Antioch, and in 
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this context he is even portrayed as a clueless sot (which has been taken too seriously 
as we saw by some of his modern students). In contrast they offer a far better image 
of Sokman and Belek, who are represented as heroic defenders of the faith and Mus-
lims who fell martyrs in trying to save Tripoli and Tyre respectively. In this quality 
they are held up as models to the rulers of the early thirteenth century. Timurtash, in 
contrast, is criticized for his abandonment of Aleppo in dire straits, and because of 
his subsequent lack of interest in fighting the Franks, he is even ridiculed as one who 
would not be able to drink a cup of water in peace in Mardin were it not for Zangi.  
We have seen that the praises and criticisms directed by medieval chroniclers 
at the Artukid rulers, as in the case of other princes and emirs of the time, reflected a 
strongly confrontational religious outlook, which constituted the main criterion in 
their evaluation. The specific approach adopted in this study, treating contemporary 
accounts as set-pieces and focusing on analyzing their individual narratives as a 
whole, rather than directly using them as repositories of evidence, has not only yield-
ed interesting insights into this outlook, but also enabled a more complete detach-
ment and distancing from it. This in turn has allowed for the emergence of a picture 
of their acts and strategies that is very different from the prevailing representation in 
the chronicles. It has thus become possible to reach a better understanding of the true 
concerns of the Artukid princes, evaluating them from the perspective of what they 
themselves were trying to do, rather than what the chroniclers thought they should 
have done –– views taken all too often for granted by contemporary historians fol-
lowing a more traditional method.  
The present study has revealed in this way that the Artukids themselves never 
considered it as their aim to wage Holy War per se, to expel the Franks from Anti-
och, Edessa or elsewhere: they did fight them, but this was either for the sake of pre-
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serving their own possessions or to prevent the Franks from becoming too powerful 
in the region, just as they did until 1115 against the Great Seljukids. On the other 
hand, this did not hinder the Artukid emirs from seeing and presenting their conflicts 
as jihad insofar as these were against the “infidels.” Sokman was the first to display 
this attitude: on the one hand he fought the Franks who had become his neighbors in 
Diyar Bakr, trying to recover Saruj from them, and later inflicted a serious check up-
on them as he played the major role in thwarting their venture to capture Harran. He 
also set out to protect Damascus and Tripoli, the fall of which would have similarly 
given the Franks a huge advantage. On the other hand, he showed himself uninterest-
ed in protecting Antioch against the advancing army of the First Crusade, and tried to 
use the already assembled Muslim forces to secure his lands in Diyar Bakr. He also 
abandoned the field after the victory at Harran, on the pretext of a dispute with his 
ally Chakarmish, and did not join forces with him to lay siege to Edessa. He probably 
thought it safer to avoid an Edessa attached to Mosul, with his lands in between, than 
to expel the “infidels” from Edessa. However, despite this pragmatic policy directed 
solely at preserving his possessions and strategic interests, and the fact that he never 
considered a more general onslaught against the Crusader presence, Sokman report-
edly made utterances which, if true, show that he thought of himself as a mujahid and 
the protector of Islam and Muslims in a general sense.  
The same attitude is also observable in Sokman’s brother Ilghazi. The latter, 
not long after his arrival in Diyar Bakr, did not flinch from diverting an expedition of 
Ridwan against the Franks of Antioch upon Nisibis, a town of the Seljukid governor 
of Mosul, in an effort to carve for himself a principality in the Jazira. When the Sel-
jukid sultan began to send armies to subjugate the Franks as well as the local emirs 
and so to regain control of his lands in the west, Ilghazi took part only in the first of 
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these and for the rest contented himself with sending a contingent under his son. He 
preferred instead to use his army to attack his northern neighbor at Akhlat. Like the 
other local emirs, he was determined to preserve his de facto independence acquired 
during the Seljukid interregnum. When the next two armies appeared to have the di-
rect mission of bringing Ilghazi and other local emirs to heel, he did not flinch from 
attacking the first and collaborating against the second with the Franks, joined by the 
emirs of Damascus and Aleppo. Even when the Seljukid expeditions ceased after this 
and the Franks began to grow bolder due to the resulting power vacuum, Ilghazi did 
not immediately assume an inimical attitude against them.  
It was only when the Franks began in earnest to encircle Aleppo and Ilghazi 
was summoned as a desperate last resort to take over the city that he began seriously 
to confront them. Even then his aim remained restricted to breaking the encirclement 
of the city. He especially tried to push back the borderline with Antioch running 
through Azaz, al-Atharib and Zardana. His first victory against the Franks came un-
expectedly as he besieged the latter two castles and the prince of Antioch desperately 
tried to prevent him, without waiting for reinforcements. And despite this crushing 
victory, Ilghazi did not make any attempt to take Antioch –– it was no aim of his to 
use Aleppo as a base to wage jihad against the “infidels” and expel them from the 
Principality. He rather saw Aleppo as a remote dependency and did only what was 
necessary to prevent it falling to the Franks and altering the power balance in the re-
gion. And he stuck to this policy until the end of his reign: in the year after Ager 
Sanguinis he tried unsuccessfully to add Azaz to his previous two conquests and 
complete the recovery of the northern half of the borderline (the southern half ex-
tending to Jabal Summaq). When his son and deputy in Aleppo revolted after his de-
feat in Georgia and the Franks took advantage of this to seize Zardana, he prepared 
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an ambitious campaign to take it back, but was again unsuccessful because of the 
nearby monastery of Dair Sarmada that the Franks had fortified and now used to 
threaten him in the rear. He then resumed his offensive against Azaz, but died before 
he could proceed further.  
Hence all of Ilghazi’s contacts with the Franks, from his collaborations with 
them to his clashes including the spectacular victory at Ager Sanguinis, are perfectly 
understandable in terms of the strategies he needed as a local emir to survive and 
thrive in the fragmented political geography of the twelfth-century Syria, making 
sure no power Muslim or Christian would establish a hegemony. Fighting the Franks 
per se, for religion’s sake, was not a motivation for him. He never saw himself 
obliged to stick to the interests of one “religious block” against the other. What he 
would not be able to keep for himself, like the city of Antioch, he did not attempt to 
take in the name of Islam. But all this did not prevent him from presenting himself as 
a mujahid to the sultan and caliph and acknowledging his renown as the foremost 
adversary of the Franks in the region, responding to requests to fight them as well as 
the Georgians. Jihad for him was not a motivating factor, but he saw what he did as 
jihad when he happened to clash with the Franks for his possessions and interests.  
This attitude of Sokman and Ilghazi is also observable in their nephew Belek, 
whom Ilghazi had taken along in his last expedition against the Franks. At the end of 
this campaign, while returning home to Kharput, Belek captured Joscelin and Galer-
an, following this some months later with the capture of the king himself. This was a 
great check on the ambitions of the Franks to capture Aleppo, as they had also 
wrested al-Atharib from Ilghazi’s nephew and feeble successor there, Badr al-Dawla 
Sulaiman, and were preparing to attack the city. Belek acquired great renown from 
this huge success and Turkomans flocked around him, but he did not use this ad-
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vantage to attack Antioch and Edessa, to deliver the “death-blow” to the Frankish 
presence in the region. Like his uncle after Ager Sanguinis, he was aware that the 
Franks, with their robust administrative structure, were still far too powerful for that, 
and more importantly, he had a practical strategy that excluded such grand designs 
motivated by religious ideology, focusing instead on the defense of Aleppo and its 
relief from the Frankish stranglehold. Accordingly Belek advanced to the city and 
captured it from his inefficient cousin, who had been isolated from the resources of 
the Jazira necessary for its defense; he also secured the town of Harran that lay on his 
communication lines from Diyar Bakr. Then he set out to push back the borderline 
between Aleppo and Antioch, just like Ilghazi had done.  
Nevertheless, Belek followed a different tactic, and putting aside al-Atharib 
and Zardana for the time being, because of the recent fortification of Dair Sarmada, 
attacked the castles of al-Bara and Kafartab at the southern end of this border in Jabal 
Summaq. Although he had to interrupt this campaign because of the revolt of the 
Frankish leaders and other captives at Kharput, he continued his attacks on the bor-
derline with an ambitious campaign against its northern end, Azaz. He also joined 
forces with Tughtekin and Aksungur, lord of Mosul for this purpose. What he did, 
however, was far from uniting the Muslim emirs against a Frankish world that sup-
posedly lay prostrate after the capture of its leaders, awaiting the death-blow: it was 
the same as Ilghazi’s strategy in 1120 and in the last raid he organized before his 
death, namely pushing back the Antiochene frontier at its northern end of Azaz as 
well as securing his approach from Diyar Bakr. He was not on a “Counter-Crusade” 
motivated by the religious aim of destroying the “infidel block,” but on a strategic 
campaign to restore the security of Aleppo and prevent any group from acquiring he-
gemony in Syria. This is also clear from the fact that Belek followed his unsuccessful 
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venture against Azaz with only a raiding band he sent against the same town, just 
like Ilghazi had done before his death.  
The steps Belek took in the last month of his life continued to follow this 
overall strategy. On the one hand, in order to secure the line of communications from 
his base in Diyar Bakr to Aleppo, which was vital for the defense of the latter, he ar-
rested the suspected governor of Harran, where the Frankish prisoners were held, and 
sent his cousin Timurtash with a detachment to arrest the emir of another town on the 
same route, Manbij. On the other hand, he prepared to set out for the relief of Tyre, 
besieged by the Franks, just as Sokman had set out to help Tripoli; the fall of this 
important port could also tilt the power balance of the region in the Franks’ favor, as 
it did in the event. But Manbij could not be taken after the arrest of its emir, and hav-
ing to proceed there first, Belek was killed before the walls by an arrow just after de-
feating the Frankish forces summoned by the arrested emir’s brother. 
“This is the slaughter of all Muslims,” Belek had reportedly declared upon 
pulling out the arrow that proved his undoing. Like his uncles, despite having pur-
sued strategically limited goals to preserve his possessions and interests, he saw him-
self as the protector of Muslims in a general sense, and as is also evident from his 
tombstone epitaph, replete with jihad rhetoric, acknowledged his renown as the 
foremost adversary of the Franks –– which derived in this case from the capture of 
their leaders. Although his motives in fighting the Franks were strictly practical in 
nature, he regarded these clashes as jihad inasmuch as the rivals he faced were Chris-
tians. Up to this point he resembled his predecessors, but diverged from them on one 
point:  in fact he made the declaration in question and was then extolled as a martyr 
in his tombstone although he had been killed while attacking a Muslim castle. And 
before this he had sought to legitimize his capture of Aleppo by his wish to protect it 
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better against the Franks. Together, these hint that differently from his uncles he 
could also regard his fight with fellow Muslims as part of jihad, inasmuch as this 
helped him to defend his possessions and interests against the Franks better. In this 
respect he resembled later leaders like Nur al-Din and Saladin, but because his prac-
tical understanding of jihad excluded any ideological aim of expelling the Franks al-
together from the Middle East, which potentially justified the conquest of all Muslim 
lands to gather the necessary resources, his attacks on Muslims remained at a modest 
level when compared with his attacks against the Franks.  
The fact that fighting the Franks did not constitute a religious aim for the 
Artukids but was only a means of preserving their own possessions and interests is 
also evident from the case of Belek’s successor, Timurtash. On the one hand, Timur-
tash’s basic strategy was no different from that of his predecessors in that he wanted 
to secure the borderline between Azaz and Jabal Summaq. On the other hand, like 
Ilghazi at the time of the Seljukid expeditions, he also had Muslim enemies to fear, 
chiefly the Arab emir Dubais ibn Sadaqa. So he supposed that he could both secure 
the borderline and ward off Dubais by arriving at an agreement and alliance with the 
captive Frankish king. Thereby he would have realized the strategic aim of his cousin 
and father and at the same time returned to the family’s former policy of alliance 
with the Franks against other Muslim powers. Aleppo was a remote dependency for 
him as well, so he may have also wanted to render it safe enough to be able to retire 
and deal with his central lands in Diyar Bakr. Thus jihad did not motivate the young 
emir to keep the king imprisoned and take advantage of the lack of his unifying lead-
ership to attack the Franks. Whenever the “infidels” were needed as allies against 
Muslim rivals, Holy War was eminently dispensable.  
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Timurtash’s ambitious but all-too-neat-and-easy tactic misfired however, as 
the Franks also coveted Aleppo and had no intention of foregoing their threateningly 
advanced border with Aleppan territory that had cost them so much effort to build 
and rebuild. Dubais and other emirs in the region were also willing to unite with the 
Franks against the presence of a power based in the Jazira, just as such local emirs 
had done a decade earlier against the Seljukids. So all came together and laid siege to 
Aleppo. What Timurtash chose to do when he saw himself incapable of relieving the 
city on his own is also revealing in this respect. The only hope of rescuing Aleppo 
from the clutches of the Franks lay in joining forces with the governor of Mosul, Ak-
sungur, and the young Artukid not only refrained from doing so, but also tried to 
prevent the Aleppan envoys from proceeding to Mosul and requesting aid from that 
emir. Apparently, he preferred the city to be taken by the Franks rather than by Ak-
sungur, as the governor of Mosul was an old enemy of the family and the Artukid 
homeland in Diyar Bakr would remain in a vulnerable position between his two ba-
ses at Mosul and Aleppo. So once more the chess of shifting alliances had proved 
superior to any allegiance theoretically owed to the “Muslim block.”  
Thus in the policies of the Artukid emirs we see the same calculation and re-
alpolitik that prevented them from acting as part of a religious block and fighting the 
Franks for being “infidels,” with the ultimate aim of expelling them from Antioch or 
elsewhere; all they did was to try and preserve their own possessions and interests. 
When they seemed to undertake more general tasks, as in the case of Ilghazi agreeing 
to take over and defend Aleppo, or Sokman and Belek accepting to help Tripoli and 
Tyre, they were still acting on the same principle, trying to prevent any group Mus-
lim or Christian from growing so powerful as to threaten them in Diyar Bakr. As in 
the case of Timurtash, when they thought rightly or wrongly that they could reach 
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their aims through negotiation rather than by war, they did not hesitate to do so. And 
yet all this did not prevent the Artukids from regarding and presenting their actions 
as jihad when they had to confront the Franks in defense of their possessions and in-
terests, from acknowledging their renown as the Latins’ foremost adversaries and 
responding in this quality to summons of aid from various quarters. In this respect 
their case also offers a good opportunity for historicizing the concept of jihad, for 
ceasing to judge the contemporaries’ attitude by the yardstick of textbook prescrip-
tions and instead trying to understand how the contemporaries may have seen it in 
practice.  
More research needs to be done in this direction for the early twelfth century. 
In the teleological reading of Muslim unity evolving against a Christian block, the 
local emirs of this period have been used sometimes to provide a sorry contrast to 
Nur al-Din and Saladin, who are represented to have understood the value of unity 
and striven to attain it with the express purpose of expelling the Franks. Trying to 
understand the predicament and strategies of these emirs with empathy and taking 
seriously what they might have made of jihad could help to balance this picture, re-
vealing that despite their elaborate propaganda pitting the Muslims against the “infi-
dels,” those later leaders were perhaps not so very different in their actual strategies 
and understanding of jihad. Whatever difference they had was conditioned by the 
progressive development of their own hegemonic position –– the more dominant 
they themselves became, the more they chose to take a somewhat altered attitude to 
jihad. For this reason, other local Muslim rulers of the time like the Burids of Da-
mascus and the Seljukids and Danishmendids of Anatolia should also be examined 
from this perspective, with an assessment of their strategies against the Franks and 
Byzantines as well as of their attitude toward jihad. 
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Figure 2 – North Syria1 
                                                 
1
 The two maps presented here are based on the maps in the following works: René Grousset, Histoire 
des Croisades et du Royaume Franc de Jérusalem, 3 vols. (Paris, 1934-1936), I; Thomas Asbridge, 
“The Significance and Causes of the Battle of the Field of Blood,” Journal of Medieval History 23 
(1997), 304-05, 310.  
